

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
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Wm Garman

HISTORY OF THE GUIDES
1846—1922



LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR H. B. LUMSDEN, K.C.S.I., C.B.

India. Army. Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Hamudini's)

HISTORY OF
THE GUIDES
1846—1922

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INTRODUCTION

THE compiling of this history is the work of no single hand, but has been undertaken as a labour of love by a number of officers, most of whom are still serving with the Corps. It makes no claim, therefore, to literary excellence, and those who are "extreme to mark what is done amiss" will find differences, as well as faults, of style.

But the story which it has to tell is one in which the events may be left to speak for themselves. It begins nearly a hundred years ago, when India was governed, and only governed in part, by the East India Company; large tracts of the Punjab were still in a state of independence and anarchy, and the Frontier was, except in a geographical sense, non-existent. It ends at a time when the people of the Punjab and of the North-West Frontier Province have been granted a large measure of self-government.

It was in those far-off days that the Guides were raised, to play their part, originally as an irregular Corps under civil control, in the conquest of India; and from the first they attracted to their ranks the boldest and most adventurous spirits among the Border tribesmen. As time went on, the Corps became a unit in the Regular Army, enlisting the same classes as other regular units employed on the Frontier, but always retaining a large proportion of trans-Frontier men. But throughout these changes the character and spirit of the Guides have remained unchanged, and the men who fought in almost every theatre of the Great War were in all essentials the same as those who patrolled the Border in the days of John Company.

Their home at Mardan, once a mud fort in the midst of a barren and thorny plain, is to-day one of the most beautiful cantonments in India, surrounded by luxuriant gardens and shaded by great forest trees, while irrigation has changed the dusty plain into green fields. But there is one feature of the landscape that has not changed, the everlasting Hills; and he who lifts up his eyes to them as he sits, perhaps, in the Mess garden, is reminded that to-day, as during the whole course of their history, the Guides are never far from active service. For if the mountains have not changed, neither have the mountaineers, and the passes through which the khaki columns have so often wound on their way to assert the *Pax Britannica* and to punish the marauder are to those same marauders the ever-open door to India whereby the needy or the adventurous may pass on their unlawful occasions.

It is with the country that lies on the other side of these passes that the history of the Guides is chiefly concerned—thousands of square miles of tumbled mountains, a maze of steep hillsides and stony ravines, as difficult for the unfamiliar

reader in imagination as they are impassable in fact to any but the skilled frontiersman. Down in the nullah along which the column crawls—sweltering with heat in summer, the rocks seeming hotter even than the blazing sky, or ice-bound with the intense cold of winter—there is nothing to see in a day's march but the utter barrenness of the mountains. But as the neighbouring heights are piqueted in turn, a very different scene is visible from their summits. The view, confined before to a few score yards of rock and scrub in any direction, now stretches over an illimitable waste of hills, confused and troubled like an angry sea, range piled on range as far as sight can reach, until in the north, two hundred miles away or more, there rise the giant peaks of the Himalayas, each one standing up sharp and glistening in the crystalline clearness of that wonderful air. He may count himself happy who has stood upon a Frontier hilltop as dawn was breaking, and has seen the world beneath him covered with cloud pierced by the summits of a thousand hills, and then as the sun rose has watched the first rays light up the giant peaks on the far horizon and touch to rose pink the billowy clouds beneath his feet.

But for twenty-three hours out of the twenty-four the Frontier is a grim place and it breeds a grim people. This is not the moment to attempt a survey of the Frontier tribes—Mahsuds, Mohmands, Afridis and many scores of others. Different as they are from each other, they are alike in this: the Hills which are so formidable to the stranger are home to them. They know every track and vantage-point and how to make best use of each. Descended as they are from generations of freebooters, they are past-masters of that guerrilla warfare which is the only warfare possible in their country. War is their trade and their hobby. A Holy War enlists their religion as well. They will fight with reckless valour to hold or to recapture a piquet, or they will melt away before an invading force, only to fall upon it in retirement with a calculating fury. Such foes are worthy the steel of any regiment, and it is well for the reader of the ensuing pages to remember that in past days they furnished the Guides with many of their best recruits.

The Great War called the Guides to serve overseas in what was to them a new world. Except to take part in the Second Sikh War and the Siege of Delhi, they had never left the Frontier, and few of them had seen the sea. The accustomed hillsides of their native Frontier were exchanged for the Flanders mud, the unrelieved flatness of Mesopotamia, or the rolling sand-dunes of the Palestine coast; the mountains of Judea seemed homely by comparison. Instead of the Pathan, they fought the German or the Turk, and—greatest change of all—they were facing modern heavy artillery for the first time. Everything, in fact, was changed except the spirit of the Corps itself, which informs the later pages of this history no less conspicuously than it does the earlier.

It is upon a note of change that this history ends; but those who through its pages have watched the Corps adapt itself to so many changes and chances will not doubt that the problems and campaigns of the future will be faced in the same spirit as those of the past.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. 1845-1849 : THE RAISING OF THE CORPS	I
Situation in the North of India—Lumsden appointed to raise and command the Guides—Early Recruits—Dilawur Khan—First Operations—The Guides at Lahore and Sheikhpura—Siege of Multan—Capture of Govindgarh—The Second Sikh War.	
II. 1849-1857 : FRONTIER WARFARE	18
Service against the Afridis—The Mohmands—The Ranizais—Lumsden goes home on leave—Succeeded by Hodson—The Black Mountain—The Jowaki Afridis—Departure of Hodson—Inquiry into his Administration—Return of Lumsden.	
III. 1857 : THE INDIAN MUTINY	33
Outbreak of the Mutiny—The Guides' March to Delhi—The Siege—The Assault—The Capture of Delhi.	
IV. 1857-1861 : RETURN TO THE FRONTIER	49
The End of the Mutiny—Return to the Punjab—Tributes to the Corps—Their Total Casualties—The Hindustani Fanatics—The Return of Lumsden—Operations in Waziristan—Transfer of the Indian Army to the Crown.	
V. 1862-1878 : THE AMBEYLA EXPEDITION	61
Departure of Colonel Lumsden—The Ambeyla Expedition—The Fight for "The Crag"—Capture of Ambeyla Village—Destruction of Malka and Mandi—Minor Operations—Peace on the Border—The "Queen's Own" Corps of Guides—Operations against the Jowaki Afridis—The Utman Khel—The Ranizais.	
VI. 1878-1879 : THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR	77
The Attempted Mission to Kabul—Outbreak of the Second Afghan War—The Advance into the Khyber—Capture of Ali Masjid—Sher Ali succeeded by Yakub Khan—Negotiations with the new Amir—Operations against the Ghilzais and Khugianis—Death of Wigram Battery—Treaty of Gandamak.	
VII. 1879 : THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR—THE DEFENCE OF THE KABUL RESIDENCY	90
The March to Kabul—Favourable Reception—Warnings of Impending Trouble—Mutiny of the Afghan Regiments—Attack on the Residency—Sallies by the Garrison—Messages sent to the Amir—The Residency set on Fire—Last Sally of the Defenders—Subsequent Appearance of the Residency—List of Casualties—Tributes to the Defence.	
VIII. 1879-1880 : THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR—SECOND PHASE	105
Plans for Retribution—The Guides join the Khyber Field Force—The Guides at Sherpur—Attack on the Afghan Position—Capture and Evacuation of the Asmai Heights—Defence of Sherpur—Action at Charasia—Return of the Guides to Mardan—Recognition of their Services.	

	PAGE
IX. 1881-1895 : MINOR OPERATIONS ON THE FRONTIER	122
Peace on the Frontier—Operations against the Bunerwals—Transfer of the Punjab Frontier Force to the Commander-in-Chief—Changes in the Corps of Guides—Expedition to the Black Mountain—Umra Khan—The Eve of the Chitral Campaign—The Route to Chitral.	
X. 1895 : THE CHITRAL RELIEF EXPEDITION	131
Formation of the Chitral Relief Force—The Forcing of the Malakand Pass—The Passage of the Swat and Panjkora Rivers—Death of Colonel Fred Battye—Close of the Chitral Expedition—Return to Mardan.	
XI. 1896-1897 : THE PATHAN REVOLT	150
Death of Sir Harry Lumsden—Jubilee of the Corps of Guides—Outbreak of the Pathan Revolt—The "Mad Fakir"—The Malakand Position—Withdrawal from the North Camp—The Defence of the Malakand—Formation of the Malakand Field Force—Relief of Chakdara—Operations round Landakai—Death of Lieutenants Greaves and MacLean.	
XII. 1897-1898 : THE PATHAN REVOLT : SECOND PHASE	168
Expedition into Bajour—Attack on the Camp—Operations against the Mamunds—A Difficult Retirement—Destruction of Mamund Villages—Operations round Inayat Kila—Punishment of Utman Khel—Operations in Buner—Tributes to the Corps.	
XIII. 1898-1914 : SOME "WEEK-END" WARS	184
Peace on the Frontier—Operations against the Zakka Khel Afridis—The Mohmand Field Force—Cholera—Changes in Establishment, etc.—Destruction of Utman Khel Raiders—An Escort of the Guides in Persia—Expedition into Buner.	
XIV. 1914-1917 : THE GREAT WAR	193
Outbreak of the Great War—Drafts for Foreign Service—The Cavalry in Operations against the Mohmands and the Swatis—The Infantry in Buner—Attacks by Ghazis—Renewed Trouble with the Mohmands—The Mohmand Blockade.	
XV. 1917-1921 : THE GREAT WAR : THE GUIDES CAVALRY IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA	205
The Guides Cavalry ordered Overseas—Journey to Mesopotamia—March from Nahr Umar to Baghdad—Operations on the Euphrates—Destruction of the Turkish Forces—Capture of Ana—Operations on the Tigris—Crossing of the Lesser Zab—Defence of the "Assyrian Wall"—Surrender of the Turkish Army—Occupation of Mosul—The Kurdish Revolt—Encounters with the Bolsheviks—Collapse of the Persian Cossacks—Winter at Kasvin—Evacuation of North Persia—Return to Mardan—Reorganization of the Indian Cavalry.	
XVI. 1917-1921 : THE GREAT WAR : THE GUIDES INFANTRY, 1ST BATTALION : MESOPOTAMIA, EGYPT, PALESTINE AND SYRIA	225
Departure of the 1st Guides to Mesopotamia—On Lines of Communication at Aziziya—Summer at Samarra—Capture of Tikrit—March to Akab—Departure for Palestine—In the Coastal Sector—The Line Advanced—Battle of "The Sisters"—A Daylight Raid—Preparations for the Great Advance—Battle of Sharon—Capture of Beit Lid—March to Tripoli—Road-making—In camp at Baalbek—Return to Egypt—Garrison Duty—Return to India—Reconstitution of the Corps.	

XVII. 1917-1922: THE GREAT WAR: THE GUIDES INFANTRY, 2ND BATTALION: PALESTINE AND SYRIA	243
Formation of the 2nd Battalion—Arrival in Egypt—In the Front Line at Telfit—Preparation for the Great Advance—The Battle of Sharon—Casualties and Awards—Return to Egypt—Garrison Duty in Syria—Winter in Egypt—Departure for India—Farewell Messages—Reconstitution as a Training Battalion.	
XVIII. 1917-1921: THE GREAT WAR: GUIDES INFANTRY, 3RD BATTALION: KURRAM AND WAZIRISTAN	254
Formation of the 3rd Battalion—Trouble in Afghanistan—Attack on the Kurram by Nadir Khan—Capture of Amir Thana Post—Ambush at Kaur Bridge—Operations against the Mahsuds—Action at Spinkai Ghash—Punitive Operations against the Mahsuds—Return to Mardan—The Battalion disbanded.	
XIX. 1914-1918: THE GREAT WAR: THE WAR SERVICES OF DRAFTS FROM THE GUIDES	269
Cavalry Drafts: to the 15th Lancers in France; to the 7th and 10th Lancers in Mesopotamia; to the 23rd Cavalry on the Frontier—Infantry Drafts: to the 57th Rifles in France—Neuve Chapelle—Second Ypres—Death of Captain Banks—Festubert—East Africa—Drafts to the 53rd Sikhs in Mesopotamia—The Advance on Baghdad—Drafts to the 151st Punjabis—Military Mission to Chinese Turkestan.	
XX. SPORTS AND PASTIMES	278
The Changing Countryside—Hawking—Polo—Shooting—Trophies in the Mess—Skill-at-Arms and Athletics—Games.	
XXI. MARDAN	285
Mardan in History—The Building of the Fort—Hodson's Letters—Growth of the Cantonment—Recent Additions—The Mess and its Garden—The Græco-Buddhist Sculptures—Trophies and Portraits—The Chapel and its Memorials—Road Names.	
INDEX	333

APPENDICES

	PAGE
I (A) OFFICERS POSTED AND ATTACHED TO THE CORPS FROM ITS INCEPTION TO 30 APRIL 1922 	296
JOINED BETWEEN 1923 AND 1938	305
I (B) OFFICERS ATTACHED TO THE CORPS DURING THE MUTINY, IN 1857 ...	307
I (C) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM 1858 TO 1914 	308
I (D) ATTACHED FROM 1914 TO 1922 	309
II (A) COMMANDANTS 	313
II (B) ROLL OF RISALDAR-MAJORS AND SUBADAR-MAJORS 	314
III. MEDICAL OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE CORPS 	316
IV. RECIPIENTS OF THE VICTORIA CROSS 	318
V. RECIPIENTS OF THE INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT 	319
VI. RECIPIENTS OF THE MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL 	322
VII. LIST OF HONOURS AND AWARDS, THE WAR, 1914-1921 	323
VIII (A) ORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY 	325
VIII (B) ORGANIZATION OF THE INFANTRY 	327
GLOSSARY 	329

ILLUSTRATIONS

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR H. B. LUMSDEN, K.C.S.I., C.B.	<i>Frontispiece</i>
	FACING PAGE
COMMANDANTS OF THE CORPS	9
GENERAL SIR H. D. DALY, G.C.B., C.I.E.	33
OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1878	77
STATUE OF HAMILTON AT KABUL, ERECTED IN DUBLIN	95
THE KABUL MEMORIAL AT MARDAN	95
OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1897	150
INDIAN OFFICERS OF THE CAVALRY, 1897	157
INDIAN OFFICERS OF THE INFANTRY, 1897	157
CORPS POLO TEAM, 1900	184
CAVALRY POLO TEAM, 1906	187
INFANTRY POLO TEAM, 1900	187
THIRTY-FOUR WEARERS OF THE INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT, 1897	190
OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1911	190
OFFICERS OF THE 1ST BATTALION GUIDES INFANTRY, 1917	225
OFFICERS OF THE 2ND BATTALION GUIDES INFANTRY, 1919	243
OFFICERS OF THE 3RD BATTALION GUIDES INFANTRY, 1919	254
OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1922	274
MARDAN FROM THE AIR—THE FORT	285

MAPS

	FACING PAGE
THE MARCH TO DELHI, 1857	36
PLAN OF DELHI IN 1857	48
THE AMBELA EXPEDITION	70
KOHAT PASS AND JOWAKI AFRIDI OPERATIONS	74
PLAN OF KABUL RESIDENCY	102
AFGHANISTAN (PESHAWAR TO KABUL)	110
BIRDS-EYE VIEW OF COUNTRY ROUND KABUL FROM WEST END OF BEMARU HILLS	120
PANJKORA	148
MALAKAND	162
MESOPOTAMIA AND NORTH-WEST PERSIA	228
SYRIA AND PALESTINE	252

In Pocket :

BLACK MOUNTAIN, BUNER, GADUN AND KHUDU KHEL.

SKETCH MAP OF EGYPT.

MOHMAND AND KHYBER

PALESTINE, 1918, AND ACTION OF THE SISTERS, 8/6/18.

SWAT AND BAJOUR.

WAZIRISTAN

MAP OF YUSAFZAI.

HISTORY OF THE GUIDES

CHAPTER I

1845-1849

THE RAISING OF THE CORPS

SITUATION IN THE NORTH OF INDIA—LUMSDEN APPOINTED TO RAISE AND COMMAND THE GUIDES
—EARLY RECRUITS—DILAWUR KHAN—FIRST OPERATIONS—THE GUIDES AT LAHORE
AND SHEIKHAPURA—SIEGE OF MULTAN—CAPTURE OF GOVINDGARH—THE SECOND SIKH
WAR.

See Map of Yusafzai, in pocket.

THIS history opens at a period when the North of India was in a state of chaos. The disasters of the First Afghan War had shaken British prestige in India, and although the Afghan situation had been relieved in the end, the large military **1845** effort involved had thrown a heavy strain on the financial resources of the East India Company. To this loss of prestige may be attributed the revolt in Gwalior in 1843 and the situation which led to the conquest of Sind by Sir Charles Napier in the same year.

In the Punjab the East India Company, whose dominion extended to the Sutlej river, was faced with a serious situation. The chaos in that province was due to the series of intrigues and murders which followed the death of Ranjit Singh, "The Lion of the Punjab," in 1839. Although Maharajah Duleep Singh, a child of five years of age, was proclaimed ruler of Ranjit Singh's dominions, the real authority was in the hands of the *panchayats*, or committees, which commanded the powerful army of the Sikh community or "Khalsa." The morale of this army had been considerably raised by the British reverses in Afghanistan, and eventually it demanded to be led against the British, crossed the Sutlej in December 1845, and fought a series of battles in the campaign known as the First Sikh War, which was brought to an end by the rout of the Sikh Army at Sobraon on 10 February 1846. The British did not wish to annex the Punjab, nor had they the means to do so. Treaties were therefore concluded stipulating for the reduction of the Sikh Army; the hill regions were handed over to Gulab Singh, ruler of Jammu, and the tract between the Sutlej and the Beas rivers was ceded to the East India Company.

Thus we find the Punjab broken up into three parts; first, Kashmir and its dependencies, which were sold to Gulab Singh; second, the remnant of Ranjit Singh's kingdom called the "Lahore State," in which Henry Lawrence was appointed Resident on 8 January 1847; and third, the annexed territory between the Sutlej and Beas rivers, to which John Lawrence was posted as Commissioner.

The first part was to be independently governed by its new sovereign ; the second was to be governed, nominally by the Durbar, in actual fact by the Maharajah's mother, Rani Jindan—with her lover, Lal Singh, as Vizier—supported by British bayonets and tutored by the Resident ; the third by its Commissioner as a Civil Division, like any new conquest when incorporated in British India.

For some time a force of 55,000 regular troops was maintained in the Punjab, while the province itself was required to raise, equip and maintain 12,000 irregulars for the defence of the Frontier against incursions by the independent tribesmen. For the Peshawar district alone the arrangement was different. In that valley were stationed 10,000 regular troops—raised in 1853 to 12,500—all under the Commander-in-Chief, a constant reminder to the Afghans that, although we had evacuated Kabul, we could always return there, while for them the road to Peshawar, the land-door of India, was barred. In addition to this standing garrison, a local corps was raised—or rather, was expanded from a nucleus formed in 1846 into a very strong regiment both of horse and foot, stationed at Hoti Mardan near Peshawar and placed at the disposal of the Board of Administration.¹ This force was known as the Corps of Guides.²

The first suggestion for the creation of such a corps seems to be contained in a letter of 7 June 1846 from the Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier (Colonel Henry Lawrence) to the Secretary to the Government of India ; and in this communication, after discussing certain proposals which had been made for raising contingents of police and other security bodies, we read :—

" I would with deference suggest some such organization as the following :

2 Corps of Infantry, 1,000 each	2,000 men
1 do. of Pioneers, armed with light Fuzees, pay, etc., the same as other Infantry	600 "
1 do. of Cavalry	1,000 "
2 9-pounder Batteries, 104 men each	208 "
1 Troop of Guides	100 "
2 Companies of do.	200 "

Total strength ... 4,108 men

" The Guides I would wish to keep with myself in lieu of all guards now supplied by the Regular Army ; when I would have half of them always employed in making themselves acquainted with localities and with the highways and byways of the frontier. . . . The necessity of having a small force, acquainted with localities, at the command of the Civil Authority in a new country, bordering on troubled districts, is too apparent to require comment. Ordinary Police Horse are usually very inefficient, and it often happens that the danger has passed and

¹ Thorburn, " The Punjab in Peace and War," pp. 73 and 171.

² From correspondence between Colonel Henry Lawrence and the Secretary to the Government of India it appears that his original suggestion for the name of this force was " The Frontier Legion."

the mischief been accomplished before the prescribed forms of military routine have enabled the local Civil Officer to obtain assistance from the Military Authorities, . . . "

These proposals found general acceptance in a letter of 8 August from the Secretary to the Government of India, except in regard to the provision of a Pioneer Corps, while as to the creation of a Corps of Guides he wrote :—

" The Corps of Guides, not exceeding 1 troop and 2 companies of 100 each, the Governor-General is disposed to look upon as a valuable addition to a force of this description for duty in these states, but a more specific proposal regarding their pay and organization is required before orders for their entertainment can be issued."

In reply to this, Colonel Henry Lawrence, in a letter of 25 September, forwarded his suggestions as to the strength, pay, etc., of the proposed Guides Corps. The rates of pay proposed were : For the Cavalry, the same as for the Corps of Irregular Horse ; for the Infantry, the same as in the Corps of the Line. Colonel Lawrence added :—

" It should be remembered that this small mixed corps will be out at all seasons, and be employed during the whole or greater part of the year on fatigue duty ; one half will be always with me, and the whole will be effective as two companies of Infantry and a troop of Cavalry, well acquainted with the frontier and the country west of the Jumna."

" It is desirable, I think, that a European officer should be attached to the Guides to direct their movements and record the information they obtain ; he will generally be with me, but his attention will be almost entirely devoted to the object of quietly and unostentatiously obtaining information and recording it ; and instructing his men in their duties as guides and intelligencers, so that, should occasion arise, men accustomed to the work may be at hand."

" I have made inquiries for an officer for this duty and learn that Lieutenant Prendergast of the 8th Cavalry or Lieutenant Pattullo, adjutant of the First Fusiliers are well qualified. I know nothing of them personally or if one or other can be spared. I should prefer Lieutenant Beecher or McLagan of the Engineers, whose professional abilities and zeal would make either very valuable at the head of the Corps of Guides."

In a letter of the same date Lawrence requests " permission at once to commence the levy of the Corps of Guides " ; he adds that

" As much of the success of the scheme proposed in this letter will depend on the officers selected, I beg respectfully to recommend the following to the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor-General. Some I know personally, and I have taken pains to ascertain the merits of all."

Colonel Lawrence proposed Lieutenant Prendergast, 8th Light Cavalry, for the command of the Guides Cavalry, and Lieutenant McLagan, Engineers, for that of the Infantry. The proposals were finally approved in a memorandum from Lord Hardinge of 15 October, but it is noted that the " Governor-General will

allow you [Colonel Lawrence] to select the Commandant of the Corps of Guides, but the services of an Engineer or Artillery officer cannot be spared for the purpose."

Final sanction for the raising of the Corps is contained in G.G.O., Foreign Department, No. 2457, dated Camp Bhyrawal Ghat, 14 December 1846 :—

"The Governor-General is pleased to direct that a Frontier Brigade shall be raised in the Trans and Cis-Sutlej States for Police and General Purposes.

"The Brigade will be under the orders of the Agent to the Governor-General on the North-West Frontier, Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Lawrence, C.B., and will consist of one company of Artillery and four regiments of Infantry.

"A Regiment of Irregular Cavalry will also be employed under the orders of the Governor-General's Agent."

[Then follows a statement of the establishments and rates of pay of the above.]

"These Corps will not be employed beyond the River Jumna to the Eastward, or beyond the Beas or the Sutlej below its junction with the Beas to the Westward, except on cases of emergency. When the public service may require that they should be employed beyond these limits they will receive extra batta.

"These Corps will be entitled to Pension on the same scale and conditions of other Local Corps, viz. Pension of Rank when worn out after 20 years' service, and Pensions for Wounds if disabled on service."

[Here follow the names of the officers appointed to the above-named Corps.]

"The Governor-General is also pleased to direct that a Corps of Guides shall be raised for general service of the following strength and organization, with the specified rates of pay :—

1 Commandant for the whole—consolidated salary Rs. 700

For the Cavalry.

1 Resaldar	Rs. 150
1 Resaidar	" 80
2 Jemadars	at	" 45
2 Kot-Duffadars	at	" 35
12 Duffadars	at	" 28
81 Sowars	at	" 20
1 Trumpeter	" 25

For the Infantry.

2 Subadars	at	Rs. 67. 0. 0
4 Jemadars	at	" 28. 4. 0
18 Havildars	at	" 14. 0. 0
18 Naicks	at	" 12. 0. 0
146 Sepoys	at	" 7. 0. 0
4 Buglers	at	" 8. 0. 0

"Lieutenant H. B. Lumsden, of the 59th Regiment Native Infantry, is appointed Commandant of the Guides.

"The 15th Irregular Cavalry is attached to the Frontier Brigade and placed at the disposal of the Governor-General's Agent.

"By Order of the Right Honourable Governor-General,

(Sd.) "W. EDWARDS,

*"Under-Secretary to the Government of India
With the Governor-General."*

The officer detailed to raise the new Corps was then a Lieutenant of some eight years' service, and at the time no more than half-way up the list of subalterns of the 59th Bengal Native Infantry. Lieutenant Harry Lumsden had served in the Afghan War of 1842 with the 33rd Native Infantry and in the Sutlej campaign with his own regiment. He had lately been appointed assistant to the Resident at Lahore, and at the end of the year 1846 had only just returned to the Punjab from Kashmir, having accompanied Sir Henry Lawrence when he marched into that country at the head of the Sikhs, who had recently been fighting against us, to assist Maharajah Gulab Singh¹ to take possession of his new kingdom and establish his authority.

The date of Lieutenant Lumsden's appointment to the Corps of Guides was 14 December 1846, and in a letter to his father of 6 February 1847 he wrote :

"I have just been nominated to raise the Corps of Guides on 700 rupees a 1847 month. It will be the finest appointment in the country, being the right hand of the army and the left of the political. I am to have the making of this new regiment all to myself. The arming and dressing is to be according to my own fancy."²

In a subsequent letter Lumsden wrote :—"I have secured most excellent drill instructors from the 59th [his old regiment] and nothing could be more satisfactory than the willingness of my recruits and their progress in training and discipline. They are all hard fellows, full of natural military instincts, and will make excellent soldiers."

Something must now be said of the man who was entrusted with and given a free hand in the raising of the new Corps, and of the recruits whom he drew to the ranks of the Guides ; and who so competent to describe both as an old comrade who served with Lumsden in those far-off days ?³

"Lumsden possessed characteristics for his task in a rare degree ; a daring sportsman, full of endurance, hardy and strong of frame, with an instinctive knowledge of men which gave him a power which none under him ever questioned. Life in the Punjab in those days was full of incident, and few were the days which did not test self-dependence and soldierly intelligence. Henry Lawrence quickly gauged Lumsden's genius. In addition to the strength begotten by the stirring scenes in which he moved, Lumsden breathed among giants—the Lawrences, Edwardes, Nicholson, were his associates.

¹ See page 1.

² "Lumsden of the Guides," pp. 34, 35. The first mention of the Guides in the *East India Register* is in that of 1848, p. 169, under "North-West Frontier Brigade."

³ General Sir Henry Daly, in a lecture at the Royal United Service Institution on "The Punjab Frontier Force." See *Journal*, vol. XXVIII, p. 909.

THE GUIDES

6
“ It is hardly enough to say that on the enrolment of the Guides each man's personal history was known to Lumsden ; men from every wild and warlike tribe were represented in its ranks, men habituated to war and sport, the dangers and vicissitudes of Border life, Affredies and Goorkhas, Sikhs and Huzaras, Wuziries, Pathans of every class, and even Kaffirs, speaking all the tongues of the Border, Persian, Pooshtoo, etc., dialects unknown to the men of the plains ; in many cases the Guides had a camp language or patois of their own. Lumsden sought out the men notorious for desperate deeds, leaders in forays, who kept the passes into the hills, and lived amid inaccessible rocks. He made Guides of them ; tempted by regular pay and enterprise, many joined the Corps and became conspicuous for daring and fidelity. On the Border and in the ranks of the Guides, tales, abundant in humour, were told of Lumsden's interviews with men who had defied all authority, and had never been seen in the plains but for murder and plunder.

“ A sketch of Dilawur Khan, who died on the path of duty, a subadar of the Guides, whose name is familiar in every village between the Khyber and Kashmir, will illustrate this.

“ When Lumsden first visited Eusofzai in search of recruits—in his own words, ‘ of men accustomed to look after themselves and not easily taken aback by any sudden emergency ’—Dilawur Khan was notorious. He had been brought up by Mohammedan priests and was intended for the priesthood ; but kidnapping bankers and rich traders, carrying them across the Indus into Eusofzai, was too attractive in adventure and remuneration, and he forsook the sacred calling.

“ Dilawur's capital consisted of his sword, a piece of rope and a huge bullock's skin, which he could inflate at pleasure and so carry himself and his guests across the sacred river ; once there, a message was sent to settle the sum the firm or family would give as ransom for his guest. This was Dilawur's occupation. Lumsden, thinking that Dilawur must have rare local knowledge and pluck to carry on such a trade successfully, sent him an invitation to his camp, promising him a safe return to the hills. The very novelty of the invitation took Dilawur's fancy, and to the astonishment of the chiefs of the district he appeared in camp. Lumsden received him with all courtesy, pointed out that in a short time posts would be so established throughout the country that his calling would be impossible and the risk of hanging great, and ended his moral by proposing to make him a Guide. Dilawur fairly burst into a fit of laughter at the proposal and took his departure across the border. Six weeks afterwards he voluntarily turned up at Lumsden's tent, saying he had come to join the Guides, but pleaded hard to be excused the degradation of the ‘ Goose-step ’ ; but Lumsden held out stoutly for the absolute necessity of his being taught the complete Art of War, and finally had the satisfaction of seeing the most dreaded man on the Frontier patiently balancing on one leg at his bidding.¹

¹ This remarkable man subsequently became a Christian, and even before his baptism he delighted to ridicule the superstitions of his fellow Mussulmans. On one occasion a boat in which he was crossing the Indus was in danger of being swamped. When the others in the boat started to invoke their saints, and to cry “ O Ali,” “ O Hussein,” “ O Kaka Sahib,” Dilawur Khan called at the top of his voice, “ O Lumsden Sahib,” and protested that it was wiser to pray for the help of a living man than of a dead saint.

"Such is Lumsden's own account, and he adds: 'About half my first recruits were of this stamp, while the other half were sons or nephews of the chiefs of the district,' who sought the Englishman as representatives of their family, and eventually rose to the higher ranks. Enlistment under Lumsden finally became so popular that thirty or forty young Affredies or Pathans, fed and clothed by their relatives in the ranks, passing through their drill, awaited vacancies. Great was the excitement at the rifle butts when a vacancy, as a prize, was shot for by these aspirants.

"The headquarters of the Corps were fixed at Mardan in the midst of Eusofzai; a rude fort was constructed, and there in a rich valley bounded on the north and east by the Swat mountains, with the Indus and the Kabul river south and west, Lumsden held civil and military sway over a people the Sikhs had failed to subdue, and who had withstood an army with guns led by Runjit Singh in person. . . . All these men were so welded together by Lumsden that they quailed before no danger, shrank from no raid, however desperate, and bore themselves to their leader against any odds with a fidelity unsurpassed by the Crusaders."

Many years later—in 1869—Dilawur Khan was sent by the Government of India on a secret mission to Central Asia. In passing through Chitral he was taken prisoner and held captive for over two months. When released he and some companions pursued their way through the mountains, but one of his comrades died of the cold and two others turned back. Journeying on, the little party took refuge for the night in a cave, when Dilawur Khan was found to be frostbitten and dangerously ill. His friends did what they could for him, but Dilawur Khan said to them: "I feel I am dying. It is quite true that I am Subadar Dilawur Khan of the Guides at Mardan. I am a Khattak and a native of the village of Jehangira. I am on a secret mission for the English Government. If either of you live to return to Peshawar, go to the Commissioner and tell him Dilawur is dead. I have served the English faithfully, and I am happy to die in the service of the British Government."

He soon fell asleep—never to wake.

Discarding the conspicuous scarlet of the old-time Indian regiments, Lumsden dressed his men in khaki—the first corps to be clothed in uniform of this colour.¹ The Corps was self-dependent; it possessed no transport save that provided by its own ponies and mules; the pay was rather above that of the ordinary scale, and to meet the exposure and the losses of continuous service the establishment of Indian officers and non-commissioned officers was double that of the Line.

Of the feeling towards himself which Lumsden inspired among the men he recruited, trained and led, General Daly tells a story of how early in the history of the Corps Sir John Lawrence visited Mardan, and it seemed to the men of the

¹ The clothing of the Guides was dyed by men regimentally employed, each soldier contributing $\frac{1}{4}$ anna *per mensem* from his pay. This arrangement was maintained until early in the twentieth century, for quite twenty years after the general adoption of fast-dyed khaki clothing; and its abolition was agreed to with reluctance, as in addition to the khaki uniform the dyers used to dye the brightly coloured pagris so popular among certain classes of Indians when wearing plain clothes. The word *khaki* is Persian and means "dust-coloured."

Guides that their leader was then harassed by discussions and explanations instead of being so constantly with them as was his wont. "The night before Sir John was to march with his retinue from Mardan, Lumsden went outside and sat on the parapet of the fort. After a while an Afridi orderly, who always attended Lumsden in sport or fight, crept up to him and said in a low tone: 'Since the great Lawrence Sahib came you have been worried and depressed; many have observed this, and that he is always looking at papers, asking questions and overhauling your accounts. Has he said anything to pain you? Is he interfering with you? He starts for Peshawar to-morrow morning—there is no reason why he should reach it'!"

The first occasion on which the newly raised Corps was employed under Lumsden was in July 1847, at which time the commandant of the Corps, as he tells us, "had collected some fifty horsemen and twenty infantry, chiefly down-countrymen and Persians," and was engaged in the collection of revenue under a rough revenue settlement drawn up by himself, "which naturally brought me in contact with the heads of villages, from among whose younger sons and relations I soon selected a score of first-class Pathan recruits for the Guides."

A noted freebooter of the neighbourhood had made off to the hills with Government revenue and was raiding thence, capturing Hindu traders and holding them to ransom. One night in July Lieutenant Lumsden, accompanied by two dafadars and eighteen sowars of the Guides, with a troop of Sikh regular cavalry, marched from Kalu Khan in Yusafzai to surprise the village of Mugh Darah in the Panjtar Hills. Half an hour before sunrise the party arrived at the mouth of a narrow defile, three-quarters of a mile long, leading to the village and along which only one mounted man could go at a time. On reaching the village "I was not a little taken aback," writes Lumsden, "to find that my Guides alone had followed me, the Sikhs having remained outside at the foot of the hills." However, all went well, the village was surprised, the men disarmed and three hundred head of cattle brought away.

Later on, in September, a village called Babuzai, which had once gained a high reputation on the Border by repulsing the attack of a Sikh brigade, refused to pay its share of revenue and necessitated the employment of a considerable body of troops. Lumsden moved out in the evening with the Infantry of the Corps—one jemadar, two havildars, two naiks and twenty-six sepoy—to Paloderai at the foot of the range separating Yusafzai from the Lundkhwar district; and in the grey of the morning scaled the almost inaccessible mountain overhanging the village of Babuzai, turning all the enemy's breastworks and surprising and driving in a hostile piquet. In the meantime a brigade of Sikh infantry with guns, and accompanied by the Cavalry portion of the Guides—one jemadar, one kote dafadar, seven dafadars, and twenty-two sowars—the whole under command of Colonel George Lawrence, the Political Agent at Peshawar, advanced from Katlang and attacked the village of Babuzai in front, the Guides Infantry at the same time coming down upon the village from the mountain in rear. The village was burned and the Guides Cavalry pursued the leader, Pasand Khan, and his mounted men



COMMANDANTS OF THE CORPS.

1. Brevet-Major W. S. R. Hodson, 1853-55.
2. Gen. Sir C. P. Keyes, G.C.B., 1869-70.
3. Gen. Sir Sam Browne, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.S.I., 1863-69.
4. Gen. Sir F. H. Jenkins, K.C.B., 1870-84.
5. Col. Sir A. G. Hammond, V.C., K.C.B., D.S.O., 1891-95.
6. Maj.-Gen. R. B. P. Campbell, C.B., 1884-91.
7. Col. Sir A. G. Hammond, V.C., K.C.B., D.S.O., 1891-95.
8. Field-Marshal Sir C. C. Egerton, G.C.B., 1895-99.
9. Maj.-Gen. Sir R. B. Adams, V.C., K.C.B., 1899-04.
10. Maj.-Gen. Sir G. J. Younghusband, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B., 1904-09.
11. Lieut.-Gen. Sir R. G. Egerton, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., 1909-11.
12. Brig.-Gen. F. G. H. Davies, 1911-16.
13. Lieut.-Col. A. H. Buist, M.V.O., 1916-21.

for four miles, cutting off their retreat to the Bazdarah valley and obliging them to seek refuge in the village of Mian Khan, which was too strong to be attacked by cavalry unsupported.

Dafadar Fattah Khan had volunteered to accompany the Infantry of the Corps, and was blown up and shot through both arms in cutting down one of the enemy who was carrying a lighted matchlock in one hand and a bag of powder in the other. Part of the blow aimed by the dafadar's sword fell upon the bag of powder, some of which ran out, when the lighted match ignited the whole mass and both men were blown into the air.

"This," relates Lumsden, "was the Guides' first taste of powder and a most trying ordeal for raw troops, as they had to scramble up the hill in the dark, over stones and rocks, but not a man lagged behind or lost his way."

Three days after this affair the Sikh brigade and guns proceeded to attack the village of Palai in the Bazdarra valley. The Infantry of the Guides, under Lumsden, again crowned the heights on the left of the village, the Sikhs attacking on the right, while the Guides Cavalry made a very successful charge along the valley, cutting down several of the enemy with a loss to themselves of only two horses wounded.

By March 1848 the Guides had been completed up to their establishment and another British officer had been appointed to serve with them in the person of Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson of the Bengal Fusiliers. This officer had served in the First Sikh War, and for some time past had been employed as assistant to Colonel Henry Lawrence, who was anxious to appoint him to the Corps of Guides. The appointment was not filled as speedily as Hodson had hoped and as Lawrence had intended, and it was not until 16 October 1847 that in writing home Hodson said: "You will, I am sure, rejoice with me at my unprecedented good fortune in being appointed to a responsible and honourable post, almost before, by the rules of the Service, I am entitled to take charge of a company of sepoys. I shall even be better off than I thought; instead of merely *doing duty* with the Guides Corps, I am to be second-in-command."¹

As we shall see, however, several months were to elapse before Lieutenant Hodson joined the Corps, but in the meantime he seems to have been of some help to Lumsden in the matter of the selection of uniform for officers and men, and in obtaining from home some fire-arms of more modern pattern than those with which the rank and file of the Corps had hitherto been armed, until Hodson was able to announce in a letter to his brother in England that "Sir Charles Napier says they [the Guides] are the only properly dressed light troops he had seen in India."

The Guides now received a sudden and unexpected order to proceed to Lahore, where they arrived in April 1848. In order to explain the cause of this hurried demand for their services, it may be well to explain the events which 1848 had happened at the capital of the Lahore state.

During the year 1847 the Wazir, Lal Singh, had been sent off to Agra as a prisoner of state, while the continued intrigues of the Queen Mother made

¹ Hodson, "Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India," p. 47.

it necessary that she should be separated from her son, the young Maharajah. She had accordingly been taken from the palace at Lahore to Sheikhpura. In the beginning of the year 1848 Henry Lawrence had gone to England on leave, and Sir Frederick Currie had assumed the office of Resident in his place. The Maharani was still doing her utmost in secret to stir up bad feeling against the British, and there was much intrigue and disaffection in the province. Lumsden on arrival at Lahore with the Guides was called upon to unravel a conspiracy, believed to have been organized by the Sikhs, which had for its object the seduction from their allegiance of certain of the Company's regiments forming the garrison at Lahore.

Lumsden chose a Guide, by name Pir Bakhsh, who had originally belonged to the 59th Native Infantry, with whom were associated Risaldar Fattah Khan and Naik Akbar Shah, to make a secret inquiry. They discovered that a Sikh general, Kahan Singh, urged on by the Maharani, was the leader of the plot, that some fifty or sixty soldiers of different regiments had already been tampered with, and that a day had been fixed for a general rising of the conspirators. Lumsden had intended to surround and capture the whole party, but the evening before the meeting was to have taken place Kahan Singh's suspicions appear to have been aroused. Lumsden then, at eleven o'clock at night, went with the Infantry of the Guides to the city of Lahore, and finding General Kahan Singh's house barricaded, entered through a window and captured him, his *munshi*, a confidential agent, and a box of papers, from which sufficient evidence was obtained to hang Kahan Singh and his *munshi*, and to banish the Maharani from the Punjab.

For their services the risaldar was presented with a *khilat* and the naik with the sum of Rs.100 by Sir F. Currie in the presence of the whole of the Lahore Brigade, at a General Parade ordered for the purpose.

By this time Lieutenant Hodson must have joined the Guides, for he formed with Lumsden the party of the Guides Cavalry—two British officers, two Indian officers and sixty-two rank and file—which proceeded to Sheikhpura on 15 May to secure the person of the Maharani and escort her to Ferozepore, there handing her over to the Political Agent. This was a service of no small risk, for it was fully expected that a rescue would be attempted between Sheikhpura and the River Ravi. Of this expedition Hodson wrote on 5 June: "Started to bag the Rani in her abode beyond the Ravi, she having been convicted of complicity in the designs of the conspirators. Lumsden and myself were deputed by the Resident to call on her and intimate that her presence was urgently required. A detachment was ordered out to support us in case any resistance should be offered. Fortunately it was not required, as the Rani complied at once with our polite request to come along with us. Instead of being taken to Lahore as she expected, we carried her off to Kana Kutch, on the Ferozepore road, where a party of Wheeler's Irregulars had been sent to receive her. It was very hard work—a long night march to the fort, and a fourteen hours' ride across to Kana Kutch, whence I had two hours' gallop into Lahore to report progress, making sixteen hours in the saddle in May, when the nights are hot."¹

¹ "Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India," pp. 66, 67.

Lumsden himself "accompanied the Maharani in her carriage along with two of the Sikh sirdars, and never lost sight of her until he joyfully handed her over to Captain Browne, the political officer deputed to receive her. The captive lady did not seem to realize her position or destiny until she had traversed a considerable portion of her journey. She then commenced to heap all the abuse she could command on the British Government and on her captor, while the foulest of Billingsgate would be thrown into the shade if compared with the language and curses with which she favoured the two Sikh sirdars who were also in the carriage."¹

About the end of May Lieutenants Lumsden and Hodson, with two Indian officers and fifty-five other ranks of the Guides Cavalry, made a forced march to punish the villages of Chorkana and Dhariaala for harbouring the Sikh Guru Maharaj and his party. A rapid night march surprised both villages, and they were destroyed.

The general unrest now appeared to have died down in the Punjab, but trouble soon began again at Multan, where the Diwan Mulraj farmed the province under a treaty made with the Sikhs. Mulraj had recently offered his resignation, and, with the full consent of the Sikh Durbar, two British officers—Lieutenants Vans Agnew and Anderson—had been sent to Multan on special duty connected with the abdication of Mulraj, escorted by a strong body of troops mainly composed of Sikhs. Within a few hours of their arrival at Multan, Lieutenants Vans Agnew and Anderson were cut down by fanatics and desperately wounded, nobody raising a hand in their defence, while their escort at once went bodily over to a powerful faction in the province which wished to keep Mulraj in power and which was strongly opposed to the British. Mulraj now raised the standard of revolt and called upon all to join him in expelling the British from the Punjab. There were at this time no British troops nearer to Multan than Lahore, and the hot weather was coming on; the Sikh army had, it is true, recently been defeated, but it was by no means crushed, and there were plenty of armed men ready and willing to take the field again under their former chiefs. On 20 April 1848 Vans Agnew and Anderson were murdered, and the news reached Lieutenant Edwardes, then engaged in the revenue settlement of the district, at Dera Fattah Khan, on the evening of the 22nd.

Some little time before this the Guides had been called upon to provide a personal escort for Edwardes, and a dafadar and eight sowars of the Cavalry and two havildars and fourteen other ranks of the Infantry had been sent to join him at Bannu, and these did excellent service under him in the stirring events that followed. They were present at the night attack on the Nasar camp at Kulachi, in which Edwardes was wounded; the affair with Lunga Mal at Dera Ghazi Khan, where two guns were taken; and at the actions of Kanari and Sadusam. Then Dafadar Khanan Khan and four sowars of the Guides Cavalry gained admittance to the Diwan's camp as spies, and one of these, Sowar Mahi-ud-Din by name, actually succeeded in being taken on as orderly to Diwan Mulraj himself, and was wounded by a round shot fired by one of the British guns at the action of Sadusam.

Edwardes summoned the chiefs and fighting men of Derajat and Bannu to his assistance, and, joined by the loyal Nawab of Bahawalpur and by General van

¹ "Lumsden of the Guides," pp. 47, 48.

Cortlandt with such troops as they could command, he engaged the Diwan's army, drove it back into the fort at Multan, and kept it besieged there until the rains should be over and British reinforcements arrive.

In the month of June the Cavalry of the Guides, under Lieutenant Lumsden, joined Edwardes's force before Multan, and when the little army first took up its position on the right of a nullah at Suruj Kund, the Cavalry charged and silenced twelve wall-pieces mounted round the Bibi Pakdaman Mosque ; but in face of the heavy odds against them Lumsden's men were unable to carry off the guns.

There was plenty of work in camp for the Guides, and they seem to have been held in continual readiness to turn out at a moment's notice. One day in August the alarm was given that a handful of the Diwan's cavalry had carried off fifty government camels which were out at graze near the camp, and the troop of the Guides, sixty-seven sabres strong under Risaldar Fattah Khan, at once turned out in pursuit. After a three-mile gallop they came up with the raiders, who proved to be the whole of the cavalry of Mulraj. The Guides without hesitation formed line to the front, and charged through the enemy no less than four times, breaking them up and pursuing them almost to the gates of Multan, the charge being witnessed by General Whish and his staff. Two sowars were killed in this affair, one of whom, Hamzulla, had distinguished himself on several previous occasions.

General Whish had now joined the force before Multan, but early in September a large body of Sikh auxiliaries deserted and went over to the enemy, and the siege had to be raised temporarily pending the arrival of further reinforcements of regular troops, British and Indian.

Meanwhile, the greater part of the Guides Infantry was still in the Punjab, under the command of Lieutenant Hodson, the adjutant of the Corps, but he was at the same time an assistant political officer in the Bari Doab, where he had with him 120 men of the Infantry. The remainder were in Lahore under command of Subadar Rasul Khan, and in view of the disturbed state of the country it was thought advisable to obtain possession of the important fort of Govindgarh, at Amritsar, where was the treasury, and which at the time was garrisoned by Sikh infantry and artillery, the loyalty of whom was more than doubtful. At noon on 28 July a party of the Guides—two jemadars and 138 other ranks, under Subadar Rasul Khan—left Lahore, taking with them fourteen prisoners so as to have a pretext for entering the fort, and reached Govindgarh early next morning.

"My Guides," wrote Hodson in describing this affair, "have covered themselves with glory (and dust) by the way in which they have got into, and got possession of, the famed fort of Govindgarh. A hundred of my men under a native officer—a fine lad of about twenty, whom I have petted a good deal—went up quietly to the gates on pretence of escorting four state prisoners whom I had put in irons for the occasion, were allowed to get in, and then threw up their caps and took possession of the gateway, despite the scowls and threats and all but open resistance of the Sikh garrison. A day afterwards a regiment marched from Lahore and went into garrison there, and so Ranjit Singh's treasure fort is fairly in our hands."¹

¹ "Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India," p. 72.

The effect of this timely movement was declared by Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, "to have placed us in a commanding position in the most disaffected district in the Punjab."¹

For this service Subadar Rasul Khan received a *khilat*, a gun, a brace of pistols and Rs.500, while each jemadar was awarded Rs.150, each havildar and naik Rs.60 and each sepoy Rs.11 as a gratuity.

On 17 September² of this year a party of 150 of the Guides Infantry under a subadar was again engaged with Lieutenant Hodson. Accompanied by a troop of Irregular Horse, that officer had marched to the fort of Rangalnagar, some fourteen miles from the right bank of the Beas, then held by rebel Sikhs, and had summoned it to surrender. His summons was refused, and there seems no reason why it should have been accepted, since Hodson's party was small, was composed of mounted men only, and was far from support, while the garrison was behind good cover and well supplied with matchlocks and wall-pieces. Hodson accordingly sat down in front of the fort and sent into Lahore for reinforcements; and when the party of Guides Infantry arrived, the place was invested until the arrival, two days later, of Brigadier Wheeler's force. The Guides were now relieved, and the same night the rebels escaped. The fort was then demolished.

Of this affair Brigadier Wheeler reported that: "*Lieutenant W. S. Hodson, with his detachment of the Corps of Guides, has done most excellent service, and by his daring boldness and that of his men, gained the admiration of all.*" During this investment, Sepoy Saif-ud-din was murdered by some men of the 3rd Bengal Infantry while guarding prize property in the fort.

On 25 September the Guides Infantry moved against the fort of Mirariah, but this was evacuated by the garrison on their communications being threatened. The detachment then, some weeks later, advanced to a place called Saronwalla, whence a sepoy of the Corps, Dhanu by name, was sent on to reconnoitre and report upon the fort of Kulalwalla; he shortly returned, stating that the garrison had come out and was advancing in fighting order.

"Thinking they had only a hundred men and myself to deal with, the Sikhs advanced in strength thirty to one, with colours flying and drums beating. Just then the breeze sprang up, the dust blew aside, and the long line of horsemen coming up rapidly behind my party burst upon their senses. They turned instantly and made for the fort."

The Guides now skirmished up to the town, which was walled, and escalated it by climbing on one another's shoulders and by throwing a *pagri* over a projecting waterpipe and pulling themselves up by it. On getting inside they occupied houses commanding the interior of the fort and kept up such a fire that nobody could move about inside it. During the night the garrison escaped.

Of this affair Brigadier Wheeler reported that :

¹ "Punjab Blue Book," 1847-49.

² This is the date as given in the Corps' "Digest of Service," but from Hodson's letters it appears that it should be 12 September.

"The detachment of the Corps of Guides moved in the morning direct on the village while the other troops were moving on the fort. It was occupied in force by the enemy, who were dislodged in a most spirited manner and the place afterwards retained as commanding the works of the fort, the men keeping up a sharp fire on all who showed themselves. The thanks of the Brigadier-General are due to Lieutenant Hodson, not only for his services in the field, but for the information with which he furnished him, and he offers them to him and to his men."

In December Hodson was again across the River Ravi with one hundred Guides Infantry and fifteen sowars, following up a party under a Sikh sirdar, one Ganda Singh, which had been plundering the country at the foot of the hills near Sialkot, and came up with them near Gamrowlah. Ganda Singh's men at first advanced against the Guides, but, losing twelve men in the first few minutes, the enemy broke and fled. In this engagement Lieutenant Hodson was engaged in single combat with an Akali¹ and was slightly wounded.

Meanwhile Lord Gough, Commander-in-Chief in India, had early foreseen the possibility of a Second Sikh War; but while he was in favour of delaying active operations until the commencement of the cold weather, he urged the assembly and equipment of a force with which the conquest of the Punjab might successfully be undertaken, and for this he judged that an army of 24,000 men with seventy-eight guns would be required. Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, did not wholeheartedly accept Lord Gough's proposals—he refused to sanction any increased establishments of Indian regiments; the request for immediate preparation was ignored, and he did not subscribe to the Commander-in-Chief's estimate of the numbers required. There was consequently much delay; and it was not until the end of September that sanction was given for the carrying into effect of the proposals put forward six months earlier; while it was well into November before, by great exertions, an army of 20,000 men with nearly one hundred guns was collected under the immediate command of Lord Gough in the neighbourhood of Ferozepore.

In the meantime a large contingent of Bombay troops had reinforced the army before Multan. The city surrendered on 2 January 1849, the fort falling three weeks later, when the troops which had been engaged in the investment marched north to join Lord Gough. The Bengal portion of the Multan force set out on 27 January, and the Bombay column on the 31st, reaching Army Headquarters in the field in time to share in the crowning victory of Gujerat.

Towards the end of October Lumsden and the Cavalry of the Guides had been ordered back to Lahore, as the district, and particularly that part of the country in the neighbourhood of Jammu, had broken out into revolt.

It must have been about 30 December 1848 that Lumsden, with two Indian officers and sixty-four other ranks of the Cavalry of the Guides, joined Hodson,

¹ *Akali*, or immortal, was the name adopted by certain members of the Sikh community who during the period of Sikh independence assumed the rôle of religious enthusiasts and warriors, not enrolling themselves in any clan or owing allegiance to any chief. They claim to be the Puritans of Sikhism, and under this cloak are always prominent in times of religious strife or political upheaval.

who had under his command close upon one hundred and fifty of the Infantry, and started off in pursuit of the insurgent force, led by the Sirdars Ram Singh and Ganda Singh, who were moving along the foot of the hills that border the districts of Narpore and Pathankot. So swift and secret were the movements of the Guides that they came up with Ganda Singh's men at Nurote, after three days' marching, and caught them as they were cooking their food.

The enemy's position was in a thick grove of mango trees, on the right of which was a deep ravine, while beyond the grove lay a considerable open space, which was again enclosed by a large sugar-cane field. Taking the Cavalry unperceived along the bottom of the ravine, Lieutenant Lumsden stationed them in rear of the sugar-cane field, at the same time directing Lieutenant Hodson to attack in front and clear the grove. The Guides Infantry charged and quickly drove the enemy from his position among the trees, while the Cavalry, darting upon the rebels from behind the sugar-cane, annihilated the party, only one man escaping. "So bad," wrote Hodson, "was the nature of the country over which Lumsden followed them that at one time more than half the horses of his troop were down, pursuers and pursued rolling together in desperate strife in the middle of the deep marshes. From thirty to forty of the enemy were killed or mortally wounded, among whom we were able to identify beyond doubt Ganda Singh and his major Sukha Singh."

Much of the booty taken by Ganda Singh was recovered, including a silver kettledrum, four horses and two riding-camels belonging to the 2nd Irregular Cavalry. Ram Singh and his party, who were encamped about a mile farther along the road, on hearing the firing, immediately retired beyond the River Beas, taking up a position on the heights of Dallah. Next day the Guides joined General Wheeler's brigade and were present in the attack on the enemy's position. The Guides Cavalry volunteered to fight on foot and, together with the Infantry, crossed the Towi stream and turned the enemy's left during a night of terrible rain. Next morning the position was stormed with no great loss, and Ram Singh fled across the Ravi with the only two followers who remained with him.

For these services the Resident of Lahore was directed by the Governor-General to "*convey to Lieutenant Lumsden the approval of the Governor-General of the gallantry and activity of himself and his men in his attack against the insurgents, and his Lordship's sense of the service he has been rendered*"; while General Wheeler described Lumsden as one "*who has aided me most cordially*."

The battle of Chillianwallah had been fought on 13 January, while Lumsden and his Guides were engaged in the operations just described, conducted in co-operation with General Wheeler; but the Corps was now ordered to join the army under the Commander-in-Chief, and the crowning victory over the Sikhs, and the subsequent pursuit to the mouth of the Khyber Pass, are best described in Lieutenant Lumsden's own words:—¹

"After this [the action of Dallah] I moved with my Guides towards the Commander-in-Chief's army and arrived at Wazirabad just in time to catch the Sikhs

¹ "Lumsden of the Guides," p. 57 *et seq.*

crossing the Chenab river to turn the right flank of our army. We had just arrived on the banks of the river, when we suddenly came on a large detachment of Irregular Sikh Horse who had forded the stream close to Wazirabad, and were quite as much taken aback at seeing us as we were at finding them on our side of the stream. Without hesitation we went straight at them, and drove the lot helter-skelter through a deep ford and, dismounting, set to work to make a breastwork commanding the passage to be occupied by our Infantry as soon as they came up. They arrived about 4 p.m. and I instantly posted Hodson off to report what I had done to headquarters. So important was this discovery considered by the authorities there that Colonel Mackeson rode down the other side of the river as fast as his horse could carry him and was ferried across on a *shurnai* by a friendly boatman to my tent. During the night a general officer with a whole brigade turned out to occupy the position. We burnt the only two boats the enemy had in possession here, and remained watching these fords until 19 January, when the Guides were ordered to join Army Headquarters. I have always felt the poor Guides got scant credit for their share in this business.

"On the 21st [of February] we took part in the general battle of Gujerat, which was an artillery action throughout and much more like a grand review than a day which was to settle the destiny of the Punjab. A more beautiful sight could not have been on earth than the steady advance of upwards of one hundred guns—Horse Artillery going to the front at a gallop, and then 'Left About!' 'Action Front!' supported by our Cavalry, the heavy guns all the time smashing away at the Sikh artillery, and breaking up their masses of infantry and cavalry. Three times did the Sikh infantry form line to advance and charge at our Horse Artillery, who coolly watched for them until they came within the range of grape, and gave them a shower of such rain as had never come within the range of their conception. Their lines at first halted, shook backwards and forwards like a field of wheat in a heavy wind, and at last broke and bolted like a flock of wild sheep, the Horse Artillery following at a gallop, and keeping up a murderous fire on them for miles. The Cavalry took up the pursuit when the Horse Artillery left off, and finished as pretty a day's work as any army in India ever got through."

General Gilbert was now sent on in pursuit of the Sikh army, having with him a large number of guns, five regiments of cavalry and four infantry brigades, and the Guides appear to have accompanied this force, for, continuing Lumsden's account, we read: "The moment the scrimmage was over the Guides were started off after the broken enemy, following them up to Naurangabad-ki-Serai on the Jhelum, where we were in time to cut up many stragglers, and prevent their crossing over to join the division of Sirdar Uttur Singh, encamped on the right bank. Here we had to remain until General Gilbert came up with his division and forced the passage of the river. No sooner were we across the water than the Guides were off again, and met, after three marches, Colonel George and Mrs. Lawrence with other prisoners at Pucka Serai, and escorted them back to the Jhelum, and again rejoined the pursuing division at Rawal Pindi. When we arrived at Attock the General found himself on the bank of the Indus, with an escort of thirty

Guide sowars and a Company of Guide rifles, which I had managed to keep up with me by picking up each man alongside of my Cavalry. The latter immediately lined the rocks on the edge of the stream and opened such a nasty fire on the Afghan infantry that they were glad to cut away the bridge of boats, which swung over to our side of the stream and was secured to us.

"Next morning, before daylight, two boatloads of Guides crossed the Indus and took possession of the fort at Khairabad, which enabled a bridge to be reconstructed and a brigade of infantry to be crossed over. Three days afterwards the Guides entered the city of Peshawar."

To this account the following may be added : That on the 6th the Sikhs gave up their prisoners ; a few days later, at Rawalpindi, the sirdars surrendered, and the disarmament of the soldiers of the Khalsa was completed ; forty-nine guns with many thousand stand of arms had been taken ; and by 21 March—exactly a month after the battle of Gujerat—Peshawar had been reoccupied and Dost Muhammad had been chased back to the Khyber.¹ The Afghans, who from hope of plunder had joined the Sikhs, "had ridden down through the hills like lions and ran back into them like dogs."

In Lord Gough's first despatch of 26 February there was no mention of the services of officers or men of the Guides ; but this omission was repaired in a subsequent despatch dated 15 March, in which he wrote :—

"On perusal of my despatch relative to the operations of the 21 February at Gujerat, I regret to find that I omitted mentioning the names of Lieutenants Lumsden and Hodson of the Guides, and Lieutenant Lake of the Engineers, attached to the political department. These officers were most active in conveying orders throughout the action, and I now beg to bring their names to the favourable notice of your Lordship."

For their services at Multan and Gujerat the Guides were, by G.G.O. of 7 October 1853, permitted to bear the words "Mooltan," "Goojerat" and "Punjaub" on their appointments.

¹ The name of this pass is spelt in this way throughout, although Khaibar seems the more modern spelling.

CHAPTER II

1849-1857

FRONTIER WARFARE

SERVICE AGAINST THE AFRIDIS—THE MOHMANDS—THE RANIZAIS—LUMSDEN GOES HOME ON LEAVE—SUCCEEDED BY HODSON—THE BLACK MOUNTAIN—THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS—DEPARTURE OF HODSON—INQUIRY INTO HIS ADMINISTRATION—RETURN OF LUMSDEN.

See Maps : Yusafzai, in pocket ; Black Mountain, in pocket ; Kohat Pass and Jowaki Afridi Operations, facing page 74.

THE value of the Corps of Guides having by this time been definitely established and recognized by higher authority, it was directed by an order, dated 19 June 1849, that the strength of the Cavalry of the Corps should be increased from one to three troops and that of the Infantry from two to six companies, bringing up their numbers to 400 Cavalry and 600 Infantry. Two more British officers were also added to the Corps—Lieutenant G. N. Hardinge as Acting Second-in-Command and Lieutenant H. N. Miller as Adjutant.

Lieutenant Hodson was not available as he had been selected by Sir Henry Lawrence to be Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab and had left the Guides. He had not done so entirely of his own choice, for he wrote : " To tell the truth, I had much rather have remained with the Guides—a more independent and very far pleasanter life and, I think, one that will in the end be more distinguished. However, I was guided by Mr. Thomason's and Sir H. Lawrence's advice and must take the consequences."¹

In a proclamation dated 30 March 1849, the Governor-General had annexed the whole of the Punjab and made it into a province of British India. Among those whose boundaries now marched with the newly constituted frontier were the people of Swat, who both then and thereafter proved themselves bad neighbours. Their country, in fact, became a sort of Alsatia, where anyone who was hostile to the British and every type of criminal were given countenance and asylum. From it there issued plunderers and marauders, horse and foot, to raid and kidnap into British territory ; and the Guides were constantly employed in punishing the tribesmen on the borders of the Yusafzai plain.

On 26 June 1849 the Corps, 69 sabres, 177 rifles, under Risaldar Fattah Khan, marched during the night from Peshawar to Yar Husain in Yusafzai, attacked and destroyed the village of Bagh in the Panjtara Hills next morning, and returned to Yar Husain by noon, thus accomplishing a distance of fifty-six miles and burning a village in thirty-six hours.

¹ Extract from " Hodson of Hodson's Horse," p. 79.

In October 1849 it was reported that the whole of the Utman Khel villages of Sam Baizai had refused to pay revenue or to receive the native revenue collector, and that the people were all preparing for war. The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar urged that a military force should be sent into the country, pointing out that while the Sikhs had been in the habit of collecting revenue under the protection of a considerable military force, none of our troops had ever been seen near this part of our border, and the hill tribes therefore imagined we either had no force available for employment, or were afraid to entangle it in those fastnesses. The Government now sanctioned the dispatch of a small punitive expedition, for while the use of British troops for the mere collection of revenue was deprecated, it was realized that this was something of the nature of a test case and that the people of the newly conquered province must be made to understand once and for all that the orders of the Government could not be disregarded or defied with impunity.

A force was accordingly detailed under Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, C.B., 60th Rifles, and marched from Peshawar on 3 December 1849. Included in it were 200 bayonets of the 60th Rifles, a regiment from which Lumsden had, while quartered with his Guides in its neighbourhood, obtained many excellent drill instructors; so that the Corps was in a position to justify the high opinion formed of it by Brigadier Wheeler, under whom it had so often served, that "they are the finest infantry I have ever set eyes on, in every way—cool under fire, first-rate shots, good judges of ground, and drilled to a perfection seldom equalled in our regiments of the Line."

Colonel Bradshaw had considerable difficulty in crossing the Kabul river at Nowshera, where there was no ford and but few boats, and on 10 December arrived at Katlang, some twelve miles due north of Mardan, a village at which Lumsden had for the past month been encamped, protecting the country. He now joined Colonel Bradshaw, bringing with him 195 sabres and 219 rifles of the Guides, and also three British officers—Lieutenant H. N. Miller, who since the 25th of the previous October had been in command of the Cavalry, and Lieutenant H. J. Hawes, with Dr. R. Lyell.

On the 12th the troops advanced against the village of Sanghao, situated in a very strong position, the Guides Infantry covering the front of the left attack and closing the direct road to Buner. After a short cannonade of the village, Risaldar Muhammad Khan of the Guides Cavalry, misunderstanding his orders, charged with his troop at a three-foot breastwork held by the enemy. The risaldar, with the greater part of his men, cleared the obstacle, drove the enemy through the village, and captured a standard, but of the Guides Cavalry Resaidar Pulwan Khan, two non-commissioned officers and a sowar were killed, and there were two wounded; in the Infantry Havildar Rasid Khan and two sepoy were also wounded. In view of the fact that the casualties in the whole force only reached twenty-two, the Guides Corps sustained their full share of the total losses.

It is on record that the advance of the Guides Infantry to attack the village was so rapid that an artillery officer, taking them for the enemy, deliberately laid a gun on them, and was on the point of ordering it to be discharged, when a keen-eyed

gunner called out, "Lord, Sir! them is our own mud-larks!"—referring to their khaki clothing.

The force then marched to a position at the mouth of the Bazdarra valley, near the villages of Palai, Zormandai and Sher Khana, in Sam Baizai. The enemy were here in very considerable force, 5,000 of them occupying a hill to the right of and commanding Palai, while the hills to the right and rear of the other villages were held by large bodies; they were also in strength in the valley in front of Palai, their right and left resting on the hills which enclosed it. On the 14th the Guides were engaged in the attack on the right, when the village of Palai was stormed, while the remainder of the force turned the left, then swept up the valley, capturing and destroying the villages and driving off the enemy. The force then withdrew unmolested.

The local fighting men had here been assisted by people from Swat proper, numbering five or six thousand, and it was afterwards learnt that reinforcements to the number of 15,000 men were hastening to the scene, when news of the defeat caused them to turn back.

Of these operations the Secretary to Government wrote to the Board of Administration as follows:—

"I am directed to state that the Governor-General has learnt with great satisfaction the result of the expedition against the Yusufzais. The Governor-General has already conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief his request that he would make known to the officers and men who were employed the warm approbation felt by the Government of India of their courage and conduct on this occasion. . . . His Lordship begs to offer to Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence, to Lieutenant Lumsden and the force under his orders, his best thanks."

In 1849 the Indian Government, following the example of former Governors of Peshawar, had entered into an agreement with the Adam Khel, the Afridi clan who inhabit the Kohat Pass, to pay them an allowance of Rs.5,700 a year, in return for which they were to keep up and safeguard the road through the pass connecting Peshawar and Kohat. The agreement had, however, only been in force some few months, when, in February 1850, a party of British sappers, **1850** engaged in road-making in British territory on the Kohat side of the pass, were surprised by a large body of tribesmen and sustained several casualties. It was found that their assailants belonged to the Galai and Hasan Khel divisions of the Adam Khel Afridis, and while the reputed reason for the aggression was the raising of the rates at which salt had hitherto been sold at the Kohat salt mines, the real cause was undoubtedly the construction of the road through the pass, which was now recognized as increasing the accessibility of the hill fastnesses of the neighbouring clans.

Sir Charles Napier, the Commander-in-Chief, happened at this time to be visiting Peshawar, and within a week of the outrage orders were issued for the advance of a force through the Kohat Pass. The column was accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief in person, and was under the command of Brigadier

Sir Colin Campbell, while with it went a small party of eighteen sabres and seventeen bayonets of the Guides under command of Lieutenant Lumsden. The object of the expedition was not merely to punish the offending clan, but to escort to Kohat two Punjab regiments which were to form the garrison of that place. The advance began on 9 February, and the troops were back in Peshawar by the 14th, but in the interval they had fought their way through the Kohat Pass and back again. Strong opposition was offered at Akhora, at the northern entrance to the pass. This village was taken and destroyed, and the tribesmen had then to be driven from positions they had taken up on the heights above the village of Zarghun Khel, which the Guides were very active in clearing. This village was captured and burnt, and the column camped for the night, suffering some casualties from snipers. When the advance was resumed on the 10th the village of Khui had to be attacked in the same way, and the rearguard was considerably harassed during the day's march. The force encamped for the night of the 11th at the foot of the Kohat Kotal, and regiments intended to garrison Kohat were passed on. Next day the village of Basti Khel was destroyed, and early on the 13th the force started on its return march to Peshawar; but from Sharaki to Akhora, practically the whole length of the defile, the Afridis contested the ground, opposing the force in front, hanging on its flanks, and continually pressing the rearguard.

In a letter, dated 2 April 1850, Lieutenant Lumsden was informed: "*I have much pleasure in communicating by order of the Board, the cordial thanks of the Government for your gallant conduct in the affairs with the Afridis at the end of February and beginning of March.*"

In March 1851 the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, paid a visit to Peshawar, and at the end of the month inspected the headquarters of the Corps of Guides, then stationed near Nowshera; in a letter dated Attock, 24 March 1851, 1851 he caused the following communication to be made to the Corps and to its Commander:—

"I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General had much pleasure in casually meeting the Guide Corps in camp at Akhora. His Lordship would have been glad, if time had permitted of his doing more than merely passing down their ranks; but even the passing glance his Lordship was able to afford was sufficient to show him the smart, active, soldier-like appearance of the Corps, both in Cavalry and Infantry.

"Their gallant and effective conduct has won for them on many occasions the approbation of the Government. The Governor-General is happy to mark the occasion of his seeing them in person, and to convey to their Commanding Officer the sense he entertains of their services under him in the field, by bestowing on one of their Native Officers a public distinction in honour of the service he has done.

"The conduct of Fattah Khan, Khatak, Risaldar of the Guides, has been conspicuous on many different occasions. The Governor-General has satisfaction in conferring on him the title of 'Khan Bahadur,' and His Lordship requests that the honour which has been conferred on him, and the sentiments herein expressed, may be made known to the Corps in regimental orders."

Towards the end of February or beginning of March of this year the 3rd Troop of the Cavalry and Nos. 2, 4, 5 and 6 Companies of the Infantry of the Guides had been sent to the village of Matta, midway between the Panjpao and Swat rivers, on the borders of the Mohmand country. The Mohmands had given more trouble than almost any other tribe since the British occupation of the Peshawar valley, and in December 1850 an unprovoked attack had been made upon the village of Shabkadar, organized by one Fattah Khan, son of the chief of Lalpur, who was himself ill-disposed towards the British and was doing all he could to incite the tribe to take up arms. On 28 March 1851 another attack was made upon Matta, when the Guides counter-attacked and drove back a strong body of Mohmands, losing one man killed. In April there was another attack made by the chief of Pandiali; other risings followed in July, headed by a leading man of Panjpao; and, finally, in October the Michni Mohmands made so serious an assault upon villages on the British side of the border that later in the month the Government directed that the fiefs held by these tribesmen, under which they were permitted to collect the revenue, should be confiscated, our border posts strengthened, and that punitive measures should at once be undertaken against the offenders.

Accordingly on 25 October 1851 a force numbering 1,593 of all ranks marched out from Peshawar, under command of Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, while 250 men of the Guides Infantry and some sabres of the Cavalry, under Lieutenant Lumsden, with Lieutenants Hardinge, Miller and Hawes and Dr. Lyell, joined the column at the Kabul river. The force moved unopposed to the village of Dab by way of Mian Khel, and here the hamlets were destroyed, Shabkadar and Matta reinforced, and a position taken up to cover the erection of a fort at Michni. The Infantry of the Guides covered the advance, held the front during the destruction of the villages, and provided the rearguard during the return to camp, receiving the congratulations of Sir Colin on their steadiness.

The tribesmen did not regard the proceedings of the British without concern. The camp was kept on the alert by frequent night attacks, and on 27 November the enemy crept down upon the village of Matta, then occupied by Major Jackson of the 2nd Irregular Cavalry with some of his men, two guns and two companies of the Guides, and, getting into the sugar-cane fields outside the village, had almost reached the walls before the troops were ordered to fall in. The Guides Infantry then sallied out under Lieutenant Miller, and drove the enemy out of the sugar-cane into the open so rapidly that the Irregular Cavalry were not formed up in time to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered them, and the tribesmen regained the hills with small loss.

Again, on 6 March 1852, Risaldar Fattah Khan with thirty sabres of the Guides Cavalry was at Gujargarhi, some five miles north-west of Mardan, awaiting the arrival of a survey party to which he was to provide the escort, when he 1852 was attacked at night by 180 horsemen from Swat, headed by one Mukaram Khan, formerly of the Peshawar Police. These, when challenged by the sentry, replied "Sahib," upon which the risaldar ran out, expecting to meet the survey officer; but on seeing that the party was carrying matchlocks, he instantly

realized they were enemies, and called out to his men "to look to themselves for the enemy was upon them." Mukaram Khan's men now galloped into camp, discharging their matchlocks into the standing tents, not one of which had fewer than eight or ten bullet-holes through it. Fortunately, all the Guides had rushed out of the tents, sword in hand, on the alarm being given, and breaking up into small parties, they defended the camp on foot, finally driving out the enemy. In this affair one sowar was killed and two were wounded.

In a letter of 15 March 1852, the Adjutant-General wrote as follows to Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., commanding the Peshawar Brigade :—

"I am also to express the Commander-in-Chief's approval of the very gallant conduct of the small party of the Guide Corps on the occasion under advertence, and to request you will be good enough to make known the same to Lieutenant Lumsden, commanding the Regiment, for communication to the Native Officer and men concerned."

The civil and military heads of the Indian Government were indeed very appreciative of the good service which was being performed on this wild frontier by the Guides and their Commandant, and shortly before this the Governor-General had caused a letter to be written in which we find :—

"No task could be more agreeable to the Governor-General than to record his very cordial concurrence in the approbation which his Excellency [the Commander-in-Chief] and Sir Colin Campbell have so warmly bestowed on Lieutenant Lumsden—a braver or a better soldier never drew a sword. The Governor-General places unbounded confidence in him and in the gallant body of men he commands. . . ."

For some time past the favourite raiding-ground of the restless spirits of the Utman Khel, neighbours to the Mohmands, had been the Hashtnagar division, and early in 1852 one Ajun Khan took up his quarters in Utman Khel villages in the north of this area, and began raiding the British border. Finally in April, collecting some two hundred men, he attacked Charsadda, the headquarters of the district, plundered the treasury, and murdered certain government officials. Within a week Sir Colin Campbell was moving out against him from Peshawar; he established his headquarters at Abazai and there concentrated a tolerably strong force of all arms, which included a squadron of the Cavalry and some four hundred bayonets of the Infantry of the Guides. The advance of this force had been pushed out to Nawe Dhand, some five miles north of Abazai on the Utman Khel border, and here on 2 May a piquet of twenty of the Guides Cavalry reported that the enemy was advancing in force. While the British were getting under arms, Lieutenant G. N. Hardinge, of the Guides Cavalry (Acting Commandant since 3 August 1850), wishing to gain time, charged the enemy's skirmishers as they advanced over a low ridge in front, cut down a number of them, checked the advance and brought in a standard. In this affair Lieutenant Hardinge was himself wounded, as were also three sowars.

On 11 May the force under General Campbell, covered by the skirmishers

of the Guides Infantry, moved on the village of Nawe Dhand, which was carried and burnt, and on the 12th the column advanced seven miles to Gandera, attacking and destroying Prang Ghar, the stronghold of the Utman Khel, who were in some force and offered considerable opposition. The Guides again covered the advance, and one of them wounded and captured Ajun Khan's headman, who was found to be in possession of the weapons of a *thanadar* who had recently been murdered in Hashtnagar. In these three days' fighting the Guides had one sepoy killed and Jemadars Ousan Singh and Pir Bakhsh and eight other ranks wounded.

It was now very evident that Ajun Khan's men had been permitted to pass through, if they had not actually been harboured in, Ranizai territory; and it was decided to proceed against this tribe, who had also refused to pay the fines levied upon them for other acts of misconduct. On 15 May a force, numbering considerably over 3,000 and including the Guides, was assembled at Shergarh, just outside the Swat border, under command of Sir Colin Campbell. From reports received it was clear that numbers of tribesmen were flocking from all parts to defend Shahkot, the principal village of Ranizai, and that many *ghazis* had come over the passes to encourage the faithful and urge on the waverers.

On the 18th the force moved on Shahkot, situated between a very deep and narrow nullah on the east and some hills on the west, where the enemy was holding a position about a mile and a half long. The infantry of the column, led by the Guides, cleared the ravine and the village and occupied the high ground beyond, while the Guides Cavalry charged the enemy and cut down many of them, pursuing the rest as far as Dargai, three miles away at the foot of the Malakand Pass. Of the forty casualties sustained by the force, half were men of the Guides, who lost eight men killed and twelve wounded. Both the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General had much to say in praise of the leaders and troops to whom the success of these operations was due.¹

The Ranizais now made overtures for peace, accepted the terms offered them, and settled down to rebuild their villages and till their lands; while all through the hot weather of 1852 the Guides were employed in guarding and patrolling the Frontier and in providing covering parties for the workmen engaged in erecting a fort at Abazai.

In July Sir Colin Campbell relinquished the command of the Peshawar Brigade, returning to England in the cold weather, and in November an event of even greater importance to the Corps of Guides took place when Lieutenant Lumsden went home on medical certificate. He had been continuously on service for fifteen years, and was greatly in need of a change; but one may readily imagine how difficult it must have been for him to make up his mind to go home, for in those days officers of the Indian service gave up their appointments when they went on furlough, and it was at least doubtful if they would be similarly employed on returning to the East.

Lumsden's services in the Peshawar district were thus acknowledged by

¹ Letter of 29 May from Adjutant-General to Sir Colin Campbell. Letter of 19 July from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Adjutant-General.

Brigadier-General A. Roberts, Sir Colin Campbell's successor, in an order of 30 October 1852 :—

" Lieutenant Lumsden having made over command of the Guide Corps and of the troops in Yusafzai and Hastnagar, preparatory to proceeding to Europe, the Brigadier-General desires to offer to him most cordial thanks for the able manner in which he has conducted the duties of his command for so long a period on this frontier. The Brigadier-General has not had the pleasure of service with Lieutenant Lumsden, and the Guide Corps has only been incidentally and occasionally placed under the orders of the Senior Officer at Peshawar ; but the records in this division abundantly show the estimation in which Lieutenant Lumsden and the distinguished body of men under his orders were held by the late commanding officer, Brigadier-General Sir Colin Campbell, who was so well able to judge their merits from frequent service with them in the field. Lieutenant Lumsden's personal influence in many parts of this valley, and his thorough acquaintance with the frontier, render his departure a great public loss, but he leaves behind a fame which has been repeatedly acknowledged by the highest authorities in India, and a Corps which, raised and commanded by himself for the last six years, whilst constantly employed in various quarters of the Punjab and Trans-Indus territories, in all situations and under all circumstances has done credit to its gallant leader."

The very high opinion expressed by the Brigadier of the Commandant and the Corps was not confined to the commander of the brigade with the troops of which the Guides, Cavalry and Infantry, had so often served ; for in the report by the Board on the Administration of the Punjab dated 19 August of this year, the following very striking tribute is paid to the Corps :—

" The Guides are an interesting and remarkable Corps. They are formed so that in the same body of men shall be united all the requisites of regular troops with the best qualities of guides and spies, thus combining intelligence and sagacity with courage, endurance and soldierly bearing, and a presence of mind which rarely fails in solitary danger and in trying situations. To insure this combination of so many diverse qualities, the Corps has been composed of the most varied elements ; there is scarcely a wild or warlike tribe in Upper India, which is not represented in its ranks. In raising this Corps, although soldierly qualities were chiefly regarded, the other qualifications were not overlooked. Men, habituated from childhood to war and the chase, and inured to all the dangers of a wild and mountainous border, were freely admitted to its ranks. To whatever part of Upper India the Corps may be marched, it can furnish men conversant with the features of the country and the dialect of the people. It is calculated to be of the utmost assistance in the Quartermaster-General's Department as intelligencers, and most especially in the escort of reconnoitring officers. In champaign country also the Corps is fully equal to regular troops. It has won applause in the Manjha, at Multan, in the Chuj Doab and at Peshawar. Indeed, during the last Sikh War, though one of its two companies was chiefly formed of Sikhs, it mainly maintained the peace of the Rechnah Doab, and on two occasions defeated large bodies of Sikhs."

"The Corps was raised at the suggestion of Colonel H. M. Lawrence, agent for the Governor-General N.W.F., by an order of Lord Hardinge soon after the conclusion of the Sutlej campaign in March, 1846. Its original strength was one troop of Cavalry of 96 sabres and two companies of Infantry, each of 92 bayonets : this number was trebled¹ by the Marquis of Dalhousie, so that three troops of Cavalry and six Companies of Infantry, in all 840 men, is the present strength. The pay is somewhat better than the ordinary scale—a private receives eight rupees and a trooper twenty-four ; but all carry their own equipage, receive no batta, and have hitherto literally been always in the field. Four European officers and a surgeon are attached ; the commandant is Lieutenant Lumsden, a first-rate soldier and an adept at partisan warfare, who, aided by Lieutenant Hodson, a young but gallant and accomplished soldier, raised the Corps. They are stationed in Eusufzye and formed a part of Sir Colin Campbell's field force during the recent operations against the Momunds in Ranizye. The Second-in-command, Lieutenant Miller, is an energetic and gallant officer ; as are Lieutenant Hardinge, the commandant of the Cavalry, and Lieutenant Hawes and Lieutenant Turner ; the past and present adjutants. All the Guides officers have magisterial powers to enable them to be employed, if needful, in police duties ; indeed Lieutenant Lumsden had civil charge of all Peshawar for a year after Lieutenant-Colonel G. Lawrence's departure, and has since continued in civil and military charge of Eusufzye."

The officer now appointed to be Commandant of the Guides Corps, on the departure of Lieutenant Lumsden, was Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson, who had recently reverted to civil employment² and was at this time Assistant Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej states. Writing home from Kasauli on 23 September 1852, he said : "Lumsden, my old Commandant in the Guides, goes to England next month, and the Governor-General has given me the command which I have coveted so long. It is immense good fortune in every way, both as regards income and distinction. It is accounted the most honourable and arduous command on the Frontier, and fills the public eye, as the papers say, more than any other. . . . I am most gratified by the appointment to the command of the Guides, and more so by the way it was given me. . . . It is no small thing for a subaltern to be raised to the command of a battalion of infantry and a squadron and a half of cavalry, with four English officers under him."

Lieutenant Hodson did not take command of the Guides until 1 November, when he joined the Infantry portion of it in time to command it in another of the many minor Frontier expeditions of those days, which was to be undertaken against the Hasanzais of the Black Mountain.

Shortly after the annexation of the Punjab a preventive line was drawn along the left bank of the Indus to prevent trans-Indus salt being smuggled into the province. In 1851 this line was extended five miles beyond Tarbela (ten miles north-east of Topi) to a point on the Indus where the Cis-Indus territory of the Nawab

¹ On 14 June 1849.

² See p. 18.

of Amb began. In November of that year two of our customs officials were murdered in the country of the Nawab by a band of armed Hasanzais. The Nawab, on being called to account, handed over such Hasanzais as he was able to secure ; whereupon the tribe at once made war upon him, laid waste his border villages, and seized and occupied two of his forts. British interference now became necessary, and early in December a strong force was concentrated at Shergarh, on the north-west border of the Hazara district, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawar ; included in this force were four infantry companies of the Guides under Lieutenant Hodson, with Lieutenant F. McC. Turner and Dr. R. Lyell.

Writing from " Camp in Hazara, 16 December 1852," Hodson says : " I took command of the Guides on 1 November, and twenty-four hours afterwards marched on service to this country, which is on the east or left bank of the Indus, above the parallel of Attock. We are now in an elevated valley, surrounded by snowy mountains, and mighty cold it is, too, at night. We have come about 125 miles from Peshawar, and having marched up the hill, are patiently expecting the order to march down again. We have everything necessary for a pretty little mountain campaign but an enemy. Then we have to take a fort, only it has ceased to exist months ago ; and to reinstate an Indian ally in territories from which he was expelled by some neighbours, only he won't be reinstated at any price."

Colonel Mackeson divided his force into three columns and a reserve, occupying respectively Chattha, Shungali, Shoshni and Shergarah. The fort at Shungali, one of the two captured by the Hasanzais from the Nawab of Amb, was retaken without loss ; but while the troops were engaged in improving and strengthening it, the Hasanzais, and their allies the Akazais, occupied the crest of the Black Mountain and advanced their piquets close up to Chattha. Mackeson had been forbidden to employ his regular troops on the mountain at this season of the year, so he placed them at Baraddar, and on 29 December gave orders for his three remaining columns to advance on Panji Gali. The Guides Infantry were with the right column under Colonel R. Napier,¹ which arrived, after a good deal of opposition, near the summit of the mountain at a point where a broad spur, forming the top of the range occupied by the Akazais, branched off at an elevation of some 9,000 feet. The ground was exceedingly difficult—the Guides Infantry covered the advance and the enemy at one time drove in a portion of the skirmishers ; but the supports now coming up, the hill was climbed, and shortly before sunset the Guides reached the shoulder of the mountain above Panji Gali, which was still occupied by the enemy. On the appearance of our troops the Akazais rapidly retreated, and the right column then bivouacked there for the night. On the 30th the villages about Panji Gali were destroyed, and the force, moving on next day to the Tilli plateau, burnt all the villages between that place and Abu, those along the

Indus between Kotkai and Baraddar being destroyed by the Nawab of Amb's 1853 men ; and on 2 January the columns retired to Baraddar.

In these operations the Guides Infantry lost Subadar Shukr Khan

¹ Afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala.

Bahadur—a most brave and deserving officer—Jemadar Jhar Singh and Naik Suban Shah, who were killed ; Jemadar Khalik Dad and six other ranks were wounded.

The Governor-General expressed his appreciation of the conduct of the troops engaged and of Lieutenant Hodson in a letter dated 8 April 1853.

Of this service Hodson has left on record that “ it was the hardest, while it lasted, I have seen with the Guides, both as regards the actual fighting, the difficulties of the ground (a rugged mountain 7,000 feet high and densely wooded), and the exposure.”

For some months now the Corps of Guides had a peaceful and uneventful existence, and it was not until the end of the year that Lieutenant Hodson was again called to lead his men into the field.

While the shortest and easiest route between Peshawar and Kohat traverses the Kohat Pass, there is an alternative though tortuous connection between these places by way of the Jammu and Bori passes through the country of the Jowaki division of the Adam Khel Afridis. During the years 1851-53 these tribesmen had given a great deal of trouble, making many serious raids in the Kohat, Khushalgarh and Peshawar districts. Every reasonable effort was made to induce the Jowakis to see the error of their ways, but they rejected all the propositions made by the Punjab Government, and at last there was nothing to be done but to send a punitive expedition into their country.

The Bori valley is about twelve miles long, having at each end a very narrow and easily defensible defile, and it was determined to cross the outer range by the Sarghasha Pass between Kandao and Taruni. The column detailed under Colonel Boileau, 22nd Foot, and accompanied by 400 of the Guides Infantry under Lieutenant Hodson, with Lieutenant Turner and Dr. Lyell, advanced very early on 29 November from Bazid Khel, where the force had been covering the construction of Fort Mackeson. The Sarghasha Pass was found to be very steep, winding, narrow and long, but fortunately it was not held ; nor were the Bori villages occupied in any strength, the Jowaki inhabitants having taken to the spurs commanding them, from which they had to be driven by the Guides Infantry and the 66th Gurkhas.

The account of the action may best be given in the words of an officer who was present with the expedition :—¹

“ Our party, after crossing the hills between Kandao and the main Afridi range at two points, reunited in the valley at 10.30 a.m. and with the villages of Bori before us at the foot of some precipitous crags. These it at once became apparent must be carried before the villages could be attacked and destroyed. The service devolved on two detachments of the Gurkhas and Guides, commanded by Lieutenants Hodson and Turner, and the style in which these gallant fellows did their work, and drove the enemy from crag to rock and rock to crag, and finally kept them at bay from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m., was the admiration of the whole force. We could plainly see the onslaught, especially a fierce struggle, that lasted

¹ “ Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life in India,” by W. S. R. Hodson, p. 140 *et seq.*

a whole hour, for the possession of a breastwork which appeared inaccessible from below, but was ultimately carried by the Guides in the face of the determined opposition of the Afridis, who fought for every inch of ground.

"Depend upon it, this crowning of the Bori heights was one of the finest pieces of light infantry performance on record. It was, moreover, one which Avitabile,¹ with 10,000 Sikhs, was unable to accomplish. During these operations on the hill the villages were burnt, and it was only the want of powder which prevented the succession of towers which flanked them being blown into the air. The object of the expedition having been then fully achieved, the skirmishers were recalled about three o'clock, and then the difficulties of the detachment commenced; for, as is well known, the Afghans are familiar with the art of following, though they will rarely meet an enemy. The withdrawal of the Guides and Gurkhas from the heights was most exciting, and none but the best officers and the best men could have achieved this duty with such complete success. Lieutenant Hodson's tactics were of the most brilliant description, and the whole force having once more been reunited in the plain, they marched out of the valley by the Turani Pass, which, though farthest from the British camp, was the shortest to the outer plains. The force did not return to camp till between ten and eleven at night, having been out nearly eighteen hours, many of the men without food and almost all without water, the small supply which had been carried out having soon been exhausted, and none being procurable at Bori.

"Not an officer of the detachment was touched, and only eight men killed and twenty-four wounded.² When the force first entered the valley there were not more than two hundred men in arms to resist; but before they returned, the number had increased to some three thousand, tens and twenties pouring in all the morning from all the villages and hamlets within many miles, intelligence of the attack being conveyed to them by the firing."

In this action Dr. Lyell particularly distinguished himself by his gallantry, leading the Gurkha company of the Guides against a strong body of the enemy and compelling them to retreat, and then reinforcing Lieutenant Turner who was on a different part of the hill with another company.

The Guides lost four sepoy killed, while nine were wounded, their casualties actually amounting to half those of the whole force.

In his despatch of 29 November Colonel Boileau wrote as follows:—

"To the admirable conduct of Lieutenant Hodson in reconnoitring, in the skilful disposition of his men, and the daring gallantry with which he led his fine corps in every advance, most of our success is due; for the safety of the whole force while in the valley of the Tillah depended on his holding his position, and I had justly every confidence in his vigilance and valour."

The Commander-in-Chief, the Punjab Government and the Government of India also expressed their appreciation in despatches dealing with these operations.

¹ Governor of Peshawar under Ranjit Singh.

² The official account gives twenty-nine wounded.

The 4th Company (Afridis) is said not to have behaved so well as usual in this affair—after all, they were fighting against their own kinsmen—though formerly it was conspicuous for its fighting qualities. Subadar Kour Singh and Sowar Dal Singh received the Third Class of the Order of Merit for their services in these operations.

While the Infantry of the Corps was thus employed against the Jowaki Afridis, the Cavalry remained at Mardan under Lieutenant C. J. Godby.¹ This officer, on 2 December, was suddenly attacked while in camp, and was stabbed in the back by a religious fanatic named Jalalah. Jemadar Latif Khan, of the 1st Troop of the Guides, the only armed man present, drew his sword and threw himself between Lieutenant Godby and his assailant, thus preventing his inflicting a second wound. At the same time Sowar Yakub Ali threw a tent-peg at the fanatic, hitting and disabling his sword arm which, at the moment, was raised to strike the Jemadar, whose sword had slipped from his hand. The opportunity was seized by Sepoy Sikandar, 4th (Afridi) Company who, picking up Jemadar Latif Khan's sword, cut down the would-be assassin.

About this time Sowars Gujar and Mutha Singh, while with a party escorting stores from Peshawar, heard of a Hindu having been plundered; they gave chase, came up with and engaged the robbers, who fought desperately, cut down one and captured another. The man killed proved to be a noted freebooter, Khudu Khan by name.

The time was now at hand when Lieutenant Hodson was to sever his connection with the Guides, and something must be said about the circumstances which led to it.

Hodson had owed his appointment to the high opinion entertained of him by Henry Lawrence, and had been sustained by the friendly support and good opinion of Colonel Mackeson. Henry Lawrence had now, however, left the Punjab, while Mackeson had fallen a victim to the knife of an assassin, and neither with John Lawrence nor with Edwardes² does Hodson seem to have been upon anything like similar terms of friendship. In the good appointments he had held Hodson had gone over the heads of senior men; and some of his methods of command and of ruling the wild men and districts among which he was set may not have appealed to those who had led more sheltered lives. Finally, Hodson was certainly not of those who "suffered fools gladly." He had made some few enemies, European and Indian, and probably did not appreciate their powers of injury.

Hodson had imprisoned, and attached the property of, a Border chief whom he believed to be implicated in the murder of Mackeson and in the attack upon Godby, and had sent the man for trial; he was acquitted, and Edwardes reported the case to the Governor-General as one of wrongful imprisonment. Acting upon

¹ Appointed to command the Cavalry, 11 December 1852.

² In 1845 Herbert Edwardes was appointed by Henry Lawrence to be one of his assistants at Lahore, together with Lumsden and Nicholson. He was a lifelong friend of Lumsden's and warmly admired his Guides, whom he saw in action at Multan in 1848 and against the Jowaki Afridis in 1853. The two men kept up a regular correspondence when Lumsden was at Kandahar during the Mutiny.

Edwardes's version of the affair, Lord Dalhousie directed that Hodson should never again have any civil charge in Yusafzai, and the Court of Directors went farther and ordered that he was never again to be employed in any civil capacity whatever. But other matters affecting his military career were now to come up for examination.

Hodson and Turner, his Adjutant, had for some time past not been on good terms, and in April 1854 Turner was transferred to the 5th Punjab Cavalry, but before leaving the Guides he appears to have preferred to the Chief Commissioner **1854** of the Punjab certain charges against Hodson amounting practically to the malversation of regimental accounts; and early in September of this year Hodson learnt that those charges were to form the subject of a Court of Inquiry. This Court assembled in December in Peshawar and sat all through the first half of January, but the proceedings when submitted to the Judge-Advocate-General were returned for revision on certain points. The Court reassembled in July, did not on this occasion hear Hodson in his own defence, and recorded their opinion that the accounts of the Guides Corps were most unsatisfactory.

Meanwhile, Hodson had pleaded again and again for a more searching **1855** inquiry into the Corps accounts, and finally, on 2 April 1855, Brevet-Major R. G. Taylor, of the 2nd Light Cavalry, was appointed to the command of the Corps of Guides, and on joining found himself charged with the onus and responsibility of investigating Hodson's administration of the regimental chest.

Taylor was one of the most conscientious and impartial of men; he was himself the soul of honour, and was known as the "Bayard of the Punjab." For nearly three months he worked on the accounts, and on 13 February 1856 he **1856** compiled a long report testifying that "the result of my examination of Lieutenant Hodson's accounts has been quite satisfactory"—and with this verdict most men who have read all that has been written on the matter are in general and sincere agreement.

After leaving the Guides, Hodson returned to his regiment, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers. He remained with it until the outbreak of the Mutiny, when he was at once appointed Intelligence Officer and authorized to raise a regiment of Irregular Horse.¹ Later on he returned to the Guides temporarily as Commandant, when Captain Daly was wounded.²

Lumsden, now a Captain and Brevet-Major, returned to India towards the end of the year 1855, having heard from Lord Dalhousie while still on leave in England that if he could be in India by the end of December he would be reappointed to the command of the Guides. The actual date of his reappointment was 3 January 1856.

In this year there were no warlike operations in which Lumsden and his Guides were concerned, but when in January 1857 the Amir Dost Muhammad visited Peshawar, the Guides provided the escort for the Chief Commissioner when **1857** he met the Amir at the mouth of the Khyber Pass. A formal treaty was drawn up and agreed upon, and it was further arranged that three British officers should proceed to Kandahar as a military mission; the officers selected

¹ Still known as Hodson's Horse.

² See Chapter III, p. 41.

being Major H. B. Lumsden, his brother, Lieutenant P. Lumsden, then of the Quartermaster-General's Department, and Dr. H. W. Bellew, who at this time was attached as medical officer to the Guides. An escort was also to be provided by the Corps, and, as the service was considered to be not unattended with risk, volunteers were called for, and of those who came forward the following were selected : of the Cavalry, Jemadar Ibrahim Khan and sixteen non-commissioned officers and sowars ; and of the Infantry, twenty-seven non-commissioned officers and sepoy with a native doctor, Yakub Khan.

In March 1857 everything seemed quiet in British India. Had there been any hint of the trouble that was so soon to arise, it is very certain that Major Lumsden would have remained in the Punjab ready to lead his Guides in the greatest campaign which so far had come their way.



GENERAL SIR H. D. DALY, G.C.B., C.I.E.

CHAPTER III

1857

THE INDIAN MUTINY

OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY—THE GUIDES' MARCH TO DELHI—THE SIEGE—THE ASSAULT—
THE CAPTURE OF DELHI.

See plan of the March to Delhi, facing page 36 ; Plan of Delhi, facing page 48.

THE first news of the Mutiny was received at Peshawar on the night of 11 May 1857, and was confirmed by a further telegram from Meerut which was received on the morning of 12 May. That same day General Reed, commanding 1857 at Peshawar, convened a Council of War, at which it was decided, subject to confirmation by the Commander-in-Chief, to form a Movable Column, composed of two European regiments (one from Peshawar, the other from Rawalpindi), with a due proportion of European artillery and with the Guides Corps, half Cavalry and half Infantry, and other Punjabi troops and Gurkhas upon whom it was considered that reliance might be placed.¹ It was intended that this column should assemble at Jhelum, a very central position, and there remain ready to fall upon and crush mutineers wherever they might declare themselves.

Accordingly at 11 a.m. on 13 May the 55th Native Infantry from Nowshera arrived at Mardan to relieve the Guides, and at 6 p.m. that same evening the Guides marched out, believing that they were to go no farther than Jhelum, but actually to proceed hot-foot to Delhi and help to save India.

The marching-out strength of the Corps of Guides was five British officers—Captain H. D. Daly,² Lieutenants Q. Battye (Second-in-Command), T. G. Kennedy (Commandant of the Cavalry), and C. W. Hawes (Adjutant), with Assistant-Surgeon J. L. Stewart—with 153 sabres and 349 rifles.

Nowshera was reached that night, and two hours afterwards urgent orders were received to proceed forthwith to Attock to relieve the three Line companies in charge of the fort, and to hold it until the arrival of a detachment from Kohat. Accordingly the Corps marched at daybreak. It was the month of Ramazan. The men had had nothing to eat during the previous day, and during the march suffered greatly from the heat, which by the time they reached Attock was intense. They crossed the Indus soon after 10 a.m. Here the remainder of 14 May and the whole of the 15th were spent. At 2 a.m. on the 16th the Guides marched on thirty-two miles to Boran in a violent duststorm, the same distance next day to

¹ Paraphrased from Forrest, "Life of Sir N. Chamberlain," pp. 330, 331.

² Captain Daly was appointed Acting Commandant of the Guides when Major Lumsden left India on appointment to the Kandahar Mission. He had already raised two regiments, the 1st Punjab Cavalry and the 1st Oudh Irregular Cavalry.

Jani-ki-Sang, and on to Rawalpindi on the 18th, where another halt was made. The rest of this truly wonderful march may best be described in the words of Captain Daly's diary :—

" 20th. Reached Mandra, twenty miles, at 5 a.m., having marched at 10 p.m. last night. Great difficulty in keeping awake. . . . Men very cheerful and ready to go anywhere ; none admit themselves too knocked up or too stiff to proceed.

" 21st. Sohawah, twenty-four miles, crossing the Bakrialla ; ravines and roads broken and intricate ; spent a burning day ; march at 8 p.m., wind scalding.

" 22nd. Jhelum at 5 a.m. ; encamping ground by the river, delightfully fresh after twenty-eight miles. First trumpet at dark ; crossed the river at nine. Great storm of dust and rain made the road difficult to follow."

On arrival at Jhelum, or more probably before, the Guides must have learnt that the suggestion of the Peshawar Council of War—that the Movable Column should use Jhelum as a centre, whence it could proceed against mutinous garrisons—was not to be followed, and that the Guides were to join General Barnard's main force before Delhi.

" 23rd. Korla, fifteen miles from the Chenab and ten from Gujerat, twenty-one miles from Jhelum. Roads heavy from the storm, air delicious and fresh ; so tired all night that I was compelled to walk to keep myself awake ; even that remedy failed, constantly found myself abreast of a sowar's horse. Some of the sowars in the rear troop kept passing right up through the column. . . . Resolved to take advantage of the cool day and push off to the Chenab. Cavalry first, Infantry in the evening. Marched Cavalry at 3 p.m., reached the Chenab at eight and commenced the crossing.

" 25th. Marched to Kamokee this morning by 7 a.m., thirty-two miles. Started for Lahore at 5 p.m., distance thirty miles.

" 26th. Reached Lahore at 6 a.m. Was met by the Commissioner and Military Secretary—difficulty about selecting recruits.

" 27th. Recruiting. . . .

" 28th. Overtook the Corps at Powindiah at 7 a.m.

" 29th. Reached the banks of the Sutlej close to Sobraon battlefield by 6 a.m., commenced the crossing at once. Here it was that the river ran red with Sikh blood. Determined to follow the Umballa road.

" 30th. Reached Mihna, thirty-two miles, about 7 a.m. The cross-country road sent many straggling ; some did not reach till dark ; there was baggage and three men missing when four o'clock struck. Resolved on a short march and to leave at the usual time, so as to enable them to make a *night's* rest. Marched at 6 p.m. to Jagraon, fourteen miles ; reached before midnight.

" 31st. Had a delightful sleep. Men much refreshed. . . . Marched at 7 p.m.

" 1st June. Reached Ludhiana, twenty-four miles, at 3 a.m. and at once composed ourselves to sleep until daylight at the foot of the Kutcherri steps, the lowest step serving as a pillow. . . . Marched on Alawi-ki-Serai at 7.30 p.m., distance twenty-eight miles.

" 2nd. Got a sight of the Serai soon after daybreak. Had two hours' sleep off the reel and was much refreshed. The men very cheery. . . . Officers and men fall asleep on the ground for an hour, and the difficulty is, who shall remain awake to sound the trumpet? Off to Rajpooora, distance twenty-eight miles, at seven this evening.

" 3rd. Reached the old Serai with the Cavalry at dawn just as the light was breaking. . . . Started for Umballa at 6 p.m., marched through the cantonment at 1 a.m., every house deserted. . . . Our guide took us down to the Boobial Tope, magnificent trees, under which a score of horses can stand free from the sun, and a large tank; altogether a beautiful spot. We all laid down to rest by the trunk of an old banyan tree.

" 4th. Marched to Pipli, twenty-six miles, by 4.30 this morning. Road very heavy.

" 5th. Pipli. Arrived at dawn. Road heavy. Spent this day in the tahsil and marched for Karnal, twenty-four miles, at sunset. Joined by Kahan Singh Rosa.¹

" 6th. Reached Karnal at 3 a.m. Cholera appeared amongst us this evening and attacked three Gurkhas; one cook died, seven or eight men under its pressure at sunset; obliged to leave five men behind. . . ."

At Karnal the magistrate, Mr. Le Bas, made a very pressing request that the Guides would halt here one day and burn and destroy the village of Kaliran, some five miles distant, the inhabitants of which had lately given a good deal of trouble in stopping the mails. Captain Daly was unwilling to delay, but the matter being represented as urgent, the Guides moved out on the 7th; the Cavalry surrounded the village, which was then stormed and burnt by the Infantry, the Guides having one man killed and three men wounded in this affair. That same night the Corps marched thirty miles to Larsauli, and another march of equal length on the following night brought them on the morning of the 9th to the British camp before Delhi.

The Corps of Guides had thus traversed a distance of 580 miles from Mardan to Delhi at the hottest season of the year in twenty-six days! Included in the twenty-six days are three days' halt made at different times by order of superior authority, and one day spent in the operations near Karnal, so that the time actually expended in marching was only twenty-two days. As it was of the greatest importance that the Infantry should keep up with the Cavalry, camels were provided for the former at the rate of one camel for every two men, and they were thus able to accomplish between thirty and forty miles from sunset to sunrise.

Of this march Colonel Edwardes wrote: "We are all delighted at the march the Guides are making. It is the talk of the Border"; and later: "The Guides made surprising efforts. They started six hours after the receipt of orders fully equipped for service and marched 580 miles, fifty marches in twenty-two days with three halts made by order"; and again: "The Guides seem to carry off the

¹ This man had fought against us at Chillianwallah in command of a Sikh Cavalry Regiment, and had shown great courtesy to Mrs. George Lawrence when in captivity.

palm from all the troops at Delhi, and I hear that the mutual cheering between them and the Europeans on their arrival was a sound to be heard."

Their arrival at Delhi provided not only a very useful reinforcement to General Barnard's force, but all who saw the Corps march in appear to have been impressed by the quality of the troops now joining them. "Their stately height and martial bearing made all who saw them proud to have such aid. They came in as firm and light as if they had marched but a mile"¹; and in the orders of the day, Major-General Barnard, in announcing the arrival of the Guides, said that the Corps had "marched from Mardan to Delhi, a distance of 580 miles in twenty-two days—a march to which Sir H. Barnard believes there is no parallel on record."

As the Guides approached the Ridge at the close of their thirty-mile march from Larsauli, a staff officer galloped up to their Commanding Officer and inquired, "How soon can you be ready to go into action?" "In half an hour," was Captain Daly's reply.

The marching-in strength of the Corps of Guides was 5 British officers, 3 risaldars, 2 resaidars, 4 jemadars, 5 kote-dafadars, 36 dafadars, 3 trumpeters and 165 sowars of the Cavalry, and 6 subadars, 11 jemadars, 37 havildars, 40 naiks, 9 buglers and 320 sepoy of the Infantry—a total for the whole of 646 all ranks, British and Indian.

In his "Forty-one Years in India," Lord Roberts tells us that on the 9th "a welcome reinforcement reached camp, the famous Corps of Guides having arrived as fresh as if they had returned from an ordinary field day, instead of having come off a march of nearly 600 miles, accomplished in the incredibly short time of twenty-two days at the most trying season of the year. The General having inspected them said a few words of encouragement to the men, who begged their gallant Commandant to say how proud they were to belong to the Delhi Force. Their usefulness was proved that same afternoon when, in support of the piquets, they engaged the enemy in a hand-to-hand contest and drove them back to the city."

When the Mutiny broke out General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, was at Simla, and on the news reaching him there that Delhi had been captured by the mutineers from Meerut, he at once ordered all troops who were in the Simla hills and who could be spared to march down and concentrate at Umballa. There a force was organized to attack and recapture Delhi, consisting of three brigades of all arms and containing 3,000 Europeans, 1,000 Indian troops and twenty-two guns. But on 26 May General Anson was seized with cholera and died in a very few hours, and the command of the force detailed for the siege of Delhi devolved upon Major-General Sir Henry Barnard, who had arrived in India less than a month previously, and was then in command of the Sirhind Division.

On 8 June, the day before the arrival in camp of the Guides, General Barnard's force had engaged the rebels at Badli-ki-Sarai, had driven them into Delhi and had taken up a position on the Ridge to the north-west of it.

"Our position was of considerable strength at all points except one. Beyond the Right Battery and somewhat to the rear was the suburb of Sabzi Mandi, a cluster of houses and walled gardens, from which the rebels could turn our right

¹ "The Siege of Delhi, by One who Served There," p. 89.

TO DELHI, 1857.

ND.
CHED.
ED.
VED
SSED.
ON AGAINST
REBELS.

	DETAIL OF OPERATION	TIME	LENGTH OF MARCH
.....	M. 12 TH MAY	6 P.M.	
.....	H.	2 HRS.	
.....	A. 14 TH M. 16 TH	10 A.M. 2 A.M.	34. MLS.
.....	A. 16 TH M. 17 TH		32 MLS.
.....	A. 17 TH M. 18 TH		32 MLS.
.....	A. 18 TH M. 19 TH	10 P.M.	15. MLS.
.....	A. 20 TH M. 20 TH	5 A.M.	20. MLS.
.....	A. 21 ST M. 21 ST	8 P.M.	24 MLS.
.....	A. 22 ND C. 22 ND	5 A.M. 9 P.M.	28 MLS.
.....	A. 8 TH M. 9 TH	P.M. A.M.	
.....	A. 9 TH JUNE X 9 TH	AM. PM.	32 MLS

To face page 36

and cut off our road to Umballa or the Punjab, upon which we rested. Not far from the Right Battery the rocky Ridge ends, but it rises again at a hill on which was built an enclosed mosque, and on the level space between were the suburbs of Kissengunge and Paharunpur. The ground between the Ridge and city was full of old buildings, with clumps of trees and gardens which afforded convenient cover and shelter to the enemy up to the walls of the city. The walls which surrounded Delhi were about seven miles in circumference and some twenty-four feet in height, with bastions in good order, each holding ten, twelve or fourteen pieces of artillery. They were covered for a full third of their height by an admirable glacis, and had in front a ditch of considerable width and about twenty-four feet deep. The eastern face of the city rests on the Jumna river, and at the season of the year when our operations were being carried on, the waters washed the base of the walls. All access to the besieged on the river front was therefore impracticable, and there could be no real investment of Delhi."¹

The Guides could scarcely have had time to do more than pitch camp and take a very brief rest at the close of their historic march, when the rebels, in the afternoon of 9 June, made a sortie in force from Delhi and delivered a sharp attack upon Hindu Rao's house, a large stone building which crowned the south-western end of the long, rocky Ridge. The Ridge, rising in broken ground on the banks of the Jumna some two and a half miles above Delhi, extended about two miles, terminating a little below Hindu Rao's house where ran the Grand Trunk Road. The Guides were at once called upon ; and while the Infantry, under Captain Daly, with Lieutenants Battye and Hawes, was told off to reinforce the piquet on the extreme right of the Ridge, the Cavalry, under Lieutenant Kennedy, was directed to move along the foot of the Ridge and watch one of the many roads that ran below it and led through the Sabzi Mandi to the city.

The entry in Captain Daly's diary of the 10th is very brief :² " The Regiment hotly engaged. Battye mortally wounded—noble Battye, ever in front. Kahan Singh Rosa hard hit. Hawes clapt across the face with a sword and many good men down. Men behaved heroically, impetuously."

The enemy, having ascended the hill, were close up to the right piquet, when the Guides Infantry arriving on the scene were instantly thrown into skirmishing order and, with a shout, dashed to the front. The rebels fell back in confusion and the Guides followed hard on their heels, friend and foe pouring together on to the main road. The Guides Cavalry were watching the opportunity to assist their Infantry comrades, and were now moved forward to attack, but had not advanced fifty yards when they came upon a body of some 150 of the enemy cavalry drawn up on a cross-road ; these the Guides at once charged and the enemy broke and fled—all but one man—afterwards recognized as a jemadar of the 3rd Light Cavalry which had mutinied at Meerut—who, reining back his horse to the side of the road, levelled his pistol at Lieutenant Kennedy. That officer delivered a cut and passed on in pursuit, whereupon Risaldar Muhammad Khan, who was

¹ Forrest, " The Indian Mutiny," vol. 1, pp. 79, 80.

² " Memoirs," p. 142.

immediately following, " jerked him (the jemadar) off his horse and sprung from his own saddle into that of his late enemy, as he thought he would profit by the change of horses."¹

For this action Muhammad Khan received the Third Class Order of Merit, while Jiwan Singh, sowar, was promoted dafadar for opportunely cutting down a rebel sowar who, unnoticed, had followed Lieutenant Kennedy and, with lance poised, was within a few paces of him.

Dal Singh, dafadar, was Captain Daly's orderly during this day's fight, and was advanced from the Third to the Second Class Order of Merit for conspicuous gallantry, combined with his accustomed coolness, in aiding that officer who, with Lieutenant Hawes, was engaged in close combat with a party of the enemy. In the Infantry, Subadars Ahmad Khan and Pir Bukhsh and Jemadar Khairulla particularly distinguished themselves in this action, as did also Kote-Dafadar Tarlok Singh.²

Of the British officers, Captain Daly had his horse killed and was himself struck on the leg by a spent bullet ; Lieutenant Hawes was also wounded ; while Lieutenant Quentin Battye, the first of the many of his name who have died on service in the Indian Army, succumbed that evening to his wounds. He was engaged at close quarters with a man who, bringing his musket to the " charge," was attempting to use his bayonet. Having succeeded in grasping the musket, Battye unfortunately pulled it across his own body, and the man pressing the trigger at the same moment, the ball entered poor Battye's abdomen, coming out at the centre of his back. " ' Now I have a chance of seeing service,' was his joyous exclamation as he set forth from Mardan with his regiment. A keen soldier, good swordsman and fine rider, there was every prospect of a splendid career for the intrepid lad. But he fell at his first fight, and as life ebbed away he murmured with his failing voice the noble words of the Roman poet : '*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*' "³

In Regimental Orders there appeared the following announcement : " The heroic Battye fell mortally wounded whilst leading and cheering on his men " ; while of the Corps generally Greathed wrote, " The Guides distinguished themselves very much." Of the other ranks of the Guides, one man was killed this day and six were wounded.

On hearing of the fighting on 9 June, Sir John Lawrence wrote to Captain Daly :—

" I was glad to get your letter of the 10th and rejoiced to hear how admirably the Guides have behaved. Poor Battye, we all grieve for him greatly. . . . Pray

¹ Greathed, " The Siege of Delhi," p. 36.

² Among the most distinguished awards made to the Guides for valour shown during the siege of Delhi was that of the Indian Order of Merit to the *bhisti* Jumma, as the result of a vote by the fighting troops. On their petition he was enlisted in the Corps as a sepoy—an unparalleled honour for a low-caste " follower "—and rose to be an Indian officer, winning a clasp to his Indian Order of Merit twenty years later in the fighting round Kabul. He was the original of Gunga Din in Rudyard Kipling's poem.

³ Forrest, vol. 1, p. 81.

tell the Guides how delighted I am with their good conduct"; and in a letter received a few days later he wrote: "I shall recommend to Government that Kennedy succeed Battye [as Second-in-Command]. Look out for some smart young fellow to join the Corps and act as Adjutant. If there be anyone in camp you fancy, General Reed will let you have him, I expect. If he is elsewhere, let me know. . . . About fifty Guides, horse and foot, start from this for Delhi this evening."

The Guides Infantry was now permanently posted on the right of the Ridge, and, besides taking their share in the general operations with the Sirmur battalion (now the 2nd Gurkhas), they held the position and furnished the outposts round Hindu Rao's house. On 12 June the enemy made an attempt to turn this flank, occupying the Sabzi Mandi in great numbers, whereupon the Guides Infantry were ordered to turn them out; this was successfully accomplished with a loss to the Corps of five killed and six wounded after two hours' fighting.

During the engagement Kour Sing, Subadar of the Gurkha Company of the Guides, later unfortunately killed at the head of his men, boldly dashed at three rebels in a house and dispatched every one of them with his *kukri*. This very gallant Gurkha officer would certainly have risen to great distinction had he survived; he had gained the Third Class Order of Merit in action on the North-West Frontier, and before his death was promoted to the Second Class. In consideration of his gallant services and invariable good conduct, his son, Kharak Sing, a boy of ten or twelve years of age, was on his father's death appointed a supernumerary jemadar in the Corps.

During the course of the siege the enemy delivered no fewer than six-and-twenty separate attacks upon this part of the line, and just now these occurred almost daily.

On the 13th the enemy again got into the Sabzi Mandi and again were they ejected by the Guides Infantry. Of this action Greathed wrote: "The enemy came out yesterday; they had some new arrivals from Oudh whom they wished to introduce to us; it did not last long and they were driven back with some loss. . . . Tombs, having just been relieved from battery duty, must needs run a mile after them with the Guides, potting with a carbine; his excuse was he wanted to see how the Guides fight. They had another officer, young Kennedy, wounded, which is a pity. They are excellent soldiers, and I wish we had more of them."

The Guides this day again had some ten men killed and wounded, while Bugler Akhtar Buland won the Third Class Order of Merit for coolness under fire; and on the 14th there was another attack by the enemy in which Subadar Mehrban Singh, a very gallant Indian officer, was killed. Then on the morning of the 17th it was noticed that the enemy seemed busy at work about the mosque, and since any battery erected there would enfilade the British position, two small columns under Major Tombs and Major Reid were sent out to destroy the works. With Major Tombs's party were thirty of the Guides Cavalry under Risaldar Khanan Khan, of whose help Major Tombs spoke very highly.

Two days afterwards there was a more serious affair. Secret notice of an enemy sortie having been received, the piquets were reinforced, and in the afternoon a large body of the rebels issued from the Lahore gate and threatened the front of the British position, while a large body of them filed unobserved through the gardens and suburbs to the right. The following is Captain Daly's account of what occurred :—

"At a time when every available British bayonet was engaged in the front, the enemy, under cover of the thick foliage, moved round to our right and rear in a large body of all arms. The move was a surprise which almost overwhelmed us. We had nothing at first but a portion of the 9th Lancers, the Guides Cavalry and four guns wherewith to meet and repel the attack. Sir Hope Grant, who was in command, divided his small body (for the ground was broken and thick with gardens and trees) and detached one to the left with two of Major Tombs' guns under Lieutenant Hills, a troop of 9th Lancers and the Guides Cavalry. I quickly found myself in the presence of a powerful force, with six or eight guns in position immediately to my front and a mass of infantry and cavalry. Knowing that there was nothing to fall back on, I directed Hills at once to get his guns into action, and detached all but a handful of Guides, which I left with the guns, to clear the left flank, already threatened by the enemy's cavalry. We were thus barely holding our own, Sir Hope hotly engaged on my right, when Major Tombs came up with the remainder of his guns. The enemy, observing our weakness and the absence of infantry, were now closing on us in such numbers that Major Tombs said to me, 'I fear I must ask you to charge to save my guns.' I was the only British officer with the cavalry, a few Guides only; with these I broke through the infantry and reached the enemy's guns. This diversion cleared our front and gave time for the arrival of reinforcements."

"The Guides Corps under Captain Daly," wrote Brigadier Grant in his despatch of 22 June, "gallantly charged twice, and I regret to say this excellent officer was severely wounded in the shoulder"; his left arm was actually crippled for life, although he retained the use of the hand. As he lay on the ground in the rapidly gathering dusk, his men at first failed to find him, but his position was pointed out to them by one of the enemy who had been a jemadar in the 1st Oudh Light Cavalry, a young man whom Daly had befriended in past days. Of the Guides who charged with Captain Daly, Jemadar Haji Baba and Kote-Dafadar Pir Muhammad Khan were killed, bayoneted while surrounded by rebel infantry. In consideration of their gallant services, the family of Pir Muhammad Khan was given two *bargirs* in the Cavalry, and the two brothers of Haji Baba were promoted jemadar. Kote-Dafadar Duni Chand also distinguished himself this day, and received a severe bayonet wound from which, however, he recovered; he was promoted jemadar.

Of the charge made by the Guides on this occasion Sir Hope Grant wrote: "I have no hesitation in saying that in all human probability that charge saved the guns from falling into the hands of the enemy"; while Hills said: "We were in a very nasty position and the enemy were very close to the guns and doing us great damage with their sharpshooters. Daly's charge was a desperate one, right

up to the enemy's guns. It was a most perilous and bold movement, but necessary to save the guns."

That night General Barnard visited Daly and expressed his regret that he could not recommend him for the Victoria Cross, which was not then open to officers of the Indian Army. Early in 1859 the award of the Victoria Cross was thrown open to British officers of the Honourable East India Company's service, and Sir Hope Grant strongly recommended Daly to Lord Clyde, who by then was Commander-in-Chief, for the decoration; but the reply was that "His Excellency has been obliged to decline forwarding claims of this sort made so long after the occurrence for which the claim is preferred."

On Captain Daly's disablement the active command of the Guides was at first entrusted to Captain Hodson, who, in a letter dated 20 June, said: "The General has asked me as a personal favour to take command of the Guides until Daly has recovered. I at first refused, but the General was most urgent . . . and . . . I accepted the command. How — will gnash his teeth to see me leading my dear old Guides again in the field. . . . Shebbeare¹ was appointed Second-in-Command at my request. He is an excellent soldier." Later he wrote: "I cannot but feel gratified at the marked pleasure all hands, high and low, have shown at my renewed command of the Guides. All congratulate me as if they were personally interested; and as to the men themselves, their vociferous and, I really believe, honest delight is quite overpowering."²

Daly, however, though unable to move, still kept an eye on all regimental matters, and of him a friend wrote:³ "In the unwholesome air of our camp Daly's wound healed very slowly, and he was strongly urged by the medical men to go away to the pure air of the hills, and was assured he was never likely to be able to lead men in the field again during the siege. He nobly declined to go, on the ground that, if he could not lead the Corps, he would daily see the native officers at his tent, and in this way he could maintain a good influence in the Corps. To this resolution he adhered, and no doubt his remaining and always taking a cheerful view of matters had a most beneficial effect on the Guides and on many others to whom his cheery remarks, though suffering a good deal of pain, were a valuable cordial."

On the 23rd, the centenary of Plassey, the enemy made the most resolute attacks they had yet delivered, advancing through the Sabzi Mandi on the Mound Battery and Major Reid's⁴ position. "No men could have fought better," declared that officer; "they charged the Rifles,⁵ the Guides and my own men, again and again, and at one time I thought I must have lost the day. The cannonade from the city and the heavy guns which they had brought out raged fast and furious, and completely enflamed the whole of my position. Thousands were brought against my mere handful of men, but I knew the importance of my position, and was determined to do my utmost to hold it till reinforcements arrived."

¹ Captain R. H. Shebbeare, 60th Native Infantry, raised the 15th Pioneer Regiment of Punjab Infantry in 1857—now the 1st Bn. 3rd Sikh Pioneers.

² Hodson, "Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life," pp. 209, 210, 212, 213.

³ "Memoirs of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Norman," pp. 83, 84.

⁴ Commanding 2nd Gurkha Rifles. ⁵ i.e., the 60th Rifles.

Greathed tells us that "our fellows followed them three times into the Sabzi Mandi, but they got into houses and closed the doors on themselves, and when our troops withdrew came out again and fired away." In this action Lieutenant A. W. Murray, 60th Native Infantry, attached to the Guides, was severely wounded.

On the 27th the enemy attacked again and were repulsed. On this occasion another attached officer, Lieutenant O. I. Chalmers, 3rd Native Infantry, was slightly wounded.

These severe actions, occurring almost daily, were seriously reducing the numbers of the besiegers generally and of the Guides in particular. Writing on 3 July, Hodson said :¹ "My poor gallant Guides ! They have suffered severely for their fidelity to our cause, above a fourth of the whole having been killed or wounded, including some of our best men. Kour Sing, the little Gurkha subadar who won the Order of Merit in that stiff affair at Bori in 1853, is gone, and others whom we can ill afford to lose now that so much depends on the fidelity of the native officers—the Guides more than all." John Lawrence in the Punjab was, however, doing all that man could do to strengthen the force before Delhi, and writing to Daly on 4 July, he said : "I am much afraid that the poor Guides have suffered greatly. What with the enemy and cholera their ranks must have been fearfully thinned. I have sent you down some 200 picked Punjabis, mounted on horses of the 6th and 8th Cavalry, under Lieutenant Hayley. This will be a grand reinforcement for your cavalry."

On the 4th the enemy moved upon Alipore, one march out on the Karnal road, and a force was sent out from camp to intercept or overtake them. As Hodson puts it, "We beat 5,000 of the rebels in the morning, and were twice attacked by upwards of 3,000 in the course of the day. I took the Guides in pursuit (as soon as our guns had driven the enemy from their position) and drove them into a village. . . . Our loss was about thirty or forty Europeans and three of my native officers temporarily disabled. Both men and horses were terribly knocked up towards the end of the day, and could hardly crawl back to camp, and no wonder. . . . My men, who were most engaged of all, escaped with the loss of one killed and six wounded and six horses put *hors de combat*."

The next day General Barnard was attacked by cholera and died in the night, General Reed assuming command of the Delhi force in his place.

On the morning of 9 July a brisk cannonade from the city and suburbs was followed by the sudden rush of a hundred mounted rebels upon a piquet of the Carabineers and Horse Artillery posted to the right of the Mound Battery. Mistaken at first for some of our own Irregulars, they dashed through the piquets right into the British camp before the mistake had been discovered. Risaldar Muhammad Khan of the Guides, who happened at the time to have his horse ready saddled, mounted and galloped off in the direction of the oncoming cavalry, and was on the point of charging the enemy single-handed when he was stopped by Major Tombs, who explained that he was about to open fire upon them with his guns. Half an hour later the discomfited raiders were hurrying back to their own line, leaving some

¹ "Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life," pp. 223, 224.

thirty-five of their dead in the British camp, pursued hotly by Risaldar Muhammad Khan, who cut down all he could overtake, and himself only narrowly escaped being shot by a European piquet in the Sabzi Mandi, who poured a volley into the flying rebels.

The rest of the Cavalry were with Hodson, who was attempting to cut off another party of the enemy.

The Infantry of the Guides also greatly distinguished themselves this day under Lieutenants E. E. B. Bond¹ and A. W. Murray, who, with seventy-eight men only, held a breastwork against far superior numbers of the enemy advancing to very close quarters. The Guides had run out of ammunition, of which the enemy appeared to be equally short, and the fight was carried on with stones, until Lieutenant H. de Brett,¹ then attached to the Guides, arrived with a reinforcement of fifty bayonets and, charging the enemy in flank, so bewildered them that they broke and fled. Some idea of the numbers of the enemy and the loss inflicted on him may be gauged from the fact that ninety of his dead were counted about the breastwork. In another part of the field, Lieutenant Hawes with fifty Guides accompanied a small column under Brigadier Chamberlain, which attacked a force of the enemy which had advanced from the city with guns.

On this day the Guides' casualties were Lieutenant Murray and twenty-seven other ranks killed and wounded.

Writing on 12 July, Hodson says: "I have got a very nice lad *pro tem.* in the Guides, young Craigie, who promises very well indeed. I have seven officers attached to the Guides, but two are wounded and Chalmers is very ill."

There was renewed fighting on the 14th, of which Hodson wrote: "Only time to say I am again mercifully preserved, safe and unhurt, after one of the sharpest encounters we have yet had. Shebbeare got wounded early in the fight, so I led the Guides Infantry myself in the skirmish of the villages and suburbs. I charged the guns with some eight horsemen, a party of the Guides Infantry and 1st Fusiliers. We got within thirty yards, but the enemy's grape was too much for our small party. Three of my officers, Shebbeare, Hawes and de Brett, slightly wounded and several men, but though well to the front, my party suffered proportionately least." Twenty-six of the Guides were, however, casualties.

In a later letter the Commandant of the Guides wrote:—

"We had an engagement on the evening of the 20th, in which Colonel Seaton commanded our column, the 1st Fusiliers, 61st Foot and Guides as usual. I had command of the Guides Infantry and led the advance as well as covered the retreat; and though we pushed close up to Delhi, we never had a shot fired from the walls until we had set out on our return to camp some way. They then came howling after us like jackals, but the Guides were mindful of their old leader's voice, and steadily kept them in check during the whole distance so completely that not a European soldier was under fire, and I only lost four men slightly wounded, while the enemy returned in utter discomfiture."

On the 23rd the enemy made another sharp attack on the right piquet and

¹ 57th Native Infantry.

was as usual repulsed, the loss in the Guides being trifling. On this day Hodson relinquished the command of the Guides in order to be able to give increased attention to the duties of A.Q.M.G. of the force, and Captain Shebbeare now became Commandant of the Corps under date of 24 July.

By this time there had been yet another change in the command of the troops engaged in the siege of Delhi, Major-General Reed having gone on sick leave to Simla on 17 July and having been succeeded in command by Brigadier-General Wilson.

From the morning of 31 July until late on 1 August there was one prolonged attack on the British, but though the firing was incessant, our loss was not heavy owing to the good cover provided. Lieutenant Hawes of the Guides was once again slightly wounded, while many of the enemy dead were lying about the position. In a despatch of 12 August, Major Reid, commanding the Main Piquet, Hindu Rao's house, wrote as follows of the Guides :—

" My acknowledgments are due to Lieutenant Shebbeare, now commanding the distinguished Corps of Guides, who has been three times slightly wounded whilst on duty with me here ; also to Lieutenant Hawes, adjutant (likewise wounded) and other officers doing duty with the Corps."

Hodson, as has been said, had before this given up the command of the Guides in order to devote more time to his intelligence and other staff work, but he still took a deep interest in the Corps and had its interests very near his heart. What he wrote in a letter of 8 August will probably appeal to all who served in the Corps prior to 1922. " Captain Daly," he said, " has not formally reassumed command of the Guides, though he virtually does all the sedentary work. By an arrangement which I cannot but think unwise, and which deprives the Corps of two-thirds of its value, they have separated the Regiment into two, putting the Cavalry into the Cavalry Brigade under Hope Grant, and the infantry at the other end of the camp under Shebbeare and Major Reid of the Gurkhas, who commands all the posts and piquets on our right. *The Guides should not be separated and should be kept as much apart as may be from other Corps.*"¹

On 13 August eighty men of the Guides Cavalry accompanied Hodson, with some two hundred of his own newly raised regiment of Irregular Cavalry, towards Rohtak for the purpose of watching a body of the enemy with two guns, who had moved out from Delhi, plundering the villages and threatening Hansi. On arrival near Rohtak it was found that the enemy infantry had taken up their position in the many gardens, woods and enclosures with which the country surrounding Delhi was studded, while their mounted men were between the gardens. Hodson withdrew his men for a short distance, luring the enemy on. " Exactly what I had anticipated happened. The enemy thought we were bolting and came on in crowds, firing and yelling, and the sowars brandishing their swords as if we were already in their hands, when suddenly I gave the order, ' Threes about and at them.' The men obeyed with a cheer ; the effect was electrical ; never was such a scatter. I launched

¹ " Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life," pp. 259, 260.

five parties at them, each under an officer, and in they went, cutting and firing into the very thick of them. The ground was very wet and a ditch favoured them, but we cut down upwards of fifty in as many seconds. The remainder flew back to the town, as if not the Guides and Hodson's Horse but death and the devil were at their heels."

Risaldar Jiwan Singh received great praise for his courage in this affair, in which the Guides Cavalry lost eight men and two horses.

On 14 August General Nicholson marched in with reinforcements from the Punjab, and these now brought up the strength of the Delhi Field Force to more than 8,000 effectives, while there were also nearly 2,000 sick and wounded in camp, exclusive of those who had been sent away to Umballa and the hills ; it was, however, not the mere numbers of the force, but the spirit which animated every member of it, which made ultimate success certain, however long it might be postponed ; and among no body of men in the besieging army was there a better morale than among the Guides, of whom at this time Daly wrote : " I wish you could see the *spirit* which actuates the Guides ; how cheerful they are amidst wounds and death ; with what heroic devotion they rush forward."

A siege train was coming up from Ferozepore, and on 24 August a large body of rebels with eighteen guns went out from Delhi in the hope of intercepting it. On the following morning a column was sent out under General Nicholson to follow and bring the enemy to action. A squadron of the Guides Cavalry, under Captain Sanford, accompanied this column and was engaged near the Najafgarh Canal. On the 26th the enemy, knowing Nicholson's force had not yet returned, and expecting that the British defence was greatly weakened, made a determined attack on the Right Piquet, but was again beaten off.

" The time for resolute action had now come. . . . The days of waiting and watching were spent. Every man, every gun, every shot, every shell that could be sent down for the final assault had now reached its destination. There was no pretext for further delay. The waste of a single hour would have been a crime, for our troops were dying fast and the enemy were escaping. The real siege of Delhi was now to commence."¹

The plan of attack had some time since been drawn up and was now decided. The numbers of the besiegers were so small compared with those of the besieged that an ordinary investment was out of the question, and it was determined to attack the Mori, the Kashmir and the Water Bastions with their connecting curtains. This front of attack had been selected for three reasons : the left flank would be protected by the river ; the flanking fire from the city would be comparatively ineffective since the ground in front was commanded only by the Mori Bastion ; and there was good cover up to within a short distance of the walls.

The attacking force was divided into four columns and a reserve. The first column, under General Nicholson, was to attack the Kashmir Bastion ; the second, commanded by Brigadier Jones, was to storm the breach in the Water Bastion ; the third, under Colonel Campbell, was to assault the Kashmir Gate after it had

¹ Kaye, " The Sepoy War in India," vol. III, p. 545 *et seq.*

been blown in ; while No. 4 column, commanded by Major Reid, was to attack and clear the suburbs of Paharunpore and Kissengunge and enter the city by the Lahore Gate. This column consisted of the Sirmur Battalion, the Guides Infantry and various detachments of European and native infantry regiments and some Dogras, and was about 860 strong.¹ The reserve column was commanded by Brigadier Longfield.

These different columns, each guided by an R.E. officer, were to cross the ditch at different points, clear the outer defences of the city, take possession of bastions, gateways and guns, and establish defensive posts. Thereafter it was left to the discretion of column commanders, under the general direction of General Nicholson, who was in charge of the attack, to determine whether they would go on and clear the city streets in their front or wait for guns to come up to aid them.

Sir Hope Grant was ordered to take the Cavalry Brigade, only 600 strong and containing the Guides Cavalry, and " proceed to the battery in front of the ruined mosque on the ridge, there to await further orders, or until the success of the assault had been assured."²

The account of the action of the fourth column is taken from an historian of the campaign :³ " At five o'clock all the detachments which composed this column were mustered for the start. The Jammu contingent was there, the stalwart Guides Infantry and the fearless little Gurkhas. . . . Three guns, however, which had been promised, were late in arriving and so inadequately manned that Reid had to send for more gunners. As he was waiting, he heard that a portion of the Jammu troops which he had sent to make a diversion on the right had prematurely engaged the enemy. He therefore decided to advance without further delay. Two breast-works lay before him, which the enemy had thrown up as a protection to Kissengunge, the first point which the column was to attack. The Rifles and Gurkhas carried the first with a rush. The enemy seemed to hesitate ; and the column, pressing on, began to cross a bridge spanning the canal under the walls of Kissengunge. Now, however, the want of guns was felt. Thousands of rebels from the city were seen pouring down the dry bed of the canal to reinforce their comrades. Still, Reid was confident of success . . . ; he was just going to direct a false attack to be made on the enemy's front and a real one against their flank and rear, when he fell wounded. . . . But the battle was already lost. The various detachments of the column, crowded together, and harassed by a severe musketry fire which the enemy poured into them from the loopholes in the wall, had become so confused that their officers could not make themselves heard ; the Jammu troops on the right, flying before their assailants, rushed panic-stricken into the column and increased its disorder ; and at last the situation became so desperate that Captain Muter of the 60th Rifles . . . withdrew the troops around him to Hindu Rao's house. . . . The enemy, following up their success, were threatening this vital point of the British position, when the Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier Hope Grant, which

¹ This column was actually made up of detachments from ten different regiments.

² Grant, " Incidents in the Sepoy War," p. 122.

³ Rice-Holmes, " A History of the Indian Mutiny," p. 365 *et seq.*

had hitherto been covering the assaulting column, moved down close under the Mori Bastion to support the beaten column. The enemy, clustering in the houses and gardens near Kissengunge, turned upon their new opponents with so sharp a musketry fire that it was necessary to send Tombs with his horse artillery troop to the rescue. The musketeers were soon subdued ; but the brigade was now exposed to a steady fire of grape from the Lahore Bastion. . . . For two hours the Brigade never moved. The horses stood still under the iron storm ; the men sat in their saddles as patiently as the sentries at the Horse Guards ; Tombs never ceased fighting his guns ; and at length the enemy's fire slackened and died away, and Hindu Rao's house was safe."

Of the Guides Infantry, Lieutenant A. W. Murray and ten other ranks were killed, Lieutenants R. H. Shebbeare and E. E. B. Bond and twenty-six men were wounded ; while of the Guides Cavalry, Captain C. A. Sanford, 3rd Light Cavalry, temporarily in command, nineteen men and fourteen horses were wounded.¹ Of Lieutenant Bond's services, Brigadier Grant wrote as follows in a report dated 17 September : " A party consisting of an officer and eighty of the Infantry Guides came down to our support, and, though so small a number, went gallantly into the gardens and took up a position close to the battery. I regret, however, to say the officer in command, a most gallant young fellow, Lieutenant Bond, was wounded in the head and had to be taken away ; but the Guides held out most bravely till they got surrounded in the house and were in great danger ; a detachment of the Beloch Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Farquhar, however, came to their assistance and brought them away in safety."

Among those killed this day in the Guides Infantry was Jemadar Akbar Ali ; as a havildar in the 4th Native Infantry he was under instruction, at the musketry depot, Sialkot, when the Mutiny broke out, but he accompanied General Chamberlain's column to Delhi and was attached to the Guides.

Kaye² thus describes the death of Lieutenant Murray : " A party of the enemy sheltered by a breastwork were firing heavily upon our people, when some officers with a handful of men made a rush upon the work to take it. Foremost of these was young Murray of the Guides, who had been wounded in June and July, who had gone to the hills to recruit, and had returned to Delhi a few days before the assault. Speeding onward with impulsive bravery, the grim message of death met him in the pride of his youth and the flush of his daring. He was shot through the chest and fell dead upon the field."

When 14 September closed little more than the walls of Delhi were in our possession ; the palace and fort and the great magazine had still to be taken. The attackers had suffered a loss amounting to two men out of every nine engaged, while the camp and all it contained was but weakly guarded. The task of capturing the rest of the town was carried on day by day, guns being brought up and used with effect on the houses and strong places in possession of the rebels, and finally

¹ Hope Grant in " Incidents in the Sepoy War," p. 125, says " fifteen men and nineteen horses."

² Vol. III, p. 609.

on 20 September "we took in succession the Lahore Gate, the Garstin Bastion, the Ajmere Gate and Bastion, the Juma Musjid, the palace and Selimgarh, and now we hold the whole city. Every post is occupied save two, the bridge head across the Jumna and the Delhi Gate to the south of the city. To the former the Guides Infantry are about to proceed."¹

This was the last task entrusted to the Guides in the three months' siege. On arrival of the Infantry, under Lieutenants Shebbeare, Hawes and McLean, at the bridge of boats, it was found that the enemy had placed a 24-pounder gun, supported by infantry, on the opposite bank, so as completely to sweep the bridge. The Guides, however, charged across, whereupon the enemy fired a few musket shots, spiked the gun and fled; the Guides then brought in the gun.


So the siege of Delhi came at last to an end, and if the gain was great the cost had been heavy. The effective strength of the Delhi Field Force was never as high as 10,000, and 992 were killed and 2,845 wounded, while many more died of disease. The Guides, as we have seen, arrived at Delhi at a strength of 646 all ranks—their casualties amounted to 361.

Of these losses of the Delhi Field Force Lord Roberts has said: "Where all behaved nobly it is difficult to particularize, but it will not, I hope, be considered invidious if I specially draw my readers' attention to the four corps most constantly engaged, the 60th Rifles, the Sirmoor Battalion of Gurkhas, the Guides and the 1st Punjab Infantry. Placed in the very front of the position, they were incessantly under fire, and their losses in action testify to the nature of the services they performed."

This chapter may fittingly close with the tribute paid to the Delhi Field Force by the Governor-General, Lord Canning, who wrote as follows:—

"In the name of outraged humanity, in memory of innocent blood ruthlessly shed, and in acknowledgment of the first signal vengeance inflicted upon the foulest treason, the Governor-General in Council records his gratitude to Major-General Wilson and the brave army of Delhi. He does so in the sure conviction that a like tribute awaits them, not in England only, but wherever, within the limits of civilization, the news of their well-earned triumph shall reach."

¹ "Memoirs of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Norman," p. 165.



To face page 48

CHAPTER IV

1857-1861

RETURN TO THE FRONTIER

THE END OF THE MUTINY—RETURN TO THE PUNJAB—TRIBUTES TO THE CORPS—THEIR TOTAL CASUALTIES—THE HINDUSTANI FANATICS—THE RETURN OF LUMSDEN—OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN—TRANSFER OF THE INDIAN ARMY TO THE CROWN.

See Maps of Waziristan and Black Mountain, both in pocket.

THE fall of Delhi brought the Mutiny of the Bengal Army within sight of its end, and John Lawrence was now anxious for the return of some of the troops spared from the Punjab, which had thus been denuded of its regular garrison. Accordingly Captain Daly, writing to Lawrence on 27 September, says: "The Guides will march back as soon as English troops arrive."

However, there was still some work for the Corps to do before it was to march northward again, and on 2 October the Cavalry under Lieutenant C. J. S. Gough¹ accompanied a column sent out under Brigadier Showers to reduce the districts west and south-west of Delhi. This column returned on the 19th, after burning a number of villages, taking three forts, about seventy guns and treasure to the amount of £70,000, and capturing two rebel princes. On this occasion the Cavalry pursued the enemy who were making for a distant range of hills, and, coming up with them, did great execution.

Then again on 10 November a column left Delhi under Colonel Gerrard to deal with the Jodhpore Legion which had mutinied at Erinpura and, having been reinforced, was marching in the direction of Delhi. Lieutenant Kennedy was at this time in temporary command of the Corps and took charge of the Cavalry portion of it attached to this force, which also included a company of the Guides Infantry under Lieutenant H. C. E. Ward.² Colonel Gerrard reached Kanoude on the 15th "and there received information which led him to believe he would be able to bring the mutineers to action next day. Next morning, therefore, he pushed on for the village of Narnoul. The road was so deep with sand that the guns could hardly be dragged along, and the infantry had to halt again and again to give them time to come up. Ten hours were consumed in marching twelve miles, and the men chafed angrily at a delay which, they feared, would allow the enemy to escape. They were soon to find, however, that this very delay was the most fortunate

¹ Appointed on 1 August to do duty with the Corps from the 8th Light Cavalry.

² Appointed on 27 September to do duty with the Corps from the 5th Bengal Native Infantry.

thing that could have happened to them. At eleven o'clock in the morning they reached a village about two miles from Narnoul. This place was so strong that if the enemy had held it, they could not have been dislodged except at the cost of much bloodshed. As a matter of fact, they had occupied it on that morning ; but their leader, concluding from the non-appearance of the British that they were not coming at all, and too heedless to take pains to verify his conjecture, had abandoned it.

"Gerrard halted for a short time to refresh his men. They were eating their food when they saw a little cloud of dust rising over some sloping ground in their front. In a few minutes they discovered masses of horsemen through the dust. Presently a shot whizzed over their heads. No time was lost in replying to the challenge. The British advanced steadily ; their artillery threw a shower of grape and round shot into the rebel ranks ; and now the loud 'Shabash' of the Guides, and the flash of sabres and *tulwars* amid a cloud of dust on the right showed that a cavalry combat had begun. The enemy's horsemen met the shock of the Guides and the Carabiniers right gallantly, but were, notwithstanding, overpowered and hurled back ; the victors, wheeling round after their pursuit, swooped upon the gunners and cut down all that stood their ground ; the 1st Bengal Fusiliers overpowered the infantry and captured the guns, and the Multani Horse, charging the rebel right, completed the rout."¹

In this affair Colonel Gerrard was mortally wounded, and of the Guides Corps, Captain Sanford and Lieutenant Craigie were dangerously wounded and Lieutenant Kennedy slightly, while in the Cavalry three men and eight horses were killed, thirteen men and fourteen horses were wounded, and in the Infantry two men were killed and two wounded.

Resaidar Ashraf Khan was awarded the Third Class Order of Merit for the very effective way he handled his *tulwar* on this day, and Sowar Kala Singh received the same decoration for the splendid way he used the pointed head of the pole of the standard he was carrying.

Colonel Wardlaw wrote as follows of the action of the Guides Cavalry :—

"They [the enemy] fought in the most determined manner, but found their pluck of little avail against the swords of the Guides or Carabiniers. . . . The Guides wheeled to their left and charged the guns on the flanks. . . . I regret to say the Guides and Carabiniers suffered rather severely in this charge. The gallantry displayed by both corps was most conspicuous and the conduct of the Guides was most distinguished. Their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Kennedy, to whom I am much indebted for assistance during the day, was wounded, but did not leave the field though his left hand was disabled. I can only say that no European corps could have charged with greater spirit or more effect than did the Guides on this occasion. . . . Lieutenant Kennedy, whose conduct I have noticed above, in command of the Guides, was worthy of the highest praise. Two other officers of the Guides, Captain Sanford and Lieutenant Craigie, were severely wounded while gallantly leading on their men."

¹ Rice-Holmes, "History of the Indian Mutiny," pp. 384, 385.

Then on 29 December, the Adjutant-General of the army wrote :—

" His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considers that the troops behaved very well in this action, but more especially the detachment of the Carabiniers under Captain Wardlaw, and the Guide Cavalry under Lieutenant Kennedy, which were highly distinguished."

Captain Daly now rejoined from Simla, where he had at last been persuaded to go and recuperate from his wound ; and almost immediately after his return to Delhi, the Guides left on their march back to the Punjab. Daly had the great privilege of at least returning to the province in command of the Corps, though his days with it were numbered.

Starting on 18 December 1857, and proceeding this time by more leisurely stages, the Guides arrived on 2 February 1858 in Peshawar, where they remained a week and where they were accorded a magnificent reception. On 1858 2 February Major-General Sir Sydney Cotton, commanding the Peshawar Division, published the following Divisional Order which explains the exceptional nature of the welcome given them by their comrades of all arms—the Wardens of the Marches :—

" Major-General Cotton makes known throughout the Division under his orders that the troops of the Peshawar Cantonment were paraded under his personal command this day to receive and welcome the Corps of Guides on its arrival in cantonments from the siege of Delhi. A Royal Salute was fired in honour of the Guides on their approaching the parade ground and the troops saluted, when the Major-General delivered the following addresses to that Corps and the Peshawar Force.

" ' Captain Daly, Officers European and Native, and soldiers of the Guide Corps.

" ' I have invited you here as brother soldiers of the Frontier this day, to welcome you on your return from the Siege of Delhi, and to acknowledge in the most public manner the high sense we entertain of the value and importance of the service rendered by you to the State during the progress of the present insurrectionary war. In the name of Colonel Edwardes, our Commissioner, on my own account, and on behalf of my brother officers and soldiers, I warmly greet you on your return amongst us.

" ' We respect, we honour you, and we feel proud of being re-associated with men whose deeds of daring have earned our noble profession never-dying fame. We deeply lament that so many brave men and comrades of the Frontier should have fallen in the rebellion, the names of Nicholson, Battye, Trevor, MacBarnett, Murray and Lumsden¹ are with sorrow deeply impressed on our hearts and minds.' "

Then, turning to the Peshawar Division, the General spoke as follows :—

" Officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the Peshawar Force.

" Great and important to the British Government have been the services of the gallant body now before you during the progress of the present war. I will briefly detail them for record as a narrative and for your information as follows :—

¹ A younger brother of Harry Lumsden.

"The faithless Hindustani sepoy's mutinied at Meerut on May the 10th and at Delhi on the 11th. The news reached Peshawar on the night of the 11th. On the 12th a moveable column was resolved on to keep down mutiny in the Punjab. It was necessary to have picked troops, men who could be relied on, not merely to fight, but to fight on the right side. All thoughts turned first to British soldiers and Her Majesty's 24th and 27th were warned. But next to British soldiers, the men who in the hour of doubt and danger stood highest in public confidence were the Guides. They were cantoned at Mardan. Their commander, Captain Daly, received the orders on the morning of May the 13th, marched that very evening, and reached Attock, thirty miles, next morning. It was soon seen that Delhi was the centre of the rebellion, and to Delhi the Guides were ordered to push on. They did push on, and reached Delhi on the four and twentieth day after leaving Mardan, three of which days they halted by order. The distance was 580 miles, or fifty-one regular marches, achieved in twenty-one days; and during those twenty-one days they turned off this road twelve miles one night, burned three villages and killed 150 mutineers. No soldier can hear of such a march without admiration and their deeds of arms were equal to their march.

"Within three hours after reaching Delhi the Guides engaged the enemy, and every one of their officers was wounded, and for nearly four months both men and officers were constantly in action, sometimes twice a day. They took 600 men to Delhi and received 200 recruits during the siege, not one man deserted to the enemy, but 350 were killed and wounded, 120 fell to rise no more.

"I need not dwell on their separate deeds of valour, their general actions, their skirmishes, or their single combats; but, as an instance of the spirit that animated the Corps, I will mention that a mere boy, Jai Singh by name, bore a wounded European soldier out of the battle.

"And now receive back these gallant Guides covered with glory.

"The plaudits of their British comrades have followed them from Delhi. Our hearty British cheers shall welcome them home again at Peshawar."

A *feu de joie*, with accompanying ordnance salute of twenty-one guns, followed the address, after which the Guides Cavalry and Infantry, joining their comrades, marched past and saluted the Major-General at the head of their respective arms.

The Guides then marched back to Mardan, arriving on 11 February, and here a great deal of work had to be done since, as Daly wrote about this time, "The Infantry are almost annihilated; killed, wounded and sick are so numerous that the Corps must be renovated."

The following lists give some idea of the losses sustained by the Corps at Delhi:—

The officers who marched out from Mardan were Captain Daly, Commandant, severely wounded; Lieutenant Battye, Second-in-Command, killed; Lieutenant Kennedy, Commandant of Cavalry, twice wounded; Lieutenant Hawes, Adjutant, four times wounded; Assistant-Surgeon Stewart.

The following officers were subsequently attached for duty:—Captain

Hodson, Officiating Commandant. Cavalry : Captain Sanford, Officiating Commandant, wounded ; Lieutenant F. G. Willock, died ; Lieutenants H. Hayley, A. Mackenzie, A. W. J. Montgomerie, C. J. S. Gough and A. W. Craigie, killed. Infantry : Lieutenant R. H. Shebbeare, Officiating Second-in-Command and later Officiating Commandant, wounded six times ; Lieutenants O. I. Chalmers, wounded ; A. W. Murray, killed ; E. E. B. Bond, wounded ; H. De Brett, wounded ; C. S. McLean, wounded ; and H. C. E. Ward.

The following table shows the original strength, reinforcements and losses of the Guides, Cavalry and Infantry, during the campaign of 1857 :—

	British Officers.	CAVALRY.					INFANTRY.					Grand Total.
		Indian Officers.	N.C.Os.	Trumpeters.	Sowars.	Total.	Indian Officers.	N.C.Os.	Buglers.	Sepoys.	Total.	
Strength on arrival at Delhi ...	5	9	41	3	165	218	17	77	9	320	423	646
Reinforcements* ...	15	6	22	1	176	205	10	25	3	203	241	461
Losses sustained† ...	4	1	4	—	23	28	5	19	3	72	99	131
Strength on return to Lahore‡ ...	6	11	50	4	273	338	22	83	9	451	565	909

* The reinforcements of the Cavalry and Infantry were composed of men entertained for the augmentation of troops and companies and to fill existing vacancies, also men who rejoined at Delhi from furlough. The Cavalry were reinforced in excess of this by Lieutenant Hayley's Police and a risaldar and two dafadars of the 1st Oudh Cavalry, who were temporarily attached.

† Means deaths only ; there were also 8 British officers, 49 Cavalry and 173 Infantry wounded.

‡ Before leaving Delhi all British officers " doing duty," save one, were transferred to other corps.

The following Indian officers and other ranks gained the different classes of the Order of Merit :—

Second Class.—Cavalry : Jemadar Dall Singh.

Third Class.—Cavalry : Resaidars Ashraf Khan and Prem Singh ; Risaldars Khanan Khan and Muhammad Khan ; Dafadars Yakab Khan, Muhammad Hussain Khan, Autar Singh, Isri Singh, Nihal Singh and Kala Singh ; Sowars Ghazi, Karim, Abdur Rahman, Kamaruddin, Kasim Ali Shah and Mirza Fazl Beg. Infantry : Subadars Ahmad Khan, Pir Bukhsh and Bhup Singh ; Havildar Jai Singh ; Buglers Gurdit Singh and Attar Buland.

Twenty-two men of the Cavalry and thirty-three of the Infantry were specially " promoted for gallantry in the field."

For their services during the campaign of 1857 the officers and other ranks of the Corps of Guides were, under a General Order dated 18 August 1858 awarded a medal¹ with a clasp for " Delhi," and six months' *batta*, with extra *batta* for

¹ The ribbon of this, the first Royal medal awarded to the Indian Army, was scarlet and white in alternate stripes, two of scarlet and three of white.

the siege of Delhi; while by G.G.O. No. 4 of 1862 the regiments engaged in the operations were permitted to bear the word "Delhi" on their colours and appointments.

The Court of Directors of the East India Company were slow in recording their appreciation of the services of the Corps of Guides, but when this did arrive it was very hearty.

In a General Order by the Governor-General in Council, No. 1277, dated 9 April 1859, we read as follows :—

"The services of the Corps of Guides from the time it was first raised are recorded in the Archives of Government. The extraordinary march of this fine Regiment in May and June 1857, the hottest season of the year, from the Peshawar frontier to Delhi, a distance of 580 miles in twenty-two days, is a feat not surpassed, and this Corps took its full share in the Siege of Delhi."

Major Daly had for some time past been doing all he could to obtain permission to join the army, now under command of General Sir Colin Campbell, engaged in the siege of Lucknow, and on the 25th orders reached him at Peshawar to join at once at Lucknow. He left Mardan on 1 March, and on arrival at Lucknow he was, on the death of Hodson, given the command of "Hodson's Horse." Major Daly was succeeded in command of the Corps of Guides by Lieutenant Kennedy,¹ whose appointment was dated 12 March, and this officer almost immediately took the Corps on service again on the North-West Frontier.

It will be remembered that when the Guides marched in May 1857 to Delhi, they had been relieved in Mardan by the 55th Native Infantry. Within little more than a week this regiment had mutinied, and those who survived the punishment dealt them by a small force under Nicholson sent from Peshawar, fled, some into Swat and others into the country of the Khudu Khel. These were then hostile to the British, and the mutineers helped to swell a settlement of Hindustanis² which had been established at Mangal Thana as a branch of the parent colony at Sitana. These Hindustanis had given trouble in July of that year and had received punishment, but the spirit of the people was not broken, and some few months later the Assistant Commissioner of Yusufzai was attacked while in camp by certain Hindustanis assisted by the Khudu Khel, and though he managed to escape with his life, five of his party were killed and the whole of his baggage was looted.

For the due punishment of this outrage General Cotton assembled a force nearly 5,000 strong on the left bank of the Kabul river opposite Nowshera on 22 April 1858.

¹ Afterwards commanded the Punjab Frontier Force as General Sir C. Kennedy.

² Early in the nineteenth century one Sayed Ahmed Shah, a native of Bareilly, returned from the pilgrimage to Mecca and preached the doctrines of the Wahabi sect, attracting a certain number of fanatical Mussulmans in Hindustan. With these he began a religious war against the Sikhs in Yusufzai in 1824. In 1829 he captured Peshawar. A year later he himself was killed and his followers (who now amounted to 1,600 Hindustanis) were defeated on the borders of Hazara, at Balkot. The remnant of his followers established themselves at Sitana in Buner. Here they were joined from time to time by other parties of fanatical Hindustanis. They were supported with arms and money from Patna, Bengal and parts of Rajputana. The fanaticism of these people led them to raid into what had now become British territory.

The force was divided into three columns, and in the first, commanded by the Major-General in person, were included 200 sabres of the Guides Cavalry and 300 bayonets of the Infantry of the Corps, commanded by Lieutenant Kennedy, with Lieutenants Hawes, Bond and Ward and Assistant-Surgeon Stewart.

Encouraged by the proximity of the troops, the people of Totali, who had for long been oppressed by the chief of the Khudu Khel, had attacked and burnt his village, the chief himself escaping to Chingalai; so that one at least of the objects of the expedition was achieved before the troops actually reached the scene of operations.

The first column now advanced upon Chingalai by the very narrow defile of the Darhan Pass, the Guides Infantry forming the advance guard; there was no opposition during the march and Chingalai was destroyed under a slight and ineffectual fire from the enemy holding the heights above. The second column burnt Panjtar, and the whole force then withdrew to Salim Khan where the third column had remained in reserve.

The colony of fanatics at Sitana had now to be dealt with, and accordingly on 2 May the force marched to Khabbal, about four miles from Sitana, and on the 4th, while the main body, covered by the Guides Cavalry, moved against the villages of Upper and Lower Sitana from the south, other bodies approached them from the east and north. On arriving near Lower Sitana, two regiments were detached to move up the mountain in rear while others attacked in front. The Hindustanis fought desperately hand to hand with their opponents, but the Guides on this occasion were not actively engaged. The villages were destroyed and the force then withdrew by Khabbal to Nowshera where it was broken up.

In June the Kandahar mission returned, and on the 28th Lumsden rejoined the Guides, his reappointment as Commandant being dated 28 June. It was not until 4 June of the year previous that Lumsden had heard in Kandahar of the outbreak of the Mutiny in India, but as his biographer tells us, "Nothing was more cheering to Lumsden than the conduct of his escort of Guides. They bore themselves like men; avowed to him their implicit confidence in the absolute loyalty of their comrades in the Regiment to the Government and to himself, and their resolve, for weal or woe, to stick to him to the death." He must have been greatly cheered during his exile by the receipt of letters from John Lawrence, Herbert Edwardes and other Punjab friends telling him of the splendid services of the Guides.

One member of the escort deserves special mention. The doctor Yakub Khan had originally been a havildar, but on one occasion, when in hospital with fever, he evinced so great an interest in the treatment of the other patients, that Dr. Lyell, the then Medical Officer of the Corps, took him in hand and taught him medicine, and with such success that he was soon able to pass his examinations. He proved an invaluable assistant to Dr. Bellew in the dispensary attached to the Kandahar Mission, and his early death was considered to have been brought on by his great exertions during an epidemic of typhus fever at Kandahar.

The following extract from a letter of 29 December 1858, from the Secretary

to Government to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, bears witness to the high sense entertained by the Governor-General, Lord Canning, of the services of Major Lumsden, his colleagues, and of the escort :—

" I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Secretary's letter No. 332, dated 21st October last, submitting report on the Kandahar Mission. The Governor-General has read these papers with the deepest interest, and with a very high appreciation of the clear sound judgment and admirable temper of Major Lumsden, who has shown no ordinary qualifications for the discharge of a very difficult duty. His Lordship desires to acknowledge the great and lasting good services which that officer has done in the warmest terms, and to express his thanks to Lieutenant P. Lumsden and Dr. Bellew for the very efficient aid given by them to the head of the Mission and for their most useful contributions to our knowledge of Afghanistan. It will be a pleasure to His Lordship to place Major Lumsden's services prominently before the Home Government, and he may be sure that, though different in kind, they will not be valued less highly than if they had been rendered in the field at the head of the noble Regiment with which he has so long been connected. . . . His Lordship further sanctions the grant of eighteen months' batta to the detachment of the Guides, Horse and Foot, that accompanied the Mission."

In January 1860, Lumsden was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel and awarded the C.B. for his services.

Lumsden had only been back a very few months in command of the Guides Corps at Mardan when he was called upon to lead them into the field once more, but to a part of the Frontier where so far in their history they had not **1859** been engaged.

On the annexation of the Punjab by the Indian Government and our consequent occupation of Kohat, the people of Waziristan became our neighbours for one hundred and forty miles along the Frontier—from the north-west corner of the Kohat district to the Gumal Pass, west of Dera Ismail Khan. They had begun as early as 1850 to give trouble, collecting armed men and attacking our posts in the Bannu district (in 1850), and necessitating the dispatch of a punitive expedition two years later. The Kabul Khel sub-division of the Utmanzai clan had made themselves especially aggressive; and when, in 1859, certain men of another clan, having murdered a British officer,¹ took refuge in Kabul Khel territory, these refused to surrender the murderers. A force of nearly 4,000 men was assembled in December of this year at Kohat under Brigadier-General N. B. Chamberlain, C.B., and marched to Thal, where, on the 19th, it was joined by some local levies which raised the strength of the whole force by nearly 1,400 men. In General Chamberlain's column was included a body of the Guides Corps, a troop of the Cavalry made up to 100 sabres and 300 men of the Infantry, with Major Lumsden and Lieutenants Kennedy and Ward.

On 20 December the force crossed the Kurram river and encamped at Biland Khel, and it was now learnt that the main body of the Kabul Khel had taken up

¹ Captain Mecham of the Artillery.

their position on a high range of hills known as Maidanai, some eight miles south-west of Biland Khel, near Zakha Narai, and consisting of two parallel ranges contiguous to each other and terminating at either end in a gorge and enclosing a long narrow valley. The two gorges were the main entrances to the valley, the one facing east being called Gandiob, the one to the south Zakha ; the enemy here was from 2,000 to 3,000 in number.

From Biland Khel the Guides Cavalry escorted General Chamberlain on a reconnaissance for some twelve miles to the mouth of the Zakha Pass, but none of the enemy was seen. On the following day the force, leaving the Cavalry and some of the Infantry to protect the camp, marched before daylight by Gandiob, a direction from which, in view of the previous day's reconnaissance, the Wazirs were not expecting attack. About sunrise the enemy was met and dispositions for attack were made. Bodies of troops ascended the hills on right and left, while another remained as a reserve in the bed of the nullah. The left attack was composed of the Guides Infantry, No. 2 Company leading, supported by the 4th Sikhs and the Peshawar Mountain Train.

The enemy was found occupying a breastwork on the top of the hill, and the Guides skirmishers, under Captain Gordon, 10th Punjab Infantry (then doing duty with the Guides), were soon engaged. As they neared the enemy *sangar*, some eight or ten mounted men appeared over the crest of the hill and charged down it at the skirmishers, accompanied by the defenders of the breastwork, who also came on sword in hand. The skirmishers were taken by surprise and ran in on their supports who stood their ground and opened a well-sustained fire, killing several of the tribesmen and causing the rest to bolt. They were followed up and the enemy *sangar* was captured. The Kabul Khel resisted no longer and the force fell back to camp at Gandiob.

A few days later the Kabul Khel Wazirs came in and made terms, when the force left the tribal territory and its units dispersed to their stations in January 1860. In this affair the Guides had one man killed and ten wounded.

1860 In the Infantry the following men distinguished themselves :—Sepoy Ziarat, who, notwithstanding the confusion following on the initial advance of his company, accompanied the supports and was one of the first men into the enemy *sangar*, which was stoutly defended until carried ; Sepoy Alladad, a small man who, when the Wazirs made their charge, fixed bayonet and called to Captain Gordon—who was six feet high and broad in proportion—to get behind him in order that he (Alladad) might protect him !

Only a very few weeks after the Guides had returned from this expedition their services were again required—on this occasion against the Mahsud Wazirs who, to the number of some 3,000, had made an attack upon the town of Tank, standing in a plain about five miles from the foot of the hills on the Dera Ismail Khan border. Such aggression called for severe punishment, while there was a long score outstanding against the Mahsuds which demanded early and prompt settlement. General Chamberlain was again placed in command of a large force which assembled on 16 April at Tank, and which included 108 sabres of the Guides

Cavalry and 407 bayonets of the Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lumsden, who had with him Lieutenants Kennedy and Bond and Surgeon Tuson.

The force entered the hills on 17 April 1860, and arrived unopposed at Palosin Kach. From here General Chamberlain, taking the Guides Cavalry with him, marched with the main column to Haidario Kach and Barwand, surveying the country and punishing troublesome sections, returning on the morning of the 24th to Palosin. Here he had left Colonel Lumsden to guard the camp and keep open the communications, with some 1,800 men, including the Guides Infantry. It was now found that the camp had been very seriously attacked during his absence.

The camp had been pitched on the alluvial land on the left bank of the Tank stream, the right resting on an old tower some eight hundred yards away and overlooking the stream; the left was protected by a piquet on an abrupt peak to the south-east, having the scarped bank of the river in its front and the edge of the high tableland immediately in rear. On the night of the 22nd the outlying piquets were at their posts on the ridge behind the camp; one company held the tower, three other parties, each composed of a havildar and eight sepoys, were posted along the rear; while a piquet of thirty men was on the high peak mentioned above. Each piquet had a support of equal strength immediately at hand.

The following is Colonel Lumsden's account of the events of this morning:—

“During the night a few stray shots were fired by the sentries at intervals, but all appeared tranquil until just as the reveillé sounded at daylight on 23 April, the camp was alarmed by a volley fired from the rear piquet and 3,000 Waziris overpowered our piquets, rushed on camp, upset some irregular levies of the Bannu district and dashed, sword in hand, on the Guides. I had my clothes half on, ready for any emergency, and immediately took my inlying piquet out to the ridge, and placed them so as to rake the face of the ridge down which they were coming, then returned to my Guides who, though surprised in their tents and the half of them unaccoutred, still made a respectable resistance, falling back inch by inch on the guns (two nine-pounders and two howitzers). Here Bond and Lewis,¹ of the Guides, contrived to get together some 200 men and formed them into line across camp, called on them to advance, which the men did with fixed swords and a cheer (which would have done your heart good to hear, for it was an earnest to me that, although taken aback, my lads were far from beaten), bearing all down before them and clearing the camp. While this was going on on the right, the Gurkhas and 4th Sikhs had time to form, and being brought up on the flank of the enemy by Major Rothney, commanding the Gurkhas, soon turned the enemy's repulse into a complete rout. I took the three regiments for about three miles over the hills in hot pursuit, and did not stop or give them time to breathe until they broke up and dispersed over the hills. . . .

“Of the total loss, of course, my Guides came in for a heavy share, and I have to regret the fall of fifteen Guides killed and sixty-one wounded; but at the same time I am most proud of their noble behaviour, under the most trying circumstances in which any soldiers could be placed. Taken aback, scattered, and unable to

¹ Of the 7th Fusiliers, and doing duty with the Guides.

understand what had taken place, they rallied at once and advanced with fixed swords without the slightest hesitation. . . . Out of a piquet of a havildar, a naik and eight sepoy of my Corps, both the non-commissioned officers and six men were killed and the other two left for dead at their post. . . . The General is well pleased with the business, so that is all right."

In spite of the surprise, the Wazirs had all been evicted from the camp within fifteen minutes of their first appearance, leaving ninety-two of their dead within the camp and forty more in a ravine close by.

The total losses of the defenders in this action amounted to sixty-three killed and 166 wounded, the losses in the Guides being fifteen killed and sixty-one wounded. In addition to the losses of the Guides as mentioned by Lumsden, the Regiment had eighteen followers killed and eight wounded. Jemadar Masam Khel was one of those killed.

The sick and wounded were now sent back to Tank, and the Wazirs having been afforded opportunities to surrender, of which they did not avail themselves, the column advanced on 2 May to Shingi Kot, next day to Zeriwam, and then on 4 May came to the Barari Tangi, a narrow passage between high and perpendicular cliffs, where it was soon evident that the enemy had made every preparation for defence. Both sides of the pass were very steep, while everywhere *sangars* had been placed in terraces. General Chamberlain decided to attack on both sides of the pass and formed two columns of attack, Colonel Lumsden taking command of the left one, composed of the Guides Infantry, the 6th Punjab Infantry, the 6th Police Battalion and the Peshawar Mountain Train. The fire from the guns of this latter was so accurate that the enemy was driven out of one position after another, each point being at once occupied by skirmishers, and the whole range of hills was cleared of the enemy, the left column having only two men wounded. The right or northern column experienced a very much stronger opposition. The Guides Cavalry was not this day engaged.

After this day's fight, the last in which Colonel Lumsden was to command his Guides, the Wazirs seemed unable to combine and, beyond a few shots daily fired at the rearguard, nothing more was seen of them. The force then marched on to Kaniguram on the 5th, remaining there until the 9th, when a move was made to Makin, the second most important town in the Mahsud country, situated at the point where the Shuidar and Pirghal mountains close in upon each other. Here towers and villages were destroyed and the column then started on its return march and, moving by Razmak, Razani and Saroba, reached Bannu on 20 May, when the force was broken up.

By this time, however, a very great change had taken place in the Government of India, seriously affecting the status and administration of the Indian Army. In the beginning of 1858 Lord Palmerston brought in a bill "for the better government of British India," the avowed object of which was the transference of the authority of the Company formally and absolutely to the Crown. The Bill passed into law in August of this year, and contained, among other provisions, one by which it was enacted that the military services of the Company should be deemed

to be those of Her Majesty, and to be under the same obligations to serve the Queen as they were to serve the Company, while continuing in the enjoyment of all their former emoluments and privileges.

" In 1861 orders were published reorganizing the confused crowd of regiments old and new, regular and irregular, which the storm of the Mutiny had left to represent the army of Bengal. The cavalry was reorganized by G.G.O. No. 494, 1861 dated 31 May 1861, but the Guides Cavalry and five Punjab regiments remained unaltered. The first reorganization of the infantry had been notified a month before—G.G.O. No. 400, dated 3 May 1861. The four Sikh regiments and the Corps of Guides remained unchanged."¹

¹ Cardew, " The Services of the Bengal Native Army," pp. 302, 303.

CHAPTER V

1862-1878

THE AMBEYLA EXPEDITION¹

DEPARTURE OF COLONEL LUMSDEN—THE AMBEYLA EXPEDITION—THE FIGHT FOR "THE CRAG"—CAPTURE OF AMBEYLA VILLAGE—DESTRUCTION OF MALKA AND MANDI—MINOR OPERATIONS—PEACE ON THE BORDER—THE "QUEEN'S OWN" CORPS OF GUIDES—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JOWAKI AFRIDIS—THE UTMAN KHEL—THE RANIZAIS.

See Maps : Ambela Expedition, facing page 70 ; Black Mountain, in pocket ; Kohat Pass and Jowaki Afridi Operations, facing page 74.

FOR some months after the close of the operations in Waziristan described in the last chapter, the Guides were engaged in the ordinary duties of peace-time soldiering.

In March 1862 the Corps experienced an irreparable loss in the advancement of their Commandant to employment higher than that of a regimental command. On the 2nd of this month Colonel Lumsden was offered the command of the Hyderabad Contingent. Having accepted the offer made him, he was parted from his Guides and the associations of all the best years of his life and left Mardan for Bolarum, near Secunderabad.

"This fine soldier, from the raising of the Corps in 1846, had held command of it for sixteen years ; the highest example of what a brave, chivalrous and resourceful leader should be. Commanders of regiments may come and go, and few leave their mark ; but over the Guides the influence of Lumsden still burns bright and clear. To be alert and ready ; to rise equal to the occasion, be the call small or great ; to be not easily taken aback in a sudden emergency ; to be a genial comrade and a good sportsman—such are the simple soldier maxims left to his comrades by one of the best soldiers who ever drew a sword."²

The effect of the expedition in which, in the year 1858, the Guides had taken part against the Hindustani fanatics and the Khudu Khel had been that the Hindustanis had been ejected from their settlement at Sitana and had settled at Malka, on the northern slopes of the Mahaban Mountain ; but in 1861 they came down to a place called Seri, close to their former haunts, and began abducting Hindu traders from across the Hazara border. Repressive measures were undertaken against those tribes who had allowed the raiders passage through their territories, and for a brief period matters improved ; but in the spring of 1863 murder and outrage began again, and with the connivance of the Gaduns and Utmanzais, the Hindustanis in the summer suddenly reoccupied Sitana, began preaching

¹ Ambeyla: The old spelling is retained in the text for the sake of its associations. The modern spelling is used in the maps facing page 70 and in pocket.

² Younghusband, "The Story of the Guides," p. 81.

something of a *Jihad*, and made many attacks on posts and villages on the British border. A blockade of the Utmanzais and Gaduns was now imposed, and on 28 July 1863 a detachment of the Corps of Guides—two troops of Cavalry and two companies of Infantry, under Lieutenants F. H. Jenkins and W. Battye—marched from Mardan to protect the border village of Topi, thirty-two miles distant, from a threatened attack by the Gaduns of Mahaban and the Hindustani fanatics of Sitana. By a forced march all night, Topi was reached at 7 a.m. on the 29th.

The prompt arrival of the Guides saved Topi from immediate attack, but the Hindustanis and Gaduns continuing to show a hostile demeanour, the Guides were ordered to remain at Topi and form part of the force blockading the offending tribes.

On the night of 3 September the usual night patrol was out, composed of Dafadar Fakira and three sowars, and came upon the advance guard of a party of 250–300 Hindustanis, who had come down from Sitana under their leader, one Mullah Abdullah, with the intention of surprising the Guides' camp at Topi. Coming upon this party in the dark, the patrol promptly charged, shouting "Fall in, fall in!" when the enemy, thinking the surprise had failed and that they had the whole detachment in their front, at once turned about and fled, their leader showing the way. The Guides had no casualties, but they killed one of the enemy and mortally wounded and brought in another, besides some arms which some Hindustanis had thrown away in their flight.

On 5 September the Corps Headquarters—two troops of Cavalry and five companies of Infantry, with Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B.,¹ Lieutenants A. M. Ommaney and W. Furlong, and Dr. Bellew—marched from Mardan, and on 8 September took up a position at Baja Bam Khel as a support to the Topi detachment and to strengthen the blockade. On the 17th Lieutenant Hawes, Commandant of the Guides Cavalry, also joined, while a few days previously two guns of the 3rd Punjab Light Field Battery had been sent to Baja Bam Khel from Kohat.

These blockade measures proved insufficient, and the Hasanzais, instigated by the Maulvi of Sitana, made an unprovoked attack upon and destroyed several villages in Amb territory. Later the same clan threatened Chamheri and attacked and killed several of the Amb levies on the Black Mountain; and as it seemed now clear that most of the Hazara tribes had thrown in their lot with the Hindustanis against the British, an expedition for their punishment was determined upon. This was to be on a large scale, and the force employed was to be commanded by Brigadier-General N. Chamberlain.

The troops were to be divided into two columns, one operating from the Peshawar valley, the other from Hazara. The following movements were proposed for each: the Peshawar column was to assemble at Nawe Kalai and Swabi with the avowed intention of moving on Mangal Thana, but was actually to march through the Ambeyla Pass, occupy Koga in the Chamla valley, and thence move on Sitana by Chororai; the Hazara column was to remain at Darband to overawe the riverain tribes and protect the Hazara border. Hostility was not expected from the people of Buner, with whom we had no quarrel and who were known to have no sympathy

¹ Appointed Commandant *vice* Colonel Lumsden on 4 March 1862.

with the Hindustanis ; but the need for keeping secret the line of operations of the force prevented the Bunerwals from being informed that their frontier would be approached. As a result they formed the impression that their country was to be invaded, and eventually took sides against the British.

On 12 October Colonel Wilde, with the Guides and the guns, left Baja Bam Khel and camped at Swabi, at which place and at Nawe Kalai the force was concentrating ; and here two days later he was joined by Lieutenant Jenkins's party from Topi. General Chamberlain had himself reached Swabi on the 13th.

By the morning of the 19th the bulk of the force was concentrated at Nawe Kalai, and on the same day orders were issued for an advance in two columns, one following the other, by the Ambeyla route to Chamla ; the leading column was to be under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, the other to be commanded by General Chamberlain in person.

At 9 p.m. this evening the first column marched off, composed of 100 sabres of the Guides Cavalry, 100 sabres of the 11th Bengal Cavalry, the Guides Infantry, eight companies of the 5th Punjab Infantry, and the 20th Punjab Native Infantry ; the Guides Infantry led the advance. At Parmulai, near Machai, the column was joined by the Peshawar and Hazara Mountain Train Batteries, the 1st Punjab Infantry and the 5th Gurkhas, who fell in and followed in rear, the advance being continued over very rough ground until 3 a.m., when a halt was made for a couple of hours some three miles from the mouth of the Ambeyla Pass. At daylight the column moved on to the village of Surkhawai, whence the pass was reconnoitred. The pass was then entered, the Guides Infantry piqueting commanding heights, and about 3 p.m. the *Kotal* was reached. This was found to be occupied by some 250 Bunerwals, who were dislodged without much difficulty by the Guides and 1st Punjab Infantry, and moving on again the column camped on the farther slopes of the pass. The distance from Nawe Kalai was some twenty-three miles, and the rearguard did not get into camp until midnight.

From the foot of the range on the north side two roads passed through the Chamla valley ; one ran under the hills dividing Chamla from Buner on the north side of the valley, while the other went by Koga on the south. Since Ambeyla, though actually in Chamla, was regarded by the Bunerwals as one of their own villages, the reconnoitring party now sent out under Colonel Probyn¹ of the 11th Bengal Cavalry, and accompanied by Lieutenant Hawes with fifty sabres of the Guides Cavalry, was ordered to proceed by the Koga road so as to avoid all possibility of embroilment with the people of Buner. As the column passed the road leading into Buner, the pass seemed to be crowded with Bunerwals, who did not, however, leave the heights ; and Colonel Probyn's party pushed on through Koga to Kuria and then returned. Near the village of Ambeyla the road was found to be held by the enemy in force, and a gallant charge by the Guides Cavalry cleared the road to camp, two sowars being wounded, while Dafadar Mahmud Khan was conspicuous for his gallantry.

¹ Afterwards General Sir Dighton Probyn, V.C., etc., after whom Probyn's Horse was so named.

The enemy came on again, however, and engaged some of the 20th Punjab Infantry under Major Brownlow, who had been sent out from camp and had taken over the duty of rearguard. Daylight had now gone and the enemy pressed the 20th very closely, following them right into camp and cutting down some camp followers before they were driven back. The whole of the Guides Infantry not on piquet duty were at once pushed to the front of the camp, and, driving the enemy before them, held the ridges on the right front of the camp until the morning. The enemy kept up a brisk fire and pressed their attack all along the front of the camp till past midnight, when they dispersed, leaving eighteen of their dead in front of the position.

It was now clear that the Hindustani settlements on the Mahaban Mountain could not be reached by way of Chamla with a powerful enemy on the left flank, so additional troops were called up for the security of the line of communications, the sick and all superfluous baggage were sent back to the rear, and the troops, now about 6,000 in number, were employed in strengthening the position and improving the communications. The Guides were now posted on a hill, forming the right flank of the camp, between the 1st Punjab Infantry and the 5th Gurkhas.

The Bunerwals for the present remained quiet, but it was noticed that they had been joined by large bodies of Hasanzais, Chagarzais, Madda Khel and Hindustanis. Many fierce attacks were made upon a piquet known as the "Eagle's Nest," a mile from camp and occupying the top of a steep, rocky knoll overlooking the left of the camp; and before long it was evident that the enemy force against us had been very largely increased, and that there was now a general combination against the British of almost all the tribes from the Indus to the border of Afghanistan. General Chamberlain recognized that any advance, such as had been contemplated, would be inadvisable with his present force in the face of so large a combination as was now arrayed against him. He therefore decided to remain on the defensive in his present position, where his force and its communications were at least secure and where reinforcements and supplies could easily reach him, trusting that repeated unsuccessful attacks would so discourage the tribesmen that the coalition would break up of itself.

Between 27 and 29 October two more guns joined the force, and two more infantry regiments—the 14th Sikhs and the 4th Gurkhas—but it was known that the enemy, too, had recently been heavily reinforced.

On the night of the 29th–30th the advanced piquets of the right defence were furnished by the 1st Punjab Infantry and one company of the Guides Infantry—Yusafzais and Akora Khattaks—under Major Keyes of the former corps. Above the main piquets and on the opposite side of the *Kotal* to "Eagle's Nest" was "The Crag," a high, rocky plateau, the ascent to which was most precipitous, and the summit of which could only hold a very small garrison. At daylight on the 30th a strong body of the enemy surprised "The Crag" piquet, held by a havildar's party of the 1st Punjab Infantry, drove it out, and opened a heavy fire into the position below. Major Keyes advanced with his regiment and a company of the Guides, and by a most gallant charge up the rock retook "The Crag" after

a severe hand-to-hand contest. In this affair one sepoy was killed and one wounded, both of the Guides ; while Subadar Ahmad Khan, Naiks Maizullah and Kamarudin and Sepoy Samundar,¹ also of the Corps, displayed conspicuous gallantry and were among the first into the recaptured piquet. Some sixty enemy dead, mostly Hindustani fanatics, were found in and about "The Crag."

While this attack on the right of the camp was in progress, another was delivered on the front by men from Swat, while a demonstration was also made against the left. These attacks all failed with heavy loss, and resulted in many of the tribesmen returning to their homes.

The General was now anxious to open a new road so as to facilitate the forward movement on Ambeyla along the western slopes of the right ridge. On 6 November three companies of the Guides under Lieutenant Jenkins and accompanied by Lieutenant Battye were out as a covering party to the Sappers and Miners working on the road, and became smartly engaged with the enemy on a hill to the right front of the camp. On this occasion Lieutenant Battye and two men were wounded, the first severely, while one sepoy was killed.

Three times again in the course of this month the Guides were engaged with the enemy. On the night of the 12th two companies under Lieutenant Furlong, the Adjutant, were posted as a night piquet in support of "The Crag," held by Major Brownlow and the 1st Punjab Infantry. During this night the enemy made a prolonged and determined attack and very nearly succeeded in entering it at its left front angle. In this affair Subadar Kurban Ali of the Guides Infantry displayed great gallantry in carrying ammunition up to the piquet. On the following day, the 13th, "The Crag" was captured by the enemy, and Major Keyes brought up some of his regiment, supported by a small body of the Guides, to retake it ; but in spite of the coolness and daring with which the assault was conducted, the detachments were too weak in numbers to take the position and had to withdraw to the rocks below.

On hearing of the loss of "The Crag," Colonel Wilde, commanding the right defences, asked for the help of the 101st Fusiliers and advanced with three companies of the Guides—Yusafzai, Mixed and Sikh Companies—towards "The Crag," meeting the 101st *en route*. On their arrival at the advanced piquets the state of affairs was as follows : portions of the 14th Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry were half-way up "The Crag," but though holding the enemy in check could advance no farther ; parties of the enemy were attacking the lower piquets, but were kept back by the fire of the mountain guns ; while the 1st and 20th Punjab Infantry and two companies of the Guides under Lieutenant Jenkins still held the breastworks of the camp, but were too weak to do more in view of the large numbers of the tribesmen.

The 101st now advanced directly upon "The Crag," stormed the heights and secured the piquet, driving the enemy over the hills beyond, while the three companies of the Guides under Lieutenant Furlong swept them from the right of the position.

On the 20th "The Crag," then held by the 101st Fusiliers, who had that morning

¹ Afterwards Subadar Samundar.

relieved the Guides, was again assailed and taken by the enemy, but was retaken by the Guides, whose advance was well covered by artillery fire. In this final capture General Chamberlain was severely wounded, and was soon after relieved in command by Major-General Garvock.

Thus three times was "The Crag" piquet lost and won—a spot which, from the heavy losses sustained by both sides, became known in the country as *Katlgar*, or the Place of Slaughter.

On 30 November Major-General Garvock assumed command. The force was now divided into two brigades, the second of which was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde and composed as follows : half No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, Hazara Mountain Train Battery, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, 14th Native Infantry, Guides Infantry, 6th Punjab Infantry, 4th Gurkha Regiment, 23rd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers).

By this time the Bunerwals at least seemed inclined for peace and deputations had been received from their *jirgas*. Negotiations, however, broke down and, though many tribesmen left for their homes, reinforcements from other tribes joined the enemy, but these were so divided in counsel that the attack was not renewed.

On 1 December the Guides were paraded and General Garvock distributed the Order of Merit medals awarded to Subadar Ahmad Khan and seven others of the Corps.

On 10 December 200 sabres of the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant Hawes were brought up to camp from the Reserve.

On this day a deputation from the Bunerwals arrived in camp and finally came to an agreement to assist in the destruction of Malka and to expel the Hindustanis from their country. They left on the following day, fully expecting to obtain the agreement of their various allies to these arrangements. Their expectations were not, however, fulfilled ; the Buner *jirga* was completely overruled, and sent word to the camp of their ill-success, informing General Garvock at the same time that the camp was to be attacked on the 16th and advising him to take the initiative.

At this time there was a force of 4,000 of the enemy at Lalu, and as no attack could be made on Ambeyla with that force on its flank, it was determined to attack Lalu. For this purpose the troops were divided into two columns, the Guides, under Lieutenant Jenkins, being in the second column, commanded by Colonel Wilde. The two columns, some 4,800 strong, moved out at daybreak on 15 December, leaving a force of 2,900 in camp, and were soon in position ready to assault the "Conical Hill," a place of great strength with rocky, precipitous hillsides, while the summit, strongly occupied, was strengthened by stone breastworks. Below it and to its left was the hamlet of Banda, strongly defended by artificial defences. Beyond it stretched a narrow ridge, terminating in a hill of lesser elevation ; behind which was situated the village of Lalu at the foot of a lofty range.

The two columns advanced simultaneously to the assault of "Conical Hill," covered by the fire of the mountain guns. The 101st Fusiliers attacked the almost perpendicular sides of the highest peak and, leaping into the breastwork, bayoneted some thirty of the defenders, while the Guides, turning the position, cut and shot

down numbers as they retreated through the village of Banda. Pushing on again towards Lalu, the Guides were the first to reach it and set it on fire.

The enemy now made a vigorous attack upon Colonel Wilde's left, which was somewhat isolated, and also upon the camp. The Guides were accordingly recalled from Lalu and, assisted by the 101st and 5th Gurkhas, finally drove off the enemy in great confusion. The force then bivouacked for the night.

Sepoy Subha Singh of the Guides Infantry displayed great gallantry at Lalu, being the first man into the village and killing his adversary in a hand-to-hand conflict in which his sword broke. Jemadar Dunichand and Sowar Buta, of the Cavalry, who accompanied the Infantry on foot, Havildar Sher Gul and Sepoy Multani also distinguished themselves in single combat on "Conical Hill." The casualties amounted to eleven; amongst the wounded were Jemadar Duni Chand and Subadar Kurban Ali.

Next morning the columns advanced down the spurs upon the village of Ambeyla. In Colonel Wilde's column a company of the Guides Infantry formed the advance guard, while the rest of the Regiment was to attack the extreme left of the ridge between the columns and the village of Ambeyla. During the advance the enemy, issuing from the village, had taken possession of this ridge and were holding it in force, but they now abandoned it after a very slight resistance and retreated to the higher spurs of the Garu Hill. Up to this time the cavalry had remained concealed behind a projecting spur; they were now ordered to advance, and moving on at a gallop, under Colonel Probyn of the 11th Bengal Cavalry and Lieutenant Hawes of the Guides, passed round the left of the enemy's position, now in our possession, swept into the valley beyond and halted to the east of Ambeyla. The village, which had previously been abandoned, was immediately fired, large stores of grain falling into our hands. There was only one casualty this day in the Guides, a sepoy being severely wounded by a sword-cut.

That night the force bivouacked on the ridge near Ambeyla village. The greater part of the tribal gathering now broke up, and on the morning of 17 December the Buner *jirga* came in and offered their submission. The following demands were then made by General Garvock, and were at once unanimously accepted :—

- (1) To dismiss the hostile bodies.
- (2) To send a party, accompanied by British officers and the necessary escort, to destroy Malka.
- (3) To expel the Hindustanis from Buner, Chamla and Amazai territory.
- (4) To give hostages until the above requirements had been carried out.

"The plan of thus making the Bunerwals destroy Malka, without the aid of our troops, was well conceived, but the undertaking was no easy one, and it was attended, moreover, with many and obvious risks. To Colonel Reynell Taylor was given the task of carrying it out . . . and an important and delicate duty of this kind could not have been entrusted to safer and more chivalrous hands. Reynell Taylor was accompanied by six British officers: they were Colonel Adye, C.B., Colonel A. Taylor, R.E., Major Roberts, V.C., Major Wright, Major Johnstone and Lieutenant Carter. The Guides, as representing the three distinctive bodies of

our native army—Pathans, Gurkhas and Sikhs—formed the escort, and on 19 December the party set out on the undertaking.”¹

Lord Roberts, who, as Major Roberts, accompanied the party, has left a full account of the events of the following four days,² and from this extracts are here given :—

“ Twenty-five Cavalry and four companies of the Guides Infantry, under four officers, formed our escort [actually twenty sabres and 400 rifles under Lieutenants Jenkins, Furlong, Ommaney and Nicholson, with Assistant-Surgeon Bellew], and it had been arranged that we were to be accompanied by four leading Buner Khans, with 2,000 followers, who would be responsible for our safety, and destroy the fanatics’ stronghold in our presence. Rain was falling heavily . . . it was rough travelling, and it was almost dark when we reached Kuria, only eight miles on our way, where we halted for the night, and where we had to remain the next day, as the Bunerwals declared they could not continue the journey until they had come to an understanding with the Amazais, in whose territory Malka was situated. . . .

“ We made a fresh start on the morning of the 21st. Malka was only twelve miles off, but the way was so difficult, and our guides stopped so often to consult with the numerous bands of armed men we came across, that it was sunset before we arrived at our destination. Malka was perched on a spur of the Mahabun Mountain, some distance below its highest peak. It was a strong, well-built place, with accommodation for about 1,500 people. The Amazais did not attempt to disguise their disgust at our presence in their country, and they gathered in knots, scowling and pointing at us, evidently discussing whether we should or should not be allowed to return.

“ The next morning Malka was set on fire, and the huge column of smoke which ascended from the burning village, and was visible for miles around, did not tend to allay the ill-feeling so plainly displayed. The native officers of the Guides warned us that delay was dangerous, as the people were becoming momentarily more excited and were vowing we should never return. It was no use, however, to attempt to make a move without the consent of the tribesmen, for we were a mere handful compared to the thousands who had assembled round Malka, and we were separated from our camp by twenty miles of most difficult country. Our position was no doubt extremely critical, and it was well for us that we had at our head such a cool, determined leader as Reynell Taylor. . . . The Amazais became still further excited. They talked in loud tones, and gesticulated in true Pathan fashion, thronging round Taylor, who stood quite alone and perfectly self-possessed in the midst of the angry and dangerous-looking multitude. At this crisis the Bunerwals came to our rescue. The most influential of the tribe . . . forced his way through the rapidly increasing crowd to Taylor’s side, and, raising his one arm to enjoin silence, delivered himself as follows : ‘ You are hesitating whether you will allow these English to return unmolested. You can, of course, murder them and their escort ; but if you do, you must kill us Bunerwals first, for we have sworn

¹ Gambier-Parry, “ Reynell Taylor : A Biography,” p. 289.

² “ Forty-one Years in India,” vol. II, p. 19 *et seq.*

to protect them and we will do so with our lives.' This plucky speech produced a quieting effect, and, taking advantage of the lull in the storm, we set out on our return journey; but . . . they followed us the whole way to Kuria. . . . On 23 December we reached our camp in the Ambeyla Pass."

"The spectacle," Colonel Reynell Taylor wrote afterwards, "of a tribe like the Buner doing our bidding and destroying the stronghold of their own allies in the war at a distant spot, with British witnesses looking on, must have been a thoroughly convincing proof to the surrounding country of the reality of our success, and of the indubitable character of the prostration felt by the tribe which had been the foremost in opposing us."

General Garvock's force now began to withdraw from this part of the Border, and the whole had reached Nawe Kalai by Christmas Day, but there was still some work remaining to be done before the troops finally dispersed. The behaviour of the Gaduns had not been wholly satisfactory during the course of these operations, and consequently on 28 December Colonel Wilde marched from Nawe Kalai into the Gadun country with a strong brigade composed as follows: the Peshawar and Hazara Mountain Train Batteries, one company of Sappers and Miners, the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, the Corps of Guides, the 3rd Sikhs, the 3rd Punjab Infantry, the 5th Gurkhas.

Maini was reached on 30 December, and on 3 January 1864 the force arrived at Khabbal in the territory of the Utmanzais, whose conduct had also been hostile.

No opposition was experienced, but it was decided to require these tribes **1864** to perform a similar service to that demanded of the Bunerwals—viz., the destruction of a Hindustani fort and settlement called Mandi near Sitana. This was done and the force was then broken up, the Guides returning to Mardan on 11 January.

In this year Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain went home on medical certificate by reason of the wound which he had received in these operations, and Colonel A. T. Wilde was appointed to officiate as Brigadier-General Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force in his place. This left the command of the Corps of Guides vacant, and Colonel Sam Browne, V.C., C.B., of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, was appointed Officiating Commandant, and Lieutenant R. B. Campbell,¹ Adjutant 2nd Punjab Cavalry, was appointed Commandant of the Cavalry.

On 8 February 1865 Colonel Browne's appointment was made substantive, and Captain F. H. Jenkins became substantive Second-in-Command. In October of this year Lieutenant A. M. Ommaney, a young squadron officer of great **1865** promise who had served with the Corps in the Ambeyla expedition, was mortally wounded by a fanatic near the regimental bandstand while attending band practice, and died the same evening; the murderer was at once arrested and was hanged on the following day.

¹ This officer was recommended for the Victoria Cross by General Sir Hope Grant for gallantry in action on the left flank of the Gumti on 10 March 1858, when, under very heavy fire, he recovered the body of Lieutenant Sanford, who was killed while reconnoitring a village during the Mutiny. See Mackenzie, "Mutiny Memoirs," p. 205 *et seq.*; Tullibardine, "History of Perthshire," p. 547 *et seq.*; Hope Grant, "Incidents in the Sepoy War," p. 253 *et seq.*

In January 1866 the Corps of Guides was again called out on service, this time against the Sam Baizais, who for the past fifteen years had been guilty of numerous raids into British territory and who had flocked to assist the Bunerwals during **1866** the Ambeyla campaign. Their punishment was long overdue, and accordingly on 15 January 1866 a force of some 4,000 men with twelve guns was assembled at Nowshera under the command of Brigadier-General Dunsford, C.B., moving out next day to Mardan, where it was joined by 275 sabres and 450 bayonets of the Guides. It was now found that the mere approach of a punitive force had of itself been sufficient to cause some of the villages to come to terms, but the troops marched on, destroyed the villages of Sanghao, Mian Khan and Barmol, and the inhabitants of these were required to rebuild upon other less inaccessible sites. The objects of the expedition having been carried out, the force marched back and was broken up.


No portion of the Corps was employed in any active operations on or beyond the North-West Frontier until the autumn of 1868, when the Guides Cavalry, under Captain R. B. Campbell and Lieutenant H. Wylie, joined at Agror a large **1868** force assembling under Brigadier-General A. T. Wilde for the punishment of the Chagarzais, Akazais, the Deshi and Thakot Swatis, the Pariari Saiyids and their followers, and the Hindustani fanatics and certain trans-Indus Pathans. The operations were prolonged until the end of October, but were conducted in very difficult and mountainous country, so that there was very little demand for the services of the mounted men with General Wilde's force.

During the years 1869 and 1870 there were several changes in the command of the Corps of Guides. Early in 1869 Colonel S. Browne, V.C., C.B., was appointed to the command of the Central India Horse, and later in the year assumed **1870** the charge of the Peshawar district, when Lieutenant-Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., 1st Punjab Infantry, was appointed, first Officiating, and then Permanent, Commandant of the Corps. In April of the year following, however, this officer obtained the command of the Punjab Frontier Force, when Captain F. H. Jenkins, 5th Punjab Infantry, was appointed Commandant in his place under date of 12 May.

Up to the year 1869 the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Corps of Guides had received no medal for any of the many Frontier expeditions in which they had taken part, but at last in this year, under G.G.O. No. 812, the India Medal, with clasp inscribed "North-West Frontier," was granted to all survivors of the troops which had been engaged in any of the following operations :—

- Expedition into Yusafzai against the Baizais, 1849.
- Expedition against the Kohat Pass Afridis, 1850.
- Expedition against the Utman Khel, 1852.
- Expedition against the Ranizai Swatis, 1852.
- Operations against the Mohmands, 1852.
- Expedition against the Black Mountain Hasanzais, 1852-3.
- Expedition against the Kasranis and Shiranis, 1853.

ELA EXPEDITION



To face page 70

- Expedition against the Jowaki Afridis, 1853.
- Expedition against the Mohmands, 1854.
- Expedition against the Aka Khel Afridis, 1855.
- Expedition to the Miranzai Valley, 1855.
- Expedition to the Bozdar Hills, 1857.
- Expedition against the Kabul Khel Wazirs, 1859-60.

In the same G.G.O. quoted above the medal was also granted to the troops who had taken part in the Ambeyla expedition, which had occupied the services of the largest body of troops employed up to that date in any one Frontier expedition.

For some considerable time after the close of the Ambeyla campaign the Corps of Guides was not engaged in actual operations, though the fact that the portion of the Frontier immediately adjacent to Mardan, the home of the Corps, remained at peace was probably due in large measure to the attitude of perpetual watchfulness there maintained.

In the winter of 1872-3 the Corps marched to join a camp of exercise which was assembled at Hasan Abdal, and remained in this neighbourhood until 14 February 1873. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Henry 1873 Davies, was present during the manœuvres that took place here, and in his camp was organized an embassy to Kashgar for the purpose of concluding a treaty of commerce with that state. Atalik Ghazi, through his envoy, had expressed his earnest desire for such a treaty as a means of improving the friendly relations which had recently sprung up between the two governments. Sir D. Forsyth, K.C.S.I., was therefore appointed as the envoy for the mission, and an escort of the Guides Cavalry and Infantry under Jemadar Siffat Khan accompanied him.

In March 1874 Havildar Ahmad Gul and Lance-Naik Sikandar returned to India from Kashgar, bringing the treaty concluded between the ruler of Kashgar and the British Government. These two men had performed the journey 1874 from Kashgar to Calcutta in sixty-two days, and on arrival were personally congratulated by His Excellency the Viceroy on the way they had carried out their orders. The havildar was promoted supernumerary jemadar by the Viceroy and was granted a reward of Rs.250, while the lance-naik was made a grant of Rs.100.

The mission was now on its way back from Kashgar, where Mr. Robert Shaw had remained as British Resident, and in June the Guides were called upon to provide a personal escort for him of two non-commissioned officers and eight men. In the following month the escort which had accompanied the mission rejoined headquarters at Mardan, when the services of those composing it were acknowledged by the Government, every man in the escort receiving Rs.100, and Jemadar Siffat Khan Rs.500. Nor was Sir Douglas Forsyth backward in his praises of those who had provided his escort on this delicate and important mission; after specially mentioning Jemadar Ahmad Gul and Lance-Naiks Sikandar and Nur Muhammad, he said :—

" Since the first formation of the camp until the present time every member of the Escort has conducted himself to my entire satisfaction, one and all have borne cheerfully the hardships of the march, and at all times, on the line of march, or in quarters, their soldierly behaviour and admirable conduct have been such as to reflect credit upon the Corps of Guides and upon the Native Army."

Sepoy Nurabdin was also specially mentioned and rewarded for his services while accompanying a messenger across the Oxus and thence by way of Badakshan and Kabul to India.

In this year also the Guides were asked to detail two men to accompany Captain the Hon. G. Napier on a special mission to Persia. Dafadar Fattah Muhammad and Sowar Ali Hussain were selected for this duty, but the dafadar was replaced before leaving India by Sowar Nadir Ali on account of the latter's knowledge of surveying. In June information was received that Sowar Ali Hussain had been killed on the road to Teheran by a gang of robbers, and in reporting his death Captain Napier wrote :—

" His death was caused by a severe wound received while defending the baggage from the attack of a party of Persian robbers. The deceased, though, as I have reason to believe, unsupported, made a gallant stand against a large number of armed men ; revolver and cartridge pouch were both empty, and the gunshot wound he received had the appearance of having been fired at close quarters."

In November 1875 King Edward VII, then Prince of Wales, arrived in India on a tour, and when in the following January he visited Lahore, the Guides Cavalry marched there and provided the escort under Captain 1875 Stewart.

On 10 March the following was published in the *Government Gazette* :—

" The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has the highest gratification in announcing that in commemoration of the visit to India of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, the Queen has been pleased to appoint His Royal Highness to be Honorary Colonel of the following regiments :

* * * * *

" The Corps of Guides.

" Her Majesty has been further graciously pleased to confer on the following Corps the distinction of being styled ' Queen's Own ' and wearing on their Colours and appointments the Royal Cypher within the Garter.

* * * * *

" The Corps of Guides."

In the autumn of this year a letter from Sir Dighton Probyn, equerry to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, informed the Commandant of the Corps that Her Majesty the Queen had graciously consented to order a print of a portrait of herself and one of the late Prince Consort to be sent to the Regiment to be hung in the officers' mess at Mardan.

During the year 1876 the Jowaki Afridis again began to give some trouble, especially in regard to the construction of a cart road through the Kohat Pass.

A blockade of the Galai Khel, Hasan Khel and Asho Khel divisions of the 1876 tribe was instituted, and in December of this year a detachment of 100 rifles of the Guides Infantry, under Subadar Ahmad Khan (recently appointed to the Second Class Order of British India with the title of Bahadur), was ordered to Cherat to remain there as garrison during the winter, since it was feared that the Afridis might attack the station.

By March 1877 the trouble appeared to have subsided, but it came to a head again in consequence of the decision of Government to withdraw from the Jowaki Afridis the allowance hitherto given them for keeping open the road through 1877 the pass. They were granted instead an equivalent sum for the safeguarding of the Khushalgarh road and telegraph line, which ran close to the hills of independent tribes and were always liable to be attacked. However, this proposal was apparently not acceptable to the Jowakis, who in July 1877 began to give renewed trouble. They attacked police posts and escorts, plundered and burnt villages, and finally burnt a bridge on the Khushalgarh road. It was then too early in the year to begin any serious or protracted operations, so it was decided to make a sudden dash into Jowaki country and to endeavour to bring the tribe to terms.

The Guides Infantry were included in the troops detailed for this sudden dash, and 201 bayonets under Major R. P. Campbell, with whom were Major G. Stewart, Captains W. Battye and A. G. Hammond, and Lieutenant F. D. Battye, marched on 28 August from Mardan to Nowshera, thence during the night down the Kabul river in boats to Attock, and on the afternoon of the 29th down the Indus to Shadipur, which was reached at seven o'clock that evening. Major Campbell had received orders to march on and attack Paiah, but at the last moment these orders were countermanded and he was now directed to take up a position south of Paiah so as to intercept the enemy retreating before the other two columns. A position was gained commanding the Kuka China Pass. The Guides were not opposed here, and, leaving the Gurkha Company to hold the *Kotal* under Captain Hammond, Major Campbell descended the hill with the remainder of the infantry and marched to meet the rest of the force, destroying a Jowaki village on his way.

The force, which had been divided into three columns, closed on the village of Lashkari Banda at about 1 p.m., and was then withdrawn by the Kuka China Pass to the border village of Tolanj, and thence to Gumbat on the Kohat-Khushalgarh road. The columns had been under arms in a burning sun for twenty hours, had marched nearly thirty miles and had sustained eleven casualties only—the Guides Infantry had two men wounded.

The Guides now returned to Mardan, but as the hostile attitude of the Jowaki Afridis remained unchanged, and aggressions upon British territory went on during September and October, another expedition became necessary, and a larger force assembled in November of this year. The general arrangements and the procedure followed were the same as in August, three columns being again formed and entering

the Jowaki country at the same points. On this occasion Brigadier-General Keyes was in command. The Guides furnished 380 men for this expedition, which advanced on 9 November. Owing to the rains, however, nothing of importance was achieved till December, when the operation was successful and the force withdrew to Shindih, with negligible casualties. Major Campbell again commanded the Guides and had with him Major G. Stewart, Captain A. G. Hammond, Lieutenants F. D. Battye, M. C. Cooke-Collis and W. Hamilton, and Surgeon Kelly.

During these operations the Peshawar force had been engaged in the Bori valley—the scene of the operations of 1853—and on 7 December General Keyes sent a small column under Major Campbell, composed of the Guides and the 4th Punjab Infantry, against the village of Ghariba, a place which had long been regarded as a “city of refuge” for Jowaki thieves. From the difficult nature of its approaches it was deemed secure from attack.

The enemy still showed no intention of coming to terms, so a further advance, by both forces in combination into the Pustawanai valley was decided upon.¹

During the rest of the month the troops were chiefly occupied in exploring the country, especially the Nara Khulla defile and the country to the west of it, and in protecting survey parties, in each case meeting with a certain amount of opposition. On the 17th, while on piquet with two companies opposite the entrance to the Nara Khulla defile, Captain Hammond was attacked by the enemy and greatly distinguished himself, being mentioned in despatches; on the 18th during a night attack a sepoy was killed.

By 23 January the bulk of both forces had been withdrawn to Kohat and Peshawar. A full settlement of all matters in dispute was now effected, and the Guides were back in Mardan by 7 March.

Immediately before the return from the Jowaki expedition of the Guides Infantry, the Cavalry of the Corps had been engaged in a small affair on their own account.

Since the operations of 1852, in which the Corps of Guides had taken part, against the independent Utman Khel, the conduct of these tribesmen had been uniformly good. In December 1876, however, certain firebrands of this tribe attacked a party of unarmed coolies engaged on the Swat river canal works near Fort Abazai and killed and wounded thirty-three of their number. At the time it was not possible to take any active measures against the Utman Khel, and no more than a partial blockade was instituted.

Early in 1878 it came to the knowledge of Captain Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, that the man who had been the leader of the party concerned in the attack upon the coolie camp was then living in the village of Sapri, just across the Utman Khel border, and on the left bank of the Swat river some five miles upstream from Abazai. Cavagnari suggested that Sapri should be surprised and, at the suggestion of Captain W. Battye, then commanding at Mardan, recommended

¹ General Ross met General Keyes at Walai and both forces burnt Pustawanai village on 3 January 1878. The combined force then began its retirement to camp, closely followed by the enemy as far as Paiah.



Reproduced from Survey of India Map,
with the permission of the Surveyor-General,
To face page 74

that the Guides Cavalry should be allowed to "do the business." The proposal was sanctioned. Captain Battye, accompanied by Captain L. Cavagnari, Captain R. C. Hutchinson, Lieutenant H. W. Hughes and Surgeon Mallins, marched from Mardan on 14 February with 264 sabres and 12 bayonets of the Guides, the Infantry being mounted on mules.

The party moved by the main Tangi-Abazai road for some distance, but on arrival at Tangi the column turned north, crossed the line of the Swat Canal, and on arriving within two miles of Abazai left the horses there under a small escort. The troops had by this time marched thirty-two miles, having made a long detour so as to avoid villages from which news of the movement might be conveyed across the border. Moving on, the Swat river was reached, and its left bank followed for about four miles to Mada Baba Ziarat, where a mountain torrent joins the river; and climbing a rough path by its side they soon reached the *Kotal* leading to the village of Sapri. It was still dark, but from here Captain Battye sent a small party on to a spur commanding the village and in particular the house of the man wanted for the outrage near Abazai. When daylight came the village was rushed and Mian Rakan-ud-din, the leader, was killed. Some of his men gave themselves up, others fled to the hills above the village, whence they opened fire on the troops. But Captain Battye was able to withdraw his party to Fort Abazai without serious molestation, having marched forty-eight miles since leaving Mardan the previous evening. The Guides had seven wounded in this affair, including Jemadar Jaggat Singh.

The Viceroy characterized this operation as "a brilliant feat," and also telegraphed his thanks and congratulations to Captain Battye and all concerned, the Secretary of State for India subsequently doing the same. Jemadar Jaggat Singh and Dafadar Tura Baz received the Indian Order of Merit for gallantry in action.


In the month following Captain Cavagnari obtained sanction to a project for bringing the people of the Ranizai village of Shahkot to their senses with the assistance of the Guides. This village had lately given trouble by harbouring outlaws and making no effort to restrain them from committing offences within the British border. On the evening of 13 March a force composed of the Hazara Mountain Battery, 249 sabres and 428 rifles of the Guides, marched out from Mardan under Major Campbell, and the following officers accompanied the force: Captains Cavagnari, Deputy Commissioner, and Warburton, Assistant Commissioner, and of the Guides, Major Stewart, Captains Battye, Hutchinson and Hammond, Lieutenants Battye, Cooke-Collis, Hamilton and Hughes, Surgeons Kelly and Mallins.

Making a detour to avoid the village of Jalala, the troops arrived within two miles of Shahkot about 2 a.m. on 14 March, and all commanding positions were at once occupied. The villagers at first prepared to resist, but, seeing they were completely surrounded, the headman came out and made a complete surrender. Thirty-three hostages were given in earnest of their good faith. Shahkot was occupied until 10 a.m., when the troops began their return march, Mardan being reached the same evening—nearly fifty miles having been covered within twenty-four hours.

The thanks of the Government of India and the Secretary of State were conveyed to Major Campbell and the officers concerned.

On 19 March Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins, Commandant, rejoined from furlough and reassumed command of the Corps, and on the very next day he led his men across the border once more.

After the events of February of this year certain villages of the Utman Khel had shown themselves anxious to establish friendly relations with the British Government, but others remained hostile. These latter it was now resolved to coerce, and on 20 March Colonel Jenkins left Mardan for the Utman Khel country with a force composed of two British officers and four guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery, two British officers and 243 sabres of the Guides Cavalry, and nine British officers, eleven Indian officers and 442 bayonets of the Guides Infantry. The Zirak villages were first dealt with, and though our troops were fired on the tribesmen were easily dispersed and the villages cleared. The Guides Cavalry were now left here in occupation while the rest of the force moved on. And eventually the Zirak and Pakhai headmen came in and arranged to pay the fines demanded of them. Colonel Jenkins then marched out of the Utman Khel country and bivouacked for the night at the Jhinda outpost on the Swat canal works, having marched over forty miles since noon the previous day. The thanks of the Government of India and the Secretary of State were conveyed to him and to the officers concerned. The Guides had one man killed.



OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1878.

Standing.—Lieut. F. Hughes, Lieut.-Col. F. H. Jenkins (Commandant), Lieut. M. C. Cooke-Collis, Lieut. F. D. Battye, Lieut. W. R. P. Hamilton, Surgeon A. Kelly.
Seated.—Capt. W. Battye, Capt. A. G. Hammond, Major R. B. Campbell (Commanding Infantry), Major G. Stewart (Commanding Cavalry).

CHAPTER VI

1878-1879

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR

THE ATTEMPTED MISSION TO KABUL—OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR—THE ADVANCE INTO THE KHYBER—CAPTURE OF ALI MASJID—SHER ALI SUCCEEDED BY YAKUB KHAN—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NEW AMIR—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GHILZAIS AND KHUGIANIS—DEATH OF WIGRAM BATTYE—TREATY OF GANDAMAK.

See Map of Afghanistan, facing page 110.

THE narrative has now reached a period when the Corps of Guides was to be concerned in events of greater importance than any of those in which it had taken part during the preceding twenty years, and something must be said in explanation of all that led up to them.

In April 1876 Lord Lytton had assumed the office of Governor-General of India, and during the months immediately preceding his advent Russia had considerably extended her empire eastward. In the autumn of 1874 the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported that the whole of the country between Khiva and the Attrek was regarded as annexed to Russia. In 1875, only two years after the Amir had been told to dismiss the contingency of Russian aggression from his mind as too remote, the whole of Khokand was incorporated in the Russian dominion. At the same time General Kaufmann, the Governor of Russian Turkestan, entered into frequent communications with Sher Ali, who had assumed an attitude of sullen reserve towards the Indian Government. A policy of abstention was no longer possible. Lord Lytton received instructions to offer the Amir Sher Ali the active countenance and protection of the British Government, on condition that a British agent was allowed to reside in Afghanistan, though not necessarily in Kabul. Thus information could be gleaned of events likely to threaten the tranquillity or independence of Afghanistan.

As a preliminary measure Lord Lytton decided to send a mission to Kabul announcing the Queen's assumption of the title of Empress of India, but this mission the Amir, under various pretexts, declined to receive. Early in August 1878 the disturbing intelligence reached Simla that a Russian mission had visited Kabul and had been most favourably received there by the Amir. Considerations of prestige made it necessary to insist on the equal reception of a British mission, and a demand was sent to the Amir in these terms. General Sir Neville Chamberlain was nominated as envoy, and Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins was detailed as commander of the escort to the mission, with Major Stewart and Captain Battye

and one hundred sabres of the Cavalry and fifty bayonets of the Infantry of the Guides. This party marched from Mardan for Peshawar on 12 September 1878.

A special Indian emissary had been sent on to Kabul announcing the coming of the British mission, the date of departure of which from Peshawar was fixed for 16 or 17 September, but was ultimately delayed until the 21st. The Indian official actually arrived in the Afghan capital on 10 September, and found there divided counsels as to whether the mission should or should not be allowed to enter Afghanistan. In the meantime Major Cavagnari had been negotiating with the Khyber Pass Afridis for the safe conduct of the mission, and all went well until 14 September, when the commander of the Amir's troops at Ali Masjid sent to Peshawar to summon back to the pass all the Khyber tribesmen, and these feared to disobey lest the Amir should stop their allowances.

*"Meanwhile [wrote Lord Lytton to the Secretary of State for India early in October] as time went on it became clear that the Amir was resolved to prevent our bringing matters to a test with him, and that for this purpose he would neither receive, nor refuse to receive our mission ; but keep it waiting indefinitely on the threshold of his dominions, without any answer at all, while the Russian mission still remained at his capital. Such a position we could not possibly accept with either dignity or safety."*¹

On 21 September the mission moved out from Peshawar to Jamrud, and from here Major Cavagnari, with Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins in command of the escort, Captain W. Battye of the Guides Cavalry and twenty-four men, with certain of the Border *Khans*, advanced to within a mile of Ali Masjid. The ridges beyond were held by the Amir's levies, who threatened to fire if anyone approached. Eventually a message was received from Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Amir's local representative, to the effect that he was about to come to a ruined tower in the bed of the stream just below where the party was halted, and that on his arrival there he would send for Major Cavagnari and three others, and would hear anything he had to communicate.

What followed may best be given in the terms of Major Cavagnari's report of 22 September : "As it appeared to me that it would have been an indignity to have remained and waited until Faiz Muhammad Khan would send for me, as well as to be dictated to as to the number of men that should accompany me . . . I determined to advance at once with as many men as I thought fit to take, and endeavour to meet Faiz Muhammad Khan before he should reach the spot named by him. Accordingly, Colonel Jenkins, myself, and one or two of the Guides Cavalry, with some of the Khyber headmen, descended without much delay into the bed of the stream and advanced to meet Faiz Muhammad Khan. A party of Afridis, headed by Abdullah Nur, a Kuki Khel Afridi Malik, in receipt of special allowances from the Amir, attempted to stop me, saying that only four persons should advance. I rode past him, telling him that my mission concerned the Kabul officials and that I desired to have no discussion with the Afridis. . . .

¹ Balfour, "Lord Lytton's Indian Administration," pp. 270, 271.

"After meeting Faiz Muhammad Khan and exchanging salutations, I pointed to what I considered a suitable place for an interview; it was a watermill,¹ with some trees close by it, and on the opposite side of the stream to the spot originally named for the place of meeting."

There was a prolonged discussion, in which several times the Afghan representative attempted to discuss the purpose of the mission itself. Major Cavagnari pointed out that both he and Faiz Muhammad Khan were but servants of their respective governments, and had no concern with such high matters of state, and that all either party was there for was to carry out whatever orders each had received; and Faiz Muhammad Khan then made it clear that in permitting the previous passage of the Indian envoy he had incurred the disapproval of the Kabul Durbar, that he had received no orders from the Amir to let the mission pass, and that in the absence of such orders he could not allow it to proceed.

Colonel Jenkins in his report thus described the close of the interview:—

"Major Cavagnari said to the Sirdar: 'We are both servants, you of the Amir of Kabul, I of the British Government. It is no use for us to discuss those matters. I only came to get a straight answer from you. Will you oppose the passage of the mission by force?' The Sirdar said: 'Yes, I will; and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already.' After this we shook hands and mounted our horses; and the Sirdar said again: 'You have had a straight answer.'"

The advance party under Cavagnari rejoined the camp at Jamrud. The mission then returned to Peshawar and was formally dissolved. The escort of Guides marched back to Mardan, Colonel Jenkins receiving the thanks of the Indian Government for his services.

For the assistance rendered to the mission by the Khyber Pass Afridis, the home of the head malik was burnt by the Afghans, and the Viceroy, on learning this, was in favour of placing the Guides and a mountain battery from Kohat at Colonel Jenkins's and Major Cavagnari's disposal and of entrusting to them the task of storming the fort at Ali Masjid, which was held by Afghan troops. The execution of this scheme was, however, stopped by the news that strong reinforcements had now reached the fort, which could therefore no longer be attacked by a small force with any reasonable hope of success. On 2 November, therefore, something of the nature of an ultimatum was sent to the Amir, demanding a full written apology for the repulse of the mission, to be tendered on British territory by an officer of rank; the Amir to agree to receive a permanent British mission, and to undertake that no injury be done to the pass Afridis for the help they had given the British; and reparation to be made for any damage suffered from the Amir. Failing acceptance of these terms by 20 November, the letter concluded: "I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government." No reply to this letter having been received

¹ This watermill still exists and is a favourite halting-place for caravans on the way through the Khyber.

within the period of grace allowed, war was declared against the Amir Sher Ali Khan on 21 November.

The increasingly unfriendly character of our relations with Afghanistan had already called for certain preparations of a military character to be made, and in August of this year the Commander-in-Chief in India had been asked for his proposals for a campaign in Afghanistan, the points to which his attention was invited being the occupation of the Kurram valley, and the strength and composition of a force for the occupation of Kandahar. Certain suggestions were made, and on 14 October it was directed that a column should be assembled in the Kurram valley and a division at Multan, the operations to be undertaken in the Khyber Pass being still unsettled ; but on 19 November the following columns were detailed :—

- (1) A Kurram Valley Column, 6,665 all ranks and 18 guns, under Major-General Roberts.
- (2) A Multan Column (later 1st Division, Kandahar Column), 7,304 all ranks and 60 guns, under Lieutenant-General Stewart.
- (3) A Quetta reinforcement (later 2nd Division, Kandahar Column), 5,560 all ranks and 18 guns, under Major-General Biddulph.
- (4) A Peshawar Valley Field Force, 16,179 all ranks and 48 guns, under Lieutenant-General Sir S. Browne.
- (5) A Kandahar Column, Reserve Division, 3,870 all ranks and 24 guns.
- (6) A Punjab Chief's Contingent, 4,478 all ranks and 13 guns.

The Amir's regular army was estimated at 20,000 men of all arms in the Kabul province, 6,000 in Kandahar, and 25,000 more in Herat and Turkestan provinces, with 324 guns, while the irregular forces at the Amir's disposal were calculated at 100,000 armed men in the Kabul province. All, both regular and irregular, were practically untrained and badly led by their officers, with the possible exception of the artillery.

During October the Corps of Guides was brought back from Mardan to Jamrud and there encamped, and was employed during this month in reconnoitring the mountains about the Khyber Pass.

On the same evening that the Government of India finally decided to assemble a force in the Peshawar valley to operate on the Khyber line, the command was offered to, and accepted by, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne,¹ V.C., K.C.S.I., C.B., and he arrived at Peshawar on the 9th. His force was then in process of assembling, some of the corps composing it being encamped in different places about the Peshawar valley, while others were still echeloned along the Grand Trunk Road. There was much to be done in the way of concentration and organization, especially in fitting the column out with tents, transport and supplies, the Kurram Column having already taken the pick of these. The orders were, however, peremptory that operations were to begin on 21 November, and by great exertions the column was finally concentrated at Jamrud two days before that date.

The Peshawar Valley Field Force was composed of one Cavalry and three

¹ Commandant 1863-9.

Infantry Brigades, with a reserve of one Cavalry and one Infantry Brigade at Hasan Abdal. The Guides Cavalry was in the Cavalry Brigade of the Force, commanded by Colonel C. J. S. Gough, V.C., C.B., and containing the following corps : two squadrons 10th Hussars, Guides Cavalry, 11th Bengal Lancers.

The Guides Infantry formed part of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, commanded by Colonel J. A. Tytler, V.C., C.B., which was composed as follows : 1st Battalion 17th Foot, Guides Infantry, 1st Sikh Infantry, 3rd Company Sappers and Miners.

The following are the names of the British officers of the Guides : Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins, Commandant ; Majors R. B. Campbell, commanding Infantry, and G. Stewart, commanding Cavalry ; Captains W. Battye, A. G. Hammond and R. C. Hutchinson ; Lieutenants F. D. Battye, W. R. P. Hamilton, M. C. Cooke-Collis and F. Hughes ; Surgeons A. Kelly and J. Lewtas.

For an advance into and through the Khyber Pass it was first necessary that the Afghans should be dispossessed of the fort of Ali Masjid, which stood on a detached hill, some 450 feet high, rising precipitously from the right bank of the Khyber stream about six miles from the mouth of the pass and nine from Jamrud. " It formed the centre of the enemy position, of which the right rested on a ridge connected with lofty hills to the north. Due east from this ridge ran a line of entrenchments broken by three peaks, each of which commanded the fort. Immediately opposite the fort, across the river, extending east from a cliff above the left bank, ran a sort of covered way with entrenchments for some 600 yards along the precipitous face of one of the spurs of the Rhotas Mountain. In the fort itself were eight guns ; two more were placed on a cliff about forty or fifty yards below, and another a few feet above the stream. Along the breastworks of the ridge on the right were eight guns ; three were placed on the cliff above the left bank, on the right of the covered way, while two mountain guns were in position on commanding points of the same entrenchments. The Afghan garrison was estimated at 3,700 men."¹

The weakness of the Ali Masjid position lay in the fact that on the east, north and north-east it was commanded by the spurs and cliffs of the Rhotas and neighbouring hills, and on 23 October the Guides, under Colonel Jenkins, had carried out a reconnaissance with a view to determining how, by a turning movement, these heights could best be occupied. This reconnaissance, and a further one made by General Browne in person on 16 November, disclosed the fact that Panepal, seven miles north-east of Ali Masjid, whence the Rohtas heights and the Khyber above Katakushta were comparatively easy of access, could be reached from Jamrud by way of Gudar and Lashora, the distance being some seventeen miles of a bad road ; and in consequence of the information thus obtained the following plan of attack was adopted :—

The 1st and 2nd Brigades of the Peshawar Valley Field Force were to march from Jamrud *via* Gudar and Lashora to the Sapri Peak, whence one brigade was to move on to the Rohtas heights, from there feeling its way cautiously to some position overlooking and commanding Ali Masjid. The other brigade was to advance

¹ " The Second Afghan War," p. 18.

from the Sapri Peak to Katakushta, and there take up a position from which fire could be opened on the pass where it widens after leaving the Ali Masjid defile. The main column, composed of the remainder of the division, was to advance up the road through the Khyber ready to open fire on the fort at about 1 p.m. on 21 November, in combination with the brigade on the Rohtas Mountain. The enemy, on being driven from the fort and escaping by the defile would come under the fire of the brigade at Katakushta. Once the enemy was in flight and the open ground beyond the defile reached, the Cavalry Brigade was to push on quickly for Landi Kotal.

On 20 November General Browne received orders to advance, and at 5.20 p.m. the 2nd Brigade of his force marched from camp at Jamrud to open the campaign, leaving behind the guns and some of the infantry units. The fighting strength of this column amounted to 1,739 all ranks, British and Indian, and marched with greatcoats only and with one day's rations in their haversacks ; two days' uncooked rations followed in rear. The order of march was :—

The Guides Infantry.
1st Battalion 17th Foot.
1st Sikhs, less one company.
Commissariat Supplies.
One company, 1st Sikhs.

At 10.30 p.m. the force reached Lashora, and here bivouacked in bitter cold for the night, the men being very wet as the Lashora stream had been crossed some twenty times during the march. The march was resumed at 6.15 a.m. on the 21st, the 1st Brigade arriving at Lashora as the 2nd moved off, and the main body of Brigadier-General Tytler's command did not reach Panepal till 1.30 p.m., all much exhausted from the heat, the difficulties of the road and the want of water. After an hour's halt, however, the Guides and 1st Sikhs were sent on to Katakushta, under Colonel Jenkins, by the direct route—a very narrow and precipitous gorge—while General Tytler remained at Panepal for the night with the 17th Foot, awaiting the Commissariat train, which had not come up.

" No sooner had the Guides and 1st Sikhs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, taken up a position on the hill opposite the village of Kata Kushta, which completely commanded the Khyber Pass, here some 600 yards broad, than a party of the enemy's cavalry, about fifty in number, was perceived about 4.30 p.m. leisurely making their way up the pass. To make the garrison of Ali Masjid realize that their retreat was cut off, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins ordered his men to open fire upon these Afghan horse at a range of about 500 yards. Several were dismounted, and the rest galloped away, some back to Ali Masjid and some up the Khyber Pass. As it began to grow dusk, a large body of the enemy's cavalry, accompanied by a small party of infantry, came from the direction of Ali Masjid, riding hard for their lives as they passed the place where the troops were posted, from which it was evident that the retreat from Ali Masjid had commenced. This body of Afghans came under fire of 200 or 300 rifles within 300–500 yards' range and suffered some

loss. As darkness closed in the Guides and the 1st Sikhs lay down on the rocks about 100 feet above the edge of the stream, and no large body of the enemy passed during the night, although, doubtless, men moving singly or in small parties escaped.”¹

The march of the 1st Brigade was greatly delayed by the difficulties of the road, and it was obliged on the night of the 21st to bivouac rather short of the position it had been intended to reach ; the main column, advancing up the Khyber Pass road, arrived at the Shagai heights about 11 a.m. on the 21st, and here the guns came into action against Fort Ali Masjid, while a small force was sent to try and turn the right of the enemy position. This advance was found to be impracticable, and there being as yet no sign of the flanking movement by the 1st and 2nd Brigades, General Browne decided against any direct assault, and withdrew his troops from contact with the enemy, the main column bivouacking for the night about the Shagai heights. During the night preparations were made to resume operations next morning, but when the troops advanced on the 22nd the whole Afghan position was found abandoned, the enemy having fled during the night, some few up the Khyber Pass towards Landi Kotal, the bulk of the defenders by the Chora Kandao and the Bazar Valley or by the Sissobi Pass to Pesh Bulak.

To return to the 2nd Brigade and the Guides. At daybreak on the 22nd some Afghan infantry were seen retreating up the pass from Ali Masjid, and, on the Guides opening fire, some stood their ground but the rest ran for cover ; and then, seeing one who appeared to be an officer, Colonel Jenkins sent down an order to him to collect his men, lay down arms and surrender. Some 300 prisoners were collected and disarmed in this way.

On 23 November the headquarters of the division, with the 3rd Brigade, 10th Hussars, Guides Cavalry and a Horse Artillery battery, moved on through Landi Khana to Dakka, the 4th Brigade remaining meanwhile at Ali Masjid, while the 1st and 2nd Brigades were still at Katakushta ; and in these different places the units of the Peshawar Valley Field Force remained some three weeks, improving the road, reconnoitring the country on either side of the Khyber Pass, and making efforts to check the looting impartially carried on by the surrounding tribesmen.

Meanwhile, the reserve brigade was moving up from Hasan Abdal and part had already arrived at Peshawar. At the end of the first week in December the Peshawar Valley Field Force was divided into two divisions, the second under Major-General Maude, and a redistribution of brigade commands was made, while a new brigade was formed composed of the 4th Mountain Battery, the Guides Infantry and the 1st Sikhs and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins. In consequence of this, Major R. B. Campbell became Officiating Commandant and Major G. Stewart Officiating Second-in-Command, while Captain W. Battye assumed command of the Guides Cavalry.

On 17 December the 1st Division left Dakka, and with it Colonel Jenkins's newly formed brigade, and after an uneventful march of four days arrived at Jalalabad on the 20th ; the city here was found to be quiet and the inhabitants generally

¹ "The Second Afghan War," pp. 23, 24.

friendly. On this date definite news, brought by Ghulam Nakshband Khan, a pensioned risaldar of the Guides Cavalry resident at Kabul, reached Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer of the force, to the effect that the Amir Sher Ali Khan had left Kabul on 13 December for Afghan Turkestan, accompanied by the members of the Russian mission, and that Sirdar Yakub Khan had assumed charge of affairs at Kabul between which city and Jalalabad the country was described as being in a state of anarchy.

On the news of Sher Ali's flight being received by the Indian Government, Major Cavagnari was directed to make every effort to open communications and arrive at a friendly understanding with the new ruler ; he met, however, with **1879** but little success, and the year 1879 opened with the political situation practically unchanged. There were, none the less, indications that Yakub Khan's intentions were warlike, and he endeavoured, but without success, to incite the Ghilzais, the most powerful tribe in Afghanistan, to take the field against the British ; but no doubt the news of the recent occupation of Kandahar did much to prevent any serious combination against us.

No further advance towards Kabul was made by the division during January ; but it was found necessary to send an expedition against the Bazai clan of the Mohmand tribe, who had been incited by the Sayeds of the Shergarh to attack Sang i Sarai. In this and other minor operations detachments of the Guides, both Infantry and Cavalry, took part.

At the end of this month the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir F. P. Haines, arrived in the Khyber and proceeded as far as Jalalabad, inspecting General Sir S. Browne's division and returning to Peshawar on 3 March. During his visit to the Frontier news was received of the death of Sher Ali, and a few days later Yakub Khan reopened negotiations, desiring the adjustment of the quarrel and the renewal of friendly relations with the Indian Government. The Viceroy's reply to this communication contained four conditions :—

- (1) The abandonment of the Afghan claim to authority over the Michmi and Khyber Passes and the tribes adjacent thereto.
- (2) The establishment of a British protectorate in the Kurram, Peshin and Sibi districts.
- (3) The British Government to control all Afghan foreign relations.
- (4) British agents and their escorts to be allowed to reside in Afghanistan.

The first of these conditions was the only one which Yakub Khan seemed disinclined to accept, but he expressed his willingness to receive Major Cavagnari at Kabul and discuss the matters at issue. While the negotiations were in progress, the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Peshawar Valley Field Force were redistributed in view of the probability that a further advance would be ordered, and certain operations of a minor character were carried out.

In the middle of March fifty sabres of the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton, and 100 rifles of the 45th Sikhs under Lieutenant Barclay,

were providing the escort for a survey party under Captain Leach, R.E., between Zarbacha and Chilgazai. While the survey party proceeded to the top of a hill, the Cavalry were halted and left in charge of Jemadar Muhammad Sherif of the Guides, who had orders to hold the position in case of attack. The survey party was fired on and the infantry escort was charged by fifty swordsmen; Lieutenant Barclay was mortally wounded and some men killed, but the party rejoined camp, the Guides Cavalry providing the rearguard. A few days later General Tytler took out a body of nearly 800 men, among whom were fifty-one sabres of the Guides Cavalry, to punish this unprovoked attack, and several village towers were blown up and fines levied.

On 24 March Brigadier-General Jenkins resumed command of the Guides, Brigadier-General Appleyard taking charge of the brigade containing the Regiment.

Towards the end of the month Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne learnt that Asmatulla, the principal chief of the Ghilzais, had come down with some 1,500 followers into the plain on the northern bank of the Kabul river to the north-west of the Siah Koh range, and was endeavouring to stir up the people to attack the troops and the friendly Ghilzais, and to incite the Khugianis to rise; and these latter, it was stated, were assembling a few miles south-west of Fattahabad on the Kabul road. Two columns were ordered out—one, under General Macpherson, into Kats Laghman, the other, commanded by Brigadier-General Gough, against the Khugianis near Fattahabad. With General Macpherson was a mixed detachment under Major Campbell in which were 200 of the Guides Infantry under Captain F. D. Battye and Lieutenant Hughes. In General Gough's column were two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry under Major W. Battye, who had with him Lieutenant Hamilton and Surgeon J. Lewtas (it was on this occasion that a squadron of the 10th Hussars met with disaster when attempting to ford the Kabul river near Jalalabad, an incident immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his "Ford o' Kabul River").

"Brigadier-General C. Gough's column left Jalalabad at 1 a.m. on 2 April and arrived near Fatehabad whilst it was yet dark. About 1 p.m. it was reported by the cavalry patrols of the Guides under Risaldar Mahmud Khan, which had been thrown out towards Gandamak, that large bodies of men were advancing with flags from the direction of Khoja Khel, south-west of the camp. The whole force got under arms, and intelligence being received of the continued advance of the enemy, Major W. Battye with the Guides Cavalry was directed to advance along the Gandamak road. Three hundred infantry and two troops of cavalry having been left to protect the camp, the Brigadier-General, with three troops of Hussars and four guns, Royal Horse Artillery, followed Major Battye's Guides, the remainder of the infantry, about 700 men, advancing as quickly as possible afterwards.

"The enemy were found to be posted on the crest of a plateau, both flanks resting on steep sides which overlooked the cultivated valleys below. The crest of the ridge was strengthened by breastworks, and completely commanded the whole front, which sloped gently down towards the troops, except at the top, where the slope was steep. The front of the enemy's force was about a mile in extent,

and its numbers probably not less than 5,000. The right of their front nearest to the camp was the key of their position.

"The cavalry and artillery advanced to within 1,200 yards, and the latter opened fire. The enemy met this fire by throwing out lines of skirmishers from their right. The mounted troops and guns were therefore ordered to retire across the plateau in the hope of drawing the enemy out of their very strong position, while the infantry came up on the left with the view of carrying the enemy's right. As was expected, this retirement was immediately followed up by the enemy, who came streaming out from behind their breastwork. As the infantry came up, they were brought into action on the left and ordered to make a continuous advance, the 1st Battalion 17th Foot being in the front line with the 45th Sikhs in reserve. They were met by a determined resistance, the flags of the Afghans keeping well to the front in spite of the heavy fire of our infantry. . . . The enemy now showed signs of giving way, whereupon an order was sent to the cavalry on the right to attack on the first favourable opportunity. But before this order was received both regiments charged successfully. The three troops of the Guides, under Major Wigram Battye, charged straight to the front, and the 10th Hussars to the right front, which the Afghans were trying to turn.

"These decisive charges completely defeated the enemy, but with the loss of the gallant Major Wigram Battye, who fell at the head of the Guides from a shot in the chest, having previously received a wound through the thigh which, however, had not deterred him from still leading his men. . . . The entrenched position was carried and from this height the enemy could be seen flying in every direction and dispersing into the numerous forts and villages dotting the richly cultivated valleys.

"The cavalry was forthwith sent in pursuit, while the Horse Artillery guns fired on any closed bodies of the enemy that were seen. The three troops of the 10th Hussars, under Lord Ralph Kerr, and the Guides under Lieutenant Hamilton, pursued the enemy close up to the walls of Khoja Khel, cutting up numbers of them. The troops were then ordered to retire to camp, as the enemy were completely dispersed."¹

In Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne's despatch reporting on this action he wrote :—

"The affair was a most brilliant one and reflects the highest credit on all engaged. . . . In Major Wigram Battye the Government have lost an officer of whom any army would have been proud, a noble and chivalrous character and beloved by all who knew him. He fell charging at the head of his men, first receiving two bullets in his hip and shortly after another in the chest."

The Military Secretary, Punjab, wrote to the Military Secretary, Government of India, in a letter of 12 April as follows :—

"In forwarding a copy of Lieut.-Colonel Jenkins' letter No. 172 of the 4th inst. reporting the death in action of Major Wigram Battye, I am desired to state

¹ "The Second Afghan War," pp. 65-7.

that the Honourable the Lieut.-Governor deeply deplores the loss of this officer. He considers the Army has lost an officer of the highest courage and accomplishments, possessing all the qualities necessary to make a good soldier. The Corps of Guides (Queen's Own) has indeed lost an officer it will be difficult to replace.

"The Guides Cavalry have suffered considerably in the action of the 2nd inst., but His Honour has much satisfaction in observing that this Regiment behaved with great gallantry."

For his gallantry in this action Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton of the Guides Cavalry was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross, the notification of the award being announced as follows in the *London Gazette* of 7 October 1879:—

"For conspicuous gallantry during the action at Fattahabad on the 2nd April, 1879, in leading on the Guides Cavalry in a charge against very superior numbers of the enemy, and particularly at a critical moment when his Commanding Officer (Major Wigram Battye) fell. Lieutenant Hamilton, then the only officer left with the Regiment, assumed command and cheered on his men to avenge Major Battye's death.

"In this charge Lieutenant Hamilton, seeing Sowar Dowlut Ram down and attacked by three of the enemy whilst entangled with his horse (which had been killed) rushed to the rescue, and, followed by a few of his men, cut down all three and saved the life of Sowar Dowlut Ram."

Risaldar Prem Singh was advanced from the Third to the Second Class of the Indian Order of Merit, while five other ranks received the Third Class for conspicuous gallantry on this occasion.

The casualties this day in the two squadrons of the Guides were heavy—killed or died of wounds were Major Wigram Battye, Risaldar Mahmud Khan, who was killed in personal combat with one of the enemy whom he slew, and five other ranks; while wounded were Resaidar Kala Singh, Wurdi-Major Duni Chand, Jemadars Jiwand Singh and Bishan Das and twenty-three other ranks—a total of thirty-four casualties, with seven horses killed and thirty-seven wounded.

On 4 April Brigadier-General Gough continued his march against the Khugiani strongholds near Gandamak, several of which he destroyed, and this action resulted in the complete submission of the Khugiani chief, Haidar Khan.

A few days later the Government of India informed the Commander-in-Chief of the expediency, for political reasons, of the occupation of Gandamak. The military authorities were equally in favour of a move on sanitary grounds, so on 12 April the 1st Division Headquarters began to advance and on the 14th arrived at Safed Sang, which was found to be more suitable for occupation than Gandamak. The Headquarters of the Guides marched there on this date under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, with 320 rifles of the Infantry and accompanied by Captains Hammond and Battye and Surgeon Kelly, while the remainder were left at Jalalabad under command of Major Campbell, with whom were Lieutenants Cooke-Collis and Hughes, and Surgeon Lewtas. Safed Sang was about thirty miles from Jalalabad and three from Gandamak.

In the meantime negotiations with the Amir Yakub Khan had been proceeding satisfactorily. He had now made a general agreement to the British proposals, and on 8 April had himself arrived at Gandamak in order to discuss personally the terms of a treaty to be drawn up between the Indian and Kabul Governments. Negotiations were prolonged until 17 May, when a general agreement, satisfactory to both parties, was reached, and on 26 May what is known as "The Treaty of Gandamak" was signed, after which the Amir returned to Kabul to prepare for the reception of the proposed British mission, while Major Cavagnari went to Simla to make his report and receive further instructions.

The Amir had been very anxious for the withdrawal of all British troops from Afghan territory, but the objections to marching our forces through the Khyber Pass in the middle of the hot weather were aggravated by the fact that cholera had appeared both at Ali Masjid and at Peshawar. The withdrawal was, however, decided upon, and on 8 June Brigadier-General Tytler's brigade, forming the rear-guard of the Peshawar Valley Field Force, as at the outset of the campaign it had formed the advance guard, vacated the camp and the last British soldier left Gandamak. The rearguard was composed of the 27th Punjab Infantry, the 45th Sikhs, the Hazara Mountain Battery and the Guides Cavalry. On 19 June the 1st Division of the Peshawar Valley Field Force was broken up.

The Infantry of the Guides Corps arrived at Mardan on 20 June and the Cavalry three days later.

The following report was submitted by Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne, V.C., K.C.S.I., C.B., on the services of the Corps of Guides during the campaign :—

"The Queen's Own Corps of Guides was the first regiment to take the field, having arrived at Jamrud two months before the Division assembled. In the interim they were engaged in much harassing work and in conducting many important reconnaissances. In the attack on Ali Masjid, the Guides Infantry, with the 1st Sikhs, was mainly instrumental in cutting off the enemy's main line of retreat. For their timely arrival at Kata Kushta I am deeply indebted to Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Jenkins. During the whole campaign they have more than acted up to their old reputation in thorough efficiency and soldierlike qualities. I consider the Guides Infantry are not surpassed by any regiment in the Service.

"Lieut.-Colonel Jenkins who, except the time he was commanding the 3rd Brigade, has commanded the Guides, is an officer of very exceptional ability. I know no officer whose intelligence, judgment and knowledge of native troops can be rated higher and none who has proved his fitness for higher command by severer tests.

"Major R. B. Campbell, who commanded the Regiment whenever Lieut.-Colonel Jenkins was not present, proved himself a most reliable and excellent soldier, and I wish strongly to recommend him as in every way fitted for promotion.

"Captain A. G. Hammond and Captain F. Batty, the adjutant, have also come under my notice and are both excellent and deserving officers.

"The Cavalry of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides has, if such a thing is possible, surpassed its old reputation as a model of what Light Horsemen should be ;

ever ready, ever serviceable, ever soldier-like, this splendid body of Horsemen has never been found wanting. These results cannot but be due to the earnest zeal of the officers, and I would therefore bring prominently to notice the names of the Commandant of the Corps, Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Jenkins, Major G. Stewart, Commandant of Cavalry, the late Major Wigram Battye and Captain R. C. Hutchinson.

"Major G. Stewart commanded the Guides Cavalry throughout the campaign, and to him, therefore, must the credit of the above satisfactory state of the Regiment be principally given. He has also made himself most useful in conducting reconnaissances, making sketches and collecting information.

"Of Major Wigram Battye it is very bitter for me to speak. His Excellency is aware of the noble end of this gallant officer, and it is some consolation to me in mourning over his loss, to feel that he died as he would have wished, at the head of his gallant Guides. Endowed both mentally and physically far beyond the average, it is no flattery to say that Wigram Battye united in his person all the best qualities which it should be the wish of every officer to emulate. Throughout his brief yet distinguished career he conducted himself in his private capacity as a high-minded English gentleman, in his public as an able, chivalrous soldier, and it seems fitting that to such a life the death of a hero should have been accorded.

"Lieutenant Hamilton has proved himself an energetic, zealous young officer, and in succeeding to the command of the Guides Cavalry at the action of Fattahabad on the death of Major Battye, he earned for himself by his brilliant leading the distinction of the Victoria Cross."

CHAPTER VII

1879

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR—THE DEFENCE OF THE KABUL RESIDENCY

THE MARCH TO KABUL—FAVOURABLE RECEPTION—WARNINGS OF IMPENDING TROUBLE—MUTINY OF THE AFGHAN REGIMENTS—ATTACK ON THE RESIDENCY—SALLIES BY THE GARRISON—MESSAGES SENT TO THE AMIR—THE RESIDENCY SET ON FIRE—LAST SALLY OF THE DEFENDERS—SUBSEQUENT APPEARANCE OF THE RESIDENCY—LIST OF CASUALTIES—TRIBUTES TO THE DEFENCE.

See Plan of the Residency at Kabul, facing page 102.

By the terms of the Treaty of Gandamak the Amir had agreed to receive a British Resident at his capital. Accordingly Major, now Sir Louis, Cavagnari was appointed as Her Majesty's Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Kabul; and while he was at Simla, during the weeks immediately following the signing of the treaty, the character and functions of the mission and the numbers of the escort to accompany it were carefully discussed. "The dangers to which Sir Louis Cavagnari considered himself and those who accompanied him most liable were those of assassination by the hand of a fanatic, or assault provoked by some street quarrel between the soldiers of his escort and those of the Amir; and he was therefore personally desirous that his staff and escort should be reduced to the most moderate and manageable dimensions. In accordance with these considerations the envoy's suite was restricted to a secretary (Mr. Jenkyns), a medical officer (Dr. A. H. Kelly), and a military attaché (Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton) in charge of a carefully picked escort of twenty cavalry and fifty Infantry of the Guides Corps."¹

The Guides had only just arrived at Mardan on their return from the Afghan frontier when telegraphic instructions were received to detail an escort for the Kabul mission, and for this purpose to join Sir Louis Cavagnari at once at Thal. The composition of the escort was:—Cavalry: 1 jemadar, 1 kote-dafadar, 1 dafadar and 22 sowars, Total, 25; Infantry: 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 2 naiks, 1 lance-naik, 1 bugler and 45 sepoy, Total, 52; with one hospital assistant. This party marched for Kohat on the night of 26 June under Lieutenant Hamilton.

The mission left Ali Khel in the Upper Kurram Valley on 18 July, and on crossing the frontier was received by Sirdar Khushdil Khan, late Governor of Turkestan, who had been deputed by the Amir to conduct it to Kabul. On the 19th Sir Louis Cavagnari joined the Afghan camp with his party. Next day the march

¹ "Narrative of Events in Afghanistan," p. 78.

to Kabul was begun and the capital was reached on the 24th. Here the mission was met with every sign of friendship and respect.

The journey of the mission from the head of the Kurram valley to Kabul was marked by only one portent which the superstitious might have regarded as something of ill-omen. The mission was accompanied for the first part of its way, as far as the Shutur Gardan Pass, by Major-General Sir F. S. Roberts, the commander of the Kurram Field Force. "As we ascended," so he recorded in after years,¹ "curiously enough we came across a solitary magpie, which I should not have noticed had not Cavagnari pointed it out and begged me not to mention the fact of having seen it to his wife, as she would be sure to regard it as an unlucky omen."

At the outset nothing could have been better than the reception accorded to the British mission on its arrival at Kabul, where it was lodged in a commodious building in the Bala Hissar, about 250 yards from the Amir's palace. Sir Louis Cavagnari telegraphed to the Foreign Secretary on 24 July, saying: "Embassy entered city this morning and received a most brilliant reception. Large crowd assembled and was most orderly and respectful. Amir's demeanour was most friendly"; and telegrams sent during the next two or three days closed with the words "All continues satisfactory," "All well," "People very orderly," "All continues well." Further, no restrictions seem to have been placed on the movements of the British officers attached to the mission, who were allowed to go about freely and ride out daily in the environs of Kabul.

This satisfactory state of affairs was not destined to last. Some two or three days after the arrival of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his mission, six regiments of Afghan infantry arrived from Herat and encamped for three days at Debori, about two miles out of Kabul. On the morning of the fourth day they marched through the principal streets of the city, headed by their officers and with bands playing. During this march they abused the envoy by name, shouting "Why has he come here?" They also abused the Kazalbashis, loyal to the Amir, and taunted them with not being men, adding that they, the Heratis, would show them how to act and put an end to Cavagnari. They then marched out of the city to a camp at Sherpur.

The inhabitants of Kabul viewed the demonstration with indifference. The affair was, however, immediately reported to the envoy by a pensioned Indian officer of the Guides Cavalry then living in Kabul. This man, Risaldar-Major Nakshband Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, appears to have recognized from the first the danger run and the risk taken by the mission. On hearing Nakshband Khan's report Sir Louis said "Fear not, keep up your heart, dogs that bark don't bite." "These dogs do bite, and there is real danger," replied the old officer. "Well, they can but kill the three or four of us here and our deaths will be avenged," remarked Sir Louis.

Nakshband Khan was not satisfied; he went to see Mr. Jenkyns and again reported what he had seen and heard. Having heard of his interview with Sir Louis, Mr. Jenkyns replied: "What the envoy says is very true. The British Government will not suffer by losing the three or four of us here."

¹ Roberts, "Forty-one Years in India," vol. II, p. 178.

During the ensuing days Nakshband Khan noted and reported many disquieting signs which strengthened his suspicions that the Amir was not as well disposed towards the British mission as he would have it appear.

Reports from other sources must have confirmed those of the old Risaldar-Major, but it was not until 6 August that there appeared any word of disquiet in the envoy's correspondence. On this date, both in a telegram and in the diary which he kept and dispatched weekly to India, Cavagnari made mention of "alarming reports" which had reached him from several sources of the mutinous conduct of the Herat regiments recently arrived in Kabul, some of the soldiers of which had been seen going about the city with drawn swords, and using inflammatory language towards the Amir and his English visitors. "I do not doubt," added Sir Louis, "that there is disaffection among the troops on account of arrears of pay, and especially about compulsory service, but the Amir and his ministers are confident that they can manage them."

It then seems to have been hoped and believed that matters had quieted down, for on 12 August Cavagnari notes in his diary that the men of the Herat regiments had received their arrears of pay and that many had been given furlough; and neither in the last instalment of the diary sent out dealing with the events of 23 August, nor in a telegram dispatched on the 24th and ending with the words "Embassy all well," is there anything to show that any untoward event was expected, though on 23 August four sowars of the Guides had been attacked in the Kabul bazaar but managed to escape and return to the Residency.

It was not until the night of 4 September that news of the outbreak came through to Simla. Upon receipt of it the Viceroy cabled as follows to the Secretary of State for India :—

"During night of 4th of September information reached Ali Khel that, on morning of 3rd, British Embassy at Kabul was attacked by three revolting Afghan regiments, joined later by six others. Embassy defending itself when messengers left Kabul. To-night, letters received at Ali Khel from Amir leave no hope as to fate of Embassy. General Massey ordered to move from Ali Khel on Shutargarden tomorrow. General Roberts from Simla will reach Peiwar in five days and take command of rapid advance on Kabul. General Baker will command one Brigade. General Stewart ordered to hold Kandahar and threaten Ghazni if necessary."

Then in a lengthy despatch dated 15 September the Viceroy forwarded such a connected statement as could be put together from the letters and reports received from the Amir and others. In his first communication, written apparently in great grief and perplexity, the Amir stated that the Afghan troops who had been assembled for pay at the Bala Hissar, suddenly broke into mutiny and assaulted the British Residency, after having stoned their officers; that they were received by the Residency with a "hail of bullets"; that the tumult was swelled by the troops from the outlying cantonments, and by the people of the city and the country around, who destroyed the artillery park, magazine and workshops; and that His Highness made three ineffectual attempts to restrain the assailants, sending first

his Commander-in-Chief, Daud Shah, who was beaten down by the mob and was supposed to be dying, then his son with Yahya Khan, the Governor of Kabul, and finally some sayeds and mullahs.

The Amir's second letter stated that the assault on the British Embassy was protracted, with much loss of life on both sides, from the morning till the evening of Wednesday, 3 September, when the besiegers set fire to the Residency, and that the Amir had been unable to discover whether the envoy had perished or had been rescued; but on the 6th the Political Officer at Ali Khel telegraphed that he had interviewed men who had visited the Embassy after the disaster, and that these stated they had seen the dead bodies of the envoy, staff and escort, and that of these latter some ten sowars only of the Guides were believed to have escaped the general massacre. All accounts agreed that all ranks of the escort fought with the most determined gallantry.

In acknowledging this fuller account of all that happened, the Secretary of State for India in a letter, No. 101, dated 18 September, wrote as follows:—

" Her Majesty's Government feel that it would be premature at this moment to discuss either the immediate causes to which this deplorable event may be attributed, or the ultimate consequences which may result from it. They cannot, however, delay expressing their keen sense of the loss which the Empire has sustained by the tragic and premature death of so able a public servant as Sir L. Cavagnari, and of his companions, to whom in full confidence of the ability of the ruler of Kabul to protect them, had been entrusted the honourable but difficult duty of consolidating the friendly relations, so recently established, between the British and Afghan Governments. They desire to place on record their recognition of the gallantry and devotion shown by the escort of the Corps of Guides in the almost hopeless task of the defence of the Embassy."

As might be expected, there are many accounts to hand of all that took place. Some of these were early furnished by Afghan officials and others, and when Sir F. Roberts arrived at Kabul a military commission was detailed, under the presidency of Colonel C. MacGregor, to collect all possible evidence in connection with the outbreak and the attack and defence of the Residency.

From statements made by those in any way connected with the Embassy, such as survivors of the escort, Cavalry and Infantry, pensioners of the Corps of Guides then living in Kabul and thus having first-hand information of all that took place, and by other individuals attached to the mission in a non-military capacity, it is possible to reconstruct with fair accuracy the story of the massacre.

The morning of 3 September broke calm and clear, and evidently there was no suspicion in the minds of the British mission that the day would bring forth any untoward incidents. Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly, taking advantage of the cool of the morning (an early September day in Kabul becomes unpleasantly hot later on), were out riding, looking for a place where good grass could be cut for the horses of the escort—up to 1 September grass and *bhoosa* had been supplied by the Amir. They had been preceded by a party consisting of Kote-Dafadar Fattah

Muhammad, 2nd Troop Guides Cavalry, and Sowars Akbar Shah and Narain Singh with four sowars of the Amir's army, acting as a sort of escort, and twenty-five grass-cutters. Sepoy Muhammad Dost, "G" Company, Guides Infantry, was about the same time in the Kabul Bazaar arranging for the purchase of flour for the escort. To the fact of being on these simple duties these men owe their lives, as none of them except the two British officers—and for them Fate willed it otherwise—was able to re-enter the Residency.

Lieutenant Hamilton and Dr. Kelly must have returned from their ride about 7.30 a.m. and, leaving their horses in the Cavalry lines, probably went to their breakfast in the Residency. While the British mission and its escort were thus going about their ordinary morning routine, a short distance away in the Bala Hissar the curtain was rising on the drama so soon to be enacted.

Shortly before 8 a.m. the Turkestani Ardal Regiment, lately arrived in Kabul and quartered in the Bala Hissar, was paraded under General Karim Khan to receive its pay. The men wore side arms but had no rifles with them. There was another Afghan regiment with them in the Bala Hissar and on duty at the Arsenal close by. There is no doubt that the pay of the Ardal regiment was in arrears and that the men were thoroughly discontented. In lieu of the two months' pay which they demanded they were given one. Brooding discontent gave way to sullen murmurs, to be replaced in turn by shouts and cries of "Dam-i-Charya!" (pay and food), "Kill the Kafirs!" "Let us destroy the envoy first of all, and then the Amir," and other remarks less printable. From words the soldiers passed to deeds and started throwing stones at General Daud Shah, who at the Amir's orders was superintending the disbursement of pay. On his coming down to reason with them he was cut down with a *tulwar* and then bayoneted. The mutiny among the troops in the Bala Hissar had now started in earnest.

News flies fast in the East, and these troops were soon joined by the other disaffected regiments lately arrived from Herat, and the riff-raff of the bazaars. The regiments intermingled and quickly became a mob, as is shown by the fact that they had no definite plan. Some went off to the Amir's palace but were turned back by the guards, Kazalbashis, who remained loyal. Another section of the mob made for the Residency cavalry lines and started stoning the syces and troopers and attempting to untie the horses. The troopers quickly armed and the mutineers met with a sturdy resistance. The escort sustained its first casualty here, one of the troopers, a Sikh, being mortally wounded by a *tulwar*, but not before accounting for at least one adversary who lay dead beside him. Two or three shots were fired, but the crowd, who were mostly without rifles, retired and some 200 of them went to the Bala Hissar to fetch their arms. The rest of the soldiers went out by the Shah Shahie gate of the Bala Hissar to fetch their arms from their camp. Some of the more daring spirits made for and entered the courtyard (B)¹ through the open gateway at (E), and started plundering anything they saw lying about. A few of them made for the door leading from the courtyard to the Residency, but were held up by Havildar Hussain. Lieutenant Hamilton came out of the Residency

¹ See sketch facing page 102.



**STATUE OF HAMILTON AT KABUL
ERECTED IN DUBLIN.**



THE KABUL MEMORIAL AT MARDAN.

at this moment and gave orders for the door to be shut. The crowd contented itself with stone-throwing for a few minutes, and then it, too, made off to the Arsenal to procure more suitable weapons for dealing with the unbelievers. The entrance (*E*) was probably an archway, as it was stated in the evidence to be "always open." It speaks well for the discipline of the escort that in spite of great provocation no shot was fired here by them. Apparently at the very beginning Lieutenant Hamilton had given orders "to get on the roof (of *B*), to be patient and not to take any offensive action."

Taking advantage of the temporary lull, the troopers came in from the cavalry lines. They and the men in courtyard (*B*) were then ordered into the Residency buildings proper. Lieutenant Hamilton, Sepoy Rasul, 7th Company Guides Infantry, and about twenty others took up a position on the roofs of (*B*) where, luckily, there was a parapet, which was quickly loopholed; the roof of the Residency itself had no parapet.

Spasmodic firing now started from the Afghans clustering round the Arsenal, which, standing on higher ground, commanded the roofs of (*A*) and (*B*). The first shot in reply which killed a man standing at the door of the Arsenal, was apparently fired by Sir Louis Cavagnari lying on the roof of his quarters at the south-west corner of the Residency. The fire of the Afghans now became general and from this moment the mutineers had one definite purpose—to destroy the unbelievers who had dared to show fight. Sir Louis fired four more shots and was then wounded and went down from the roof. This was at about 8.45 a.m. The men with Lieutenant Hamilton had in the meantime received orders to fire and, after what must have seemed hours of inaction, responded with a will, some at the Afghans round the Arsenal, "a good stone's throw from (*B*)," and others at those who had again entered the cavalry lines and were leading away or, out of sheer savagery, killing the horses. The party on the roofs of the barracks (*B*), firing as they were from behind cover, must have taken heavy toll of their adversaries, the Arsenal itself being so close and the cavalry lines still nearer.

To deal with Lieutenant Hamilton's party more effectively some of the mutineers, covered by fire from the Arsenal, advanced and secured a position in a place called Kulla-Fi-Arangi closer still to the barracks and completely commanding them. This appears to have been some sort of enclosure north of the wall of the Bala Hissar, which is also on higher ground than the Residency.

If the fire of his party was not to be silenced these Afghans had to be dislodged, and Lieutenant Hamilton decided to do it. Once started, it was not likely that a mere passive defence would suit him.

An eyewitness stated: "At about 9 a.m., while the fighting was going on, I myself saw four European officers charge out at the head of some twenty-five of the garrison; they drove away a party that was holding some broken ground. When charged the Afghan soldiers ran like sheep before a wolf. About a quarter of an hour after this another sally was made with three officers at their head with the same result." Cavagnari was not with them this time (apparently he was the first time, although wounded earlier in the morning). "A third sally was made with two

British officers, Jenkyns and Hamilton leading." (One can imagine Dr. Kelly having to stay behind to attend to the wounded.) "A fourth sally was made with a Sikh jemadar, Jewand Singh, bravely leading. After this no further sally was made, the defenders appearing to go up to the upper part of the house and firing from there."

The eyewitness in question was Risaldar-Major Nakshband Khan, to whom reference has already been made. On hearing of the mutiny he had made his way at once to the Residency, but was recognized and roughly handled by the crowd, eventually being forced to take refuge in the house of Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan. From the upper storey of this house, 200 yards away, he watched the attack on the Residency.

On his return from the third sally, Lieutenant Hamilton was met with the news that the mutineers were trying to force the small door (*D*) in the eastern wall of the Residency. He hurried off to this new danger point and arranged for its defence by four men, two Sikhs and two Mussulmans, one of the latter being Sepoy Rasul, the other Mehr Dil.

Sir Louis must now have realized the full gravity of the situation—that the affair was more than a mere demonstration of hate by dissatisfied soldiery—for he wrote a letter to the Amir asking for help. This was sent by the hands of a Kabuli, Ghulam Nabi (brother of Risaldar Muhammad Sherif Khan, at that time Wurd-Major of the Guides Cavalry), who had previously served in the Guides and had been engaged as a Chuprassi in Kabul. Jemadar Mehtab Singh brought him along to the door (*D*), which was opened at his orders and Ghulam Nabi passed out on his perilous mission. He succeeded in delivering the letter but was unable to bring back an answer. The Amir's answer actually was "God willing, I am just making arrangements." As a matter of fact, he did nothing, although none of his cavalry and only a few artillerymen had joined the mutineers.

To return to the fighting. A continuous and heavy fire was directed on the defence from the west and from houses on the east which practically adjoined the Residency wall. On this side, too, the Afghans had resorted to more active measures and by about 11 a.m. had succeeded in sapping through the wall just south of gate (*D*) when, in spite of the fire of the defenders from above, men succeeded in penetrating into the middle portion of the Residency between (*F*) and (*G*). The garrison were now apparently disposed in three groups, one on the roofs of the quarters (*B*), one in the building (*G*), and one, including Hamilton, Jenkyns and Kelly, on the roof of the building (*F*).

This last was now the chief danger point. Covered by fire from the neighbouring roofs and by that of the men who had penetrated into the courtyard, the Afghans placed ladders across from the adjacent roofs on to (*F*) and attempted to cross them. Time and again they attacked, only to be repulsed by fire and hand-to-hand fighting in which Jenkyns and about nine men took the chief share.

It was not until midday, however, that they obtained a footing on the roof, by which time many of the gallant defenders had been killed, among them Jemadars Mehtab Singh, wounded earlier in the day, Jiwand Singh and Havildar Kharak

Singh. Driven from the roof the brave remnant only retired to the storey below from which they fired with such good effect that they prevented the Afghans advancing any farther.

It was about midday, too, that Cavagnari was wounded again, and this time seriously, by a bullet in the head. "He was lying on his bed with his knees doubled up. Dr. Kelly was attending him." This was the last mention of Sir Louis Cavagnari, who up till now had taken as gallant a part as any in the defence.

Another danger more deadly than the Afghans now threatened the defence—fire. The wall (*MN*) had been sapped through in many places, and the Afghans, creeping through, had set fire to the woodwork on the ground floor of (*F*). To make things worse two guns had been brought up and were battering the wall of the Sikh barracks.

The position was now desperate, and Jenkyns dictated another letter to the Amir and sent it out by a Hindu servant. Somehow or other this loyal man found a way out of the Residency but was caught and cut to pieces by the Afghans before the eyes of the defenders.

By 2 p.m. the fire had got such a hold that its heat made the building (*F*) untenable. Parched with thirst, scorched and blinded with smoke the survivors of the heroic band leaped across from (*F*) on to the narrow parapet round the roof of the barracks, from which they continued to fight.

Those still in (*G*) were fighting with the same grim determination and courage. From this roof (*B*) Lieutenant Hamilton wrote out and sent the third and final appeal to the Amir. Sowar Taimus, "B" Troop Guides Cavalry, took it, but was captured in the Residency itself, thrown from its walls on to the roof of an adjoining house, soundly beaten and taken more dead than alive before General Karim Khan. Even then he tried to save his officers and fellow-Guides by putting before Karim Khan Lieutenant Hamilton's message in which he promised the Afghan soldiers six months' pay. Karim Khan replied: "I am powerless to stop the mutineers." Taimus was detained but eventually escaped with the connivance of a wounded havildar of the Afghan Army, from whose back he removed a bullet, and lived to tell his very gallant story.

Shortly before 3 p.m. one of the guns was moved from its first position to within seventy paces of and opposite the archway (*E*) through which it could fire point-blank at the door separating the courtyard (*B*) from the Residency. The door was finally blown in at about 3 p.m. and opened a way for the Afghans to attack, or perhaps set fire to, the Guides' barracks from the east. What actually passed through Lieutenant Hamilton's mind can never be known, but it was then that he collected the few men who remained alive and, putting himself at the head of his beloved Guides for the last time, charged the gun. Some accounts say three charges were made. Lieutenant Hamilton shot three men with his revolver, cut down two more with his sword and reached the gun, where he was hacked to pieces. Jenkyns fell some twenty yards behind him, while Kelly was killed as he came through the archway. Of those that made the final desperate sortie all were killed.

There is no record of Sir Louis Cavagnari's ultimate end, but it seems that he

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perished in the flames of the building (*F*) where he was last seen being attended to by Dr. Kelly. In any case his corpse was never found. The bodies of Hamilton, Jenkyns and Kelly were reported to have been buried in a garden about a hundred yards from where they fell. Their bodies, though stripped and hacked to pieces, are said not to have been dishonoured.

All their officers had now been killed, but no thought of surrender entered the heads of those still holding out in (*G*). It was not until between 8 and 9 p.m. that all firing ceased with the death of the last of the escort, and a terrible silence fell over the smouldering ruins of what twelve hours before had been the British Embassy in Kabul.¹

Mr. Hensman, the well-known war correspondent, who accompanied the force under General Sir F. S. Roberts, which entered Kabul on 8 October, has written an account² of the appearance of the Residency building on that date. The following extracts³ bear with melancholy interest on the story which has just been told.

"Our first view of the Residency was of the rear wall, still intact, but blackened on the top where the smoke from the burning ruins had swept across. At each angle where the side walls joined were seen the loopholes from which the fire of the little force on the roof had been directed. . . . The western wall facing towards the Upper Bala Hissar, which commanded it, was scarred with bullet marks showing how severe had been the fire from the higher level occupied by the mutineers in the Arsenal. At this end the Residency was of three stories. . . . A lane six or eight feet wide runs between this wall and the buildings on the right of which the Guides were quartered. In the plan the Residency and these quarters appear as one block, but they are quite distinct really.

"Riding along the lane we came to the southern end of the Residency, built upon the edge of the wall looking towards Beni Hissar. We entered the main court of the Residency . . . the southern end was standing untouched and consisted of rooms built on wooden pillars so as to form a kind of oblong pavilion. The mud basement is three or four feet from the ground, and the whole structure, except a few partition walls and the roof, is of wood and very inflammable. . . . The upper rooms being open on both sides must be cool and pleasant. These were Sir Louis Cavagnari's quarters. . . . The courtyard of the Residency is about ninety feet square and at its northern end formerly stood a three-storied building like that I have just described. . . . The ruins are still smouldering.

"The Residency . . . is commanded completely from the walls of the Arsenal in the Upper Bala Hissar and also from the roofs of some high houses to the southwest. In addition, houses closely adjoin it on the eastern side, and an attacking party sapping the walls would have perfect cover in this direction the whole time. Riding into the quarters occupied by the Guides escort on the western side of the lane . . . I saw facing me a high door firmly closed and seemingly uninjured ;

¹ Some idea of the loss inflicted on the mutineers may be gathered from the statements heard next day by a survivor that the Herati regiments alone had lost 300 killed.

² "The Afghan War," p. 53 *et seq.*

³ Written on 11 October 1879.

but on going into the Sikh quarters on my right and following a broad passage which turned at right angles towards the wall, a huge breach was visible. This was where the Afghans had blown in the gate.

"A more unfavourable locality for defence would be difficult to imagine."

One wonders whether Lieutenant Hamilton had any premonition of what was to happen in those early days spent in the Residency at Kabul; every thinking man of the Embassy and escort must have realized how completely all were at the mercy of a fanatical, cruel and faithless population, how far from all possible support, how wholly defenceless their position. We know that Lieutenant Hamilton visited in August the village of Bemaru in Sherpur cantonment, the scene of the outbreak of the Kabul disaster of 1841, and only eight days before the end came—on 25 August—he sent home the following verses, which seem indeed to breathe something of the spirit of prophecy :—

THE VILLAGE OF BEMARU.

Though all is changed, yet remnants of the past
Point to the scenes of bloodshed, and, alas !
Of murder foul ; and ruined houses cast
Their mournful shadow o'er the graves of grass
Of England's soldiery, who faced a lot
That few, thank Heaven ! before or since have shared ;
Slain by the hand of treachery, and not
In open combat, where the foe ne'er dared
To show themselves. . . .

Yet to die
Gave to the last, as they did, well upheld
Their English name. . . .
And now, while standing here, where side by side
Fell many fighting with a fruitless bent,
Regret were uppermost, were't not for pride,
Which gives no place for weaker sentiment.
And Pride might well be foremost if one thought
That though fair fortune smiled for a while
How England's fame shone brighter as she fought
And wrenched lost laurels from their funeral pile
And rose at last from out misfortune's tide
Supreme—for God and Right were on her side.

Of the eighty all ranks of the Guides who formed the escort to the Embassy, seventy-one fell in defence of their trust—one British officer, two Indian officers, sixty-eight sowars and sepoy, with one hospital assistant ; only nine escaped the massacre. The following are the names of the fallen, given for the Cavalry by troops, and for the Infantry by companies, so that all who serve hereafter may know the richness of their inheritance :—

Lieutenant W. R. P. Hamilton, V.C.

Cavalry :

1st Troop :—Sowars Gul Ahmad, Khairulla, Akbar Khan, Akbar, Ghulam Habib and Miru.

2nd Troop : Sowars Muhammad Amin, Muhammad Hassan and Amir Haidar.

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3rd Troop : Sowars Paras Ram, Amar Singh, Wazir Singh, Ratan Singh and Mul Singh.

4th Troop : Jemadar Jiwand Singh, Dafadar Hira Singh, Sowars Jiwan Singh, Harnam Singh, Thakur Singh and Dewa Singh ; Farrier Amirulla.

Total for the Cavalry, 22.

Infantry :

" A " Company : Lance-Naik Jangi, Sepoys Sonu, Shibba, Sirsa and Tota.

" B " Company : Havildar Hassan, Naik Mehr Dil, Bugler Abdullah, Sepoys Khoedad, Akbar Shah, Said Amir, Alam Shah, Mir Baz Khan, Hamzulla (1), Hamzulla (2), Zaidulla and Daria Khan.

" C " Company : Sepoys Yakub Khan, Maznur and Baidulla.

" E " Company : Sepoys Devi Singh, Partab, Gobardhan, Jai Singh and Amar Singh.

" F " Company : Jemadar Mehtab Singh, Havildar Hazara Singh, Sepoys Fatteh Singh, Wariam Singh (1), Mith Singh, Hira Singh, Chanda Singh, Gurdit Singh, Gaja Singh and Wariam Singh (2).

" G " Company : Sepoys Ajaib Singh, Nidhan Singh and Suleiman.

" H " Company : Havildar Kharak Singh, Sepoys Tahlil Singh, Ranju Singh, Bhagat Singh, Esa Singh, Narain Singh, Hari Singh, Udin Singh and Gurdit Singh ; also Third Class Hospital Assistant Rahman Baksh.

Total for the Infantry, 48.

The under-mentioned non-commissioned officer and men formed part of the escort, but escaped the massacre :—

Kote-Dafadar Fatteh Muhammad, 2nd Troop, Sowars Akbar Shah, 2nd Troop, and Narain Singh, 4th Troop, were on duty with the grass-cutters.

Sowar Taimus, 2nd Troop, Sepoys Hussan Gul, " B " Company, and Rasul, " G " Company. These escaped out of the Residency during the fighting.

Sepoy Said Agha, " C " Company, was on leave at his home.

Sepoy Muhammad Dost, " G " Company, was purchasing *atta* in the bazaar.

Sepoy Gaina, " A " Company, died on the day previous to the outbreak.

On 12 September the Commandant of the Corps of Guides received the following telegram from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab :—

" The Lieutenant-Governor desires you will communicate to the Corps of Guides His Excellency the Viceroy's sincere regret as well as his own, at the loss which the Regiment has recently sustained in the deaths of Lieut. Hamilton, Jemadars Jewand Singh and Mehtab Singh and most of the men of the Escort of Sir Louis Cavagnari at Kabul, in bravely resisting the attack made upon the Embassy by overwhelming numbers ; this small body of the Guides have not only upheld the credit of their distinguished Corps, but have, by their heroic conduct, earned the gratitude of the Government."

On 17 October 1879 the following Special General Order was published :—

" No. 1001. In special recognition of the conspicuous gallantry of those Native Commissioned Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides who fell in the defence of the British Mission at Kabul, the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General in Council is pleased to determine that the pensions to be conferred on their widows and heirs shall be double in amount to those ordinarily provided by regulation."

Later, by Government letter of 30 October 1882, Sowar Bahadur Singh,¹ Guides Cavalry, son of the late Jemadar Jiwand Singh, who particularly distinguished himself in the defence of the Kabul Residency, was granted one hundred acres of land in the Lahore district in proprietary right.

The following correspondence may fittingly close this chapter : On 20 November 1879, Colonel MacGregor wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Kabul Field Force :—

" As President of the Court of Enquiry, to which office Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts did me the honour to appoint me, I hope I may be excused in bringing prominently to his notice the conduct of the Queen's Own Guides throughout the attack on the Residency on 3 September 1879.

" The Court of which I was President have recorded the following remark in their report :—

" ' The conduct of the escort of the Queen's Own Guides does not form part of the enquiry entrusted to the Commission, but they have in the course of these enquiries had the extreme gallantry of these men so forcibly brought to their notice that they cannot refrain from placing on record their humble tribute of admiration. They do not give their opinion hastily, but they believe that the annals of no Army and no Regiment can show a brighter record of devoted bravery than has been achieved by this small band of Guides. By their deeds they have conferred undying honour, not only on the Regiment to which they belong, but on the whole British Army.'

" The Report of the Enquiry has gone to the Foreign Office, but perhaps the Lieutenant-General may be pleased to take some steps with a view to the conduct of the Escort being brought more prominently to the notice of H.E. The Commander-in-Chief."

On the very same day General Roberts wrote as follows to the Adjutant-General :—

" I have the honour to forward for the consideration of H.E. the Commander-in-Chief a letter from Colonel MacGregor whom I lately appointed President of a Commission of enquiry into the causes and circumstances of the late outbreak in Kabul.

" I am myself quite of the same opinion as that officer as to the extreme gallantry of the behaviour of the Escort of the Corps of Guides, who, though seventy-five in number, disputed the position with more than a hundred times their number for twelve long hours, and who to the last man died fighting.

¹ Later Risaldar-Major and Indian Order of Merit, Sardar Bahadur ; retired as Honorary Captain in 1919.

"I would respectfully submit that conduct such as this is deserving of some public and substantial acknowledgment, and would therefore suggest for His Excellency's consideration that all the men of the Escort should be recommended for the Order of Merit, and that the Queen's Own Guides be permitted to bear on their colours the words 'Residency—Kabul' in commemoration of the gallantry displayed by their comrades on 3 September 1879."

A week later—on 28 November—General Roberts wrote again to the Adjutant-General in Letter No. 253. In this he said :—

"In my letter No. 185 dated 20th instant I alluded to the conduct of the escort of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides as a whole without particularizing anyone, but lest it should be thought that the omission of the names of British officers was intentional, I beg you will now submit the following remarks as a supplement to those contained in my former letter.

"The gallant conduct of Lieutenant W. Hamilton, V.C., who commanded the escort was most conspicuous, worthy alike of the Regiment to which he belonged and of the name he had already earned. Details of the defence have been difficult to get, but there can be no doubt that the noble conduct of the Escort was due in a great measure to the gallant example he and the other officers set the men.

"Mr. Jenkyns, C.I.E., Political Secretary to the envoy, also, throwing aside his pen, has earned by his noble conduct during the defence, a title to the respect and honour of every soldier, for his behaviour was such as no soldier has ever surpassed.


"Information as to the exact circumstances of the deaths of H.E. Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., C.S.I., and of Surgeon Kelly is unfortunately not forthcoming, but there can be no doubt but that they too behaved throughout in the most gallant manner."

Then on 29 December 1879, in Letter No. 17511, the Adjutant-General, Major-General G. R. Greaves, C.B., addressed the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, as follows :—

"I have the honour by direction of the Commander-in-Chief to forward for submission to Government the enclosed copies of letters from Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts, K.C.B., V.C., Commanding Kabul Field Force, bringing to notice the conduct of the British officers of the Kabul mission who were killed at Kabul on 3 September 1879, and the gallant bearing of the escort of the Corps of Guides in the defence of the Residency, and recommending that the Order of Merit may be conferred on the men and that the Queen's Own Corps of Guides may be permitted to bear on the colours the words 'Residency—Kabul,' in commemoration of the gallantry displayed by their comrades.

"His Excellency fully endorses the opinion of the Commission of which Colonel C. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., was President, as to the gallantry displayed by the men of the Guides in their defence of the Residency, and would most strongly recommend that the words 'Residency—Kabul' be borne on the colours of the Corps.

"In regard to Lieutenant-General Sir F. S. Roberts' recommendation that the Order of Merit should be conferred on the names of the gallant men who fell on the



To face page 102

occasion, His Excellency considers that the matter is one which requires the fullest consideration. The conduct of the garrison was deserving of any honour which Government could bestow, but from a military point of view the grant of posthumous honours is to be deprecated as tending to create precedents which, when once established, are difficult to overcome.

"In this particular instance the family pensions of the deceased have been doubled by G.G.O. 1001 of 1879."

It has not been possible to trace any further correspondence on the matter of the award of the "Battle Honour," suggested by Sir Frederick Roberts and strongly supported by the Commander-in-Chief in India; but it seems that the proposal was negatived when it came before higher authority primarily by reason of the old ruling in such matters that "a Battle Honour shall not be awarded for the services of any smaller unit than the wing of a Regiment." There was, however, another reason why the suggestion was ruled out, and this was because it "was against all precedent of the day to record a disaster notwithstanding its admittedly meritorious character."

The Government of India themselves took the initiative in making a proposal, in Letter No. 5473K of 27 January 1880, that a monument should be erected at or near Mardan, and invited suggestions from the Punjab Government and from the Corps of Guides as to the design which this should follow.

Colonel Jenkins, Commandant of the Corps, suggested a drinking-fountain to be erected between Mardan and Nowshera, but this was objected to on the ground of the difficulty involved in upkeep and the initial and recurring expense connected with the necessary water supply; and a later suggestion made by the Government of India was for the memorial to take the form of a *Baoli*, or well, with steps and a commemorative tablet, to be erected at Rushakai.

Eventually a memorial of this nature was erected by the Government at Mardan. It takes the form of a bathing tank 100 feet square, the approach to which is under an archway of oriental design. It is dedicated "To the memory of Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.S.I., officers and men Q.O. Corps of Guides who fell in Defence of the Kabul Residency on September 3rd, 1879."

Incorporated in the archway also are four engraved marble tablets—two in English and two in Urdu. Two tablets are engraved as follows: "This Memorial has been erected to perpetuate the remembrance of the conspicuous gallantry of the officers and men of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides who, when escort to Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.S.I., fell in the defence of the Residency at Kabul on September 3rd, 1879."

"The Commission of enquiry of which Colonel C. M. MacGregor was President recorded as follows:—

"They do not give their opinion hastily, but they believe that the annals of no Army and no Regiment can show a brighter record of devoted bravery than has been achieved by this small band of Guides.

"By their deeds they have conferred undying honour not only on the Regiment to which they belong, but on the whole British Army."

On the other two tablets is a detailed list of casualties.

Sir Henry Newbolt has paid a noble tribute to the devoted bravery of the little band of Guides who fell in the defence of the Residency in his poem entitled :—

THE GUIDES AT KABUL.¹

(1879)

Sons of the Island race, wherever ye dwell,
 Who speak of your fathers' battles with lips that burn,
 The deed of an alien legion hear me tell,
 And think not shame from the hearts ye tamed to learn,
 When succour shall fail and the tide for a season turn,
 To fight with a joyful courage, a passionate pride,
 To die at last as the Guides at Kabul died.

For a handful of seventy men in a barrack of mud,
 Foodless, waterless, dwindling one by one,
 Answered a thousand yelling for English blood
 With stormy volleys that swept them gunner from gun,
 And charge on charge in the glare of the Afghan sun,
 Till the walls were shattered wherein they crouched at bay
 And dead or dying half of the seventy lay.

Twice they had taken the cannon that wrecked their hold,
 Twice toiled in vain to drag it back,
 Thrice they toiled, and alone, wary and bold,
 Whirling a hurricane sword to scatter the wrack,
 Hamilton, last of the English, covered their track.
 "Never give in!" he cried, and he heard them shout,
 And grappled with death as a man that knows not doubt.

And the Guides looked down from their smouldering barrack again,
 And behold, a banner of truce, and a voice that spoke :
 "Come, for we know that the English all are slain,
 We keep no feud with men of a kindred folk,
 Rejoice with us to be free of the conqueror's yoke."
 Silence fell for a moment, then was heard
 A sound of laughter and scorn, and an answering word.

"Is it we or the lords we serve who have earned this wrong,
 That ye call us to flinch from the battle they bade us fight?
 We that live—do ye doubt that our hands are strong?
 They that have fallen—ye know that their blood was bright!
 Think ye the Guides will barter for lust of the light
 The pride of an ancient people in warfare bred,
 Honour of comrades living, and faith to the dead?"

Then the joy that spurs the warrior's heart
 To the last thundering gallop and sheer leap
 Came on the men of the Guides: they flung apart
 The doors not all their valour could longer keep:
 They dressed their slender line; they breathed deep,
 And with never a foot lagging or head bent,
 To the clash and clamour and dust of death they went.

¹ Taken by permission of the author from "Poems New and Old," published by John Murray.

CHAPTER VIII

1879-1880

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR—SECOND PHASE

PLANS FOR RETRIBUTION—THE GUIDES JOIN THE KHYBER FIELD FORCE—THE GUIDES AT SHERPUR—ATTACK ON THE AFGHAN POSITION—CAPTURE AND EVACUATION OF THE ASMAI HEIGHTS—DEFENCE OF SHERPUR—ACTION AT CHARASIA—RETURN OF THE GUIDES TO MARDAN—RECOGNITION OF THEIR SERVICES.

See Map of Afghanistan, facing page 110, and Panorama of Country round Kabul, facing page 120.

As has already been stated the greater portion of the troops composing the Peshawar Valley Field Force was withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the Afghan border during June and July 1879. The force in and about 1879 Kandahar was directed not to move India-wards until 1 September, the earliest date at which troops could safely march through the Bolan Pass ; and Major-General Roberts had been ordered to hold his ground, since Kurram, by the conditions of the Treaty of Gandamak, was to remain under the control of and be administered by the Indian Government. Thus the Kurram Valley Field Force was not only the nearest available body of troops when news of the attack on the Kabul Residency reached India, but practically the only one at the time ready and in a position to act.

Major-General Roberts was temporarily absent from his command as member of an Army Commission assembled at Simla, where the news of the happenings at Kabul arrived on the night of 4-5 September. On the 5th a Council was held, and as a preliminary measure Brigadier-General Massy, then commanding in Kurram, was directed to move a small force to the crest of the Shutur Gardan Pass and there entrench. In addition, a division of one Cavalry Brigade and two Infantry Brigades, to be known as " the Kabul Field Force," was to be got ready for an immediate advance on Kabul, another division was to hold Jalalabad, and Kandahar was to be reoccupied and Ghazni threatened. A force of some 6,000 men had been collected at Ali Khel on 12 September, on which date General Roberts resumed command of the force in the Kurram valley, where was available the division composing the Kabul Field Force and a 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigade for the protection of the line of communications.

Meanwhile, on the Khyber line, steps had been taken to strengthen the weak garrisons of Landi Kotal, Ali Masjid and Jamrud, and a plan was drawn up to support General Roberts's advance from Kurram by a forward movement by way of the Khyber, creating depots along the route and increasing the posts as fresh troops arrived. On this line Major-General Bright was in command.

The first move was to be made by the Guides Corps, which was to advance from Mardan with two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery and occupy Dakka

as soon as possible. The Corps therefore left Mardan on 21 September *en route* for the Khyber Pass, for attachment to the 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General C. Gough, of the Khyber Field Force. Early reconnaissances had, however, shown that Dakka was held by Afghan regular troops, that six Herati regiments were moving on the Khyber from Kabul, and that efforts were being made to excite a general rising of the tribes; so that no movement was at first attempted beyond Landi Kotal. But on 25 September Brigadier-General Gough reported from Landi Kotal that the Amir had positively forbidden any opposition being offered to the advance of the British troops; accordingly on the arrival of the Guides at Landi Kotal, these, with the two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Jenkins, C.B.,¹ pushed on to Dakka which was reached on 29 September and occupied without opposition. Next day the Headquarters of the 1st Brigade arrived there with two more regiments. The strength of the Khyber Field Force, henceforth known as the 2nd Khyber Division, was now 13,411 of all ranks.

Brigadier-General Gough, with the advance column, continued his march on 2 October as far as Basawal, thence, as soon as transport and supplies allowed, to Barikao, and on the 12th the Guides occupied the fort at Jalalabad. Meanwhile, the 2nd Brigade had closed up to Jamrud, and Divisional Headquarters had reached Landi Kotal. The advance was greatly delayed by supply and transport difficulties, and also by a considerable amount of sickness among certain of the regiments composing the force.

On 12 October General Gough was ordered to send forward a flying column under Colonel Jenkins, composed of the Guides, a wing of the 9th Foot, and the Hazara Mountain Battery, which was to reach Gandamak as speedily as possible, with the double object of overawing the Ghilzais and of intercepting Afghan fugitives from the action at Charasia, fought by General Roberts on the 6th. But General Gough did not think himself sufficiently strong at the time to make this considerable detachment, and on his representations the orders, so far as concerned an advance to Gandamak, were cancelled. The column, however, moved forward to Fattehabad, which was then garrisoned by a force consisting of the Guides Cavalry (220 sabres), No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery, the 2nd Battalion 9th Foot (300 rifles), and the Guides Infantry (480 rifles), the Headquarters and remainder of the 1st Brigade being at Jalalabad.

On 8 October the force under General Roberts occupied Kabul. As he has told us,² "up to this time [the middle of October] communication with India had been kept up by way of the Shutargardan, and I had heard nothing of the approach of the Khyber column. It was so very necessary to open up the Khyber route, in view of early snow on the Shutargardan, that I arranged to send a small force towards Jalalabad, and to move the Shutargardan garrison to Kabul, thus breaking off communication with Kurram."

¹ He was awarded the C.B. on 25 July 1879, and became Brevet Colonel and A.D.C. to the Queen on 29 October 1879.

² "Forty-one Years in India," vol. II, p. 240.

In consequence of this, the remainder of General Gough's brigade now closed up to Colonel Jenkins's column at Fattehabad. On 23 October the 1st Brigade moved to and occupied Fort Battye at Safed Sang, with an advance guard, composed of the Guides and the Hazara Mountain Battery, at Gandamak, halting in these positions until news was received on the 26th that General Roberts proposed, in the first week in November, to send a strong brigade towards Gandamak to co-operate with an advance from that place. On 3 November General Gough's brigade marched to meet Major-General Macpherson's column from Kabul, taking seven days' supplies and the scale of baggage being reduced to a minimum. It was composed as follows :—200 sabres of the Guides Cavalry and 100 of the 10th Bengal Lancers, two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery and six of the Hazara Mountain Battery, about 500 bayonets from each of the 2nd Battalion 9th Foot, the Guides Infantry and the 24th Punjab Infantry, and companies Nos. 2 and 6 of the Sappers and Miners. The whole force amounted to over 2,000 men.

At 8.30 a.m. on 4 November the force marched for Jagdalak, the Guides Infantry, in the advanced guard, being ordered to crown the heights on either side when necessary. They were relieved by the other regiments as these came up, and then rejoined the advanced guard, repeating the process until, after an uneventful march of eight miles, the brigade encamped at Surkhab. Here the two Royal Horse Artillery guns were left under an escort of the 45th Sikhs sent up from Gandamak, and the force marched on in the same order on the 5th, halting on the Pezwan Kotal and again on the Jagdalak Kotal, where some slight opposition was met with. A round hill commanding the Jagdalak end of the pass below the Kotal was occupied by a company of the Guides Infantry, who held it until the rearguard came in, and the column reached Jagdalak by dark. Here the dismounted portion of the force encamped in a large ruined fort beyond the village and overlooking the entrance of the Pari Dara, a narrow defile through which ran the road and the stream, while the cavalry occupied the valley between the fort and the village.

Leaving 200 men of the 24th Punjab Infantry and fifty sabres of the Guides to hold the old fort at Jagdalak, the column advanced to Katasang on the 6th by two roads, the Guides, 9th Foot, the guns, the Sappers and Miners, and the mule and pony transport proceeding by the upper road, and the rest of the brigade by the Pari Dara. The two columns arrived practically simultaneously at the camping-ground at Katasang where they were met by General Macpherson, whose brigade was halted at the foot of the Lataband Pass, four miles farther on.

The route of communication between Kabul and Peshawar having thus been opened, the 1st and 2nd Brigades retraced their steps, General Gough sending Colonel Jenkins with some of his Guides to reconnoitre *en route* the track which leads over the Dabeli Pass towards the Adrag Badrag Pass, striking the Kabul river near Kats Muhammad Ali, after which the troops of this brigade resumed their old positions in the fort and valley at Jagdalak.

On 8 November the Guides, a company of Sappers and two guns were left to hold Jagdalak under Colonel Jenkins, who was directed to reconnoitre the Iro

Manzil route, and to return the next day to the Pezwan Kotal, leaving 200 Guides Infantry, fifty Cavalry, two guns and the company of Sappers to hold the Jagdalak Kotal and repair the road. He was to hold the Pezwan Kotal with the rest of the Guides, four mountain guns and another Sapper company, which was to repair the road and the Surkhab bridge. The rest of the force marched to Lukhai, about one and a half miles west of the Surkhab bridge. A signalling party was left on the Jagdalak Kotal and another on the Pezwan Kotal till late in the afternoon and until a helio message was received from Colonel Jenkins on the Iro Manzil Pass. On 9 November the rest of the force marched back to Gandamak, and for a whole month nothing of any importance occurred. The cold was very severe by this time, and the only excitement provided was the passage India-wards of the Amir Yakub Khan, who had abdicated the Afghan throne.

During November and the first week in December the Guides were distributed as follows :—

At Jagdalak Kotal : Headquarters, four companies and fifty-four sabres under Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins.

At Pezwan Kotal : Four companies and 103 sabres under Major R. B. Campbell.

During the same period three officers were posted to the Corps : Lieutenant I. de C. Meade, Hyderabad Contingent, to command the depot at Mardan ; Lieutenant R. B. Adams, of the 12th Foot ; and Lieutenant G. K. Daly, Central India Horse, joined the Corps at Gandamak.

Lord Roberts has told us¹ of the various influences which had been at work since the arrival of his force at Kabul, to inflame Afghan feeling against the British, making all the disunited sections of the people combine in the first half of the month of December with a view to gaining possession of the city of Kabul, occupying the numerous forts and villages in the neighbourhood of Sherpur, and surrounding the cantonment occupied by the British garrison. "That there was serious trouble ahead was plain enough when the conflicting reports had been carefully sifted," writes Lord Roberts, "and I therefore thought it only prudent to telegraph to General Bright at Jalalabad to push on the Guides Corps, although I was very much averse to augmenting the Sherpur garrison and thereby increasing the drain on our supplies."²

At this time General Bright was preparing for a long-projected expedition into the Laghman valley, but on the evening of 7 December an order was received from General Roberts that the Guides Corps was to march at once with all speed to Kabul. The Laghman expedition was accordingly abandoned and every effort was made to carry out the order with all possible speed. On the 8th Major Campbell was directed to march his detachment from Pezwan and join the Headquarters of the Corps at Jagdalak. Lieutenant Cooke-Collis, who had been detached to Jalalabad with a troop of the Guides Cavalry, was also recalled and instructed to march with all details of the Corps at Gandamak to Headquarters, but for one

¹ "Forty-one Years in India," vol. II, Chap. LV.

² *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 263.

reason and another this last detachment, with Lieutenant Daly, was not able to reach Kabul until 14 December.

Colonel Jenkins left Jagdalak with the bulk of the Corps on 9 December, and on the 11th marched from Seh Baba to Lataband, on reaching which place a helio message was received that reinforcements were urgently needed at Kabul. Leaving all baggage behind at Lataband in charge of one company, the remainder, taking only ammunition with them, pushed on and marched that night into Sherpur Cantonment, a distance of thirty-six miles.

"On 11 December, the troops at and around Kabul amounted to 6,352 men and twenty guns, disposed as follows :—

Baker's Column	1,325 men and 4 guns
Macpherson's Column	...	1,492	" " 4 "
Massy's Column	...	351	" " 4 "
At Sherpur	...	3,184	" " 8 "
<hr/>			
Total	...	6,352	" " 20 "

"There were besides at Butkhak and Lataband 1,343 men and two guns, together with the Guides Corps, which reached Sherpur on the evening of 11 December at a strength of 679 men, bringing the total of the force to 8,374 men and twenty-two guns."¹

"On the morning of the 12th," writes their new commanding general, "I was cheered by hearing that the Guides had arrived during the night under the command of Colonel F. Jenkins—a most welcome reinforcement, for I knew how thoroughly to be depended upon was every man in that distinguished Corps."

During the 11th things had not gone very well with the British troops in Kabul. Three enemy forces—from the south, from Kohistan, and from the Ghazni direction—were advancing on the city, and General Roberts had sent out two columns to deal with these under Generals Macpherson and Baker. The result had not answered expectations; our troops by the end of the day had suffered a distinct reverse and sustained considerable loss, while the Afghans had gained a footing on the Takht-i-Shah, the heights overlooking the Bala Hissar. On the 12th this position was attacked by troops under General Macpherson who were no more than partially successful, but the Guides, in view of the previous day's march, were not employed on this occasion. General Macpherson, who had attacked the Takht-i-Shah from Deh-i-Mazang, was directed to hold the ground he had won until General Baker should co-operate with him in a fresh attack from the Beni Hissar side on the 13th.

During the night the enemy, who had been strongly reinforced, had occupied the villages between the Beni Hissar and the Bala Hissar and those along the road; and so the force² which moved out at 8 a.m. on the 13th had, first, to gain the

¹ From "Forty-one Years in India," vol. II, p. 268 *note*.

² Eight guns, one squadron 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, six companies 92nd Highlanders, 300 3rd Sikhs, 150 5th Punjab Infantry, and seven companies of the Guides, with Colonel Jenkins, Major Campbell, Captains Hammond and Battye, Lieutenant Adams, and Surgeon Lewtas.

high ground above these villages, and, while holding the point overlooking Beni Hissar, to wheel to the right and move towards the Takht-i-Shah. This was a most formidable position to attack. The slopes leading up to it were covered with huge masses of jagged rock, intersected by perpendicular cliffs, and its great natural strength was increased by breastworks and stockades thrown up at different points.

"General Baker took the road past the Bala Hissar, and, upon debouching into the plain north of Beni Hissar, found the enemy posted in force all along the ridge in front, leading down from the Takht-i-Shah peak. Beni Hissar was also full of Afghans and in the fields about it were detached parties. These, seeing our force advancing, began to stream towards the ridge, and the original plan of attack was so far modified that, instead of working round through Beni Hissar village, the Highlanders and Guides were sent straight across some marshy ground at the ridge. The object in view was to cut the enemy's line in two, and it was attained most successfully. Our eight guns opened fire at 1,400 yards upon the masses of Afghans on the ridge, and the shells kept under the musketry fire opened upon our infantry. Nothing could be finer than the advance of the 92nd and the Guides; they reached the slope of the hill and opened fire upon the enemy, one continued roll of musketry being heard as they pushed upwards. They gained the crest and the Afghan line was severed, about 2,000 being left about Beni Hissar while the assault was made upon the peak. The rapid fire from the breech-loaders swept away such of the enemy as stood firm, while the bayonet made short work of the Ghazis who defended the standards. . . . In a very short time the majority opposed to the storming party had broken and fled. A few Ghazis fought desperately, but upwards went the Highlanders in the same gallant style they had shown at Charasia. . . . The Guides, under Colonel Jenkins, were equally eager, this being their first chance in the campaign, and they shared with the 92nd the honour of scattering the defenders of the ridge. . . .

"While the Highlanders and the Guides were storming the ridge, an attack had been attempted from Beni Hissar upon General Baker's left flank, but the 3rd Sikhs drove back the enemy, who began to move round towards Siah Sang, and eventually collected in force upon these hills. They were shelled by our guns, and the 5th Punjab Cavalry were reinforced by two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, a squadron of the 14th Bengal Lancers and the Guides Cavalry. Wherever the ground was good, our sowars and lancers charged and did great execution. The Afghans fought bravely, forming up to receive the cavalry with a steadiness that trained infantry would not have surpassed and reserving their fire until the horses were close upon them. . . . The Guides twice got well among the fugitives. Their second charge was upon a body of Kohistanis, who had crossed the plain east of Bemaru and made for Siah Sang. They were shelled from the east end of the Bemaru heights; and upon seeing General Baker's force engaged, halted irresolutely near Siah Sang. They tried to retrace their steps, but were suddenly charged down upon by the Guides, who had waited for them behind the northern slopes of Siah Sang. Sixty are said to have been killed in this charge alone, the

35°


Ā N

'GHĀNISTĀN (ĀWAR TO KĀBUL)

Scale of miles.

2 0 10 20 Miles

A J A U R



34°

Reproduced from Survey of India Map,
with the permission of the Surveyor General.
To face page 110

Guides chasing them as far as the Logar river, where the swampy ground checked the cavalry."¹

Of these operations General Roberts wrote as follows in his despatch :—

" A large portion of the enemy being thus prevented from uniting themselves with those occupying the Takht-i-Shah, the 92nd Highlanders and Guides, covered by the fire of Major Swinley's guns, which had by this time gained the summit of the lower ridge, and aided by that of G.3. R.A. from the plain below, continued the advance on the conical hill, fighting, for some distance, every foot of the way. The position of the enemy was enormously strong, but by 11.30 a.m. the 92nd Highlanders and Guides had reached the summit. . . .

" In the meanwhile the Guide Cavalry, under Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, accompanied by Captain Hutchinson and Lieutenant Hughes, were ordered out of Sherpur to cut off the retreat of a body of the enemy, who were moving along the Siah Sang heights towards Kohistan. They were successful in intercepting them, and cut up a good number of the enemy who, however, fought obstinately and caused some loss on the cavalry. . . .

" During this operation the Guides Cavalry, under Lieut.-Colonel G. Stewart, were very successful and made a grand charge. . . . "

For conspicuous gallantry in this action Sowar Zaidulla subsequently obtained the Order of Merit (Third Class), while the casualties incurred by the Corps of Guides were as follows : in the Cavalry three sowars killed and Kote-Dafadar Bhup Singh, one trumpeter and six sowars wounded. The Infantry had only one man wounded. The Cavalry also had ten horses killed and six wounded.

" The night of the 13th passed quietly, but when day dawned on the 14th crowds of armed men, with numerous standards, could be seen occupying a hill on the Kohistan road ; and as day advanced they proceeded in vast numbers to the Asmai heights, where they were joined by swarms from the city and the Chardeh valley. It then became apparent that the combination was much more formidable than I had imagined, and that the numbers of the enemy now in opposition to us were far greater than I had dreamt was possible. Foiled in their attempt to close in upon us from the south and west, the tribesmen had concentrated to the north, and it was evident they were preparing to deliver an attack in great strength from that quarter. I quickly decided to drive the enemy off the Asmai heights, to cut their communication with Kohistan, and to operate towards the north, much as I had operated the previous day to the south of Sherpur.

" At 9 a.m. I despatched Brigadier-General Baker to the east slope of the Asmai range with the following troops : 4 guns R.F.A. ; 4 guns Mountain Artillery ; 14th Bengal Lancers ; 72nd Highlanders (192 rifles) ; 92nd Highlanders (100 rifles) ; Guides Infantry (460 rifles) ; and 5th Punjab Infantry (470 rifles)."²

The advance, composed of the 72nd, 92nd and Guides Infantry, was under the orders of Colonel Jenkins, C.B. The British officers this day present with

¹ Hensman, " The Afghan War," p. 201 *et seq.*

² " Forty-one Years in India," vol. II, pp. 287, 288.

the Guides were Colonel Jenkins, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell,¹ Captains Hammond and Battye, Lieutenant Adams and Surgeon Lewtas.

After crossing some deep ditches and marshy ground under enemy fire, a conical hill west of the Asmai heights was reached and occupied, and here Colonel Jenkins was ordered to leave a sufficient force to hold the hill, taking on the remainder to storm the main Afghan position on the heights. Accordingly, two mountain guns were left here with sixty men of the 72nd Highlanders and sixty rifles of "A" Company of the Guides Infantry under Subadar Gulabu.

The first position held by the enemy was a very strong one, the ascent to it was both precipitous and rocky, and the enemy fought with great determination. The Guides worked round on the right and the position was finally captured by a simultaneous rush of the Highlanders and Guides, the Afghans being driven out with severe loss. Captain F. D. Battye was here dangerously wounded when gallantly leading a party of the Guides, while shortly afterwards Subadar Rup Sing (Gurkha) was killed and Subadar Jowalla Singh (Sikh) was dangerously wounded. The enemy was pursued and driven along the Asmai heights towards Kabul city, suffering severely, but at the same time they inflicted no small loss upon their pursuers. The last and highest point, above the city, was very stubbornly held by a body of the enemy, and was finally cleared by parties working round on both flanks—that on the right under Colonel Jenkins—and ending with a charge from front and flanks by the Highlanders and Guides. The Ghazis here were all killed.

The official account² is as follows: "Nothing could have exceeded the dash and resolution with which the Highlanders advanced up the steepest part of the ridge, while the Guides on their right were affording every assistance by continually turning the positions held by the enemy. The western portion of the heights was gained; but not without hard fighting and several casualties. . . . The enemy now retreated from the left of their position under a heavy fire from our troops, while the artillery played on them with the most telling effect. The several points of importance along the ridge were stubbornly defended, and the highest peak on the extreme right was held with the greatest determination, a number of the defenders being killed by the bayonet in a hand-to-hand fight before it was stormed by the Highlanders and Guides. . . . Meanwhile, General Macpherson had been directed to give all the assistance in his power to General Baker's attack; and accordingly the whole of the 67th Foot moved across the gorge at Deh Mazang and worked towards the enemy's rear. . . . arriving just as the summit was finally stormed by the Highlanders and Guides."

The work had been very hard and everybody would have been glad of a rest, but heavy firing was now heard in the direction of the conical hill, and it was seen that the detachment left there was being heavily attacked by large masses of Afghans arriving from the direction of Kohistan.

¹ Promoted Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel on 22 November 1879.

² "The Second Afghan War," pp. 268, 269.

Colonel Jenkins ordered ammunition pouches to be replenished and the force to march back to the relief of the isolated party on the hill ; the 67th Foot, then arriving from Brigadier-General Macpherson's brigade, being left in charge of the high peak just captured. On arrival on the high ground overlooking the conical hill, it was seen that the force there had been overpowered by numbers and forced to retire. Volleys fired by the Highlanders and Guides checked the pursuing enemy, but caused them to turn back, swarm up the Asmai heights and attack their fresh assailants ; at this moment, while the troops were actually engaged with the enemy, orders were received to fall back on Sherpur.

It was no easy matter to bring off a force from such a hill as Asmai in the face of an exulting foe, but it was done and with remarkably small loss. A party of the Guides, under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and Captain Hammond, was the last to leave the crest of the Asmai under the covering fire of two companies of the 67th Foot holding the highest *sangar* ; these then retired down the hill under the shelter of the Bala Hissar walls. But the two guns of the Mountain Battery on the conical hill, which maintained a fire up to the last, could not be brought away and fell temporarily into the hands of the enemy.

In his despatch General Roberts thus described the retirement of these brigades :

" The withdrawal from the Bala Hissar and Asmai heights was accomplished in a manner highly creditable to the officers in command and the discipline of the troops. The retirement of General Baker's troops down the east face of Asmai, under a very heavy fire, was most ably conducted by that distinguished officer Colonel Jenkins, C.B., who speaks with great admiration of the example set to their men by Lieut.-Colonel Brownlow, C.B., and Major Stockwell, 72nd Highlanders, and also of Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Campbell, Queen's Own Corps of Guides. Another officer who greatly distinguished himself on this occasion was Captain A. G. Hammond, Corps of Guides. He had been very forward during the storming of the Asmai heights, and now, when the enemy was crowding up the northern slopes, he remained with a few men on the ridge until the Afghans were within 30 yards of them. During the retirement one of the men of the Guides was shot and Captain Hammond stopped and assisted in carrying him away, though the enemy were at the time close by and firing heavily."

For this gallant action Captain Hammond was awarded the Victoria Cross, the announcement of the bestowal of which runs as follows in the *London Gazette* of 15 October 1881, by which time this officer had been promoted Major :

" For conspicuous coolness and gallantry at the action on the Asmai Heights, near Kabul, on the 14th December, 1879, in defending the top of the hill with a rifle and fixed bayonet, against large numbers of the enemy, while the 72nd Highlanders and Guides were retiring ; and again on the retreat down the hill, in stopping to assist in carrying away a wounded Sepoy, the enemy being not sixty yards off, firing heavily all the time."

In his despatch General Roberts further wrote :

"Amongst many who distinguished themselves on this occasion I would specially mention . . . Lance Naiks Dillia and Lehna of the Guides Infantry"

while Brigadier-General Baker specially mentioned the good services of Surgeon J. Lewtas, Corps of Guides.

Eight non-commissioned officers and four men of the Guides received the Order of Merit (Third Class), for gallantry in action this day.

On this day again there were a considerable number of casualties : killed or died of wounds, Subadars Rup Sing and Jowalla Singh, and fourteen men ; wounded, Captain F. D. Battye, and twenty-six men.

As a result of this day's action, the determination shown by the enemy and his ever-increasing numbers, General Roberts came to a weighty decision :

"I determined," he writes,¹ "to withdraw from all isolated positions and concentrate my force at Sherpur, thereby securing the safety of the cantonment and avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice of life." The necessary orders for withdrawal were sent to Generals Macpherson and Baker.

The critical events of 12, 13 and 14 December were followed by a period of some ten days' comparative calm, and attention was now devoted to strengthening the defences of the very extended entrenched cantonment of Sherpur, pending the arrival of reinforcements from Gandamak for which General Roberts had asked. The defence was distributed in five sections, No. 2 Section, from Bemaru village up to the east slope of the Bemaru Ridge, being in charge of Colonel Jenkins, Corps of Guides. The reserve was composed of the 92nd and a wing each of the 67th and 72nd, also one squadron of each regiment of cavalry, the remainder being dismounted and serving as infantry.

"Sherpur," so Lord Roberts wrote at the time, "is almost a parallelogram, whose north side is formed by the Bemaru Ridge, a range of low but steep isolated hills rising some 300 feet above the surrounding plain, and running almost due east and west for a distance of 2,500 yards. . . . The southern face is a continuous and massive mud wall sixteen feet high, pierced at intervals of about 700 yards by three gateways, which again are protected by lofty circular bastions. . . . The length of the south side slightly exceeds 2,650 yards. The western flank is constructed on a precisely similar plan. . . . This face is about 1,000 yards in length. On the east the defences are much weaker, as the original design was never completed, and the wall . . . does not exceed seven feet in height."

Brigadier-General Gough had been ordered to push on to Kabul with the desired reinforcements at all hazards, and on 21 December he was near Seh Baba, expecting to reach Lataband next day and Kabul on the 24th. The Afghans were fully aware of General Gough's approach and judged that their only hope of success lay in striking before his arrival. On the night of the 22nd reliable information came to Sherpur that a general attack was to be delivered on the cantonment next morning—a main attack on the east face, the weakest side, supported by a feint

¹ "Forty-one Years in India," vol. II, p. 292.

attack against the south wall, while a beacon fire lighted at dawn on the Asmai Heights was to be the signal for the opening of the assault.

At 5.30 a.m. on 23 December the signal fire was lighted and by seven o'clock an attack in force was fully developed against the east face, the most determined attack being directed against the sections commanded by Colonel Jenkins and Brigadier-General H. Gough and covering the ground from the east side of Bemaru village to the gorge which divided Bemaru Ridge.

"The troops defending these sections were the Guides Infantry in the trenches about Bemaru, 100 men of the 28th Punjab Infantry in the native hospital, and the 67th Foot, reinforced by two companies of the 92nd Highlanders from the reserve. When the attack was first made, it was still so dark and misty that little could be seen in front of the trenches, and orders were given to reserve fire until the advancing masses of Afghans could be clearly distinguished. The men of the 28th Punjab Infantry were the first to open fire, while at the same time the guns of No. 1 Battery fired star shells, which, bursting in the air, illumined the attacking forces in the fields and enclosures 1,000 yards away. The Guides next joined in the fusilade. To the right of the 28th Punjabis were the 67th and the 92nd, whose fire was reserved until they were ordered to fire volleys within 200 yards' range on the advancing enemy, some of the Ghazis amongst whom advanced to within eighty yards against the concentrated fire. The attack collapsed and the Afghans hastened behind cover."¹

General Roberts now sent out guns and cavalry through the gorge in the Bemaru Ridge, and when these attacked the enemy in flank, the Afghans wavered and soon began to seek safety in flight, and against them every available horseman in Sherpur was now sent out. The cavalry who had advanced by the Bemaru gorge got well into the Kohistanis retreating to the north, and while the 14th Bengal Lancers blocked the Kohistan road, the 9th Lancers and the 5th Punjab Cavalry were sent to the Siah Sung hills to intercept the enemy retreat towards the city of Kabul, and the Guides Cavalry remained on the plain to the east to prevent the Afghans getting away towards Butkhak. The Afghans suffered heavily from the cold steel of the 9th Lancers and 5th Punjab Cavalry and from their dismounted fire, while the Guides Cavalry also succeeded in rendering a good account of the enemy more to the east.

Next morning Brigadier-General C. Gough reached Sherpur with reinforcements amounting to six guns, two squadrons of cavalry and 2,000 infantry.

On the 23rd the Guides had killed or died of wounds in the Cavalry, one sowar ; and in the Infantry, Jemadar Jag Bahadur, who would have been recommended for the Order of Merit had he survived, and a naik ; while one sepoy was wounded.

On 27 December Brigadier-General Baker marched through deep snow into the heart of the Koh-i-Daman to punish Mir Bacha, the leader of the Kohistanis in the late rising : General Baker had under his command four guns, the Guides Cavalry, 200 sabres, and some 1,700 Infantry, including 400 rifles of the Guides. Mir Bacha's fortified village of Baba Kushkar was burnt and razed to the ground,

¹ "The Second Afghan War," pp. 285, 286.

as were many other small forts belonging to him and his people, and the force was back in Sherpur on 31 December, having experienced no opposition but all having suffered severely from the extreme cold.

The Corps of Guides passed the winter in tents within Sherpur cantonment, and was the only regiment in the force which was not provided with quarters ; but the men kept very fit and healthy, though the horses of the Guides Cavalry 1880 suffered much in condition as was only to be expected, for they stood out in the open and did not receive a full allowance of forage.

At the end of March negotiations in regard to the assumption of the title of Amir of Afghanistan were opened with Abdur Rahman, who was a grandson of Dost Muhammad and a nephew of the former Amir, Sher Ali, and since 1868 had been living in Russian territory. He was believed to be an able man and to be possessed of more influence than any other chief in the country.

On 30 March General Stewart's division left Kandahar for Kabul with a view to assisting in the pacification of northern Afghanistan, and on 16 April a force marched out of Kabul under General Ross to meet the Kandahar column and take it some needed supplies. A few days later it seemed likely to General Roberts that the people from Wardak and Logar might attack General Ross's column, and on 20 April a force was sent towards Charasia under Colonel Jenkins, consisting of two Royal Horse Artillery guns, two squadrons (250 sabres) of the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, 266 rifles of the 92nd Highlanders and 600 of the Guides Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell. The other officers accompanying the Corps on this occasion were Major Hutchinson, Captains Hammond and Battye, Lieutenants Cooke-Collis, Hughes, Adams and Daly, and Surgeon Lewtas.

"The column encamped on the 20th at Beni Hissar and marched for Charasia on the following morning ; here it encamped between the Charasia hamlets and Chihil Dukhteran, where news was brought to Colonel Jenkins that Muhammad Hasan Khan had started with 2,000 men to attack General Ross, but that on hearing of Colonel Jenkins' march he had returned and was then at Muhammad Agha or Kuti Khel, two villages on the Logar road, twelve miles ahead of the column.

"On the 22nd the force remained halted. Further intelligence was received of the gathering, and a piquet of the Afghans was discerned on a high hill about a mile south-east. At 2 a.m. on the 25th Colonel Jenkins received warning that the enemy intended to attack him at dawn. This intelligence was at once dispatched to Sherpur and preparations were made for meeting the attack. To the left and front of the camp, and distant from 1,300 to 1,500 yards, were ranges of rocky hills, spurs of which ran down to the Logar road, 1,200 yards from the camp front. On the right and right rear, 1,200-1,300 yards away, were the hamlets of Charasia with their gardens and enclosures." Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell was directed to get the Infantry of the Guides under arms an hour before daybreak, and "a party of Guides Cavalry was sent to reconnoitre down the Logar road, which ran due south from the camp past the spurs described above, and as day broke this party

was seen retiring slowly before an advancing body of Afghans, while similar hostile forces were descried threatening both right and left flanks."¹

The tents were now ordered to be struck and the baggage to be taken under the cover of a small detached hill in rear of the camp, which "G" Company of the Guides under Lieutenant Adams was sent to hold with half a company of the 92nd Highlanders. A small ruined fort, west of this hill, was held by twenty rifles of "D" Company under Lieutenant Cooke-Collis; while in another, west of the camp, were placed thirty rifles of "H" Company under Subadar Sher Singh; in rear of this post was the 1st Troop of the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant Daly.

Two and a half companies—"E," "F," and half "H"—protected the left flank under the command of Captain Hammond, while "B" Company, with parts of "A" and "D," under Captain Battye, covered the front in line with the skirmishers of the Highlanders. "C" Company and part of "A" were in support under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, and with these was a company of the 92nd under Major White. The Guides, owing to the reserve of infantry being so weak, were kept close at hand to support the Cavalry in repelling any sudden rush against the position, and thus suffered severely, exposed as they were to the fire of the enemy, who were using Martini, Snider and Enfield rifles.

During the morning the enemy advanced their standards to within 100–200 yards of the skirmishing line of the Guides and Highlanders, but could not be induced by their leaders to charge home. About 3,000 men opened the attack, but they were reinforced during the day and must finally have numbered between 4,000 and 5,000 men.

As soon as the sun was high enough Colonel Jenkins sent a helio message to Kabul announcing that he was attacked; in answer to which he was informed that reinforcements had already started to his support under General Macpherson. In anticipation, therefore, of their arrival the British forces maintained their original position unaltered, with the exception of the withdrawal of the guns to a less exposed spot about 400 yards in rear. Soon after 1.30 p.m. General Macpherson's force was seen approaching from Kabul, and the Brigadier-General, sending three companies of the 45th Sikhs to support the Guides, then attacked the left flank of the enemy and they were soon seen flying from the villages and orchards. On the skirmishers of the reinforcing troops coming abreast of Colonel Jenkins's force, his line advanced and drove the enemy off the field.

Captain Hammond, with the companies on the left and supported by the 45th Sikhs, advanced over the south-eastern heights and stormed the hill in front of him.

The Guides Cavalry, supported by the Horse Artillery, pursued the flying enemy for some four miles, then made a detour and returned by Chehil Dukhtaran to the original site of Colonel Jenkins's camp. The enemy suffered severely and their defeat was decisive; the estimated number of killed was 200, but subsequent reports added greatly to this total. The whole combined force was reassembled on the camp site at 4 p.m. and marched for Sherpur under the orders of General Macpherson, the cantonment being reached about eight in the evening.

¹ "The Second Afghan War," p. 398 *et seq.*

The services of the force under Colonel Jenkins received well-merited commendation ; in General Roberts's despatch of 11 May, he wrote :

" I beg to bring to His Excellency's notice the excellent arrangements made by Colonel Jenkins for the defence of his position when he found the enemy's numbers increasing, and the success which attended his efforts to preserve the baggage animals from the long range fire of the enemy. . . .

" It affords me great pleasure to bring the valuable services of Brig.-General Macpherson and Colonel Jenkins to His Excellency's most favourable notice. . . .

" I would also remark on the gallantry and steadiness of the troops engaged, and on the excellent spirit they displayed during a long and exhausting day. . . .

" The following officers are reported as having done good service on this occasion. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. P. P. Campbell, Commanding the Corps of Guides, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Stewart, Commanding the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides, Surgeon J. Lewtas, Corps of Guides, Subadar Sher Singh, Corps of Guides."

On 29 April Lieutenant-General Roberts published the following in Field Force Orders :

" No. 1074. It affords the Lieut.-General much pleasure to publish the following telegram from the Commander-in-Chief in India expressing His Excellency's satisfaction at the manner in which the operations on the 25th April at Charasia were conducted by Brig.-General Macpherson, V.C., C.B., and Colonel Jenkins, C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen. Colonel Jenkins' disposition, in finding the numbers of the enemy increasing, was most masterly, and the rapidity with which General Macpherson reinforced Colonel Jenkins and assisted that officer to drive off the enemy is deserving of all praise. Sir Frederick Roberts thoroughly appreciates the good work performed by the troops on this occasion, and begs that they will all accept his hearty congratulations."

The following is the telegram above referred to, dated Simla, 28 April 1880 :

" Colonel Jenkins' action at Charasia was admirably fought. Congratulate him and his troops on my behalf. Also General Macpherson and troops who so promptly and effectually supported."

Finally, the following appreciation from the Viceroy was conveyed in a letter No. 695K of 3 June, from the Secretary, Military Department, to the Adjutant-General in India :

" I am directed to acknowledge your letter No. 2327.A. dated 25th May, 1880, forwarding for submission to the Government of India, reports describing the operations of the troops under the command of Brig.-General H. F. Macpherson, V.C., C.B., and Colonel F. H. Jenkins, C.B., A.D.C., at Charasia on the 25th April, 1880.

" I am to request you will inform the Commander-in-Chief that the Governor-General in Council entirely concurs with His Excellency as to the excellence of

the arrangements made for the defence of his position by Colonel Jenkins, and the ability, promptitude and judgment in attack, displayed by Brig.-General Macpherson.

"The Governor-General, I am to state, shares with Sir F. Haines in his admiration of the gallantry and steadiness evinced by the troops on this as on all other occasions."

One non-commissioned officer and two men of the Corps of Guides were awarded the Order of Merit (Third Class) for conspicuous gallantry in this action.

Of the Guides eight were killed or died of wounds and twenty were wounded, nine horses were killed, including the chargers of Colonel Jenkins and Surgeon Lewtas while twenty-three were wounded, including those of Major Hutchinson and Lieutenant Hughes.

On 2 May the troops from Kandahar marched into Kabul, and on the following day Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart assumed command of "The Northern Afghanistan Field Force" which was now constituted as follows :

- " 1. The 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Kabul Field Force which became the 1st and 2nd Divisions of 'The Northern Afghanistan Field Force,' and remained under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts.
- " 2. 'The Ghazni Field Force' which became the 3rd Division of 'The Northern Afghanistan Field Force' under Major-General Hills.
- " 3. 'The Khyber Line Force' which retained its name.
- " 4. 'The Kurram Force,' should the forces touch, under its present designation."

The Guides remained with the first-named force until General Roberts marched to Kandahar.

The negotiations which had already been opened with Abdur Rahman Khan proceeded during May and June, and news having been received that he was on his way to Kabul, where he was to be proclaimed Amir, General Stewart was directed, at the beginning of July, to proceed with the arrangements which had already been made for the withdrawal of the British troops from northern Afghanistan by the Khyber route. Now, however, news reached Kabul of the defeat of the British troops at Maiwand by the forces of Ayub Khan from Herat, and that General Stewart's successor in command, General Primrose, was closely besieged in Kandahar. A strong force under General Roberts was at once sent from Kabul for the relief of Kandahar, but it was considered inadvisable to make any considerable change in the plans for the withdrawal of the remainder of "The Northern Afghanistan Field Force" to India. The troops under General Roberts left Kabul for Kandahar on 8 August, the new Amir having been installed a week previously, and the charge of the capital being handed over to him on 11 August; then, early on the 12th, the rest of the British Force, now formed in one division of three brigades, numbering something less than 7,000 men, marched out of Kabul and the Bala Hissar in three parallel columns, thus bringing to a close the eventful occupation of the Afghan capital.

The Guides were now thus distributed: the Cavalry, in a Cavalry Brigade with the 1st and 2nd Punjab Cavalry under Brigadier-General C. Gough; the Infantry, with the Bengal Sappers and Miners, marched down as divisional troops; and, after a journey which was almost wholly without incident, the Corps was finally back in Mardan on 6 September, just a year after the murder of the British Resident and his escort of Guides.

For the services of the Corps of Guides in the Second Afghan War it was, under authority of a letter from the Military Department of 29 July 1881, accorded permission to bear the following Honours upon its Appointments: "Ali Masjid," "Kabul, 1879," "Afghanistan, 1878-80"; while the following received advancement in the Order of British India for good and gallant work during the campaign—Risaldar-Major Prem Singh Bahadur to the First Class with the title of "Sirdar Bahadur," and Subadar Sher Singh to the Second Class with the title of "Bahadur."

The following is a return of the casualties in the Corps during the campaign:

CAVALRY.


Killed in action: 2 British officers, 2 Indian officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, 27 sowars	38
Died of disease: 1 non-commissioned officer, 1 trumpeter, 8 sowars	10
Wounded: 4 Indian officers, 9 non-commissioned officers, 1 trumpeter, 32 sowars	46
Total casualties: 2 British officers, 6 Indian officers, 17 non-commissioned officers, 2 trumpeters, 67 sowars	94

INFANTRY.

Killed in action: 4 Indian officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 1 bugler, 53 sepoy	68
Died of disease: 4 non-commissioned officers, 43 sepoy	47
Wounded: 1 British officer, 7 non-commissioned officers, 1 bugler, 30 sepoy	39
Total casualties: 1 British officer, 4 Indian officers, 21 non-commissioned officers, 2 buglers, 126 sepoy	154

The British officers of the Corps of Guides were not so fortunate as to secure any special recognition of their services in the second phase of the Afghan War, and this was realized and remarked upon by Colonel MacGregor, now a Major-General and Quartermaster-General in India, in a letter¹ which he wrote on 12 April 1881 to Major-General Greaves, then Adjutant-General. He said: "I simply do not understand the services of the Guides being so completely ignored. A regiment that could produce such men as those who died in the Residency at Kabul, I think deserve that some recognition should be made; but after that, throughout the whole second campaign, the Guides were ever foremost. They led the Khyber column right up to Jagdalak, and when called on, marched straight into Kabul. They were at the capture of Takht-i-Shah on 13 December 1879, and of the Asmai Hill on the 14th, and held the most exposed part of the Sherpur cantonment. Everywhere their conduct was magnificent, and Sir F. Roberts repeatedly acknow-

¹ "Life and Opinions," vol. II, pp. 295, 296.



VIEW

PHOTO-SIMULATED AT THE SURVEYOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, CALCUTTA, FEBRUARY 1880.

To face page 120

ledged their services. Campbell commanded the Infantry at the attack on Asmai and at Sherpur and at the second fight at Charasia. Stewart commanded the Cavalry throughout, and in the very brilliant charge on 13 December; Hammond always distinguished himself, but especially on the 14th when the steady way the Guides came down the hill, if anything, surpassed the splendid way they had assaulted it. I heard Jenkins himself say that Hammond was worth a company to him, and Campbell and Battye also behaved very well. I know scarcely any who more thoroughly earned the C.B. than Campbell and Stewart; and they were, besides, officers of very distinguished service before the Afghan War was heard of."

Note 1.—The "Sam Browne Belt" was in use by certain regiments during the Afghan campaign, as is clear from the Report of the Kabul Committee on Equipment, of which Colonel C. MacGregor was president and which was convened in Kabul in August 1879; while there is a photograph in the mess of the Guides showing the belt in regimental use in 1878. It has always been a moot point whether the late General Sir Sam Browne invented the belt which bears his name while he was with the 2nd Punjab Cavalry or with the Guides; but a reference to Colonel Sir Guy Campbell, who was for some time on that General's personal staff, seems to prove that though Sir Sam Browne probably *invented* the belt while serving with the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, the Guides were the first Corps to take it into use. Sir Guy Campbell writes as follows: "Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., K.C.B., who commanded the 1st Division Peshawar Valley Field Force, was a very distinguished Indian officer. I think it was in 1858 at an action at Sarpoorah that he commanded a mixed force with great success and was dangerously wounded in two places, losing his left arm in attacking single-handed the enemies' guns, by which act of gallantry he won the V.C. Continuing to serve, he found himself greatly handicapped by his loss and invented the 'Sam Browne Belt' which was so highly thought of as a practical military equipment that it was adopted and approved for the Indian Army. I never heard that there was any restriction as to regiments wearing it: but I think that it was first of all taken into use by the Corps of Guides and gradually spread through the Indian Army, then to the British regiments serving in India, and finally to the whole force. That is its origin and history."

Note 2.—It was while the Guides were in Kabul, living and fighting beside the Gordon Highlanders, that their Pipe Band first came into existence, beginning with one or two men of the Guides Infantry being taught the use of the Highland pipes by the pipers of the Highlanders.

Note 3.—In a Report, No. 40, dated 26 January 1881, on the classes of men of the Indian Army who best stood the hardships of the campaign, it is stated: "The Pathans head the list; next to them stand the Punjabi Mahomedans. The Sikhs come third, but are almost as well suited for service in Afghanistan as the Punjabi Mahomedans. The five Gurkha regiments employed stood the climate well, while the Dogras and Hindustanis suffered most."

CHAPTER IX

1881-1895

MINOR OPERATIONS ON THE FRONTIER

PEACE ON THE FRONTIER—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE BUNERWALS—TRANSFER OF THE PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—CHANGES IN THE CORPS OF GUIDES—EXPEDITION TO THE BLACK MOUNTAIN—UMRA KHAN—THE EVE OF THE CHITRAL CAMPAIGN—THE ROUTE TO CHITRAL.

See Map of Black Mountain, in pocket.

FOR some years after the close of the stirring events recorded in the three preceding chapters, there was peace on and beyond the Border, and there is but little of importance to chronicle. In February 1884, Colonel F. H. Jenkins, C.B., 1884 A.D.C., gave up his appointment as Commandant of the Corps of Guides and was succeeded by Colonel R. B. Campbell, Colonel G. Stewart becoming Second-in-Command of the Corps, while Major R. C. Hutchinson became Commandant of Cavalry. In November 1884, however, Colonel G. Stewart left to take command of the 6th Punjab Infantry, Major Hutchinson then assuming the post of Second-in-Command.

During this year—on 9 March 1884—Lieutenant F. Campbell of the Guides, then quartered at Abazai, was in a canoe on the Swat river above the fort when he was upset in a rapid. Entangled in the framework of the canoe and in a waterproof sheet that was over his legs, he was greatly exhausted by the time he managed to get free. He called for help to some villagers on the bank, but these took no notice. Luckily Subadar Samundar Khan of the Guides Corps saw his officer's predicament and, plunging in to the rescue, was just in time to seize him as he was sinking for the third time, assisting him to the bank where both were helped out by the ferryman. Lieutenant Campbell was insensible for nearly an hour and must have been drowned but for the prompt action of the subadar, to whom the medal of the Royal Humane Society was subsequently awarded.

The Corps, under Colonel R. B. Campbell, left Mardan for the Camp of Exercise at Rawalpindi in March 1885, and formed one of the regiments of the Viceroy's escort on the occasion of the visit to India of the Amir of Kabul.

1885 In the winter of 1885-6 the Cavalry of the Corps had marched down to Ambala to take part in the large-scale manœuvres which were then being held in the country between Ambala and Delhi, while in the same manœuvres Colonel R. B. Campbell had been detailed to command a brigade; consequently it was only the Infantry of the Corps who were immediately available at Mardan when trouble broke out in Yusafzai, necessitating the dispatch of a small punitive expedition against the people of Buner.

Since October 1884, a blockade had been instituted against the Bunerwals, who had been guilty of persistent raiding over the Frontier, and in the afternoon of 8 January 1886 news came in to Mardan that a number of Bunerwals were **1886** assembling in the Malandrai valley. The Political Officer, considering the matter urgent and that the offending tribesmen should be turned out of the positions they had taken up in the villages of Surai Malandri and Pitao Malandri, asked that the military authorities at Mardan should take immediate action. The station commandant at this time was Lieutenant-Colonel A. Broome of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, 200 sabres of which had temporarily taken the place of the Guides Cavalry absent at manœuvres. This officer marched out that night for the Malandrai valley, twenty-six miles distant, with a force composed of ten sabres of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and seven British officers, eleven Indian officers, seven buglers and 410 rifles of the Guides Infantry. The British officers present were Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson, Major Lorne Campbell, Lieutenants Adams, Younghusband, Bretherton and Barton, with Surgeon Grant.

Of these officers Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson, Lieutenants Adams and Barton were away shooting near Sanghao when this minor expedition was first projected, but a camel-sowar was sent with a note from Lieutenant-Colonel Broome to Lieutenant Adams saying that he was taking the Guides Infantry that day to Rustam for a night raid on the Bunerwals, and adding : " Come along, tell Hutchinson and Barton." These three officers started off at once and caught up the Regiment at Rustam that evening, while local guides were being procured to lead the way to the villages of Surai Malandri and Pitao Malandri—names meaning " Malandri on the shady side," and " Malandri on the sunny side," of the valley.

Lieutenant Younghusband was sent off in advance of the column with a hundred rifles and with orders to leave the main route at Rustam and get in rear of a village just across the border, in which the tribesmen were reported to be collecting. " Our sole guide was one of our own infantry, Bahjun by name, who was a villager of Rustam. He was indeed invaluable to us, but so dark was the night that he had every now and then to crawl on hands and knees to feel the path."¹

The main body moved off, but unfortunately during a halt not far beyond the village of Baringanr, and before arrangements could be made for taking up positions to surround the villages which it was proposed to surprise, a scouting party of the enemy encountered the head of the column, charged down and fired at close range. Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson fell mortally wounded, not, however, before he had shot down several tribesmen with his revolver. A havildar was killed, and three men were wounded, one mortally. The Guides speedily dispersed the tribesmen, who disappeared in the darkness, but all hopes of a surprise were now at an end. The column, however, pushed on at daybreak and cleared the village of Surai and drove the enemy into the hills, inflicting serious loss upon him. Surai was burnt and the troops then returned to Rustam which they reached at 2 p.m. on the 9th, the Guides Infantry having by then marched thirty-four miles in twenty-one hours.

The gathering of the Bunerwals present at this affair was estimated to be between 4,000 and 5,000 strong ; and although the village of Pitao was not dealt with, the

¹ Younghusband, " Forty Years a Soldier," p. 66.

punishment received by the men of Surai made a lasting impression on them, and they were careful in future to avoid exposing themselves to our attacks.

The Guides marched back to Mardan, but were recalled next day to Rustam, while the Cavalry of the Corps was sent back by train from Delhi in view of possible eventualities, for the Bunerwal *jirgas* remained recalcitrant and refused to comply with the demands of the Punjab Government. The question of an expedition on a larger scale was now under consideration, but at the time it was not considered convenient to undertake military operations and the question was deferred. The Guides Infantry remained, however, in the neighbourhood of Rustam until 7 February when they marched back to Mardan.

On the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchinson the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab sent the following telegram to the Commandant of the Corps of Guides :—

“ Lieutenant-Governor desires to express to Guides his sense of the loss which the Corps has sustained by the death of Colonel Hutchinson. The Corps has lost in him a most efficient officer, much respected by all ranks.”

Of him a brother officer has written : “ The men were simply devoted to him, and he was, amongst other things, one of the best judges of a horse in India.”

An important change marked the year 1886. The Punjab Frontier Force, which since its formation in 1846 had been under the control of the Government of the Punjab, was brought directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India.¹

The transfer took place on 1 August, and in the orders issued thereon by the Punjab Government the Corps of Guides received honourable mention, special reference being made to the march of the Guides to Delhi at the outbreak of the Mutiny and to the services of the Corps in the defence of the Kabul Residency.

The Force had originally been known as the “ Punjab Irregular Frontier Force,” but the word “ Irregular ” disappeared from the Army List in 1866 ; and this may possibly be taken as the earliest attempt to assimilate the regiments composing the Force more nearly to those of the Regular Army—a matter in regard to the wisdom of which experts have always disagreed and no doubt will continue to disagree.

The original Frontier Force, as designed by Sir Henry Lawrence, had been considerably expanded at the date of the outbreak of the Mutiny in May 1857 and at that time consisted of :—

- 3 Field Batteries,
- 2 Mountain Batteries,
- 5 Regiments of Cavalry,
- The Corps of Guides,
- 4 Regiments of Sikh Infantry,
- 6 Regiments of Punjab Infantry.

At this same establishment the Force stood in 1886 when it came under the Commander-in-Chief, except that the field batteries had been changed to mountain batteries and one garrison company, while a Gurkha Regiment, the 5th, had been added.

¹ G.G.O. 485 of 1886 ; G.O. 58 of 1886.

As to the desirability of the transfer many high authorities were in entire disagreement ; for instance, General Sir Henry Daly, who had commanded the Guides before Delhi, considered the scheme a dangerous experiment.¹

General Lumsden's opinions on the matter are well known : his biographers tell us that " he deprecated the transfer of the Punjab Frontier Force to the Commander-in-Chief. He thought that the campaigns of 1857 and on the Frontier proved that the soldiers of that Force were equal to any demand that could possibly be made upon them. He quite allowed that, theoretically, there was reason for such a measure when great mobilization schemes were considered paramount, but in practice he considered it was detrimental to the interests of Government, unless some other like body were created on the Frontier. He reiterated his opinion that no regular regiment of the line could secure the men who could be brought into the service by the native officers of a corps in which there were only three British officers, acting as assistants to a political agent. It stands to reason, he thought, that such native officers have greater responsibility than they would have in regiments where there is a larger number of British officers. Selected as they should be from the sons and relatives of the chiefs or most influential men of the clans, they bring with them a following for whom they are sponsors, and who, for the sake of their home reputation, are bound to bear themselves as soldiers on service. Moreover, in Lumsden's opinion, such an organization secures a political influence of inestimable value, and produces a closer connection between the British officers, the chiefs and the people than is in any other way obtainable."

From about this time also dates a change in the system inaugurated by Lumsden when he raised the Guides under which all British officers in the Corps had been interchangeable. The system was perhaps not ideal, but it worked well enough for forty years as the records of the Corps testify. When changes occurred due to the exigencies of leave, active service, etc., appointments had to be made in order to allow senior officers to hold the appointments carrying the higher staff pay ; but such were not frequent, and satisfactory arrangements for carrying on the work could usually be made, since most of the senior officers had had some experience of service in both the Cavalry and Infantry of the Corps.

In 1887 orders were published to the army in India with important consequences to the Corps of Guides. By a General Order of 4 March, the designation of the appointments of " Second-in-Command " and " Commandant of 1887 Cavalry " Queen's Own Corps of Guides, was altered to :—

" Second-in-Command, Cavalry,"

" Second-in-Command, Infantry."

By a special Indian Army Circular of 14 March, the Infantry of the Corps was ordered to be augmented to a strength of 912 of all ranks ; and by another special Indian Army Circular, dated 23 March, one squadron was ordered to be 1888 added to the Cavalry of the Corps. In January 1888, an Adjutant was sanctioned for the Guides Cavalry.

¹ Lecture to the Royal United Service Institution, June 1884.

One effect of all these changes was to render much less frequent the occasions calling for an interchange of officers between the two branches of the Corps, although occasional exchanges did occur for a year or two longer, as may be seen from the Army Lists of those years. But as the standard of training and calls to attend Camps of Exercise, etc., increased, it became more necessary that, after a short probationary period, officers should remain permanently with one or the other branch of the Corps. There was, however, no unalterable rule—it was still a matter purely for the decision of the Commandant.

In June of this year an entirely new departure was made when an Indian gentleman, one Muzaffur Khan, was given a direct commission as jemadar on probation in the cavalry.

In December the Corps was armed with Martini-Henry rifles and carbines.

Among these more important changes there may be mentioned a minor reform made at the instance of Sir Charles MacGregor, Quartermaster-General and acting in command of the Punjab Frontier Force, 1885-6, who took a friendly interest in the Guides. Hitherto the officers of the Corps had never worn uniform at mess, but always mufti. Originally there was no mess uniform; and later on, though a mess uniform was authorized, it was customary for no one to wear it except when the General, or some other distinguished guest, was dining with the Corps. Now, at Sir Charles's suggestion, the Guides took to wearing mess uniform nightly, and have worn it ever since. Before the end of the year General Sir F. Roberts, Commander-in-Chief, inspected the Corps at Mardan and expressed himself as very much pleased with the state in which he found it.

The Marquis of Lansdowne had become Viceroy of India in 1888, and in the autumn of the year following he visited the Frontier; on 24 October 1889 the Cavalry and Infantry of the Corps of Guides marched to Peshawar from 1889 Mardan to be present at the visit of the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, providing escorts when they visited the Khyber Pass and taking part in a review on the 31st in a manner which earned the commendation of the Viceroy. The Guides returned to Mardan on 3 November.

On 13 November the Third Squadron of the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenant R. G. Egerton marched to Kohat to relieve the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and within a very few days this squadron was engaged in one of those border surprises to which on their own part of the Frontier the Guides were so well accustomed. On the 17th, part of the squadron under Lieutenant Fox-Strangways was detailed to the Kohat force employed in the surprise of the village of Shindand which resulted in the capture of the outlawed headman, Mushki. The Commander-in-Chief, in commenting upon this affair, gave it as his opinion that the surprise was admirably planned by Colonel R. B. Campbell, who at the time was in command of the Punjab Frontier Force and had evolved it; and that it was equally well executed, "that, in fact it was an example of a completely successful operation to effect a surprise and capture without bloodshed."

Nothing of any unusual importance occurred affecting the Corps of Guides until early in 1891, when trouble, which had long been brewing on the Hazara border,

came to a head, and the Infantry of the Corps was detailed to form part of one of the columns of which the Expeditionary Force was to be composed.

In 1888 there had been an expedition, commanded by Brigadier-General McQueen, against the Black Mountain tribes, and the results of the operations then undertaken were that certain offending sections of the Hasanzais had been severely dealt with and all their principal villages had been burnt. The Hindustani settlement had been completely destroyed, fines had been levied and hostages given for good behaviour, while the tribesmen had agreed to the making and maintaining of certain roads. During the year following the close of this expedition the Agror border remained quiet.

In March 1890, however, Government ordered the construction of several roads leading from Agror up to the crest of the Black Mountain, following upon which it was decided in the autumn to send a small body of troops to march peaceably along the crest of the range.

Brigadier-General McQueen was accordingly given a force, composed of a mountain battery and three infantry battalions, and directed to undertake this test march, being instructed that if he met with any opposition he was to withdraw, in which case a larger force would be sent into the Hazara country in the spring.

The force accordingly moved up the Barchar spur to the village of that name, but almost at once it became apparent that the Akazais, Hasanzais and other clans were collecting to oppose the advance, and General McQueen withdrew his troops in accordance with his instructions.

In consequence of the opposition offered to our troops, it was now decided to send a force into the territories of the offending tribes, with the object of punishing those who had shown hostility and to assert our right to move along the crest of the Black Mountain without molestation.

"This force was directed to advance from Darband into the enemy's country in two columns, one moving *via* Baradar and Pailam to Tilli, and the other along the river route *via* Kotkai and Kanar; and the troops were ordered to concentrate at Darband and Oghi by 1 March 1891. The total strength, exclusive of the Reserve Brigade, was 169 British officers, 7,120 native officers, non-commissioned officers and men (British and natives), and fifteen guns."¹

Major-General W. K. Elles, C.B., was in command of the force, and the Guides Infantry were in the Left or River Column, commanded by Brigadier-General R. F. Williamson, and composed of:—

No. 1 Mountain Battery R.A. (three guns); No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery (three guns); 2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders; Wing, 32nd Pioneers; 37th Bengal Infantry; Guides Infantry; and 4th Sikhs.

At the same time Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C., Commandant of the Guides, was appointed to the command of the Right or Tilli Column, with Lieutenant F. J. H. Barton of the Corps as his orderly officer.

The Infantry of the Guides left Mardan on 4 March, under command of Major F. D. Battye, to join the Hazara Field Force and arrived at Darband on the 9th. The following officers accompanied Major Battye: Captain M. C. Cooke-Collis,

¹ "Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India," vol. 1, pp. 170, 171.

Lieutenants G. B. Hodson, H. W. Codrington, A. R. H. Garden, A. B. Dew, H. L. S. MacLean and C. L. M. Rich, with Surgeon-Major A. Duncan and Lieutenant G. MacHutchin, 26th Madras Infantry, attached.

The weather was unfavourable for movement at the date the concentration was effected, and the advance did not begin until the morning of the 12th, when Pailam and Kotkai were occupied by the two columns with only trifling opposition. On the 13th the Right Column moved on to and halted at Tilli, while the River Column visited the Palosai Plain and also Nadrai on the right bank and reconnoitred the road between Kotkai and Kanhar. During the night of the 19th there was some firing at Kanhar, and two companies of the Guides, under Lieutenants Codrington and MacHutchin, were sent up as a support. On the 20th the River Column moved to Pirzada Bela, where the enemy was seen in considerable numbers on the surrounding hills and Bakrai and Makhrai were shelled. On the 21st the River Column marched to Palosai and took up a defensive position there. Two days later a flying bridge was established at Bakrai under cover of a party of the 4th Sikhs, who were sent across the river to occupy that place.

This movement led to a large gathering of the enemy on the Diliarai hill overlooking Bakrai, and these shortly after advanced down the spur towards the position, whereupon a wing of the Guides was sent across the river in support and, with the Sikhs, drove off the enemy and occupied the crest. Shortly after, however, a withdrawal was ordered to a breastwork which had been constructed about half-way up the slope from Bakrai. The enemy were now collecting in force and the O.C. 4th Sikhs decided to occupy the village of Diliarai, on the crest of the hill : this was done in face of considerable opposition and the hill was cleared, two companies of the Guides remaining here for the night while the other two were sent back to camp at Palosai.

Towards the end of March the gathering of tribesmen had increased ; there were many Bunerwals at Baiho and in the neighbourhood, while in the Chagarzai country to the north there appeared to be a coalition of all the clans from Thakot to the Peshawar border—from Buner, Chamla and from the Amazai and Gadun country. The situation looked threatening, and in consequence a regiment of cavalry and a battalion of infantry were sent to Mardan, where were now the Guides Cavalry and a battalion of British infantry ; and these were held in readiness for action against the Bunerwals, should such become necessary. The Reserve Brigade was strengthened and concentrated at Darband. The Buner *jirga* was now warned that no action was intended against them and they eventually returned to their homes, while certain of the Hasanzais had already made their submission.

Towards the end of April the whole of the Akazai country was visited, and shortly after Darband was evacuated and the base transferred to Oghi ; but it was not until a month later that the Akazais at last gave in and submitted unconditionally. The force was not broken up until June, the Guides Infantry returning to Mardan on the 23rd¹ ; but a force under Colonel Hammond, of the Guides,

¹ For their services in the operations of 1891 Colonel Hammond, Major Battye, Lieutenants Codrington and Barton were mentioned in despatches.

remained on until the end of November in occupation of Seri and Oghi and of the crest of the Black Mountain.

Though the losses in this expedition were comparatively trifling—under fifty killed and wounded—the coalition of tribesmen was larger on this occasion than on any other, with the exception of the outbreak of 1863 and the Pathan revolt of 1897.

In 1892 the Guides Cavalry won the Commander-in-Chief's Musketry Prize for the third year in succession, and received a congratulatory telegram from His Excellency.

1892 In this year there was a very brief and bloodless expedition against the Isazai clans by a force under Major-General Sir W. Lockhart, and in this Colonel Hammond of the Guides commanded the Second Brigade with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General.

On 30 April 1893, the following announcement appeared in Corps Orders :—

1893 *"The Commanding Officer having been directed to detail a non-commissioned officer from the Cavalry to form one of the Native Escort for Her Majesty the Queen at the opening of the Imperial Institute in London, selected Duffadar Bahadur Singh, 'D' Troop, son of the late Jemadar Jiwand Singh, who was killed at Kabul on the 3rd September, 1879."*

In the spring of 1895 the Corps of Guides were again summoned to take the field in a Frontier expedition, the account of which must be reserved for a separate chapter, but it may be well to give here some account of all that led up to it,

1895 and particularly of a somewhat dominating personality known as Umra Khan of Jandol, whose activities and usurpations were largely, if not indeed primarily, responsible for the formation of the Chitral Relief Force, which the Cavalry and Infantry of the Guides were now under orders to join.

Umra Khan was a younger son of the Khan of Jandol, and a grandson of the Chief of Bajour who took up arms against the British during the Ambeyla campaign. He quarrelled with his father and was expelled from the country ; but returning there in 1878 he killed his elder brother, and later, as the result of a year's successful fighting, he made himself master of Jandol and eventually brought under his control a tract of country extending from the Dir-Chitral border in the north to the Swat river in the south, and including the whole of Dir, the greater part of Bajour and a portion of Swat.

He then turned his attention towards Afghanistan and seized Asmar in the Kunar valley, out of which he was eventually driven by the Afghans. Up to 1891 he was friendly inclined towards the British, but during the following two years his friendship turned to hostility as the result of an appeal to the British for arms and ammunition being refused and of Asmar being handed over to Afghanistan after the Durand Mission to Kabul in 1893. In 1894 he began to encroach upon Chitral territory and to demand payment of tribute from Chitral villages.

On 1 January 1895, Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral, was murdered and Umra Khan was suspected of being concerned in the intrigue which led to the murder ; for as soon as he heard of it he marched to Drosh, twenty-five miles

from Chitral, and joined forces with Amir-ul-Mulk and Sher Afzal, the son and brother of the deceased Mehtar, who were besieging Chitral Fort.

Early in March news of the trouble in Chitral reached Gilgit, 220 miles away, and a relief column was dispatched from that place. After considerable fighting Chitral was ultimately relieved by this column on 20 April and the enemy withdrew. Meanwhile on 14 March the British Government mobilized a division to operate against Umra Khan and, if necessary, to assist in the relief of Chitral.

Some idea may now usefully be given of the country in which operations were about to be conducted and of the people who lived within and without its boundaries.

From Nowshera, the base of the proposed operations, the road for the first forty miles passed over a level plain, north of which a range of rugged hills rose to a height of from 3,000 to 6,000 feet. The existing information as to what lay beyond these hills was somewhat meagre, but such as it was it was tolerably accurate, "and this was especially the case," so the official account of the expedition tells us, "in regard to a sketch-map of the Swat-Sado-Panjkora route to Dir, which had been executed at the beginning of 1895 by a sepoy of the Guides Infantry," by name Ghulam Nabi, who in 1896 was awarded the MacGregor Memorial Medal.

Beyond the range of hills lay the richly cultivated Swat valley, some forty miles long, one and a half miles wide and watered by the Swat river, a considerable stream, at certain times of the year deep, swift and dangerous. Beyond the river the Laram Hills rose to a height of 7,000 feet, and on the farther side of these was the Panjkora valley, narrow, and in winter impassable without extensive road making. The river in this valley is subject to rapid changes—one day everywhere fordable, the next it may be a roaring torrent.

To the west of the Panjkora valley, and separated from it by a range of high hills, are the open cultivated valleys of Jandol and Bajour. At the head of the former is the range crossed by the Janbatai Pass, with an altitude varying from 7,000 to 8,000 feet, on the north side of which are a number of narrow valleys. North again is the high range crossed by the Laorai Pass (10,250 feet), whence the descent is made to the Kunar river and so along its difficult valley to Chitral. Thus four ranges of hills, three large rivers, besides numerous smaller, though often dangerous, streams had to be crossed between the British frontier and Chitral.

From the point where independent territory began up to the Panjkora river the country was occupied by various branches of Yusafzai Pathans. To the west of the Ranizais are the Utman Khel who inhabit both banks of the Panjkora river; and still farther west is the country of the powerful Mohmand tribe. Crossing the Swat river at Chakdara the road to Chitral enters the territory of the Khwazazai Yusafzais. West of the Khwazazai and north of the Mohmands and Utman Khel lies the district of Bajour, which is inhabited by another distinct tribe of Pathans (called Tarkanri or Tarkalani).

Such was the difficult and little-known country through which the hastily mobilized column had to make its way, and such the tribes, no less difficult nor better known, who barred its passage.

CHAPTER X

1895

THE CHITRAL RELIEF EXPEDITION

FORMATION OF THE CHITRAL RELIEF FORCE—THE FORCING OF THE MALAKAND PASS—THE PASSAGE OF THE SWAT AND PANJKORA RIVERS—DEATH OF COLONEL FRED BATTYE—CLOSE OF THE CHITRAL EXPEDITION—RETURN TO MARDAN.

See Maps : Malakand, facing page 162 ; Panjkora, facing page 148.

THE Chitral Relief Force was composed of three Infantry Brigades and Divisional Troops, with a Reserve Brigade, a Movable Column, and Lines of Communication Troops, and was placed under the command of Major-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B. Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., was appointed to command the Lines of Communication Troops with the rank of Brigadier-General, Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye succeeding to the command of the Corps of Guides.

The Guides Cavalry, under the command of Captain R. B. Adams, formed part of the Divisional Troops, and squadrons were distributed as follows : To the 2nd Brigade one squadron under Lieutenant Baldwin (four Indian officers and 124 sabres) ; to the 3rd Brigade one squadron under Captain Egerton (four Indian officers and 121 sabres). The third squadron (Captain Barton, four Indian officers and 115 sabres) was first placed under the orders of the officer commanding the Lines of Communication, but was subsequently attached to the 1st Brigade.

With the Guides Infantry were Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye, in command, and Captain F. Campbell, Lieutenants H. W. Codrington, Adjutant, P. C. Elliott-Lockhart, A. H. Ommaney, A. C. Stewart, J. S. Bogle, Second-Lieutenant J. Blois-Johnson and Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell, 24th Punjab Infantry, attached, with Surgeon-Lieutenant D. W. Sutherland. The Infantry of the Guides was in the 2nd Infantry Brigade which consisted of the following units : 2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, Guides Infantry, 4th Sikhs ; the brigade being commanded by Brigadier-General H. G. Waterfield.

Railway concentration began on 26 March and was completed on 1 April ; that is, within seventeen days of the order to mobilize, 15,000 troops, rather more than that number of followers, and over 20,000 transport animals had **1895** been concentrated at Hoti Mardan and Nowshera ; while during the same period about forty days' supplies for the whole force had been collected at and beyond the base. Of these numbers, 10,000 troops, most of the followers, and 10,000 animals had been brought up by rail (a large number of the latter from distances of over 1,000 miles), the remainder of the force moving by route march. The Base Commandant, in his report on the working of the base, also states :

" Within the period, therefore, of twenty-one days (*i.e.*, on 3 April) a force of approximately 15,000 fighting men, with 19,000 followers and 26,000 transport animals, with field hospitals and ammunition train complete and their food supplies for two months, were placed across the frontier, in a position to fight an action forty-six miles from the railway terminus, having been conveyed to that terminus by a single line of rail and thence by road."¹

Nowshera, despite the paucity of railway sidings, etc., was made the base of operations, and on 30 March Divisional Headquarters with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades marched from there to Hoti Mardan where the 1st Brigade arrived next day.

On the morning of 1 April Divisional Headquarters with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades marched from Mardan to Jalala, Captain Adams and three British officers accompanying them with a squadron of the Guides Cavalry, while the Guides Infantry—10 British officers, 14 Indian officers and 650 rank and file—moved with their Brigade.

Three passes, each about seven miles apart, lead into the Swat valley from this portion of the Mardan district—the Mora, the Shahkot and the Malakand—all equally difficult, each from 3,000 to 4,500 feet above sea-level and each barely passable by laden animals. General Low had decided to ignore the Mora and advance by the Shahkot and Malakand Passes, and here disposed his troops so as to assault both these on the morning of 3 April. On the evening of the 1st, however, it was reported that the Shahkot Pass was held by 6,000 men and the Mora by 13,000, while on the Malakand Pass there were said to be no more than 3,000 defenders. General Low accordingly changed his plans and decided to deceive the enemy by sending the cavalry towards the Shahkot Pass on the 2nd, while at the same time, by moving the 1st Brigade towards the Malakand and bringing up the 2nd and 3rd by a forced march to Dargai on the night of the 1st–2nd, he hoped to carry the Malakand on the 2nd with all three brigades. This night, however, turned out very wet and stormy, and all that could be done was to concentrate the three brigades near Dargai on the 2nd.

On the evening of 2 April, Lieutenant Stewart, with " B " Company of the Guides Infantry, furnished the escort for Lieutenant Cockerill, Field Intelligence Officer, who reconnoitred towards the Malakand Pass, and having advanced to within a quarter of a mile of the path leading up to the pass, succeeded in making a sketch of the enemy's position. The enemy opened fire, but as the range was extreme no damage was done. On this afternoon " A " and " B " Squadrons of the Guides Cavalry moved towards Shahkot and bivouacked for the night.

The road to the Malakand Pass, after leaving Dargai, lay north-east for two miles up a gradually narrowing valley to the foot of the Malakand hills. Then, turning north-west and leaving the bed of the valley, it ascended very steeply by zigzags to the crest which was gained near a small village, from which a track descended northwards into the Swat valley direct, and another, after running

¹ " Official Account of the Chitral Expedition, 1895," pp. 49–50.

north-east for nearly three-quarters of a mile along the east side of the ridge and just below the crest, crossed by a rocky cutting through a gap in the hills, and, descending, joined the other track. North-east of this gap precipitous hills, which rose to a height of over 4,400 feet, formed the left of the enemy's position ; while to the south-west of the village, the crest of the range, sloping very steeply upwards, culminates in three peaks nearly 4,000 feet in height, on which the right of the enemy's position rested. The whole of the intervening ridge, including the village, was held in force, and thus the position to be attacked was over two miles in length.

On the night of 2 April at Dargai Brigadier-General Waterfield issued the following orders to the 2nd Infantry Brigade :

" The Brigade will march to force the Malakand Pass at 8 a.m. to-morrow. Reveille at 6 a.m.

" The following is the order of march :

<i>Guides Cavalry, one squadron</i>	} <i>advanced guard</i>
<i>Guides Infantry, two companies</i>	
<i>Maxim Gun detachment</i>	
<i>Remainder of Guides Infantry.</i>	
<i>Three Mountain Batteries.</i>	
<i>Sappers and Miners, three Companies.</i>	
<i>King's Own Scottish Borderers.</i>	
<i>Gordon Highlanders.</i>	
<i>4th Sikhs, and find rearguard of one company.</i>	

" Each Corps will be accompanied by its first reserve ammunition, and every man, British and Native, to carry half a ration, ready cooked, and greatcoats, as the Brigade will bivouac on the Pass. All the rest of the kits, baggage, etc., will be parked here regimentally, and left under the charge of small regimental guards ready to be loaded up at a moment's notice and sent on ; all this will be under the charge of Captain Thackwell and Lieutenant Churcher, Transport Officer.

" A signalling party will be left here to communicate with the Brigade as it advances."

General Sir R. Low had intended to use only the 2nd Brigade and the three mountain batteries for the actual forcing of the pass, but the position proved so difficult and so obstinately defended that the 1st Brigade had also to be utilized.

Early on the morning of the 3rd Captain Adams pushed boldly forward up the valley with a squadron of the Guides Cavalry, accompanied by Captain Barton, Lieutenants Davies and MacLean and Surgeon-Lieutenant Heard, and, moving well in advance of the 2nd Brigade, reconnoitred the enemy's position ; while two officers' patrols, under the two subalterns above named, went to the front on either side of the valley. The enemy opened fire, and from the reports brought back to General Waterfield by the cavalry it was clear that the tribesmen were occupying the hillsides in very considerable force.

In the meantime the 2nd Brigade had marched from Dargai at 8 a.m., followed by the 1st Brigade which had left Shahkot village at seven o'clock, the 3rd Brigade being for the present held in reserve at Dargai. On reaching the point where the valley bends north-east, "Brigadier-General Waterfield ordered the 4th Sikhs to ascend a spur to the left, and the Guides Infantry were directed up a spur to the right of the Sikhs: on gaining the summit they were to move along it towards the pass and thus turn the enemy's right flank. The Guides had a most difficult task to perform, for they had to ascend to a height of some 2,000 feet above the valley, in the face of several large *sangars* held by the enemy's riflemen and a crowd of others who hurled down huge rocks and stones; the 4th Sikhs having an equally arduous climb, advanced parallel with the Guides up to the highest peak overlooking the enemy's position and carried many *sangars* full of the enemy.

"The whole of the artillery was ordered to come into action on a low spur to the right; but as they were found here to be beyond effective range, the guns took up a second position at a range of 2,300–2,500 yards, whence they were ordered to shell the *sangars* in the line of advance of the Guides and 4th Sikhs, and, also, at a range of 2,400–2,800 yards, the *sangars* below the pass. From this position they were able effectually to aid the turning movement and also the frontal attack, which soon afterwards began to assume a definite shape. The remainder of the brigade now proceeded up the narrow valley ahead of the guns and passed the cavalry, which for the rest of the day necessarily remained inactive. As the column advanced the enemy's position was disclosed, and it was seen that they held the entire crest of the hills west of the pass with numerous *sangars* down the hillsides, each commanding the one below it, and that their main strength was on the north end of the hills close to the actual pass. The King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordon Highlanders continued to move slowly up the valley, and it became evident that, owing to the steepness of the ascent, the turning movement would take longer than had been anticipated, and that the troops making it were likely to be seriously outnumbered. At about 12 noon, therefore, Brigadier-General Waterfield ordered the King's Own Scottish Borderers to make a direct attack from the bottom of the valley, some 1,000 feet below the pass, and the Gordon Highlanders to continue for a short distance up the valley, and, after ascending the hillsides, to turn what seemed to be the enemy's left flank."

Ultimately the guns had to be brought up to closer range and the 1st Brigade also employed to attack other portions of the front before the enemy resistance was wholly overcome and the position on the Malakand Pass was carried.

Such is the official account of the operations during the morning of this day; a more detailed description of the part played by the Guides Infantry may now be given.

The 2nd Brigade left the camp at Dargai with the Guides Infantry forming the advanced guard, and at 9.30 a.m. five companies under Lieutenant-Colonel Battye (with whom were Lieutenants Codrington, Elliott-Lockhart, Ommaney, Stewart and Bogle and Second-Lieutenant Blois-Johnson with Surgeon-Lieutenant

See Map facing page 162.

Hayward, attached) began the ascent of the spur up which they had been directed to move; "C" and "D" Companies were detached under Captain Campbell and Lieutenant Maxwell, with Surgeon-Lieutenant Sutherland, with orders to occupy a conical hill on the left and thence to work their way up the hill between the main body of the infantry under Colonel Battye and the 4th Sikhs farther to the left. The main body of the Regiment, moving steadily up the spur, found it occupied at every point of vantage by the enemy, who was in occupation of well-built *sangars* from which he maintained a constant fire. Each *sangar* in turn was, however, abandoned as the Guides advanced, the flanking fire from "C" and "D" Companies doing much to compel the retirement of the tribesmen, for Captain Campbell's party was able to get a view of the occupants of the *sangars* which the steepness of the ascent denied to those attacking them directly in front. For the same reason, these two companies were very favourably situated for facilitating the advance of the 4th Sikhs on their left.

At about 1.30 p.m. the crest was reached, shortly before which Lieutenant Ommaney was severely wounded in the knee. After a brief halt, the Guides moved along the crest towards the head of the pass, from which the enemy was seen, in large numbers and in great disorder, retreating before the direct attack of the 2nd and 1st Brigades. The 2nd Brigade was now halted while the 1st took up the pursuit, and the Guides Infantry, being ordered back to Dargai for the night, reached the camp there about 10 p.m. It had been a very hot day, and the climb long and steep, while as the men had carried great-coats and capes, their staying powers had been put to a severe test.¹

In this day's engagement the Infantry of the Guides had three severely or dangerously wounded: Lieutenant A. H. Ommaney and two sepoys.

In General Sir R. Low's despatch of 27 July 1895, he wrote:

"At the storming of the Malakand Pass, the attack, as already reported, was made by seven battalions of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, two battalions, the 4th Sikhs and Guides Infantry, being sent up the highest peaks with orders to make a turning movement on reaching the crest, while the direct frontal attack on the enemy's main position was made by the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordon Highlanders, supported on the left by the King's Royal Rifle Corps, and on the right by the Bedfordshire Regiment and the 37th Dogras. The action commenced at 8.45 a.m. and the pass was captured about 2 p.m. . . . The enemy numbered about 12,000 and afterwards admitted a loss of over 300 killed.

"I would bring to the notice of H.E. the Commander-in-Chief the admirable manner in which the regiments above mentioned completed a very difficult task and the able manner in which they were led. I would bring the following officers to His Excellency's notice in connection with this action. . . .

"Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye, Commanding the Queen's Own Corps of Guides (since killed) who advanced on a parallel spur leading his Regiment with great judgment and gallantry. . . .

¹ The hill climbed and captured by the Guides was given the name of "Guides' Hill" at the time, and is now marked as such on maps of the district.

" Captain F. Campbell, of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, was detached with two companies and ascended the hill on a spur between the Guides Infantry and the 4th Sikhs, and rendered great service to the advance of both regiments by the skill with which he used his position and brought flanking fire from both sides on the enemy opposing the advance. . . ."

The following non-commissioned officer and sepoy were awarded the Order of Merit under the circumstances detailed below :

" Naik Gul Dast. For conspicuous gallantry in having led a small party of two or three men with great dash up a small spur of the hill and dislodged a body of the enemy who were harassing a portion of the Regiment in its advance."

" Sepoy Ghani Shah. For conspicuous bravery : he was one of the foremost of a small party who dislodged a body of the enemy who were harassing the Regiment in its attack and was severely wounded."

" A curious circumstance in connection with the pass may here be mentioned. The track leading to the summit from the south ascended the hillsides by the usual short zigzags, over boulders and often under protruding crags ; and when first seen on 3 April it appeared impossible in any reasonable time to make it fit for animal transport. But in his report of the action of the 3rd, the O.C. King's Royal Rifles stated that going half-way up the hill he came upon an old Buddhist road, disused for hundreds of years, but so well made originally that it took our Engineers and Sappers but two days to make it into a camel road from near Dargai to the top of the pass. This road, on a good alignment and easily repairable, enabled the force to advance with much less delay than would have been the case had the usual path been followed."

The orders for 4 April were : 1st Brigade to advance to the Swat river, 2nd to relieve the 1st on the Malakand, and the 3rd to remain south of the pass pending the onward passage of the baggage and supplies of the advanced brigades.

Early on the morning of 4 April " B " Squadron of the Guides Cavalry left camp to join the 1st Brigade, but being delayed until 2 p.m. at the foot of the Malakand, was unable to join its brigade in the Swat valley until nearly five o'clock. During the march thither, at the very urgent request of the officer in charge of the brigade baggage, who feared attack by the enemy occupying the hills on his right, Captain Adams left with him a guard of one field-troop under Lieutenant Davies. When the remainder of the squadron came up with the main body of the 1st Brigade, this was occupying a more or less defensive position about the hills north of the village of Piran, merely to cover the issue of the transport from the defile, and the enemy, who was present in considerable strength, was emboldened to come down from the hills and try to work round the left flank. On the arrival of the Guides squadron Brigadier-General Kinloch, commanding the 1st Brigade, directed Captain Adams to endeavour to relieve the pressure on the flank of the 37th Dogras, who were holding a low hill, joined by a neck to the main range.

Thereupon Captain Adams with Lieutenant Baldwin, Surgeon-Lieutenant Heard and fifty-two sabres, trotted rapidly round the hill and came upon the

enemy descending into and scattered over the plain to the north of it. "This handful of cavalry attacked about 1,200 of the enemy and cut down thirty of them; the remainder fled back to the hills, the result being that pressure was at once removed from the Dogras. The going was very heavy and the ground closely cultivated, while two or three awkward nullahs had to be crossed"¹; but the Guides Cavalry pursued right up to the foot of the hills whence a heavy fire was opened on them. The horses of the squadron had not been watered all day and by this time were unable to move out of a walk; but being now joined by Lieutenant Davies and his troop, the squadron remained out in the plain in observation until dusk, when it rejoined the 1st Brigade in camp near Khar.

This day's charge cost the Guides Cavalry five casualties, Lieutenant G. M. Baldwin and four sowars being wounded.

In his despatch of 27 July Major-General Low wrote of this day's action :

"The brunt of the fighting fell on the 37th Dogras, supported by No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and by one company of the 15th Sikhs, who were ordered to hold a low hill which commanded the passage, and who repulsed repeated attacks of large bodies of the enemy; the final and most determined attempt being frustrated and the enemy routed by a brilliant charge of the Guides Cavalry. . . ."

Captain R. B. Adams and Lieutenant G. M. Baldwin, D.S.O., were mentioned in despatches, and the Order of Merit for conspicuous gallantry on this occasion was awarded to Dafadar Tota Singh and Lance-Dafadar Subha Singh.

On this day "A" Squadron of the Cavalry marched from Shahkot to join the 2nd Brigade and was halted for the night at the foot of the Malakand Pass.

The Guides Infantry had, on the morning of the 4th, marched as rearguard to the 2nd Brigade, which had been intended to cross the Malakand, but it was very soon found that so great was the congestion on the road and so hopeless the task of pushing on the commissariat supply camels, that the Infantry finally camped for the night less than a mile from Dargai. Towards evening, however, orders were received to send a wing up to the Malakand. Accordingly Captain Campbell and Lieutenant Bogle marched there at 6 p.m. with four companies, but the road being blocked with transport animals, they did not reach the farther side of the pass till midnight.

Early on the morning of 5 April successive patrols were sent out from "B" Squadron of the Guides Cavalry under Lieutenants Baldwin and Davies, which reconnoitred from the village of Khar nearly as far as Allahdand. No trace of the enemy was to be found, though the local villagers reported that 10,000 men had been present in the previous day's action. Later, the squadron escorted Brigadier-General Blood, the Chief of the Staff, who made a reconnaissance through Allahdand and as far as the bank of the Swat river opposite Chakdara, the patrol under Lieutenant Davies joining the squadron just short of this point. The forts of Chakdara and Ramora were found empty of hostile tribesmen, but a gathering of

¹ Official Account, p. 59.

some 3,000 fanatics was observed beyond and above the large village of Thana, situated some little way back from the left bank of the river and nearly opposite Chakdara. These fired a few shots at the squadron, but no casualties were caused and the mounted men returned to and camped at Khar that night. "A" Squadron under Captain Barton, with the headquarters and main body of the 2nd Brigade, crossed the Malakand Pass this day and encamped near Allahdand; but the Headquarters and left wing of the Guides Infantry, escorting the Commissariat Godown, only got as far as the foot of the Malakand Pass owing to the road being still greatly congested.

On the morning of 6 April "A" and "B" Squadrons of the Guides Cavalry were instructed to reconnoitre the country towards Thana, where the large gathering of the previous day was still reported. The enemy were found to be holding a spur about one and a half miles above the village of Jalala, and these exchanged shots with the advanced guard, but the reconnaissance was not pushed farther as there was nothing to be gained by moving against this body of tribesmen. A warning was, however, sent to them that unless they dispersed troops would be sent into Upper Swat and severe punishment inflicted.

"On the evening of the 6th Sir Robert Low ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, 11th Bengal Lancers, to take his regiment with one squadron of the Guides Cavalry, and march early on the following morning to the 2nd Brigade camp, and from thence to ford the Swat river and make a reconnaissance up the Adinzai valley towards Wuch, being supported by other arms from the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Waterfield, who was directed to cross the river and destroy the fort of Ramora."¹

Next morning, 7 April, while "A" Squadron of the Guides Cavalry, under Captain Barton and Lieutenant MacLean, reconnoitred the left bank of the Swat river from near Allahdand towards Thana, "B" Squadron (Captain Adams, Lieutenants Baldwin and Davies and Surgeon-Lieutenant Heard) marched from Khar with the 11th Bengal Lancers and was joined at the Swat river by "A" Squadron, when it was found that the enemy was in occupation of the low hills and villages on the right bank, opposing the crossing of the 2nd Brigade. Many of the tribesmen appeared to be Umra Khan's personal followers; they had a good number of rifles among them and kept up a warm fire.

Captain Adams, with "B" Squadron of the Guides and half a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, was now directed by Colonel Scott to join the G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, while "A" Squadron and the rest of the 11th Bengal Lancers crossed the river higher up. This was effected under a very heavy fire, covered by the guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery R.A. and the rifles of a wing of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The river here ran in several channels from two and a half to three and a half feet deep, flowing at the rate of about five miles an hour, but as soon as the cavalry entered the second channel the enemy began to evacuate their positions and to retreat up the Adinzai valley. The tribesmen, however, had waited rather too long and were overtaken by the 11th Bengal Lancers and "A"

¹ Official Account, p. 61.

Squadron of the Guides Cavalry, some 100 of them being killed, and their leader narrowly escaping capture. Captain Barton's squadron pursued to Wuch and the 11th Bengal Lancers as far as the top of the Katgala Pass, seven and a half miles from the Swat river. The Guides Cavalry had no casualties and only one horse wounded.

On this day the Headquarters and left wing of the Guides Infantry marched at 9 a.m. up the Malakand Pass, but owing to the block on the road caused by the long strings of camels, it was 2.30 p.m. before the rearguard was able to leave camp, and 11 p.m. before Allahdand was reached and the whole Regiment was again with the 2nd Brigade.

On 8 April "A" Squadron marched from Allahdand, crossed the Swat river and reconnoitred towards the Laram Pass; while the Infantry of the Guides, starting at 8 a.m. with the Derajat Mountain Battery, crossed the river by a long and difficult ford, where the river ran very swiftly in five separate channels, in places reaching over the men's hips, and arrived on the Katgala Pass at 5.30 that evening. "A" Squadron came in later, and this force on the Katgala Pass—the squadron of the Guides, the Mountain Battery and the Guides Infantry—now covered the advance of the whole and was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye. The other squadron—"B"—was with the 2nd Brigade at Chakdara.

Captain Adams, Lieutenant Davies, Adjutant, and Surgeon-Lieutenant Heard, Medical Officer, joined the advanced squadron from Khar, and on the 9th they moved out, traversed the Talash valley and crossed the Kamrani Pass to Sado, where they were joined by Captain Younghusband; here the Panjkora river was found to be impassable by infantry and nearly unfordable for cavalry. Two troops under Captain Barton returned to camp by the Kamrani Pass, while Captain Adams led another troop back through the Shigo Kach defile, thoroughly examining both routes and returning in the evening to the camp which had been moved forward during the day to near Shamshi-Khan.

The 4th Sikhs had joined the advanced body under Lieutenant-Colonel Battye on the evening of the 9th, and next day Captain Campbell, with the right wing of the Guides Infantry, the 4th Sikhs and two guns, crossed the Kamrani Pass, while the other four companies, "A" Squadron of the Cavalry and four guns marched by the Shigo Kach defile, the two parties uniting at Sado, where a camp was formed near Khungai Fort. After a brief halt, "A" Squadron went on with Captain Robertson,¹ the Intelligence Officer, crossed the three branches of the Panjkora river by a ford, and pushed up the Jandol valley to Kotkai Fort, which was seen to be burning and was found empty. Going on farther, the squadron was fired at from a hill near Ghobani village where the valley narrowed. The troops were now dismounted and returned this fire, while Captain Adams went on another mile with a patrol to the high right bank of the Jandol river, whence large numbers of the enemy were seen streaming out of Munda Fort—believed then to be occupied by Umra Khan himself—and Mian Kalai, and making for the high ground on both sides of the valley. After some little time the squadron began to fall

¹ The late Field-Marshal Sir W. R. Robertson.

slowly back and, recrossing the Panjkora, which was running very fast, the water reaching to the saddle-holsters, returned to camp.

As the river had become quite unfordable on the morning of 11 April, the leading portion of the 2nd Brigade halted at Sado and Khungai and proceeded to collect materials for a raft bridge, while the rest of the Brigade and Divisional Headquarters closed up to these two places.

On the evening of the 12th Lieutenant-Colonel Battye received the following orders :

“ The bridge will be ready for foot passengers at 7 p.m. Please order the Guides Infantry to be ready at the bridge-head at 6.30 p.m. to cross and bivouac on the farther bank. At daylight to-morrow morning all villages on the other bank within reach should be burnt, and the enemy turned out of all positions from which firing has taken place to-day and yesterday.”

Leaving “ G ” Company as a guard for the regimental baggage and transport at Sado, and “ H ” Company on the left bank of the Panjkora to guard the reserve ammunition, etc., at the bridge, the remaining six companies of the Guides Infantry crossed the Panjkora at dusk by the partially made raft bridge and entrenched themselves on the farther bank, covering the bridge. Next morning about 6 a.m., leaving Second-Lieutenant Blois-Johnson with “ B ” Company in charge of the entrenchment, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye moved out with the other five companies and the following officers: Captain Campbell, Lieutenants Codrington, Elliott-Lockhart, Bogle, Stewart and Maxwell, with Surgeon-Lieutenant Sutherland and Lieutenant Cockerill, the Intelligence Officer. These advanced up the left bank of the Jandol river, burning the villages of Walai, Dehrai and Khazana on their way, and capturing some 100 head of cattle which were sent back under escort to the bridge-head. In the meantime, the advanced guard under Captain Campbell, which had halted near Subhan Kalai, was engaged in replying by occasional shots to the fire of parties of the enemy on the right bank of the Jandol river.

At 9 a.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Battye formed up his five companies in three small columns—the right under Captain Campbell, the centre under Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart and the left under Lieutenant Codrington, and, fording the river, pushed southwards up the opposite heights, driving the enemy, who were in small numbers, before him and burning several hamlets. On arriving at the crest, Lieutenant Codrington with “ F ” Company was directed to move along the heights above the site selected for a suspension bridge over the Panjkora river, covering “ D ” Company which had been sent down to the valley below to destroy hostile villages. About noon masses of the enemy, estimated at between 7,000 and 10,000 men, were seen collecting with many standards near Munda and on the adjacent heights, while a large body was also noticed near Kotkai, and strong parties were seen crossing to the right bank of the Jandol river, advancing towards the Guides until hidden from view by the slope of the hill.

Colonel Battye immediately heliographed as follows to 2nd Brigade Headquarters :—

"Two large columns of the enemy advancing along right bank of river, probably about three thousand strong."

This message was crossed by one from Brigade Headquarters :

"Don't take any more defences or burn any more villages in the valley unless actually fired upon. It is the village on the south side of the bridge which fired on convoy I most particularly want destroyed. You may still go on punishing the Utman Khel people."

This again was followed at about 1 p.m. by a further message :

"Clear the line. Retire at once by river directly in your rear. Your retirement will be covered."

Meanwhile, seeing that Lieutenant Stewart, commanding "D" Company, had effectively completed the destruction of the houses within his reach, Lieutenant Codrington had ordered him to collect his men, and these had just been assembled when Lieutenant Codrington received a repetition of the brigade order from Colonel Battye with instructions to collect all scattered parties and fall back on the river. Remaining in position on the commanding heights sufficiently long to pass Lieutenant Stewart's company safely through his line, Lieutenant Codrington began his withdrawal, Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart also conforming to this movement. Owing to the right column being on the exposed flank, Colonel Battye recognized the risk of being outflanked if that column held its ground overlong, while on the other hand, the slightest error in withdrawing it prematurely would uncover the centre and left columns and expose each to destruction in detail. Before, therefore, issuing orders to the right column to retire, Colonel Battye wished to assure himself that the two other columns had withdrawn within a zone of safety. For this reason he had moved from the right to the centre, and, when he judged it opportune, sent the following message to Captain Campbell :—

"Following just received from G.O.C. 2nd Brigade : 'Fall back on river direct to your rear. Your retreat will be covered.' Call in your advanced post and retire steadily down the ridge towards the river. Always leave a party on a commanding position in your rear which should not come down until called, which should be done as soon as another position is occupied." This was the last field message written by the gallant Fred Battye.

Lieutenants Codrington and Stewart were on the extreme left with "F" and "D" Companies and one section of "C," and these, not being seriously molested by the enemy, moved round the base of the hill, eventually pushing up the main spur and rendering great assistance to their comrades. Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart retired down a central spur with half "E" Company and a section of "C."

Lieutenant-Colonel Battye himself moved with the right party, consisting of "A" Company, half "E" and a few men of "C"; with these were Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Bogle and Surgeon-Lieutenant Sutherland. The enemy at first attempted to make a direct advance down the spur by which Colonel Battye's party was retiring, and opened a rapid and accurate fire; but this was checked

by a very useful flanking fire from Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart's men. The enemy now made every endeavour to work round Colonel Battye's right, and during the remainder of the retirement down this spur flanking parties were employed, and their withdrawal and reposting, to keep pace with the retirement, was a matter of great difficulty.

When about one-third of the way down the right spur, Lieutenant Codrington, accompanied by Lieutenant Maxwell, who had left "F" Company at the base of the hill to protect the right flank, brought up "D" Company as a very welcome reinforcement; while the guns of the 2nd Brigade fired on the enemy with great effect at a range of only 1,700 yards.

Continuing the retirement, Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart's party reached very precipitous ground and was lost to view by the party on the right; but he, on arrival at the base of the hill, crossed the Jandol river and took up a position to cover the passage by the main party of the Regiment under Colonel Battye. Lieutenant Blois-Johnson had moved out of the entrenchment with "B" Company, under Subadar Samundar, and one section of "C"—"H" Company by this time having crossed the river and occupied the bridge-head—and established himself on the high ground to the right of Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart's party.

The main party, closely followed by the enemy, arrived within 1,000–1,200 yards of the rifles of the infantry and the Maxim guns of the 2nd Brigade. Their fire was now turned on the tribesmen with great effect, since it was a flanking fire and swept the crest of the hill and the slopes down which the retirement was being conducted, so that no large body of the enemy could move over the ground; while every moment of retirement brought increased fire support to the retreating companies of the Guides.

The enemy, however, now made a determined charge and got to within twenty yards of the bayonets which had been fixed to receive them, but the attack was not pressed home. At these close quarters the assailants displayed the utmost disregard for their personal safety, those who had fired their rifles hurling rocks and stones until shot down.

Early on the morning of this day the Panjkora had risen and logs brought down by the stream had carried away the raft-bridge by which the Guides had crossed overnight. Consequently no substantial reinforcements could reach them, so that some anxiety was felt when large numbers of the enemy, who had advanced directly down the left bank of the Jandol river, attempted to make a turning movement by the east of Khazana, and thus cut off the retreat. This was, however, frustrated by the companies moving out from the entrenchment and taking up a position on some high ground to the north, thus forestalling the enemy and surprising him by the sudden opening of a hot fire.

The retirement was thus skilfully and deliberately carried out by Colonel Battye whom an eyewitness described as "himself the last to leave after every stand."¹ Unhappily shortly after reaching the level ground at the foot of the hill he received a wound which proved almost immediately fatal. There

¹ Letter from Lieutenant Codrington, dated 4 July 1895.

immediately ran to his help Lance-Naik Senu, Havildar Sundar, Naik Bela and others, with Lieutenant Maxwell, under whose direction the body of their commander was carried off the field. The enemy at this moment was pressing the retirement very closely ; but Subadar Rajah, with men of " D," the Afridi Company, immediately at hand, shouting to his fellow tribesmen, " Now then, Afridi-folk of the Guides, the Colonel Sahib is killed, now is the time to charge," made a most gallant charge and relieved the pressure. " Many of the enemy attempted to get to close quarters in the most marvellously plucky way, but were shot down man after man by the Afridis, who shot wonderfully steadily. It seemed that they rarely missed at that time."¹

The retirement continued under direction of Captain Campbell, and as the front of the 2nd Brigade became unmasked, a very heavy fire was opened which prevented the Regiment being harassed to any very great extent while fording the Jandol stream, while Lieutenants Elliott-Lockhart and Blois-Johnson also were very favourably posted at this time for covering the final retirement to the bridge-head, which was finally reached just before dark. The last-named officer had previously sent out a number of ammunition carriers from the entrenchment to meet the men now crossing the river, whose supply was very nearly exhausted.

The following were the casualties sustained this day by the Guides Infantry : killed, Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye, and three sepoy ; wounded, nine sepoy.

In announcing in Corps Orders the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, Captain Adams wrote as follows : " It is with great sorrow that the Officer Commanding has to record the death in action on the 13th inst. on the right bank of the Panjkora river of Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Battye, officiating commandant of the Corps, while conducting a retirement of the Regiment before large numbers of the enemy off a hill which he was himself one of the last to leave. By his death the Corps, to which he was devotedly attached and whose interests he had always deeply at heart, has suffered an irreparable loss, and the Officer Commanding knows that the deepest regret for this sad event is felt alike by all ranks."

Lieutenant-Colonel Fred Battye was the fourth of the brothers to be killed and the third who had died on active service with the Corps of Guides.

Of the conduct of the retirement of the Infantry of the Guides, General Low wrote in his despatch of 1 May :

" The retirement as it was carried out was a splendid performance. It is deeply to be deplored that when the Battalion had reached level ground, and was about to cross the Ushiri River to its entrenched post, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye was killed. In his death the Corps of Guides has lost an able commander, and the State a gallant and valuable officer."

In forwarding this despatch the Commander-in-Chief wrote as follows in his covering letter of 21 May to the Government of India :

" The Commander-in-Chief cannot send forward Sir Robert Low's despatch without recording separately his admiration of the way in which the retirement

¹ Lieutenant Codrington, *lit. cit.*

of the Guides Infantry was carried out on the 13th April. From Sir Robert Low's despatch it is evident that the Guides kept perfect formation throughout the movement; that they were attacked by 4,000 tribesmen emboldened by their retirement; that the Guides, supported towards the end of the operation by the fire from the left bank of the Panjkora, inflicted a loss of 500 on the enemy, probably one for every sepoy of the Guides engaged, while of their number only three were killed and 9 wounded.

"His Excellency considers this a very remarkable instance of results that may be obtained under very trying circumstances by absolute steadiness combined with high training and perfect fire control, and believes that the Guides must have felt themselves conquerors though retiring before eight times their number of brave but undisciplined tribesmen. The impression left on the enemy may be gauged by the fact that they never afterwards made the faintest effort to stand against our troops.

"Sir George White has not dwelt specially on the irreparable loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, as this brave officer fell after he had withdrawn his Battalion with great skill and determination within the zone of comparative safety, covered by the fire from the left bank."

The retirement was witnessed by many regiments lining the farther bank, and the impression made by the sight of the splendid discipline of the Guides may be read in biographies and regimental records.

Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson wrote¹: "For some time the situation appeared critical, the enemy coming on in the most determined way, but the Guides splendidly upheld their reputation, and, moving as steadily as if on parade, slowly fought their way back to their entrenchments." Equally enthusiastic is the tribute of the historian² of the Gordon Highlanders, the Guides' comrades of the 2nd Brigade: "From their position on the left bank they admired the deliberate retreat of the various companies of the Guides. Fiercely assailed on all sides they fired with the greatest coolness by word of command, quietly relinquishing one position to take up another a few yards back. In the open field, below the hills, the enemy pressed on them still more vigorously, and for the second time the Guides fixed bayonets, but the enemy did not charge home."

In General Low's despatch of 27 July the following officers and other ranks of the Guides were brought by him to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief:

"Captain F. Campbell, who took command when Lieutenant-Colonel Battye fell and who skilfully conducted the further retirement of the Regiment.

"Lieutenant F. A. Maxwell, Royal Sussex Regiment, probationer for the Staff Corps, attached to the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, for the gallantry he displayed in the removal of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye's body under fire.

"Surgeon-Lieutenant D. W. Sutherland, Indian Medical Service, for the promptitude and coolness he displayed in attending on the wounded under short range fire."

¹ "From Private to Field Marshal," p. 74.

² "The Life of a Regiment," vol. II, pp. 336, 337.

The Order of Merit (Third Class) was awarded to the following N.C.Os. and men of the Guides Infantry for conspicuous gallantry :

" Subadar Rajah, for having dashed forward to the charge with some of his men and checked the enemy at a time when the Regiment was hard pressed during its retirement.

" Havildar Ali Gul for having with great dash supported his Subadar in leading a charge against the enemy at a critical moment.

" Sepoy Makhmadin for having under a hot fire checked the advance of a party of the enemy while covering the retirement of the party who were conveying Lieutenant-Colonel Battye's body from the field of action.

" Lance-Naik Senu for having rushed to Lieutenant-Colonel Battye's assistance when the latter was mortally wounded, being the first to reach him, and while exposed to a hot fire at short range, in assisting to carry him from the field.

" Havildar Sundar and Naik Bela, for having assisted, under a hot fire, while closely pressed by the enemy, to remove Lt.-Col. Battye's body from the field."

The retirement of the Guides Infantry to the comparative safety of the entrenchment gave them a brief, but greatly needed, respite. The fire of the enemy ceased for the best part of an hour, and all were able to busy themselves in strengthening the breastwork. Two Maxim guns had also by this time been conveyed over the river on rafts made of inflated skins under Captain Peebles and Lieutenant Kane of the Devonshire Regiment, as well as forty men of the 4th Sikhs under Captain Falcon and Lieutenants Davies and MacLean of the Guides, with a plentiful supply of ammunition. No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery and five companies of the Gordon Highlanders were posted on the left bank of the Panjkora to support the Guides during the night of 13-14 April.

" The enemy now opened a slow but accurate fire, which was maintained until the moon rose about 11.30 p.m. There was a clear field of fire all round the entrenchment which was lined by the men with fixed swords, ready for any attack which might be made. Then night fell and the firing continued, and throughout the night we lay behind our entrenchment, receiving and returning shots every moment. The enemy were lit up now and then by star shells fired by the Mountain Battery, and a rush on the camp consequently prevented. The first shell set fire to some brushwood which burnt for some time. Still, some of the enemy came very near, and were shot about forty yards only from our camp. On the hills in front some sharp-shooters made excellent shooting at us, and every bullet, almost, reached the camp, the number falling in the vicinity of the mess table being especially noticeable.

" After a weary night of anxiety and watching the dawn at length approached, and just before we heard the music of pipes above us on the hills, and after that received only an occasional shot, the main body having marched away. . . . Still, after dawn came, a few *budmashes* remained on the hill, and kept firing on the camp with Sniders and Martini-Henrys. About five o'clock they seemed to increase in number and wounded one of the Devons in the leg. Immediately afterwards

Captain Peebles, of the Devons' Maxim gun crew, fell near the mess table, shot through the abdomen. Then orders came for the Guides to clear the hills, which they at once did, driving the enemy before them and securing the summits. Not until the afternoon of that day did the men obtain any food, having fasted more than forty-eight hours. Some of the sepoys had fasted even longer.

"The Guides remained on the hills that day, and were joined in the afternoon by the 4th Sikhs, who had come over on the rafts, and the two regiments bivouacked together on the hills. During the night a thunderstorm came on with very heavy rain, which lasted some hours and soaked us thoroughly."¹

As a matter of fact, all the men received this day was some food which had been cooked for them by their comrades of the Cavalry of the Corps and which was passed over the river in the evening. The 4th Sikhs also handed over half their own rations to the Guides, who were in a famished state. The great-coats had been left in the kits within the entrenchment, so that the only protection the men had against the storm was their capes.

The critical position in which the Regiment might at any moment have found itself during 15 and 16 April, is best described in the words of General Sir Robert Low's despatch of 1 May, which runs as follows: "On the night of the 14th very bad weather set in, and rain continued all that night and through the day and night of the 15th, much delaying work on the suspension bridge, and the rising water approached nearer and nearer to its piers. On the morning of the 16th, with the Swat river in my rear reported also to be steadily rising, and the bridge over it, on which I depended for supplies, hardly completed and of doubtful stability, with the Panjkora river in front of me rising into a tremendous torrent and threatening the new suspension bridge, the two remaining rafts (one had been overturned, and two damaged by bullets) unable longer to pass over supplies, the situation was one of grave anxiety. The Guides Infantry and 4th Sikhs with them had the previous evening been ordered, as the only means of feeding them, to be ready to park their ammunition and baggage in the entrenched post of the Guides Infantry and make their way to the suspension bridge, so that they might recross before the bridge was swept away; and things looked so serious on the morning of the 16th that they were ordered to commence this movement. When, however, I visited the bridge early in the morning, I was informed no further rise had taken place in the last three or four hours; and during the time that I was there the water, if anything, fell and the rain ceased. I therefore sent orders to the Guides Infantry and 4th Sikhs to stand fast. At noon it was clear that the water was falling and that the danger was over for the time."

By the evening of the 16th the new suspension bridge was completed, and early next morning the troops began to cross. "A" Squadron of the Guides Cavalry left Sado at 5.15 a.m., accompanying the Chief of the Staff across the Panjkora and reconnoitring towards Mian Kalai. Large numbers of the enemy were seen near this place and they started to advance, while fire was opened on the squadron from a fort commanding the road, when the squadron fell back to

¹ From Surgeon-Lieutenant Sutherland's diary, given in "The Chitral Campaign," by Thomson, pp. 201, 202.

the vicinity of the village of Ghobani. On the arrival of the 3rd Brigade, which was now leading the advance, and of the 11th Bengal Lancers, the artillery opened fire from a position near Ghobani on the enemy who were in occupation of the high right bank of the Jandol river, of the village above it, and of some spurs on the left bank.

The Seaforth Highlanders and the 4th Gurkhas were now sent forward to the attack along the south side of the valley (on the right bank of the stream), and the Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, of the 11th Bengal Lancers, were ordered to advance up the centre of the valley to endeavour to intercept the enemy as he retired over the ford by which he had crossed earlier in the day. "A" Squadron of the Guides Cavalry was leading, and the whole of the cavalry, moving at a walk in close formation, came under very heavy fire from both sides of the valley, finally halting and dismounting near Gosam on the left bank of Jandol river, to give time for the infantry attack to take effect and to assist it by carbine fire. All fighting here ceased at 3.30 p.m., the Highlanders occupying Andak Fort while the rest of the 3rd Brigade and Divisional Headquarters bivouacked at Ghobani.

During this day the Infantry of the Guides remained in occupation of their previous day's piquet line, receiving a warning to be on the look-out as the enemy was believed to be advancing; the piquet line was strengthened but nothing of importance happened.

At 4.45 a.m. on the 18th the Guides Infantry and 4th Sikhs marched to rejoin their brigade, meeting it at seven o'clock near Ghobani, and an hour later the 2nd and 3rd Brigades moved against Mian Kalai and Munda Fort, both of which were found to be deserted, while it was reported that Umra Khan had fled to Asmar.

Up to this time no reliable information of what was occurring at Chitral had been received. It was believed that the place had supplies sufficient to last until the end of April, but about the situation of the garrison itself no news could be obtained. Sir Robert Low therefore decided to send on the 3rd Brigade as rapidly as possible to Chitral, and on this afternoon the advanced troops of the brigade moved out, taking with them seventeen days' supplies.

While the 3rd Brigade was advancing to Chitral news was received, first, that the garrison was holding out, and, later, that Sher Afzal had abandoned the siege and fled. The brigade continued its progress but less hurriedly, and ultimately a portion of the troops arrived in Chitral, when the objects of the expedition may be said to have been achieved. Chitral Fort had been relieved, the British prisoners who were in Umra Khan's hands had been surrendered, Umra Khan himself was a fugitive, and Sher Afzal was a prisoner.

Active hostilities therefore now came to an end, but the force was not immediately dispersed. The Corps of Guides, Cavalry and Infantry, had been concentrated with 2nd Brigade Headquarters at Munda¹ and remained here for some four months longer, during which time several reconnaissances were carried out, the most important of these being as follows:—

¹ The table at the mess tennis courts at Mardan is half the wooden gate of Munda Fort.

On 25 April Captain Adams with three field troops from "A" and "C" Squadrons made a reconnaissance into the Salarzai valley, the people of which had been active in sniping the camp by night. Some Maliks were brought in as hostages. Captain Egerton, Lieutenants Davies and Battine (attached from 1st Punjab Cavalry) accompanied this party.

On the 29th of the same month sixty sabres under Captain Adams, who had with him Captain Egerton, Lieutenant Battine and Surgeon-Lieutenant Heard, proceeded on a five days' reconnaissance into the Maidan valley, accompanied by two companies of the Infantry of the Corps under Lieutenants Maxwell and Blois-Johnson.

On 18 May Lieutenants Davies and Battine with forty-one sabres started for Dir to take over and escort from thence the political prisoner Amir-ul-Mulk, who was next taken to Serai on 23 May by Lieutenant Baldwin and handed over there to the 11th Bengal Lancers.


Dafadar Suchet Singh of the Guides Cavalry distinguished himself at Munda on 31 July. At 2.45 a.m. three men suddenly rushed at one of the Cavalry sentries on the left front of the camp; the sentry fired and wounded one of them, but the other two men fled and, with some other kindred spirits, opened a hot fire on the camp whereby a sowar and a horse were wounded. In the meantime another man managed to get into camp and was attempting to cut down some of the syces when Dafadar Suchet Singh, hearing the noise, rushed out and attacked the man with his sword. After a running fight in which the raider was severely wounded, the dafadar secured his gun and *tulwar*; the man, however, managed to crawl away in the darkness.

Early in August the dispersal of the Chitral Relief Force began, and on the 13th the Guides Infantry left Munda and marched into Mardan on the 22nd. In the meantime the Cavalry had proceeded to Sado and began to move back to India on 22 September, arriving in Mardan on the 26th; they left, however, certain detachments behind them, one Indian officer and twenty-five sabres remaining at Chakdara, while Captain Egerton, with one Indian officer and sixty men, formed for the present part of the garrison of the Malakand.

Five brass cannon had been captured in Jandol and Dir, and the largest of these was given to the Corps of Guides on condition that regimental arrangements were made for its transport to Mardan. The gun was without any carriage and weighed 18 cwt., but the men of the Regiment volunteered to carry it themselves and "thus twenty men at a time carried the gun while their comrades carried a double load of arms and ammunition." The gun now stands at Mardan near the Memorial to the officers and men who fell in defence of the Kabul Embassy, and on it is engraved in Persian the curious and bombastic inscription:

Its mouth is open wide to eat.
What shall I call it? A gun or a serpent?
This gun is most heavy, and makes victory certain;
There is none like it in India or Kabul.
Made by Ghulam Rasul.¹

¹ Younghusband "The Story of the Guides," p. 171.



To face page 148

At the conclusion of the operations General Sir R. Low brought the following officers of the Guides to notice :

" Brig.-General A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., had charge of the Line of Communication up to the arrival of Major-General Stedman, C.B., and did good work under considerable difficulties. Afterwards he was appointed to command the 4th Brigade and has exercised his command with ability and success. . . .

" Captain G. J. Younghusband, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Brigade Major 4th Brigade, who also served throughout the first phase of the campaign as Brigade Major of Divisional Troops, showing himself to be a most smart, energetic and promising staff officer."

All who had served in the operations conducted by General Sir R. Low were awarded a clasp, inscribed " Relief of Chitral, 1895," to the India Frontier Medal which the majority of the Guides already possessed. By G.G.O. No. 397 of 16 April 1897, the Corps of Guides was permitted to bear the word " Chitral " upon its standards, colours and appointments in commemoration of its " gallant conduct in the operations carried out for the relief of that place."

For their services in the campaign Captain (now Major) Adams received a Brevet Lieutenant-Colonelcy, Captains Younghusband and Campbell were promoted to Brevet Majorities, while Lieutenant Baldwin was awarded the D.S.O.

Grants of Rs.100 each were made to Lance-Dafadar Sikandar Shah of the Guides Cavalry, and to Sepoy Ghulam Nabi of the Infantry of the Corps " for valuable reconnaissance."

In this year, by G.G.O. 670 of 28 June, and with effect from 1 July, an increase of Rs.2 *per mensem* was made to the pay of every non-commissioned officer and soldier of Indian infantry ; in this increase the Corps of Guides also shared.

On 12 October Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., 3rd Punjab Cavalry, was appointed Commandant of the Corps *vice* Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., whose tenure of command had expired. In the following month Colonel Egerton considered it advisable to define more clearly the duties and responsibilities of the officers of the Corps and, whilst retaining paramount authority, to decentralize as much as possible. With this end in view he decided not to attach himself permanently to either branch of the Corps to the exclusion of the other. To the Seconds-in-Command he delegated the entire executive command of their respective branches, whilst Wing and Squadron Commanders were granted fuller power and responsibilities in regard to their commands.

CHAPTER XI

1896-1897

THE PATHAN REVOLT

DEATH OF SIR HARRY LUMSDEN—JUBILEE OF THE CORPS OF GUIDES—OUTBREAK OF THE PATHAN REVOLT—THE "MAD FAKIR"—THE MALAKAND POSITION—WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NORTH CAMP—THE DEFENCE OF THE MALAKAND—FORMATION OF THE MALAKAND FIELD FORCE—RELIEF OF CHAKDARA—OPERATIONS ROUND LANDAKAI—DEATH OF LIEUTENANTS GREAVES AND MACLEAN.

See Maps : Malakand, facing page 162 ; Mohmand and Khyber, in pocket.

IN May 1896, Colonel C. C. Egerton was appointed to the command of the Indian contingent of the Suakin Force, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, and Captain R. G. Egerton accompanied him as orderly officer.

1896 Colonel W. J. Vousden, V.C., of the Punjab Cavalry, was appointed Officiating Commandant in place of Colonel Egerton and joined at Mardan on 14 July.

On 1 August sanction was given for the rearming of the Guides Cavalry as a Lancer Regiment.

The Corps of Guides completed the fiftieth year of its existence on 14 December of this year, and it had long been determined to celebrate its Jubilee in a fitting manner. It had been hoped that General Sir Harry Lumsden, who some years previously had retired from the service and was living at home in Scotland, might have been able to attend, but for him the end had come on 12 August. "On the morning before his death he talked cheerfully to his brother of the plan he had long cherished of revisiting Mardan during the approaching cold season and of spending the fiftieth anniversary of their creation with the Guides. But it was not to be. Attended to the last by his devoted wife, he passed away in the early hours of 12 August, and all who knew him, rich and poor, lost a friend whom to know was to love."¹

On receiving the news of the death of this great Frontier soldier, the Commandant published the following in orders :—

"It is with the deepest regret that the Officer Commanding has to announce to the Corps the death of their first Commandant, the distinguished soldier who raised the Guides, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Lumsden. To Sir Harry Lumsden's brilliant leadership, splendid activity, and wonderful resources in war, the Guides owe that honoured name they to this day bear.

"Whilst deeply mourning the loss of an old chief, let us each and all in our turn endeavour to follow worthily in the footsteps of the brave soldier, genial comrade, and born leader of men, whose noblest monument to all time will be, that he raised the Corps of Guides."

¹ "Lumsden of the Guides," p. 289.



OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1897.

Standing.—Capt. G. B. Hodson, Major H. I. E. Palmer (5th P.C.), Lieut. J. E. Blois-Johnson, Lieut. J. S. Bogle, Capt. G. M. Baldwin, Capt. J. N. McLeod, I.M.S.,
 Capt. A. R. Gardien, Lieut. H. L. S. MacLean,
Seated.—Lieut. P. C. Elliott-Lockhart, Lieut.-Col. R. B. Adams, Col. C. C. Egerton, Major F. Campbell.
Seated on Ground.—Lieut. A. H. Ormaney, Lieut. I. U. Battye.

The Corps Jubilee celebrations were held in March 1897, and invitations were sent to all officers who had served in the Corps, and to all civil and military officers who had ever been connected with the Corps or with Mardan, to be **1897** present during the week that the projected festivities were to last. Invitations were also sent to all regiments and batteries of the Punjab Frontier Force, to the Nowshera garrison and to the Buffs, King's Own Scottish Borderers and Gordon Highlanders—with which the Corps had been associated during the Chitral expedition. Lieutenant-General Sir W. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding the Forces in the Punjab, and Major-General Sir A. Power Palmer, K.C.B., and their staffs were also invited. All old pensioners of the Corps whose addresses were known were asked to attend, their railway fares being paid and free entertainment given them. This invitation was largely responded to, and some hundreds of men of all ranks accepted it.

The presence of these veterans, some of whom had enlisted with the Corps when it was first raised, and several of whose names are to be found honourably mentioned in this history, formed a notable feature in the Jubilee celebrations.

The Punjab Frontier Force polo tournament took place during the week and was won by the team of the Guides—Lieutenants Blois-Johnson (No. 1) and MacLean (No. 2), Captains Baldwin (No. 3) and Hodson (back)—which beat the 2nd Punjab Cavalry in the final tie. The other entertainments during the week included sports for the men, and a fireworks display, while all ranks were supplied with a free *ziyasat* at the expense of the officers.

On Friday, 12 March, Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart inspected the Corps at a full-dress parade, at the conclusion of which he made the following address in English and Hindustani :—

“ Colonel Egerton,

“ I congratulate you and the Queen's Own Corps of Guides with all my heart. The Guides have been in existence for fifty years and for fifty years they have been famous. All men who like myself have seen them in the field know their value—know also that they maintain untarnished the high reputation they won at the outset of their career. May fortune ever follow you and the Guides in peace and in war.”

The Jubilee dinner was held in the officers' mess, over 100 people being present, and after the usual loyal toasts Sir William Lockhart proposed the toast of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides in the following terms :—

“ Ladies and Gentlemen,

“ I am going to give you a toast which you will receive with delight and enthusiasm. We are the guests on the occasion of their Jubilee of the most famous unit of the famous Punjab Frontier Force—a Force renowned alike for its valour and for its hospitality, and this most famous unit bears a name of world-wide celebrity, for not only are its exploits well known in its own country, but they are also familiar in every military country in Europe.

"The Guides! What a panorama passes through one's mind at the mere mention of the name—a panorama of fiery onslaught and dogged defence, forced march and bivouac on sun-scorched plain or hillside deep in snow. And what a procession of heroes! Lumsden, Hodson, Daly, Sam Browne, the glorious Battye brothers, Jenkins, Hamilton, Hammond, Campbell, and many more linked with a host of equally brave men of other races whom I cannot even attempt to enumerate or to select from for enumeration. And how well those who have disappeared from the rolls are represented by my old comrade, the present commander, and those serving under him.

"I have heard this famous Corps styled by less fortunate brothers in arms, 'God's Own Guides'! and perhaps a little good-humoured malice may have entered into the idea of that title. Well, God has befriended them on many a hard-fought field, and our trust is that He will never desert in the future this band of different races, professing different creeds, but bound together in the brotherhood of chivalrous duty.

"I propose good luck to the Guides from their gallant Colonel down to their last-joined recruit and to their oldest pensioner. Good luck in peace, and the next time swords are out for their Queen and for their country may the Guides be there to reap a fresh harvest of laurels."

Colonel Egerton briefly responded for the Corps, alluding to the recent death of General Sir Harry Lumsden who raised the Regiment, and to the presence there that night of Colonel A. G. Hammond, a former Commandant of the Corps.

General Sir William Lockhart can hardly have realized when he spoke how very short a time would elapse before "swords were out" indeed for the greatest of our Frontier wars, and that the Guides as ever would be among the first to take the field.

In the spring of the year 1897 the Indian Government, thanks to a bountiful harvest, was just beginning to breathe freely again after a long and desperate struggle with one of the most widespread famines recorded in the annals of the country. No cloud had appeared on the political horizon to give any warning that there might be cause for uneasiness in the north-west, far less to show that before the end of the year the whole extent of the Frontier would be one blaze of revolt, for the extinction of which a call must be made upon their military resources only to be met by putting forth their utmost available strength.

As to the cause of the outbreak an historian of a portion of the campaign which followed has said:¹ "I venture to submit that for the *fons et origo mali* we must hark back to the year 1893, when Sir Mortimer Durand returned from Kabul with the Boundary Agreement signed by the Amir of Afghanistan in his hand; and that that document was the outward and visible sign of all our subsequent troubles on the North-West Frontier. . . . (a) The Boundary Agreement was most distasteful to the Amir; and *a fortiori* to his subjects. (b) The tribes on the border were thoroughly alarmed by the demarcation of the boundary; their fears were accentuated by our establishment of military posts in Wana, in the Tochi and Kurram

¹ Hutchinson, "The Campaign in Tirah," p. 3 *et seq.*

valleys, in Chitral, on the Malakand and on the Samana range, and in spite of our assurances they trembled for their independence."

The first indication of coming trouble was given in the Tochi valley, where a treacherous and unprovoked attack was made early in June upon the escort of a political officer. Before the end of July two brigades had overrun the Tochi valley, experiencing but small opposition, and had laid waste the villages of the offending tribesmen. This prompt chastisement, however, did not deter risings on other parts of the Frontier, for the flames of revolt spread rapidly from Waziristan on the left to Buner on the right, a stretch of over 400 miles, and the closing days of July witnessed the fierce and repeated attacks of the people of Swat upon the garrisons of Chakdara and Malakand. Within a week of the relief of Chakdara, and when the Malakand Field Force had barely begun its work, some four or five thousand Mohmands made a sudden raid into British territory near Shabkadar fort, only eighteen miles north of Peshawar on 7 August; so that the Government of India had already no fewer than three separate expeditions on their hands, when the contagion of revolt spread to the Afridis and Orakzais, two of the largest and most warlike, and probably the best armed, of all the Frontier tribes living about the Kabul river, and between them capable of putting nearly 60,000 men in the field.

It was the rising of the people of Swat and the attacks made by them upon the positions at Chakdara and the Malakand, that more immediately concerned the Guides, who formed something of the nature of a reserve at Mardan.

The rising in Swat was due to the preachings of a *Fakir* named Sadullah, who took up his abode at Landakai. This man, who came to be known as the "Mad Fakir," was a Bunerwal. Having failed to incite the people of Buner to join in a *Jihad* against the British, he set himself to arouse the fanaticism of the Swat tribes.

On 26 July the *Fakir* was joined by a small number of lads who, with some others, fired shots at some of the men of the Khan of Thana; from this it was thought possible that the disturbance might be due more to the factional fights of Thana than anything else, and no serious alarm was felt.

Even up to the afternoon of that day the people of Khar remained unaffected, and the officers of the Malakand and Chakdara garrisons met on the Khar polo ground as usual to play polo, while the inhabitants of Khar looked quietly on. In fact, at 6.58 p.m. on this very day, Major Deane, the Political Agent, in telegraphing to Government concerning the presence of the *Fakir* in Swat and the nature of his workings, reported that, although the *Fakir* had undoubtedly obtained a great hold on the religious superstition of the people throughout the Swat valley and Dir territory, and the movement of troops to Thana might become advisable, he did not personally anticipate that it would; but at the same time he pointed out the advisability of calling up the Guides from Mardan the moment that the troops were compelled to move.

"Later in the day, however, reports reached the Malakand showing that the *Fakir* was obtaining a hold on the people that appeared to be almost incredible, and matters assumed so serious an aspect, that Major Deane warned Colonel

Meiklejohn, commanding the Malakand Brigade, that the immediate intervention of troops would probably be necessary; while Lieutenant Minchin, Assistant Political Officer, was sent to Chakdara to report as to actual occurrences, and to try to steady the Dir levies, who were said to be panic-stricken. Shortly after his arrival at Chakdara, Lieutenant Minchin telegraphed to Major Deane, reporting that the *Fakir* had moved towards Thana, that the whole of the Thana people had joined him, and that he was then marching towards Aladand with a following of some 400 or 500 men, though they did not appear to be armed—at the moment they could be seen halted between Thana and Aladand. On receipt of this information Major Deane, at 8.25 p.m., telegraphed particulars to Government, stating that none of the Swat Khans or people dare oppose the *Fakir*, that a column was moving out from the Malakand to Amandarra at 3 a.m. on the following morning, and that the Corps of Guides had been sent for.

“The Malakand position was somewhat extended; the fort itself had been erected about 600 yards west of the *Kotal* on a narrow spur running up towards the high hill known as Guides Hill.¹ This was held by 200 men of the 24th Punjab Infantry with two nine-pounder smooth-bore guns. Still further south-west of this post, at a distance of 1,100 yards from it, on the summit of Guides Hill, was a small, one-storied tower with a defensible roof, whence signalling was maintained with Chakdara signalling tower, nine miles distant in a direct line to the north-east. Immediately in front of the Malakand fort to the north is an irregular cup-shaped hollow of about 600 yards' diameter called the Crater, in and around which were the camps of the 24th and 45th Sikhs and of the Sappers and Miners, as well as the engineer park, commissariat stores and bazaar. The northern slopes of the spur on which the fort was situated were covered with trees and scrub jungle. The central position of this camp was a low, rugged, irregularly shaped mound, round which were grouped certain camps and offices, the whole being surrounded by an irregular line of *abattis* and wire entanglement. The remainder of the troops, with the transport, were encamped on a flat, open piece of ground some 1,300 yards to the north-west outside this hollow. This camp, which was called the North Camp, was protected by low breastworks and by *abattis*; communication between the two camps was by means of a broad road passing through a narrow dip in the spur which lay between the two camps.

“Both positions were overlooked by the high hills on the east and west. It will be seen that two roads lead over the Malakand Pass, and after passing through the position, run down to the Swat valley; the more easterly of these is merely a rough track known as the Buddhist road,² while that to the west is the newly constructed Chitral road, called the graded road. Both passed down into the Swat valley through short, narrow defiles separated by a small hill, known as Castle Rock, a steep eminence covered with huge rocky boulders, on the summit of which was a strongly built bungalow occupied by the Officer Commanding. To the east rose the lofty and rugged range of hills which is the watershed between the Swat

¹ See footnote on p. 135, Chap. x.

² For this Buddhist road, see Chap. x, p. 136.

valley and the Yusufzai plain. Both these roads connected the Malakand position with the post of Dargai, which lay seven miles south-south-west of the Malakand fort at the foot of the pass. This post was a small earthwork and ditch held by 200 rifles, 31st Punjab Infantry."¹

At nine o'clock on the evening of 26 July the telegram already mentioned reached the Commandant of the Guides from the Officer Commanding at the Malakand, stating that the presence of the Corps was urgently needed there by reason of a serious outbreak of disturbance in the Swat valley, and asking that the Cavalry might, if possible, arrive at daybreak for employment in keeping open the road between the Malakand and Thana for a force which was about to move out against the enemy.

The Corps was rapidly mobilized and marched from Mardan, the Cavalry at 12.15 a.m. on the 27th, the Infantry starting an hour and a half later. With the Cavalry were Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Captain Baldwin and Lieutenant MacLean with 216 sabres, while with the Infantry were Lieutenants Elliott-Lockhart and J. C. H. McCaskill, Surgeon-Captain A. J. Macnab and 304 Indian ranks; Second-Lieutenant C. V. Keyes remained at Mardan in charge of the depot.

The Cavalry, halting for three-quarters of an hour at Dargai, reached the Malakand Kotal at 8.30 a.m., and was at once sent down to the North Camp. This was practically empty at the time, as the troops occupying it had moved out in the early morning to follow up the enemy, who had attacked the Malakand position soon after 10 p.m. on the 26th and had kept up a most stubborn fight until 4.30 next morning, causing some sixty casualties among the defenders. The troops returned later to camp followed by the enemy who, however, beyond sniping from the hills around, did not cause much annoyance during the day.

The gravity of the situation was now apparent. It was clear that the rising was not merely a small affair confined to the people of Lower Swat, nor was the attack on the Malakand simply an attempt to do as much harm as possible and then retire. All day large bodies of tribesmen were seen to be collecting from different directions, and swarms of men were noticed to be crossing over from the right bank of the Swat river in the neighbourhood of Badwan and Barangola opposite the Malakand. This was plainly the beginning of an important movement on the part of all the neighbouring clans to turn the British out of the Swat valley and regain possession of the Malakand. The news was immediately telegraphed to Government and steps were taken to prepare against another night attack, which from the attitude of the enemy now seemed certain.

The first thing that Colonel Meiklejohn decided was that the North Camp should be evacuated and the whole of the troops be concentrated in the Crater and on the Kotal. Accordingly, a start was at once made to withdraw all the baggage and stores from the North Camp; but the tents could only be struck and left on the ground, and at 4 p.m., when the enemy seemed to be closing in on all sides, Colonel Meiklejohn ordered immediate evacuation and the retirement up the narrow road to the Crater began, the Guides Cavalry leading. The retiring troops were not

¹ "Official Account of the Operations of the Malakand Field Force," pp. 13, 14.

pressed, the tribesmen being busily occupied in looting whatever had of necessity been abandoned in the North Camp. The last of the troops reached the Crater by 5.30 p.m., shortly before the enemy had begun their second night attack on the camp.

The Guides Cavalry were now told off to occupy a portion of the Commissariat and the Engineer Park enclosures of the Lower Crater camp ; and they held part of the north and the whole of the west side of the defences.

The Guides Infantry arrived on the Malakand Kotal at 5.45 p.m., having accomplished the thirty-two-mile march from Mardan in exactly sixteen hours. "The conditions under which this march was made were most trying," writes one who took part in it.¹ "The road from Mardan is for the greater part entirely destitute of shade or water, and the last seven miles, being a steady climb to a height of some 2,000 feet above the plain, made it most exhausting to the troops, who were marching at the hottest period of an Indian summer. In spite of their fatigue, the men arrived fit and full of keenness for a fight, a desire that was soon to be fully satisfied, for rest or sleep was a luxury which the garrison were unable to experience for some time to come."

Of this march of the Guides Infantry another writer² tells us that "this wonderful feat was accomplished without impairing the efficiency of the soldiers, who were sent into the piquet line and became engaged as soon as they arrived. An officer who commanded the Dargai post told me that as they passed the guard there they shouldered arms with parade precision, to show that twenty-six miles under the hottest sun in the world could not take the polish off the Guides. Then they breasted the long ascent to the top of the pass, encouraged by the sound of the firing which grew louder at every step."

The official account says³ : "The heat on the road between the Malakand and Mardan was intense, and the march redounds to the credit of the Regiment. The Guides Infantry were not able to obtain much rest after their long and trying march, for at 8.30 p.m. the enemy again attacked the camp in force all along the line."

The Guides had left fifty rifles at Dargai to strengthen the garrison there, and on arrival at the Malakand 100 men under Lieutenant McCaskill were sent for the night to reinforce No. 8 Piquet near Castle Rock held by the 45th Sikhs, the remainder of the Infantry under Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart joining the Cavalry of the Corps in Lower Crater Camp when they occupied the south side of the defences. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was placed in command of the Kotal Camp which comprised : (a) Castle Rock and the piquets adjacent to it, with the camp by "Gretna Green," held by the 45th Sikhs and two guns of No. 8 Mountain Battery ; (b) the Commissariat and Engineer park enclosure held by the Guides Cavalry and Infantry, the 31st Punjab Infantry, the Sappers and Miners and two mountain guns ; and (c) the 24th Punjab Infantry camp with the ridge in front of it held by that regiment and two mountain guns, with "Maxim Point" and "Gibraltar" occupied by piquets.


¹ Fincastle and Lockhart, "A Frontier Campaign," pp. 43, 44.

² Winston Churchill, "The Malakand Field Force," pp. 63, 64.

³ p. 19.



INDIAN OFFICERS OF THE CAVALRY, 1897.



INDIAN OFFICERS OF THE INFANTRY, 1897.

Attacks were made by the enemy at several points during the night ; " it was a veritable pandemonium that would seem to have been let loose around us. Bands of Ghazis, worked up by their religious enthusiasm into a frenzy of fanatical excitement, would charge our breastworks again and again, leaving their dead in scores after each repulse, while those of their comrades who were unarmed would encourage their efforts by shouting with much beating of tom-toms and other musical instruments. Amidst the discordant din which raged around, we could even distinguish bugle calls, evidently sounded by some soi-disant bugler of our native army. As he suddenly collapsed in the middle of the officers' mess call, we concluded that a bullet had brought him to an untimely end."¹ At daybreak a counter-attack cleared the enemy from the nearer heights and caused him to retire to the shelter of the hills.

During the night's fighting the Guides Infantry had two men killed, while Jemadar Khazan Singh and nine other ranks were wounded.

During the morning of 28 July the Guides Infantry reinforced No. 8 Piquet near Castle Rock with sixty men, and took over the " Gibraltar " Piquet—fifty rifles—from the 24th Punjab Infantry. " A desultory fire was kept up all day from the tribesmen on our troops who were busy strengthening our defences and demolishing the bazaar and serai, which it was now determined to abandon. Trees were cut down to strengthen the *abattis*, and a wire entanglement and other obstacles were placed round the Crater Camp. No rest was to be allowed to the hard-worked garrison, as towards evening the enemy could be seen swarming down the hills to the attack, while the white dusty road leading up from the Swat valley was completely hidden by the dark, sombre-clad figures of the Bunerwals,² who, attracted by the wild rumours of a successful raid on the North Camp, had now arrived to partake in the capture and loot of the Malakand."³

By this time, however, reinforcements were already on their way to succour the hard-pressed garrison of the Malakand. As soon as Government recognized that the rising was general, one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, No. 7 Mountain Battery R.A., the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras were ordered up to the Malakand, while two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers and the 22nd Punjab Infantry were directed to proceed to Mardan and the 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment was held in readiness to move if required.

As the 28th wore on, it became evident that the Malakand position was practically besieged, as the enemy was in possession of all the neighbouring heights, from which a constant fire was kept up on the camp. The telegraph wire between the Malakand and India was now cut, and news could only pass through by the hands of friendly natives.

" As darkness fell, heavy firing recommenced along the whole front. The enemy had apparently plenty of ammunition and replied with effect to the heavy

¹ " A Frontier Campaign," pp. 45, 46.

² The Bunerwals habitually dress in black.

³ " A Frontier Campaign," p. 47.

fire of the troops.¹ In the centre severe fighting ensued and the enemy charged again and again up to the breastwork of the enclosure. They did not succeed in penetrating. All through the night the enemy continued their attacks. They often succeeded in reaching the breastworks, only to die on the bayonets of the defenders. The guns fired case-shot with terrible effect, and when morning dawned the position was held by the Imperial forces."²

About 3 a.m. the enemy withdrew to the Khar plain, and as day broke they could be seen on the hills dragging away large numbers of killed and wounded ; the troops, however, were far too much exhausted to be sent out in pursuit. In the morning signalling communication was reopened with Chakdara, and it was learnt that repeated attacks by day and night had been made on the post, but that, so far, all was well ; ammunition, however, was running short and more was urgently needed. All through the 29th the troops and followers at the Malakand were again employed in still further strengthening the position, the ground in front was cleared of everything giving cover to an enemy, and large bonfires were prepared 200 or 300 yards apart and set on fire just before dark, so that an attacking enemy would have to cross a line of light. Towards evening large organized bands could be seen collecting on the hills to the west, and as the day was *Jumerat*, and the moon a new one, and the omens therefore auspicious, it was confidently expected that on this night the tribesmen would make their supreme effort.

Fortunately, during the afternoon a welcome supply of 12,000 rounds of rifle ammunition reached the Malakand, under the escort of a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, commanded by Major Beatson.

At 9.30 this night the attack began again and was kept up with increased vigour, the brunt of it falling on the left of the camp. An especially fierce and determined attack was made about 1.30 a.m. but was everywhere repulsed with great loss, and it was afterwards learnt that the Mad Fakir had himself led this attack, but had been wounded and had retired to Landakai.

The following Special Brigade Orders were issued at this time by Colonel Meiklejohn :—

" It is notified for information that H.E. the Commander-in-Chief and the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces in the Punjab have both telegraphed their congratulations to the Officer Commanding the Brigade on the successful resistance made by the troops at the Malakand, and the Officer Commanding takes the opportunity to thank all ranks for the support he has received from them, and to express his appreciation of the steady courage and endurance which they have displayed during the last three days' fighting ; and in this he wishes to include the Guides, who, after performing a very trying forced march, have been under arms ever since their arrival and have been of invaluable assistance."

¹ Lieutenant MacLean, of the Guides Cavalry, who was attached temporarily to the 31st Punjab Infantry, had a wonderful escape. A bullet entered his mouth and passed through his cheek without injuring the bone in any way. He continued on duty.

² " The Malakand Field Force," p. 69 *et seq.*

Early on the morning of the 30th Colonel Meiklejohn learnt that Colonel Reid had now arrived at Dargai with thirty-nine sabres and 168 rifles of the Guides, the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras ; but as some of these troops were greatly exhausted by the heat—the 35th alone losing twenty-one men from heat apoplexy—and Colonel Meiklejohn was confident of being able to hold his own with the troops already at his disposal, Colonel Reid was directed to give his men a day's rest, and did not actually reach the Malakand until the morning of the 31st, bringing with him rather more than 700 rifles and a very welcome supply of ammunition amounting to 190,000 rounds.

Lieutenants A. C. M. Waterfield and W. H. Norman,¹ of the 11th Bengal Lancers, were now temporarily attached to the Guides Cavalry for duty at night ; and on the 30th Second-Lieutenant C. V. Keyes joined from Mardan, having made over charge of the depot to Lieutenant Ommaney ; he brought up with him the detachment of fifty rifles of the Guides Infantry originally left at Dargai.

At 9.30 p.m. on the 30th the attacks began as usual, but the enemy, although in greater strength than ever, did not display the same spirit as before, while the bonfires in front of the position acted admirably and proved of the greatest help in repelling the assaults. Firing was kept up more or less all night, but little harm was done to the garrison. Great discomfort, however, was caused by a severe dust-storm which broke over the camp in the middle of the night ; this was followed by thunder and torrents of rain, and at the height of the storm the enemy tried to rush the 45th Sikhs' piquets, being repulsed with great loss. The Guides had now to remain in their wet clothes until day broke and the enemy had withdrawn.

On 31 July Lieutenant I. U. Battye, three Indian officers and 150 rifles arrived with the reinforcements under Colonel Reid, and the enemy now appeared to realize that all hope of capturing the Malakand position had gone, for during the ensuing night there was little to disturb the troops, no attacks being made, though the Guides had four men wounded.

The following were awarded the Order of Merit (Third Class) for their gallantry during this day's fighting :—

Havildar Biaz ; Lance-Naik Mir Jafar ; and Sepoy Sohbat Khan, Corps of Guides—for conspicuous gallantry on Gibraltar Hill on 31 July 1897, on which occasion, under a heavy fire from the opposite hill they attacked and drove from a *sangar* a party of the enemy, of whom they killed several.

On 30 July the Government of India had issued orders for the formation of a force to be known as "The Malakand Field Force," the command being entrusted to Brigadier-General Sir Bindon Blood,² then commanding the Bundelkand district, who was given the temporary rank of Major-General. His force was to be composed of two brigades and divisional troops, the 1st Brigade containing the original garrison of the Malakand and being commanded by Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, while the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General P. D. Jeffreys, C.B., contained the following : 1st Battalion The Buffs, 35th Sikhs, 38th Dogras, Guides Infantry.

¹ Elder brother of C. L. Norman, who afterwards served in the Guides.

² The same officer who had been Chief of the Staff of the Chitral Relief Force.

The Guides Cavalry, with the 11th Bengal Lancers, one squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers, three Mountain Batteries, two companies of the 21st Punjab Infantry, the 22nd Punjab Infantry and two companies of the Sappers and Miners, composed the divisional troops.

Sir Bindon Blood arrived on the Malakand at midday on 1 August. Early on this morning, as the tribal gatherings had practically all withdrawn and Colonel Meiklejohn feared that they might be concentrating in full strength against Chakdara, he determined to make an effort to relieve that post or at least to throw in supplies and ammunition. A column was accordingly detailed to move out for this purpose, composed of Guides Cavalry, one squadron Bengal Lancers, 24th Punjab Infantry, 45th Sikhs, Guides Infantry, four guns No. 8 Mountain Battery R.A., and No. 5 Company Madras Sappers and Miners.

Orders were issued in the morning to Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, directing him to move out with some of the Guides Cavalry, with the object of seizing the Aman-darra defile if possible. Accordingly, at 9 a.m., Colonel Adams marched off with Captain Baldwin, Lieutenants C. de H. Smith (Central India Horse, attached), C. V. Keyes, Surgeon-Captain Macnab and 190 sabres of the Guides, and the squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers under Major Beatson. The Guides Cavalry led the advance down the road to the North Camp and thence followed the road which joins the graded road at the village of Pirano-Kili. However, before the cavalry had reached the plain, the enemy had realized the nature and object of the movement, and immense numbers flocked from every side to oppose it, the progress of the cavalry being barred by the enemy who crowded the low ridges of the rocky hill near the village and pressed forward into the nullahs and broken ground which lie close to the north of the road leading to it.

Directing the squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers to hold with dismounted fire some high ground by the North Camp and to protect his left, Colonel Adams withdrew the Guides Cavalry slowly by alternate squadrons, using dismounted fire, until a small open space was reached near the North Camp, where the presence of some small huts and a slight depression in rear permitted the combined employment of dismounted fire with shock action when the enemy pressed forward. The final withdrawal was completed under cover of the fire of the 24th Punjab Infantry from the ridge above.

Colonel Meiklejohn had by this time fully realized that further progress in face of the swarming masses of the enemy would be so slow that Chakdara could not be reached that day, and he decided to postpone the attempt until the next day, a decision with which General Blood, who had now arrived at the Malakand, was in complete agreement.

The Cavalry this day had one man killed and two British officers, one Indian officer and fourteen other ranks wounded; these were Captain Baldwin, Second-Lieutenant Keyes, Resaidar Tirath Ram, Kote-Dafadar Ram Kishen and thirteen sowars, of whom one died of wounds. Twenty-seven horses were also killed or wounded, including the chargers of Colonel Adams and Captain Baldwin.

"It will be seen from the above that the men of the Corps of Guides, after

making a long and severe march from Mardan on 27 July, were under arms every night up to 1 August, as well as constantly during the day, and were also employed on frequent fatigue duties.”¹

For their gallantry on 1 August the undermentioned were awarded the Order of Merit (Third Class) :—

Resaidar Tirath Ram, Corps of Guides Cavalry—for conspicuous gallantry at Malakand on 1 August 1897, when leading his men against the enemy, whom he personally engaged, receiving a wound from a spear. The same award was made to Dafadar Tursam, Sowar Sirandaz, Sowar Gurdit Singh, Kote-Dafadar Sadr-ud-Din, Dafadar Sham Singh, Sowar Pir Muhammad and Sowar Panjaba.

On 2 August at 5.10 a.m. the troops previously detailed marched out along the graded road towards Chakdara under Colonel Meiklejohn, the Guides Infantry (200 rifles under Lieutenants Elliott-Lockhart and Battye) forming the advanced guard, while the Guides Cavalry (four British officers, eight Indian officers and 152 other ranks) moved with the 11th Bengal Lancers in rear of the transport ; the four British officers were Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Lieutenants Smith and Norman and Second-Lieutenant Keyes.

No opposition was experienced until the advanced guard neared the junction of the graded road with that from the North Camp, where the enemy had collected in considerable numbers on the hills on either side of the road. Colonel Meiklejohn now sent Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart with some of the Infantry of the Guides to attack the hills on the right of the road, supported by the 45th Sikhs, while Second-Lieutenant Battye, with Surgeon-Captain Macnab, and the remainder of the Guides Infantry attacked the low hills on the left of the road and also the village of Pirano-Kili. The enemy was driven from one strong position after another, and the road opened for the advance of the main column which moved towards “ Bedford Hill,” upon which and the hills above it numbers of the enemy were collected. From here they were again driven with severe loss, some of the Guides Infantry, under Second-Lieutenant Battye, being sent against “ Bedford Hill.”

The enemy was now thoroughly panic-stricken and streamed off in every direction from all parts of the position which he had so confidently been holding. Driven from the hills, large numbers sought the refuge of their villages, to reach which they had to cross the open Khar plain, thus affording an excellent opportunity for the employment of cavalry. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams now brought his men quickly to the front and sent the squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers to the left, round the western slopes of “ Bedford Hill,” while with the two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry he moved by the road on to the Khar plain and thence onward as far as the village of Bat Khela. Both parties encountered large numbers of the enemy in full flight and did great execution among them, spearing and cutting them down in every direction and leaving the ground strewn with killed and wounded tribesmen. Colonel Adams then, having re-formed his squadron, pushed rapidly

¹ Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams to D.A.A.G., 1st Brigade, Malakand Field Force, 8 August 1897.

forward and at 7.30 a.m. seized the Amandarra position, meeting with only slight opposition *en route*.

Communication by helio was now opened with Chakdara—at this time hotly attacked—from the Amandarra Kotal, and the Cavalry then pushed rapidly on, but as the bridges along the road had been broken down and the rice fields on either side were flooded, progress was somewhat delayed. As the mounted men neared the Chakdara bridge, which was still intact, the garrison of the fort made a sortie and drove the enemy from the right bank of the river, so preventing them from firing on the advancing cavalry, who crossed the bridge and, as soon as the spur commanding the exit from the fort had been cleared, took up the pursuit on the right bank and drove the enemy on to the neighbouring hills and into the village of Chakdara. By this time the cavalymen had to confine their energies to dismounted action, as the ground was very heavy and the horses were much exhausted. When the infantry of the relieving column arrived on the scene most of the enemy had completely disappeared.

In the Guides Cavalry this day one sowar was wounded, while the casualties in the Infantry were: Killed, two men; and wounded, Subadar-Major Sarfaraz Khan, and six sepoy.

The following awards of the Order of Merit (Third Class) were afterwards made in connection with the operations of 2 August:—

Subadar-Major Sarfaraz Khan, Queen's Own Corps of Guides Infantry—for conspicuous gallantry on 2 August 1897, during the advance to the relief of Chakdara, in gallantly leading a party and storming several strong positions, killing some of the enemy with his own hand. He was severely wounded.¹

The same award was made to Subadar Shahi Jan and to Sepoys Nur Ahmad, Dar Jan, Jowahir Singh and Bishan Singh.


On 2 August Major-General Sir Bindon Blood issued the following order:—

"H.E. the Commander-in-Chief has telegraphed congratulating Colonel Meiklejohn, C.B., C.M.G., and the officers and men of the Malakand garrison on the grand spirit displayed by them in the defence of the post. He also congratulates Colonel Reid and the officers and men of the relieving force on the pluck and energy displayed during the forced march in relief of the garrison.

"The General Officer Commanding the Field Force heartily congratulates Colonel Meiklejohn and Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney and all ranks under their command on the brilliant manner in which they carried out this morning's operation."

The relieving column, having bivouacked for the night of 2 August near Chakdara Fort, started at 4 a.m. on the 3rd to return to the Malakand, meeting at Amandarra a force under Colonel Reid, who was accompanied by General Blood, and included in which was one troop of the Guides Cavalry under Captain Palmer and Lieutenant Blois-Johnson. That night the force bivouacked near Allahdand village, and next

¹ His knee-cap was completely severed by a sword-cut received in a hand-to-hand combat with a *ghari*. His opponent was dispatched by Lieutenant Battye; and the Subadar-Major subsequently recovered.



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To face page 162

day 200 rifles of the Guides Infantry under Lieutenant Elliott-Lockhart returned to the Malakand, where Lieutenant C. P. Wynter, 2nd Sikhs, was attached for duty ; the rest of the Guides Infantry bivouacked near Allahdand village.

On the 4th the Cavalry reconnoitred towards Landakai without, however, seeing anything of the enemy. On the 5th and 6th these reconnaissances were repeated and the villages of Haibatgram, Jalala and Thana were burnt, after which the force returned to the Amandarra Kotal, where the Guides Infantry joined it on the 6th. By this time Captain Brasier-Creagh, 9th Bengal Lancers, had been attached for duty to the Guides Cavalry, and Captain R. C. O. Creagh, 5th Punjab Infantry, to the Guides Infantry.

The Malakand Field Force had now been organized ; and on 9 August the Guides Infantry marched to join the 2nd Brigade of the Force in camp at Khar, when Brigadier-General Meiklejohn issued the following order :—

" The Brig.-General Commanding the 1st Brigade cannot allow the Guides Infantry to leave the Brigade under his command without a word of farewell, and expression of regret that they are going away. The splendid march from Mardan, and the cheerfulness and alacrity with which they have performed throughout the arduous duties which have entailed upon them, show that all ranks are emulous of upholding the splendid reputation of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides."

Several more officers had joined or rejoined by this time—Captain Hodson rejoined from leave and took over command of the Infantry ; Lieutenant A. C. Stewart joined from Burma ; Lieutenant Ommaney handed over command of the depot at Mardan to Lieutenant Garden and came up to the front, as did also Lieutenant MacLean on recovery from his wound.

As the arrangements for rearming the Cavalry with lances had not been fully completed when the Cavalry left Mardan for field service, the lances had been left behind, but now some of these were sent for and the flank sections of squadrons and all the " number threes " were armed with them.

On 16 August the 1st Brigade, with which was the Guides Cavalry, moved to Thana, and a reconnaissance was made as far as Jalala village, a few hundred of the enemy with several standards being seen on Landakai spur. Early the following morning the brigade left Thana, " B " Squadron of the Guides Cavalry, under Captain Brasier-Creagh, providing the advanced guard. The enemy was found in occupation of the Landakai spur and so barring further progress up the valley, since the road for about a quarter of a mile now ran along a narrow causeway between the end of the spur and the river, while the position held by the enemy extended from the river up to the high hills towards the Mora Pass. The guns accordingly opened fire and the infantry of the brigade advanced against the front and left flank, when the Cavalry moved on to effect the passage of the causeway.

Preceded by dismounted men of one squadron and by some Sappers and Miners, the cavalry passed along the causeway in single file, the men leading their horses. Progress was slow, as in many places the enemy had blocked the roadway by erecting stone walls ; but as successive bodies of the cavalry cleared the defile and emerged

on the farther side of the spur near the village of Landakai, they remounted and pressed forward in pursuit of the enemy, passing first over broken ground and then over a long stretch of ploughed fields.

"By the time that the head of the leading squadron had emerged into the plain, the enemy were already more than a mile away on the other side of it, and could be seen swarming up the hills in large numbers, many of them carrying standards of variegated colouring. Owing to the constant rain of the preceding days, the ground had become exceedingly heavy, and being also cut up by several deep ravines, Captain Palmer, who had at once pushed forward in pursuit of a few tribesmen who had not yet reached the shelter of the hills, soon found himself far ahead of his men, who were unable to keep up with him. Near on his left was Lieutenant R. T. Greaves,¹ Lancashire Fusiliers, and some 200–300 yards on his left rear rode Colonel Adams with his galloper, Lieutenant Norman, 11th Bengal Lancers; while at some distance their men, consisting of about one troop, in somewhat loose formation owing to the difficulties of the ground, followed as quickly as they could. After traversing a mile in this formation, some of the enemy were seen passing through a *ziarat* or graveyard to a spur of a hill some eighty yards distant, from which the enemy were keeping up a fairly hot fire on our advancing men. Seeing that the enemy were in considerable force, Colonel Adams made for and directed his men to the *ziarat*, intending, if possible, to hold this position by dismounted fire until the infantry should arrive in support. Owing, however, to the noise of the firing, Palmer and Greaves were unable to hear him and charged up to the foot of the hill, hoping to cut off a few tribesmen who were hastening towards it. The unfortunate occurrences of the next few minutes are best described by the following extract from a letter written by an officer who was present.

"On Palmer and Greaves approaching the hill they were subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy. Palmer's horse was at once killed, while Greaves, in difficulties with his mount and some 200 yards to the left front of Palmer, was shot at close quarters, and fell some twenty yards further on among the Pathans, who at once proceeded to hack at him with their swords. Seeing this Adams and Fincastle² went out to his assistance, followed by two sowars,³ who galloped towards Palmer, at that moment engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with a standard-bearer. Palmer had been shot through the right wrist, and was only saved by the opportune appearance of these two men, who enabled him to get back to the shelter of the *ziarat* in safety. Meanwhile, Fincastle, who had had his horse killed while galloping up to where Greaves lay, tried to lift Greaves on to Adams' horse, in the process of which Greaves was again shot through the body and Adams' horse was wounded. They were soon joined by the two sowars who had been to Palmer's assistance, and almost immediately afterwards by MacLean, who, having first dismounted his squadron in the *ziarat*, had very pluckily ridden out with four⁴ of his men to the

¹ Acting as correspondent of the *Times of India* with the Malakand Field Force.

² Lieutenant Lord Fincastle, 16th Lancers, acting as correspondent of *The Times* with the Malakand Field Force.

³ Dafadars Hayat Muhammad and Bura Khan.

⁴ Actually three—viz., Jemadar Bahadur Singh, Sowars Muhammad Khan and Alaf Khan.

assistance of this small party, who otherwise would have been rushed by the enemy. With his assistance Greaves was successfully brought in, but unfortunately MacLean, who had dismounted in order to help in lifting the body on to his horse, was shot through both thighs and died almost immediately.'"¹

"I have since ascertained," wrote Colonel Adams afterwards, "that as I went to the assistance of Lieutenant Greaves, Lieutenant MacLean with Lieutenant Norman, collecting some men, advanced to the *ziarat*, where he dismounted them. Lieutenant MacLean then came out as above described. The fire of these men under Lieutenant Norman I believe alone checked the enemy from rushing the party who were round Lieutenant Greaves."²

While this was going on, the rest of the Guides Cavalry had arrived upon the scene and, dismounting under cover of the *ziarat*, opened a heavy fire; shortly afterwards the infantry and guns also came up from Landakai—about a mile and a half distant—when the enemy retired into and along the hills.

Colonel Adams then pushed on about a mile with two squadrons and seized the village of Abueh and a small kotal behind it which a few of the enemy had been holding. Abueh was burnt, and the Guides Cavalry returned about 6.30 p.m. to camp near Kotah, east of Landakai spur.

This day the Guides Cavalry had Lieutenant MacLean killed, Captain Palmer and one sowar wounded, four horses killed and three wounded.

In his despatch of 30 August 1897, General Blood wrote:—

"I trust it will have been gathered that the feat of arms performed on this occasion by Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Lieutenant Lord Fincastle, Lieutenant MacLean and their men was of the most truly gallant description."

For their gallantry on this occasion Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Viscount Fincastle were subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross in the *London Gazette* of 9 November 1897, as follows:—

"During the fighting at Nawa Kili, in Upper Swat, on 17 August 1897, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams proceeded with Lieutenants J. L. S. MacLean and Viscount Fincastle and five men of the Guides, under a very heavy and close fire, to the rescue of Lieutenant R. T. Greaves, Lancashire Fusiliers, who was lying disabled by a bullet wound and surrounded by the enemy's swordsmen. In bringing him under cover he (Lieutenant Greaves) was struck by a bullet and killed—Lieutenant MacLean was mortally wounded—whilst the horses of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and Lieutenant Viscount Fincastle were shot, as well as two troop horses.

"Memorandum.

"Lieutenant Hector Lachlan Stewart MacLean, Indian Staff Corps, on account of his gallant conduct as recorded above, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the Victoria Cross had he survived."

¹ "A Frontier Campaign," pp. 95–7.

² From a report made by Colonel Adams to the A.A.G. Malakand Field Force, dated 20 August 1897. See also Chap. XXI, p. 291.

In the *London Gazette* of 15 January 1907, however—nearly ten years later—the following announcement was made :—

“ The King has been graciously pleased to approve of the decoration of the Victoria Cross being delivered to the representatives of the undermentioned officers and men who fell in the performance of acts of valour, and with reference to whom it was notified in the *London Gazette* that they would have been recommended to Her Late Majesty for the Victoria Cross had they survived :

“ ‘ *London Gazette*, 9 November 1897.

“ ‘ Lieutenant Hector Lachlan Stewart MacLean, Indian Staff Corps, on account of his gallant conduct, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the Victoria Cross had he survived.’ ”

Lieutenant Lord Fincastle was now appointed to do duty with the Guides Cavalry.

The Indian ranks who were awarded the Order of Merit (Third Class) in recognition of their services on this occasion were :—

Jemadar Bahadur Singh, The Queen's Own Corps of Guides Cavalry, for conspicuous gallantry on 17 August 1897, in action near Nawa Kili, in coming out under a hot fire at close range to assist in carrying away the body of Lieutenant Greaves, who had been shot, and afterwards in supporting and bringing away Lieutenant MacLean, who was wounded at the same time, and whose body, when he became unconscious, he carried off the field on his saddle in front of him.

The same award was made to Dafadar Hayat Muhammad, Dafadar Bura Khan, Sowars Muhammad Khan and Alaf Khan.

On 18 August the force marched by way of Abueh and Barikot to Ghaligai, and on the day following to Mingaora, and while here, on the 21st, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams made a reconnaissance into Upper Swat with a force composed of two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry, two mountain guns and the 24th Punjab Infantry. Marching about two miles up the valley in the direction of the Khalel Pass, the force turned north by the village of Dangram and crossed the Shamelai Pass by a very difficult road, steep and covered with slippery rocks, over which they had great difficulty in dragging their horses. The troops then descended some 900 feet to the village of Manglaur, near which the guns and infantry remained halted while the Cavalry went about four miles farther through the village of Charbagh to a spur above Gul-i-Bagh, from which a good view was obtained up the valley. A rough survey was made of the Kotke Pass leading into Kohistan and the reconnoitring party then returned, arriving in camp about seven o'clock.

On the 24th the Force marched back to Barikot, whence next day two squadrons of the Cavalry accompanied a reconnaissance and pushed up to the top of the Karakar Pass. On 26 August the force moved back to Thana, where it was joined next day by the 2nd Brigade with the Guides Infantry.

On 25 August the following gracious message from Her Majesty The Queen was published in Field Force Orders :—

" I am grieved at the loss of brave officers and men and trust that the wounded are doing well. It is most gratifying to see how well the Native Troops have behaved, and the conduct of all my troops has been admirable."

During these last few days there had been some arrivals among the officers of the Guides and certain changes in the disposal of others. Major Campbell, Captain Davies and Lieutenant Codrington had rejoined the Corps from leave or furlough, as had Captain Baldwin, on recovery from his wound ; Lieutenant Bogle, on return from leave, had taken the place at the depot at Mardan of Lieutenant Garden, and Surgeon-Lieutenant E. L. Perry, I.M.S., had taken over medical charge of the Guides Infantry. Captain Brasier-Creagh and Lieutenant Norman had now left to join their respective corps.

While the Guides Cavalry and the 1st Brigade had been absent in Upper Swat, the 2nd Brigade had remained camped about Khar under Brigadier-General Jeffreys. On his return from Upper Swat General Blood intended to visit and punish in turn each of the several tribes which had been concerned in the attacks upon our posts, beginning with the Utman Khel ; and the Sappers with the 2nd Brigade had been engaged in improving the road leading to their country on the left bank of the Swat river. Having dealt with the Utman Khel, General Blood proposed then to visit Buner, and in the course of a ten-days visit to overrun and thoroughly subdue the country. But by this time the condition of the Frontier had assumed a very serious aspect ; the fanatical rising had now spread to the Afridis and Orakzais, who had attacked the British forts and posts in the Khyber Pass and on the Samana range. Government therefore rejected General Blood's scheme for visiting Buner and ordered him to proceed only with the punishment of the Utman Khel, provided he still considered such action desirable and timely.

Accordingly, on the 28th the 2nd Brigade left Thana, marched to Jholagram, and on the day following into the Utman Khel country ; there was no opposition, but news now reached Sir Bindon Blood that the Hadda Mullah had raised a large body of men and was marching through Bajour to invade the territory of the Nawab of Dir, in retaliation for the assistance that ruler had afforded the British. The 2nd Brigade was therefore recalled and the 3rd Brigade was concentrated at Wuch. In consequence of these movements the Hadda Mullah's gatherings now dispersed, and General Blood again made arrangements for visiting the Utman Khel country. But on 3 September, before the orders for this could be carried out, instructions were received from the Government of India that the troops under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood were to advance by Sado and Nawagai to Kamali in the Mohmand country. The objects of these movements were to destroy the Hadda Mullah's power and disperse his following, to clear the Mohmand country of any enemy forces, and to give support to the Nawab of Dir and the Khan of Nawagai against any threatened attack by the Hadda Mullah.

The punishment of the Utman Khel, as also of the Bunerwals, had thus to be postponed *sine die*.

CHAPTER XII

1897-1898

THE PATHAN REVOLT—SECOND PHASE

EXPEDITION INTO BAJOUR—ATTACK ON THE CAMP—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAMUNDS—
A DIFFICULT RETIREMENT—DESTRUCTION OF MAMUND VILLAGES—OPERATIONS ROUND
INAYAT KILA—PUNISHMENT OF UTMAN KHEL—OPERATIONS IN BUNER—TRIBUTES TO
THE CORPS.

See Maps : Swat and Bajour, and Black Mountain, both in pocket.

THOUGH the force under the command of Major-General Sir Bindon Blood was now detailed to take part in the operations against the Mohmands, his troops were not actually employed in their country, so that no very detailed 1897 explanation seems necessary of the causes which had induced them to join in the general Pathan Revolt of this year. They had not been in any way interfered with, no military road ran through their territory, there were no fortified posts within their borders and their independence was in no way threatened. But while the Mad Fakir was rousing Swat and Buner against the British, the Hadda Mullah was busily engaged in inciting the Mohmands to take up arms for the Faith, and it is sufficient here to say that on 8 August a large gathering of this tribe, some 6,000 strong, crossed the border, invaded British territory, burned the village of Shankarghar and attacked the frontier fort of Shabkadar, some nineteen miles north of Peshawar. A flying column was at once sent out from Peshawar, and by this force, aided by a most opportune and successful charge of the 13th Bengal Lancers, the Mohmands were driven from the field and disappeared into the semi-security of their hill fastnesses.

The Government of India at once issued the necessary orders, which were as follows :

General Blood, with two brigades of the Malakand Field Force, and the necessary cavalry and guns, was to move through southern Bajour to Nawagai, and on 15 September to invade the Mohmand country from that place, while on the same date General Elles with a force of equal strength was to leave Shabkadar, and, entering the mountains, march north to effect a junction with General Blood's column. This done, the combined forces under General Blood were to return through Mohmand territory to Shabkadar, incidentally dealing *en route* with the Hadda Mullah's village of Jarobi.

As a preliminary measure General Blood, on 4 September, sent part of the 3rd Brigade to secure the Panjkora suspension bridge near Sado. On the 6th, Divisional Headquarters and the 2nd Brigade moved to Chakdara, and four days later the Guides Cavalry marched to the Panjkora where the 3rd Brigade was

concentrating. The 1st Brigade was detailed to hold the Malakand, Khar and the posts on the advanced Line of Communications at Sarai and Sado.

The 2nd Brigade reached Sarai on 7 September, camped on the farther side of the Panjkora near Kotkai on the left bank of the Jandol river on the 8th, and on the 9th reached Gosam, remaining there over the 10th, on which day the three squadrons of the Guides Cavalry marched to Sado.

By this time Captain Creagh of the 5th Punjab Infantry had left to join his own Corps, his place with the Guides Infantry being taken by Lieutenant Bogle, on relief by Lieutenant Battye at the depot at Mardan.

On 14 September the 3rd Brigade moved to Nawagai, while the 2nd marched to Markhanai, where camp was pitched on the right bank of the Charmung stream at the foot of the Rambat Pass leading from Bajour into Mohmand territory. The Buffs and Sappers and Miners encamped on the top of the pass, while the remainder of the brigade remained near Markhanai with the idea of crossing the Rambat Pass on the following day. The east side of the camp, held by the Guides Infantry, was bounded by a nullah about thirty feet deep and 80-100 yards wide with fairly steep banks. During the day the Guides threw up a shelter trench along their front, but this very necessary and indeed obvious precaution was not taken by all the units in the camp.

" At about eight o'clock, while we were still at dinner, several shots were fired into camp from fairly close range, some of which from the sound of the bullets we could tell were Martini-Henrys. We thought it was only the usual sniping game and took no notice at first, but very soon after a very hot fire commenced from all sides and we did not take long in putting our lights out and throwing down our shelters made from waterproof sheets, which offered a conspicuous mark in the faint moonlight. Our men were, of course, in the trenches, but the 35th and 38th had to throw up trenches under fire and lost some men at this. This sort of thing continued until about eleven o'clock, during which time they seemed to rather favour our side. The enemy's fire was wonderfully accurate for night work and animal after animal was knocked over. It was only our men being under such good cover that prevented them from suffering more, as we only had two hit.

" About eleven o'clock there was a lull and we heard a great tom-toming in a village about a mile away, where they were evidently withdrawing to consult as to further proceedings. We had some hope of being left in peace for the rest of the night, but, soon after midnight, on they came again in greater force than ever, only they had changed their tactics and had concentrated opposite the 38th Dogras and managed to get within fifty yards of the line, owing to a nullah, and put in a very hot fire. By this time the men had got a pretty good trench, but the British officers made a conspicuous mark as they moved about the line. . . ."¹

" Several star shells were also fired by the battery. The ground was so broken that they revealed very little but the tribesmen were much frightened by the smell they made, thinking it a poisonous gas.

¹ Extract from a letter of Lieutenant H. W. Codrington, dated 22 September 1897.

"The enemy had drawn off, taking their killed and wounded with them, by 2.15 a.m. They had no mind to be surprised by daylight away from their hills. But they had already remained too long."¹ As soon as the light permitted, the cavalry—one squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers under Captain Cole—issued from the camp in pursuit, northwards across the valley, and coming up with the enemy in the Mamund country, killed twenty-one of them. The Guides Infantry, two guns and some Sappers and Miners, all under Major Campbell of the Guides, followed in support of the cavalry, destroyed certain villages north of Inayat Kila and collected some supplies.

The brigade losses in these night attacks amounted to three British officers, eight Indian ranks and six followers with eighty-five animals killed and wounded : one man of the Guides Infantry was severely wounded, also a follower of the Regiment.

The brigade, which was wholly equipped with mule transport, was somewhat crippled by the loss of so many transport animals, but managed to move on the 15th to a camp at Inayat Kila, and here at midday Brigadier-General Jeffreys received a message from General Blood, cancelling all former orders and directing him to undertake at once the rigorous punishment of another tribe, the Mamunds. On receipt of these instructions the Buffs and Sappers and Miners occupying the Rambat Pass were ordered to evacuate their position and rejoin the brigade. This they did in the course of the afternoon and arrangements were made for starting operations against the Mamunds.

At this time very little information was available concerning the Mamunds or their country, and the map of the Watalai valley on which the operation orders were issued was very inaccurate and misleading. The valley itself is about thirteen miles long from north to south and some ten miles broad at its widest part ; the largest villages are built round the head of the valley, at the foot of the hills wherever good springs are found. The whole valley, though much cut up by deep, dry nullahs, is very carefully cultivated, the fields being laid out in successions of stone-faced terraces.

At 6 a.m. on 16 September, Brigadier-General Jeffreys moved his force up the valley in three columns :

No. 1, under Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney, 35th Sikhs, contained one squadron 11th Bengal Lancers, four mountain guns, four companies The Buffs, six companies 35th Sikhs and some Bengal Sappers and Miners.

No. 2, under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian, 38th Dogras, contained six companies 38th Dogras, and some Bengal Sappers and Miners.

No. 3, under Major Campbell, the Guides, contained two companies The Buffs, five companies Guides Infantry and some Sappers and Miners.

The rest of the troops, with the exception of one company of the Guides Infantry detailed as escort to a survey party, remained in charge of the camp.

No. 1 column was to advance up the centre of the valley along the road to

¹ "The Story of the Malakand Field Force," by Winston S. Churchill, pp. 175, 176.

the Koga Pass and destroy the fortified villages of Taani, Mankot, Kamar¹ and Badalai; No. 2 was to move along the foot of the hills on the east of the valley and destroy the villages of Shinkot, Chingai and Damadola, and also Badankot, where the enemy had taken refuge from the cavalry on the previous day; while No. 3 column was to march along the west side of the valley, dealing with Niag, Sharif Khana (north-west of Niag), Khalozi, Agra and Gilal. The first and third columns were to move on parallel lines as far as Kamar and the second independently, so that the whole force might be concentrated anywhere whenever considered necessary. By these movements it was intended to deal with all the villages at once in the low-lying portion of the valley. Brigadier-General Jeffreys attached himself to No. 1 Column.

No. 2 column burnt Shinkot and Chingai, but, meeting with serious opposition at the next village on the programme, Colonel Vivian decided to leave it alone and fell back, boldly followed up, reaching camp about 4 p.m., having suffered two casualties.

No. 3 column, under Major Campbell of the Guides, had carried out as far as possible the destruction of the villages named in the orders to his party, when about 9 a.m. Major Campbell received an order² from the Brigadier, with the centre column, to march his force across the west side of the valley, a distance of about five miles, and protect the left flank of the centre column from the enemy then collecting to oppose it. This was done, and about 3 p.m. a general retirement towards camp was ordered and dispositions made to carry it out. But it had not long begun when Brigadier-General Jeffreys informed Major Campbell that a company of the 35th Sikhs was in difficulties on the hills to the east—*i.e.*, farthest from the flank of the column on which the Guides Infantry were operating; that they reported having many killed and wounded, were hard pressed by the enemy and could not retire without assistance. The Guides were ordered to proceed forthwith to their relief. The Regiment was at once collected and about 4.20 p.m. moved off towards the hill.

In the meantime, however, a note was received from Lieutenant Garden, commanding a company of the Guides, detailed as regimental ammunition guard, stating that he had been ordered (at 3.45 p.m.) by the General Officer Commanding to reinforce the Sikhs on the hills above mentioned, had sent off half a company under Jemadar Sikandar Khan, and would himself take on the other half if his guard could be relieved.

Of the services of the Guides Infantry this day, Mr. Winston Churchill gives the following account.³ "At about two o'clock Major Campbell, Guides, and Captain Cole, 11th Bengal Lancers, both officers of great experience on the Frontier, had realized the fact that the debate with the tribesmen could not be carried to a conclusion

¹ As already stated, the map in use was inaccurate; Mankot and Kamar correspond to Manarkot and Hazarnao of the corrected map.

² The order was worded as follows: "To Officer Commanding Guides Infantry. Dispatched 8.15 a.m. Received 8.57 a.m. Enemy collecting at Kanra; come up at once on Colonel Goldney's left."

³ "The Story of the Malakand Field Force," p. 192 *et seq.*

that day. At their suggestion a message was heliographed up to the General's staff officer on the spur near the guns, as follows : ' It is now 2.30. Remember we shall have to fight our way home.' But the Brigadier had already seen this possibility, and had issued orders for the return march. These orders did not reach Captain Ryder's company on the extreme right until they had become hard pressed by the increasing attack of the enemy. Their wounded delayed their retirement. They had pushed far up the mountain side, apparently with the idea they were to crown the heights, and we now saw them two miles away on the sky-line hotly engaged. . . .

" At about 3.30 the Brigadier had ordered the Guides to proceed to Ryder's assistance and endeavour to extricate his company. He directed Major Campbell to use his own discretion. It was a difficult problem, but the Guides and their leader were equal to it. They had begun the day on the extreme left. They had hurried to the centre. Now they were ordered to the extreme right. They had already marched sixteen miles, but they were still fresh. We watched them defiling across the front with admiration. Meanwhile, the retirement of the brigade was delayed. It was necessary that all units should support each other, and the troops had to wait until the Guides had succeeded in extricating Ryder. The enemy now came on in great strength from the north-west end of the valley. . . .

" Such ponies and mules as were available were laden with exhausted soldiers. Nor was this all. Other troops had passed before us and more than a dozen native soldiers of different regiments were lying senseless by the roadside. All these were eventually carried in by the rearguard, and the Buffs reached camp at nine o'clock.

" Meanwhile the Guides had performed a brilliant feat of arms and had rescued the remnants of the isolated company from the clutches of the enemy. After a hurried march they arrived at the foot of the hill down which Ryder's men were retiring. The Sikhs, utterly exhausted by the exertions of the day, were in disorder, and in many cases unable from extreme fatigue even to use their weapons. The tribesmen hung in a crowd on the flanks and rear of the struggling company, firing incessantly and even dashing in and cutting down individual soldiers.

" Both officers were wounded. Lieutenant Gunning staggered down the hill unaided, struck in three places by bullets and with two deep sword cuts besides. Weary, outnumbered, surrounded on three sides, without unwounded officers or cartridges, the end was only a matter of moments. All must have been cut to pieces. But help was now at hand. The Guides formed line, fixed bayonets and advanced at the double towards the hill. At a short distance from its foot they halted and opened a terrible and crushing fire upon the exulting enemy. The loud detonations of their company volleys were heard and the smoke seen all over the field, and on the left we wondered what was happening. The tribesmen, sharply checked, wavered. The company continued its retreat. Many brave deeds were done as the night closed in. Havildar Ali Gul¹ of the Afridi Company of the Guides,

¹ He had already been awarded the Indian Order of Merit (Third Class) for gallantry at the Panjkora when Colonel Battye was killed.

seized a canvas cartridge carrier, filled it with ammunition from his men's pouches, and, rushing across the fire-swept space which separated the regiment from the Sikhs, distributed the precious packets to the struggling men. Returning, he carried a wounded native officer on his back. Seeing this, several Afridis in the Guides ran forward shouting and cheering to the rescue, and other wounded Sikhs were saved by their gallantry from a fearful fate. At last Ryder's company reached the bottom of the hill and the survivors re-formed under cover of the Guides.

"These, thrown on their own resources, separated from the rest of the brigade by darkness and distance and assailed on three sides by the enemy, calmly proceeded to fight their way back to camp. Though encumbered with many wounded and amid broken ground, they repulsed every attack, and bore down all the efforts which the tribesmen made to intercept their line of retreat. They reached camp at 9.30 in safety, and not without honour. The skill and experience of their officers, the endurance and spirit of the men, had enabled them to accomplish a task which many had believed impossible, and their conduct in the action in the Mamund Valley fills a brilliant page in the history of the finest and most famous frontier regiment."

Major-General Sir Bindon Blood, K.C.B., commanding the Malakand Field Force in his despatch dated 27 October 1897, described the incident as follows :

" . . . Brig.-General Jeffreys ordered Major Campbell with six¹ companies of the Guides Infantry to go to his (Captain Ryder's) assistance, which they did about 4 p.m. a short time being taken up in assembling the companies which were in extended order. The fact of this movement having to be undertaken so late in the afternoon was a most unfortunate occurrence, since Brig.-General Jeffreys had to wait until the safety of the Guides and Captain Ryder's detachment was assured, and the consequent delay at that time of day made it impossible for him to reach camp before dark."

"The Guides under Major Campbell most successfully and gallantly relieved and brought off Captain Ryder's detachment, which had suffered heavy losses. The combined detachment did not, however, succeed in rejoining Brig.-General Jeffreys, being prevented by nightfall and a thunderstorm which came on about the same time. Ultimately they made their way to camp without further loss, arriving about 9 p.m. . . ."

"The behaviour of the troops throughout this trying day was very good. . . . Brig.-General Jeffreys has particularly commended the gallantry with which the Guides Infantry under Major Campbell brought off Captain Ryder's detachment of the 35th Sikhs, carrying the wounded on their backs under a heavy fire. He has further strongly endorsed Major Campbell's favourable mention of the courage and judgment shown by Captain G. B. Hodson and Lieut. H. W. Codrington of the Guides who commanded the companies of the Battalion, which were chiefly in contact with the enemy; the gallantry of Surgeon-Captain J. Fisher, I.M.S., who made a most determined though unsuccessful attempt to take medical aid to

¹ Actually only five.

the wounded of Captain Ryder's detachment through a hot fire ; of Surgeon-Lieut. E. L. Perry, I.M.S., of Jemadar Sikandar Khan of the Guides, and of several non-commissioned officers and sepoy of the same corps, regarding whom I have had the honour to make a separate application. . . ."

After darkness set in the tribesmen ceased to give much trouble, and camp at Inayat Kila was finally reached in a deluge of rain which had converted each small nullah into a roaring torrent.

"I don't think I was ever more relieved in my life," wrote Lieutenant Codrington, "when a flash of lightning showed up Inayat Kila about a mile from us. . . . We began to picture to ourselves the comfort of changing into dry things and getting a good meal. So our disgust may be imagined when we found that the camp had been restricted to as small a space as possible so as to resist an expected attack, and all our kits had to be rolled up and chucked anywhere and we had to stump about in the slush and filth with no prospect of anything to eat.

"However, our discomforts were as nothing to our anxiety when we found that two of our companies ["A" and "E" under Lieutenant Wynter] and two of the 35th Sikhs had been sent on to our assistance and that nothing had been heard of them since." Failing to come up with the Guides in the darkness, Major Worledge of the 35th Sikhs had been led by sounds of heavy firing towards the village of Bilot, where General Jeffreys with a small detachment was surrounded by the enemy. Being unable in the darkness to make their way into the village, Worledge and his four companies entrenched themselves close by, joining the General in the morning, when all returned to camp.

In this day's fighting the Guides Infantry suffered the following casualties : Killed, two men ; wounded, Subadar Shahi Jan and nine men, of whom one died subsequently.

The following letter was received by Major Campbell on 21 September from Lieutenant-Colonel Goldney, commanding the 35th Sikhs :

"MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

"I send you an extract from Ryder's account of his doings on the 16th inst. 'We finally reached a small party of the Guides without whose assistance, which I wish to acknowledge in the warmest terms, I do not see how any of our party could have escaped alive.' Please also accept yourself and convey to your Regiment my thanks for the help they gave to the companies of my Regiment.

"Yours very sincerely,

"J. H. GOLDNEY."

During the next few days the Guides Infantry took part with the remaining troops of the 2nd Brigade in further operations in the Mamund country. On the 18th the brigade attacked and destroyed the village of Damadola, a strongly built village of many stone houses and walled enclosures with several towers, situated on the lower slopes of a high hill and surrounded by terraces covered by high crops of Indian corn, and having retaining walls in some places as much as ten feet in height.

Six companies of the Guides formed the advanced guard of the brigade, moving direct on the village and then, passing through it, occupying two peaks to the right and left of the horseshoe-shaped gorge in which the village lay. The 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras occupied the high ground on the right and left respectively, while the guns and the Buffs were on the left flank and in rear of the centre. The enemy's opposition did not last long under the very effective fire of the mountain guns, and all grain having been removed, the village was set on fire and the brigade returned to camp, arriving there about 3 p.m.

Brigadier-General Jeffreys personally expressed to Major Campbell his appreciation of the manner in which the withdrawal of the Guides was conducted on this occasion, as also of the work done by the Regiment on the 16th.

On the 20th, Zagai, a village belonging to Umra Khan, was attacked and destroyed; on the 22nd Dag was treated in the same way, the Guides on this occasion having two sepoys wounded, one of whom died.¹ On the 23rd the brigade marched to and destroyed Tangai. By these operations the people of the Mamund valley had been so severely punished that they were thoroughly disheartened and already had begun to sue for peace.

"The turning aside of the 2nd Brigade to punish the Mamunds made a considerable change in the aspect of affairs in southern Bajaur and the Mohmand country; and the strategical situation which now developed was interesting. Sir Bindon Blood found himself at Nawagai with a brigade of all arms in a strongly entrenched position, faced by the Hadda Mullah's gathering in the Bedmanai Pass. . . . East of, and behind his position, lay the road to the camp of the 2nd Brigade at Inayat Kila, running for about six miles through a network of deep ravines and then for the remaining six or seven over a plain. Sir Bindon was not strong enough to attack the Mullah's gathering with sufficient odds in his favour, while he did not think it advisable to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys. . . . Accordingly he determined to stay where he was, until Major-General Elles' advance should make it possible to dispose effectually of the Mullah's gathering; and to clear out completely the Bedmanai Pass and the Mitai and neighbouring valleys. . . . On 21 September Sir Bindon Blood met Major-General Elles at Lakarai, seven miles south of Nawagai. . . . In accordance with instructions received from Army Headquarters, Sir Bindon Blood decided on leaving Major-General Elles to carry on the operations in the Mohmand country, while he himself returned to Inayat Kila to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys' brigade, and to supervise the completion of the punishment of the Mamunds and the passage of supplies to his own force via the Panjkora."²

The 3rd Brigade was now temporarily handed over to Major-General Elles,

¹ Both these men were Afridis. After the campaign the officer who was making over the estate to the father of the dead man noticed that he had lost an eye, and on being questioned he explained that he had lost it fighting against our troops at the Sampagha Pass. This was within a few weeks of the son receiving his death wound when fighting for the Sirkar, and is a proof of the fidelity of the Afridis who served in the Corps of Guides during the campaign in which their country was being invaded and their kith and kin exposed to the ravages of war.

² Official Account, p. 60 *et seq.*

and on the 22nd General Blood returned to Inayat Kila, where a forty-eight hours' truce had been granted to the Mamunds to enable them to assemble and discuss among themselves the terms of submission. The opportunity was also taken to reorganize the 2nd Brigade ; the Buffs, the 35th Sikhs and No. 8 Mountain Battery, which had suffered considerably from sickness and from casualties in action, were sent back to the Lines of Communication, being replaced at Inayat Kila by two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry, No. 7 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, 500 rifles of the Royal West Kent Regiment and 539 rifles of the 31st Punjab Infantry.

In accordance with the above arrangement, on 24 September the Guides Cavalry marched from the camp at Panjkora with this force and reached Jar, whence on the following day the whole arrived at Inayat Kila under Colonel Adams. The two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry were "A" under Captain Davies and "B" under Captain Baldwin. "C" Squadron remained at Panjkora under Lieutenant Blois-Johnson who had relieved Lieutenant Smith, that officer having left to join the staff of Lieutenant-General Sir W. Lockhart, appointed to the command of the Tirah Expeditionary Force.

Meanwhile the negotiations with the Mamunds had not made much progress. The tribesmen, realizing how much we now had on our hands, imagined that our troops must shortly leave the country, and indeed rumours were rife that a night attack on the camp at Inayat Kila might shortly be expected. On 29 September, therefore, punitive operations were resumed and several fortified villages were destroyed and large stocks of grain removed. With the exception of the Guides Cavalry, who had a few shots fired at them from the high hills west of Hazarnao, the troops saw nothing of the enemy on this occasion.

On the next day again a force some 1,400 strong, and containing 163 sabres of the Guides Cavalry and 364 rifles of the Infantry, marched out at 6 a.m. to attack the villages of Agra and Gat, the Guides Cavalry leading. On arrival near the villages, situated in ravines on the slopes of the high range of hills on the north-west side of the Mamund valley, the Cavalry worked up a side nullah to the left front towards the Hindu Raj Pass, so as to cover the left flank of the brigade, and prevent parties of the enemy, now visible on the hills beyond the valley, from crossing it or going to the assistance of the villages to be attacked, without making a wide detour. The ground in this valley was unfavourable for the action of the cavalry, being stony and terraced, and in the upper part covered with sparse scrub jungle.

The action that followed is described in "The Story of the Malakand Field Force," as follows: "It was evident as the Guides Cavalry approached the hills that resistance was contemplated. Several red standards were visible to the naked eye, and the field glasses disclosed numerous figures lining the ridges and spurs. The squadrons, advancing as far as the scrub would allow them, soon drew the fire of isolated skirmishers. Several troops dismounted and returned the salute with their carbines, and at 8.45 a dropping fire began. The brigade now came into action in the following formation. The cavalry, on the extreme left, covered the head of a considerable valley, from which our flank was threatened ;

the Guides Infantry and the Royal West Kent Regiment prolonged the line to the centre of attack ; the 31st Punjab Infantry moved against the spurs to the right of the village, and the 38th Dogras were in reserve. The action was begun by the Guides Infantry storming the ridges to the left of the enemy's position ; these were strongly held and fortified by *sangars*, behind which the defenders were sheltered. The Guides advanced at a brisk pace, and without much firing, across the open ground, to the foot of the hills. The tribesmen, shooting from excellent cover, maintained a hot fire. . . . When the troops got to within 100 yards and fixed bayonets, a dozen determined men were still firing from the *sangars*. The Afridi and Pathan companies of the Guides, uttering shrill cries of exultation, culminating in an extraordinary yell, dashed forward, climbed the hill as only hillsmen can climb, and cleared the crest. On the side of the next hill the figures of the retreating tribesmen were visible, and many were shot down before they could find shelter. . . .

"The West Kents had now come into line on the Guides' right, and while the latter held the long ridge they had taken, the British regiment moved upon the village. . . . It soon became evident that the troops were too few for the work." Accordingly General Jeffreys now ordered a withdrawal, which was carried out with great steadiness, the Guides Cavalry and Infantry protecting the flanks.

Of the work of the Guides Cavalry on 30 September the same author points out that for five hours two weak squadrons of the Guides Cavalry were sufficient to hold the enemy in check and prevent him from falling on the flank of the brigade. "The methods they employed," he remarks, "are worth noticing. Little groups of six or seven men were dismounted, and these with their carbines replied to the enemy's fire. Other little groups of mounted men remained concealed in nullahs or hollows or behind obstacles. Whenever the enemy tried to rush one of the dismounted parties, and to do so advanced from the bad ground, the mounted patrols galloped forward and chased them back to cover. The terror these men have of cavalry is out of keeping with their general character. It was a beautiful display of cavalry tactics in this kind of warfare. . . . The Guides Cavalry know all there is to know of frontier warfare."

In the Guides the casualties were wholly among the Cavalry who had five men wounded—Risaldar Ishar Singh and four sowars—while one horse was killed and seven were wounded.

On 2 October Lieutenant Blois-Johnson and fifty-six other ranks of "C" Squadron arrived from the Panjkora and joined the 2nd Brigade, which next day left to attack Badalai, a village about eight miles distant on the east side of the valley and in a re-entrant angle at the foot of the hill on which the 35th Sikhs had suffered so heavily on 16 September. With the column were two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry, ten mountain guns, the 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment, the 31st Punjab Infantry, the 38th Dogras and the Guides Infantry. Marching at first in the direction of Gat, the object of the operations was not immediately apparent to the tribesmen, and Badalai was occupied without opposition. The Guides Cavalry, leading the advance, pressed through the village and formed

a screen of patrols across the other part of the valley facing north, while the Guides Infantry protected the left flank of the brigade, and the guns took up a position in rear of the Cavalry. The two Indian infantry regiments seized the hills on either side of the village, which the rest of the column entered and destroyed. The retirement commenced about midday, just as large numbers of the enemy, coming from the direction of Agra, Gat and Zagai—north and west—began to press the Cavalry patrols, which retired through the Guides Infantry. The tribesmen followed up with great boldness, taking every advantage of the broken ground, but their losses seemed rather more than usual.

The column arrived in camp about 3.30 p.m., the Guides Cavalry and Infantry having each had two men wounded.

The strength of the force at Inayat Kila was now considerably raised, for on 3 and 4 October Generals Blood and Meiklejohn arrived there, bringing with them four field guns, four mountain guns, one squadron of the Guides Cavalry, the Highland Light Infantry, four companies of the 24th Punjab Infantry and a company of Sappers and Miners.

This force now remained camped for another week at Inayat Kila, while negotiations were proceeding with the Mamunds; but foraging parties continued to be sent out daily and shots were exchanged with the tribesmen, an N.C.O. of the Guides Cavalry being wounded.

The troops of the Malakand Field Force were now reorganized in two brigades, Divisional and Line of Communication Troops. The Guides Infantry were in the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Jeffreys with the 1st Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment and the 38th Dogras, while the Guides Cavalry with one squadron 10th Bengal Lancers, four field guns, ten mountain guns, and two companies of Sappers and Miners formed the Divisional Troops.

Speaking generally of the operations, Major-General Sir Bindon Blood says in his despatch dated 27 October 1897:

"The conduct and discipline of the troops in the operations under reference were in the highest degree satisfactory. The operations which extended over seven weeks, were carried on without tents and on a very low scale of baggage, while the rations, though abundant and excellent in all respects, were necessarily open to the objection of sameness. Notwithstanding these inconveniences, the troops remained uniformly cheerful, especially when active hostilities were going on.

"Regimental Officers: The following officers specially distinguished themselves in the fighting in the Mamund Valley. . . . Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Adams, V.C., Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Major F. Campbell, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Captain G. B. Hodson, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Lieutenant H. W. Codrington, Queen's Own Corps of Guides. . . ."

In forwarding the above to the Government of India, the Adjutant-General in India wrote on 11 November 1897:

" The gallantry and discipline of the troops were, in Sir George White's opinion, conspicuous throughout the operations, especially so in the night attacks

made by the enemy on 14, 16 and 20 September, as well as during the trying incidents of 16 September, and in the attack on the villages of Agra and Gat on 30 September. . . . The skilful handling of the Cavalry of the Corps of Guides by Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Adams, V.C., on 30 September, appears to the Commander-in-Chief to be specially worthy of commendation."

Havildar Ali Gul of the Guides was promoted to the Order of Merit (Second Class) "for conspicuous gallantry in action near Inayat Kila, in Bajour, on 16 September 1897, in having voluntarily rushed forward and carried ammunition to a company of the 35th Sikhs who were retiring closely pressed in a hand-to-hand combat with the enemy. Also for having on the same occasion, while still a considerable distance in advance of the firing line and under a heavy fire, carried in (for some distance alone) Subadar Hazara Singh, 35th Sikhs, who was wounded."

Sepoy Sohbat was also awarded the Order of Merit (Second Class) for his gallantry on the same occasion; while Jemadar Sikandar Khan, Havildar Alam Khan and six sepoy received the Order of Merit (Third Class).

The Malakand Field Force marched on 12 October to Jar Qala and next day to Matta Shah in the Salarzai valley, from which, while negotiations were going on with the Salarzai, reconnaissances were carried out up the valley as far as a little beyond Pashat and over the Takwara Pass into the Jandol valley. There was spasmodic sniping into the camp, and as a result one sowar of the Guides Cavalry was severely wounded. Lieutenant F. McConaghey, 5th Punjab Cavalry, now joined from the depot at Mardan, where he had been relieved by Lieutenant W. S. French, 19th Bengal Lancers.

The force was back at Jar by the 20th, and within a few hours the Salarzais and Shamozaïs of Bajour had complied in full with the terms demanded of them, whereupon the troops began their march back to the Malakand, and by 27 October the whole force was concentrated in the Swat valley. Owing mainly to the unhealthiness of the valley at this season, it was decided to retain only the 2nd Brigade in the old Malakand North Camp, placing the 1st Brigade and Divisional troops in a camp at Jalala. In the 2nd Brigade the 1st Battalion The Buffs had now taken the place of the Royal West Kent Regiment, and the Guides, Cavalry and Infantry, were directed to return to Mardan to refit, remaining, however, at the disposal of the G.O.C. if required.

Two squadrons of the Cavalry and the Infantry reached Mardan on 28 October, "B" Squadron following on the 30th.

It will be remembered that large numbers of the Utman Khel had taken part in the attacks on the Malakand, and that punitive operations had been proposed against them, which, had, however, to be postponed when the Malakand Field Force was ordered to advance into Bajour and co-operate with the Mohmand Field Force. Up to 21 November only a few isolated sections of the Utman Khel had made their submission, and consequently a small force, of which the Guides Infantry formed part, was now sent into their country, and succeeded in enforcing the demands of the Indian Government without a single shot being fired.

There remained some five other tribes only to be dealt with for their participation in the Malakand rising, and of these all but the Bunerwals and Chamlawals speedily gave in. These two tribes, persuading themselves that Government troops could not or would not enter their country, ignored the demands made by the Political Officers and showed no signs whatever of submission. The periods of grace given to these recalcitrant tribes expired on 5 and 6 January 1898, respectively, and, pending submission, General Sir Bindon Blood had been making due preparations for the invasion of Buner. For this purpose two brigades were at his disposal, of which the 2nd, again under command of Brigadier-General Jeffreys, contained the 1st Battalion The Buffs, the 21st Punjab Infantry and the Guides Infantry, while the Guides Cavalry were, as before, numbered among the Divisional Troops.

On 2 January 1898 the 1st Brigade and Headquarters of the Malakand Field Force marched to Mardan. At the same time the Guides Infantry from the 2nd Brigade, and the 31st Punjab Infantry from the 1st, moved through **1898** Mardan and camped about a mile beyond Hoti on the Rustam road, where, with the Guides Cavalry, the 3rd Squadron 10th Bengal Lancers, and some Sappers, they formed a separate column under Colonel Adams to operate from the Rustam direction. The remainder of the 2nd Brigade marched to Katlang. By 6 January the force intended to operate in Buner was disposed as follows: At Pirsai were the 31st Punjabis, the Guides Infantry and a section of Sappers and Miners; Rustam was held by three squadrons 10th Bengal Lancers and two squadrons Guides Cavalry; while at Sanghao was the remainder of the two brigades and the Divisional Troops.

With the Guides Cavalry were Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Captains Davies and Baldwin, Lieutenants Stewart, Blois-Johnson and McConaghey, ten Indian officers and 240 sabres, while the following British officers accompanied the Infantry of the Corps: Major F. Campbell, Captain Hodson, Lieutenants Codrington, Elliott-Lockhart, Garden, McCaskill, Battye and Bogle, and Surgeon-Captain Macnab.

On 6 January, in accordance with orders received, Colonel Adams sent Cavalry detachments to demonstrate against the Pirsai, Malandrai and Ambeyla Passes leading from Rustam into Buner and to ascertain how far these were held.

All the passes leading into Buner had been carefully reconnoitred, and it was considered that the Tangi Pass¹ was the most suitable of all for the main advance on account of the special advantages it offered for the combined action of artillery and infantry in the event of resistance being offered. Accordingly the plan of operations decided upon was that the troops at Sangau should force the Tangi Pass, while the Pirsai detachment was to force the Pirsai Pass early the same day; the cavalry from Rustam were then to cross the Pirsai Pass, working on from it towards the enemy's line of retreat from the Tangi Pass.

At 7.30 a.m. on 7 January the Infantry advanced from Pirsai village, the left wing of the Guides forming the advanced guard, followed by the 31st Punjabis, the right wing of the Guides bringing up the rear. On reaching the foot of the

¹ Four miles north-east of Sanghao.

steep ascent to the *Kotal* the troops were disposed as follows : of the Guides one company was in reserve, one company was to form piquets protecting the advance, one company to occupy a spur on the left and assist with flanking and long-range fire, two companies to cover the right flank of the advance, and three companies to form the right of the main attack. The 31st Punjabis were to form the centre and left of the main attack.

There was a great deal of high, overhead jungle on the hillsides which was especially thick on the right of the line of ascent. Two or three standards were seen on the crest of the pass, but though the position here was a very strong one, the enemy did not attempt to hold it, and, after firing a few shots, dispersed before the troops reached the crest at 11.30 a.m. In the meantime the Guides Cavalry, leaving their baggage under a guard commanded by Lieutenant Blois-Johnson, and carrying on their horses two days' rations, sixty rounds of ammunition, great-coats and *poshteens*, had marched at eight in the morning from Rustam, and at eleven o'clock began the ascent of the pass, leading their horses, and followed by the transport of the Infantry. The ascent was very steep and difficult and the road had in places to be improved or even remade by the Sappers, while the descent on the north side was rendered even more difficult by frost and ice. The checks were so many and the consequent delay so great, that the Cavalry did not reach the top of the pass until 4.30 p.m., and only arrived at the village of Chorbanda, a mile and a half down the far side, two hours later.

While the Cavalry of the Guides were negotiating the pass, Colonel Adams and Major Campbell had reconnoitred as far as Khuai without opposition.

The 1st Brigade had gained possession of the Tangi Pass by 2 p.m.—within five hours of the guns opening fire against its defenders. When the enemy here found the attackers closing with them, they fled precipitately, leaving many of their dead behind them, and the reason for this hurried flight became apparent as soon as our troops reached the top of the pass. For although the enemy's position on the ridge appeared from the south side to be a strong one, in reality it was not so. The ground on the Buner side was found to be most unfavourable to troops retiring over it before a successful attack from the south, as for a very considerable distance there is no cover whatever either in the valley below the pass or on the spurs on either side.

From the top of the ridge further loss was inflicted on the retreating enemy, and troops were then sent on to Kingargalai, which was found to be deserted and was occupied without further opposition, the enemy having retired to the hills beyond.

Of the Rustam column, five companies of the Guides Infantry and a wing of the 31st Punjabis bivouacked for the night with the Cavalry at Chorbanda, the rest of the Infantry remaining on the top of the Pirsai Pass. The troops had been employed day and night (the nights being brightly lighted by the moon) from 7 to 9 January inclusive. Next morning the Guides Cavalry pushed on to Bampokha, whence signalling communication was opened with the Tangi Pass. Reconnaissances were also made towards Jowar and to Tursak, where a gathering

of the tribesmen was seen on the hills. The Cavalry then joined the 1st Brigade for the night at Kingargalai.

General Sir Bindon Blood, in commenting on these operations, wrote as follows :

*" The movement thus successfully carried out by Lieut.-Colonel Adams, V.C., was of very great value, as the sudden appearance of five squadrons and two battalions in the middle of the Buner country in addition to the brigade which came over the Tangi Pass, helped most effectually to prevent the enemy from being encouraged to make fresh resistance, as they might have been otherwise, in consequence of the delay which necessarily took place before I could bring supplies enough over the pass to enable me to advance."*¹

The Guides Infantry remained with the 31st Punjabis under Colonel McRae at Chorbanda and on the Pirsai Pass until 10 January, helping to get the baggage forward, but ultimately that of the Guides Cavalry had to be sent round to Sanghao and taken over the Tangi Pass.

During the course of the next few days certain sections of the offending tribesmen had made a start in paying the fines demanded of them, but none the less movements of troops continued in order to hasten these measures and to bring pressure to bear on such sections as were still inclined to stand out. On 10 January the Guides Cavalry accompanied a force under Brigadier-General Meiklejohn to Jowar, in the Bazargai country, the village which the Cavalry had already reconnoitred. Next day Colonel Adams marched by way of Charai, Gatkala and Nawe Kalai to Tursak and Anghapur, and thence round the other side of the Nikanai hill *via* Bampokha back to Jowar. On the 12th General Meiklejohn's force marched to Tursak, where General Blood joined it, and on the 13th a squadron of the Guides Cavalry accompanied some troops with which Brigadier-General Meiklejohn moved to Bhai, bivouacking in the Gadaizai valley, seven miles from Tursak and two from the famous Pir Baba *Ziarat*. The Cavalry returned to Tursak in the evening, and next day Captain Baldwin's squadron joined General Meiklejohn's force at Camp Ilai.

On the 15th a squadron of the Guides Cavalry formed part of a small column which, under command of Colonel Adams, escorted Sir Bindon Blood to Daggar, seven miles from Tursak and in the Nasozai country, while General Meiklejohn marched to Rega, about four miles from Ilai, where the house and property of the Mullah Sadullah, the notorious "Mad Fakir," were situated. The house was burnt, and two towers in Rega were also demolished to mark the disapproval of the Indian Government of the conduct of the maliks of Rega in giving the Fakir asylum after his retreat from the Malakand and Swat. On 17 January this column moved to Bar Kalai, near the Buner Pass, while Colonel Adams marched his column to Bajkatta. Next day General Meiklejohn crossed the Buner Pass to Ambeyla village in the Chamla valley, whither it was followed on the 19th by the troops from Bajkatta, and, the Bunerwals having now wholly submitted, their country was evacuated.

¹ Despatch of 19 January 1898.

Meanwhile the Guides Infantry, which had encamped at Bampokha on the 10th, marched next day to Kingargalai, proceeding on the 12th with the squadron of the 10th Bengal Lancers to Rustam *via* Sanghao and Katlang, rejoining the 2nd Brigade at Surkhawai on the 15th. On the 16th the Guides Infantry bivouacked on the top of the Ambeyla Pass, moving next day to Nawagai in the Chamla valley, the rest of the brigade being four miles in rear at Koga. Returning on the 18th to Koga, the Buner Field Force crossed the Ambeyla Pass to Rustam on this day and the next, reaching Mardan on the 20th, where three days later the Force was broken up.

For their services in these operations Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, V.C., Major F. Campbell and Captain Elliott-Lockhart of the Corps of Guides were mentioned in despatches, the first-named being awarded the Companionship of the Bath and the other two the Distinguished Service Order.

The Commandant of the Corps received the following letter from Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, V.C., K.P., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. :

"I write a line . . . to tell you with what interest and admiration I have watched the conduct of your splendid Corps during the recent operations in Swat, etc. It delighted me to see the rapidity with which they started off on receipt of the call for help from the Malakand, and the keenness they displayed to come into contact with the enemy. I know no regiment with a grander *esprit de corps*. . . Please remember me to all your officers with whom I am acquainted, and tell the native officers and men that I always remember with pride and pleasure their services at Delhi and under my command in Afghanistan."

Then the following very gratifying and greatly prized letter was received by the Commanding Officer from General Sir Dighton Probyn, V.C., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Equerry to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales :

"I am desired by the Prince of Wales to request you will make it known to the British and native officers, as well as to the non-commissioned officers and men (both Cavalry and Infantry) of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides with what great satisfaction His Royal Highness has heard and read of the loyalty, devotion and gallantry displayed by the regiment in the late campaign on the North-West Frontier of India. The Guides Corps in this very trying campaign has not only kept the great name it has always borne for loyalty and gallantry, but the Prince of Wales says it has gained fresh laurels and further distinction, and His Royal Highness wishes all ranks to know how proud he is to be the Honorary Colonel of this distinguished Corps."

The troops engaged in the operations described in this chapter were subsequently granted the India Medal, 1895, with clasps "Punjab Frontier, 1897-98" and "Malakand, 1897," as stated in Army Orders No. 77 and 96 of 1898; while by G.G.O. No. 288 of 16 April 1900, they were permitted to bear the same words (without dates) on their colours and appointments.

CHAPTER XIII

1898-1914

SOME "WEEK-END" WARS

PEACE ON THE FRONTIER—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ZAKKA KHEL AFRIDIS—THE MOHMAND FIELD FORCE—CHOLERA—CHANGES IN ESTABLISHMENT, ETC.—DESTRUCTION OF UTMAN KHEL RAIDERS—AN ESCORT OF THE GUIDES IN PERSIA—EXPEDITION INTO BUNER.

See Maps : Mohmand and Khyber, and Black Mountain, both in pocket.

AFTER the Buner operations the Corps of Guides remained quietly at Mardan until on 1 December the Infantry marched to join the Swat Movable Column which had been ordered from Khar to Chakdara and afterwards camped near the **1898** Landakai Spur. This move was necessitated by a certain amount of unrest caused by attacks which had been made by the Mad Fakir and his followers upon the Nawab of Dir in Upper Swat. The trouble was, however, soon allayed, and on 24 December the Guides Infantry returned to Mardan, where their place had temporarily been taken by the 19th Punjab Infantry.


On 31 March 1899 Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., relinquished the command of the Corps of Guides on appointment to the command of the Punjab Frontier Force, and was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. **1899** Adams, V.C., C.B.

In August of the year following a very distinguished Indian officer **1900** retired on pension; this was Resaidar Sharbat Ali Khan, Khan Bahadur, who had enlisted in the Guides Cavalry on 27 February 1858 and had seen service in the same year against the Hindustani fanatics at Sitana, subsequently serving with the Corps in the Mahsud-Waziri Expedition of 1860, the Ambeyla Expedition of 1863, the operations of 1868 on the Black Mountain, at the surprise of the Utmán Khel villages in 1878, in the Afghan War of 1878-9, in the Chitral Relief Expedition of 1895 and in the operations in the Mamund and Buner countries in 1897 and 1898—a total service of forty-two years.

At this time a concession of some importance was announced to the effect "that the existing consolidated rates of pay of the Infantry of the Corps of Guides should be considered their pay proper, and that on Field Service they should be allowed the same rates of *batta* as are admissible to other native infantry regiments in India."¹

On the retirement this autumn of Dafadar Shahzada Taimus he was granted the honorary rank of Jemadar in recognition of his services in Persia with the

¹ *Vide* Secretary of State's No. 75 of 21 June 1900.



CORPS POLO TEAM, 1900.

Lieut. C. W. Carey.

Lieut. A. H. Buist.

Capt. G. B. Hodson.

Lieut. C. L. Norman.

escort of the Agent to the Governor-General at Meshed. The Indian officer named was one of the few survivors of the Kabul Residency escort.¹

In July 1901 the Guides Cavalry were rearmed with the Lee-Enfield carbine, and in the month following Lee-Enfield rifles arrived for the rearmament of the Infantry.

1901 The outbreak of the South African War gave to several of the Guides officers an opportunity of service overseas. Major G. J. Younghusband commanded the 3rd Imperial Yeomanry and was wounded while serving with them. On his recovery he raised the 26th Imperial Yeomanry (Younghusband's Horse), having Captain Carey as his adjutant. Captain F. G. H. Davies went out later with Remounts.

G. G. E. Wylly, who afterwards joined the Guides Cavalry, enlisted during the South African War in the Corps of Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen. He was three times wounded, and won the Victoria Cross while serving with his unit. When a corporal he formed one of a foraging party which was ambushed by the Boers near Warm Bad in the Transvaal. Six of the advanced party under him were immediately hit and he himself was severely wounded; but in spite of his wound he contrived single-handed to keep the Boers at bay by quick and accurate shooting from behind a rock. Thanks to his courage and determination, all the wounded were eventually brought in.

On 10 May 1902 a representative contingent of Pathans from the Cavalry of the Corps left to join the Indian contingent proceeding to England to take part in the Coronation ceremonies of King Edward VII; the party consisted of Risaldar Faiz Talab, three dafadars, six lance-dafadars, one trumpeter and nine sowars.

Two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry under Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. Younghusband and one double-company of the Infantry under Major G. B. Hodson took part in the ceremonials connected with the proclamation of the accession of King Edward VII to the throne of England at the Great Durbar held at Delhi in the winter of 1902-3, under the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon.

In April 1903 the Guides Cavalry were rearmed with the Lee-Metford rifle in lieu of the carbine, and on an application from the Commandant were permitted to abandon the lance and take to the sword again.

Colonel Adams, V.C., C.B., A.D.C., was this year appointed Colonel on the Staff at Nowshera and consequently relinquished the post of Commandant and severed his connection with the Corps after twenty-five years' continuous and distinguished service with it. He was succeeded as Commandant of the Guides by Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. Younghusband.

On 13 June 1904 it was announced in orders that His Majesty the King had honoured the Corps by becoming its Honorary Colonel-in-Chief, and that Major-General G. Stewart was appointed Honorary Colonel. At the same time **1904** the designation of the Corps was changed to "The Queen's Own Corps of Guides (Lumsden's)."

¹ See Chap. VII, p. 97.

Towards the end of May 1905, on account of disturbances in Bajour and Dir, the Movable Column, to which both the Guides Cavalry and Infantry at this time belonged, was ordered to Chakdara. But on hearing of this movement **1905** the different factions speedily made up their quarrels, and the Guides moved back to Mardan on 15 June.

In this year an expedition was sent from India into Thibet. The mounted infantry of the force was accompanied by Jemadar Ali Gul and twenty-five rank and file of the Guides, and one of these men was subsequently awarded the Order of Merit (Third Class) in the circumstances recorded in the *Gazette of India* of 23 October 1905, as follows:

"Sepoy Muhammad Nasim, Queen's Own Corps of Guides.

"For conspicuous gallantry in Tibet on the 5th July, 1904, when he, well knowing the great danger of the undertaking due to the width and rapidity of the stream, and the risk of attracting the fire of the enemy, voluntarily swam across the Sanpu River to bring back a boat from the opposite bank.

"His Excellency in Council is also pleased to notify that had Naik Sohbat of the same Corps survived, the distinction of the Third Class of the Military Division of the Indian Order of Merit would have been conferred upon him in recognition of his conspicuous gallantry on the same occasion when he was drowned in his attempt to swim the river. His widow is admitted to the pension of the Third Class of the Order with effect from the date of his death."

It should be mentioned that Naik Sohbat was already in possession of the Second Class of this Order, and that the error in the above notification was brought to notice with a view to the necessary correction being made and his widow being awarded the pension of the First Class of the Order.

The Corps was not again engaged in active operations until 1908, when there was a recrudescence of trouble on the North-West Frontier, and the first of the Border tribes to call for punitive treatment were the Zakka Khel Afridis.

For some years after the close of the Tirah Expedition of 1897-8, quiet had reigned on this part of the Border. But the mullahs in tribal territory were ever prone to make trouble, while there was a strong anti-British party in Kabul, which city was visited in 1904 by a large body of Afridis, who were well received by the Amir and allowed to make considerable purchases of rifles and ammunition. On their return the Afridis in general, and the Zakka Khel in particular, adopted and maintained an attitude of open defiance towards the Indian Government, and in

1907 the border raids formerly carried out by them were resumed, until in **1908** February 1908 a field force was mobilized for service against the Zakka Khel of the Bazar Valley.

In order to release other troops for the expedition, detachments of Guides Cavalry and Infantry were sent to garrison Shabkadar Fort as well as Abazai, each detachment being of a strength of thirty Cavalry and seventy Infantry under a British officer.

The following officers of the Corps were actually employed with the Zakka Khel Field Force: Major A. R. Garden as Commandant of Details at Jamrud, Captain



CAVALRY POLO TEAM, 1906.

Capt. J. E. Blois-Johnson.

Major F. G. H. Davies.

Capt. C. W. Carey.

Capt. C. L. Norman.



INFANTRY POLO TEAM, 1900.

Capt. G. B. Hodson.

Lieut. B. R. Graham.

Lieut. H. Campbell.

Lieut. A. H. Buist.

NOTE: These two Teams met in the final of the Punjab Frontier Force Jubilee Tournament in 1900, the Cavalry Team being the same as in 1906. The Infantry, the only team entered by an Infantry regiment, were the winners.

P. Howell as Intelligence Officer, and Lieutenants D. Sandeman and D. K. McLeod as Signalling Officers.

The expedition only lasted about a fortnight, and owing to the rapidity with which it was conducted and the success of the operations, it was the subject of a cartoon in *Punch*, entitled "Willcocks' Week-end War."

The trouble on this part of the Frontier had barely settled down when disturbance arose in the Mohmand country, into which detachments of troops had been sent from Peshawar and Nowshera some weeks previously to protect our border villages. The Mohmands, aided by contingents from the Utman Khel country and Afghanistan, and by firebrands from many neighbouring tribes, had lately become increasingly bold, raiding villages several miles within the British border, cutting the telegraph line, firing on our troops and even endeavouring to burn the bridge of boats which kept open communications between Peshawar and the Frontier outposts. A large *lashkar*, estimated at 5,000 men, had taken up a position on the foothills facing Matta Mughal Khel, while other large bodies were in the villages of Hafiz Kor and Shahbaz Khan Kor. So threatening was their attitude that General Willcocks, commanding the 1st Peshawar Division, determined to attack and disperse these gatherings, and at 4 p.m. on 23 April an urgent message was received at Mardan directing the Infantry of the Corps of Guides to march at once to Shabkadar.

There was some slight delay owing to the fact that the baggage camels were all out grazing, but the battalion was on the road within two and a half hours from the receipt of the message and, taking the Charsadda road, settled down to a march of thirty-six miles on a dark and sultry night. Charsadda and the eighteenth milestone were passed soon after midnight, but three miles farther on came a serious check, for it was here found that the bridge of boats over the Khiali branch of the Swat river had been carried away and only two moderate-sized rowing boats were available for the transshipment of the whole battalion. It took till 6.15 on the morning of the 24th to effect the crossing, the mules, and more especially the camels, giving a good deal of trouble in the dark. There now still remained some fourteen miles to be covered in the blazing sun, but by 11 a.m. the battalion arrived at Shabkadar in excellent condition.

During the whole morning the sound of heavy firing could be heard in the distance and the Guides were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to move out and support either the force under General Anderson at Matta Mughal Khel or that commanded by Colonel Unwin at Hafiz Kor; but as events turned out they were not required by either of these commanders.

On the morning of 25 April a force was sent out, under command of Colonel Younghusband of the Guides, to Shahbaz Khan Kor and Hafiz Kor to complete the destruction and dispersal of those tribesmen who had been in action against our troops on the previous day. It was composed of 18th Field Battery, Royal Artillery, 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, Guides Infantry, and 54th Sikhs, with detachments of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment and the 28th Punjab Infantry. The whole country was found to be deserted, and the only living person to be seen anywhere was a wounded Mohmand who was brought in. During the retirement

to Shabkadar, however, a few of the enemy appeared on the hills, but did not fire on the troops.

On the following morning the Guides Infantry moved a few miles along the Abazai road to form a mobile column under Colonel Younghusband, with the 54th Sikhs (later relieved by the 55th Rifles), two mountain guns and a squadron of the 21st Cavalry ; but this column was not called upon to act as the enemy had entirely withdrawn from the border.

News now arrived that the fort at Landi Kotal in the Khyber Pass, garrisoned by the Khyber Rifles, was being threatened by a considerable tribal gathering, supported by large contingents of Afghans. Sir James Willcocks therefore decided to send the 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders and the Guides Infantry to reinforce the troops on the Khyber line. The order to move was received at Abazai at 2 p.m. on 2 May, and the Guides were directed to endeavour to reach Peshawar, twenty-one miles distant, that night ; after a very hot and dusty march the Regiment arrived opposite the Indian infantry barracks in Peshawar at 10.30 p.m. Next day the baggage was sent on by road, while the men proceeded by train to Jamrud, marching thence to Ali Masjid. The Guides, however, were on rear and convoy-guard and did not get in till 6.15 p.m., while the head of the column arrived at one o'clock, thus covering the forty-one miles from Shabkadar in twenty-three hours.

On 3 May the troops under General Willcocks attacked and drove off the gathering about Landi Kotal and this then dispersed.

The Khyber Pass and its neighbourhood were now reported quiet, so the Seaforth Highlanders and Guides Infantry returned on 7 May to their former posts on the Mohmand border. Unhappily on the way the battalion was attacked by cholera, one fatal case occurring at Jamrud, and two men being attacked while in Peshawar. The battalion was consequently struck off the strength of the Field Force as a temporary measure and was sent into cholera camp near Daudzai ; but as no other cases occurred orders were received, at the end of five days, to move up by easy stages and join the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Major-General A. A. Barrett, C.B., and composed of the 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 28th Punjabis, 54th¹ Sikhs and 55th Coke's Rifles, the Guides Infantry being divisional troops.

The Guides Infantry rejoined the brigade at Hafiz Kor on 13 May, and next day they and the 55th Rifles were ordered up to Ghalanai ; but after marching only a few miles they came upon the rear of the 1st Brigade baggage column at Dand, and were not able to move forward again until 2.30 a.m. on the 15th. The Karppa Pass, which had to be crossed by a rough footpath, hurriedly improved and remade by the 34th Pioneers, constituted a serious obstacle, and some of the transport animals had been standing or moving slowly forward, with their loads on their backs, for close upon twenty-four hours. Fortunately there was no opposition, not a single armed tribesman being seen throughout the day or night. The battalion remained some days at Ghalanai to safeguard the pass and the lines of communication, while the rest of the 2nd Infantry Brigade marched on over the Nahakki Pass and joined Divisional Headquarters.

¹ This was the new regimental number of the 4th Sikhs, old friends and comrades-in-arms of the Guides.

On 20 May, just as the Guides Infantry were expecting orders to move up to the front, two more fatal cases of cholera occurred, those of Lieutenant L. S. Wells and a Ghurkha sepoy ; both were taken ill about 2 p.m., and both were dead within six or seven hours. The whole camp was consequently shifted at once, two other cases of cholera having occurred among the men of the 1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment. There were no further cases, but it was not until 26 May that the Guides Infantry had an opportunity of seeing any fighting in this little campaign.

On that day a wing of the battalion under Major Codrington crossed the Nahakki Pass and joined the 2nd Brigade, while the other wing, commanded by Major Garden, together with the 34th Pioneers, went over the Khapak Pass on the 28th, joining the brigade at Khan Beg Kor ; both these parties were slightly engaged.

Next day, the 29th, Major-General Barrett, accompanied by Sir James Willcocks and his staff, moved out at 5.15 a.m. with a battery and four infantry battalions to destroy the Baizai village of Khudu Khel. To the Guides Infantry and the 54th Sikhs was entrusted the duty of driving the enemy through and out of the village and of holding the heights beyond until the group of villages had been destroyed, the Guides moving on the right and the 54th on the left. The villages and crops having been destroyed, the retirement was carried out with but slight loss. The Guides had four men severely wounded, while Havildar Manga and Sepoy Nur Zaman were awarded the Order of Merit for acts thus described in the *India Gazette* :

" Havildar Manga and Sepoy Nur Zaman, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, for conspicuous gallantry during the operations of the Mohmand Field Force. On the 29th May, 1908, at Khudu Kheyl during the retirement from the heights, Sepoy Mir Hussain was severely wounded in the leg ; the enemy were then only about 50 yards distant. Sepoy Nur Zaman, followed by Havildar Manga, at once rushed back and with the greatest gallantry, under a close and heavy fire, carried the wounded man down a precipitous slope out of danger."

On the nights of the 28th and 29th there was heavy sniping into camp, but as all were well entrenched there were few casualties, and the Guides did not suffer at all.

The Mohmands had now made such submission as seemed to meet the case, and the force then left their country, the Guides Infantry, with the 22nd and 28th Punjab Infantry and two guns, providing the rearguard. There was some firing by isolated tribesmen as the troops cleared the Khapak Pass and two men of the Guides were severely wounded. The frontier at Hafiz Kor was reached on 1 June and the Guides Infantry were back in Mardan on the 4th, one Gurkha sepoy dying of cholera a few hours after arrival. The marching-in strength was ten British officers, thirteen Indian officers and 575 other ranks.

The following British officers took part in the expedition :—Colonel G. J. Younghusband, Majors H. W. Codrington and A. R. Garden, Captains J. McCaskill and J. S. Bogle, Lieutenants C. E. Morris, C. H. Campbell, D. G. Sandeman, L. S. Wells, N. H. Prendergast and C. E. T. Erskine, with Captain H. M. Cruddas, I.M.S. ; Captain J. E. Blois-Johnson and Lieutenant R. G. Trail of the Cavalry were attached.

On 1 January 1909, the pay of rank of captains and subalterns of the Indian Army was raised to Rs.400 and Rs.280 per mensem respectively, while the staff pay of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Squadron and of Double-Company Commanders **1909** was raised to Rs.250 and Rs.200 respectively.

In this month the Guides Cavalry were rearmed with the Lee-Enfield Mark III short rifle.

On 15 February Colonel G. J. Younghusband, C.B., relinquished the post of Commandant of the Corps of Guides, which he had held since 26 February 1904, on leaving to take up the command of the Fyzabad Brigade. He was succeeded by Colonel R. G. Egerton who had left the Guides in November 1907, to command the 5th Cavalry.


In February 1911, an occurrence took place recalling the life in old days on the Frontier before the continued presence of the Guides had taught the neighbouring tribesmen that raiding the border was not a thing lightly to be under-
1911 taken. In this month the Chief Commissioner was touring in Yusafzai with an escort of which fifty sabres of the Guides Cavalry, under Jemadar Khan Bahadur, formed part. On the 28th news reached the Chief Commissioner's camp at Charsadda of the presence of a party of Utman Khel raiders, under a notorious outlaw, one Hakim Khan, at Turnab, a village on the Swat river, south-west of Tangi. Part of the escort, including Jemadar Khan Bahadur and thirty sabres, commanded by Captain Howell of the 82nd Punjab Infantry, marched off at once to assist the police in effecting the capture of the gang; while news of the whereabouts of the raiders was also sent by the Thanadar of Tangi to Captain Wylly, V.C., who was at the time commanding the Guides detachment at Abazai. This officer at once moved out with twenty sabres of the Cavalry under Risaldar Abnashi Ram, followed by thirty rifles under Havildar Khawas Shah. Turnab was reached about 7 p.m., and Captain Wylly now, as senior officer present, took command of the combined party.

The raiders, twenty-nine in number, had established themselves in a walled *ziarat* on a mound about a mile north of Turnab. This they had loopholed and from it they kept up a brisk fire. Between 8.30 and 9.30 p.m. further reinforcements, including two guns of No. 25 Mountain Battery, arrived upon the scene, and an entrenched cordon was formed round the *ziarat* at a distance of 150-200 yards from it. This was held during the night, and at 7 a.m. on 1 March the guns opened fire upon the *ziarat*, speedily reducing it to ruins, while those of the raiding party who attempted to break out and escape were shot down. Hakim Khan, the leader, and nineteen of his followers were killed, while nine, including three wounded, were captured.

The thanks of His Excellency the Viceroy were telegraphed to Captain Wylly for communication to all concerned.

On 4 August Risaldar-Major Bahadur Singh and Subadar-Major Wadhawa Singh rejoined the Corps on return from attendance at the Coronation ceremonies in England of King George V.

In November of this year Colonel R. G. Egerton was appointed Colonel on the



THIRTY-FOUR WEARERS OF THE INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT, 1897.



OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1911.

Standing.—Capt. G. G. E. Wylly, V.C. Lieut. J. V. C. Anderson. Lieut. P. d'A. Banks. Capt. C. Kirkpatrick. Capt. B. R. Graham.
 Capt. C. W. Carey. Major H. M. Cruddas. Lieut. W. H. Blood. Lieut. N. H. Prendergast. Lieut. C. E. T. Erskine.
 Lieut. D. K. McLeod. Lieut. L. V. S. Blacker. Capt. C. J. B. Hay.

Sitting.—Capt. H. Campbell, M.V.O. Major P. C. Elliott-Lockhart, D.S.O. Major A. C. Stewart. Major H. W. Codrington.
 Colonel R. G. Egertou. Lieut.-Col. F. G. H. Davies. Major J. S. Bogle. Major A. H. Buist.

Sitting on Ground.—Lieut. H. M. Hankin. Lieut. E. M. Murray.

Staff to command the brigade at Ferozepore, and was succeeded as Commandant of the Corps by Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. H. Davies.

On 8 January 1912, the following announcement was made in Corps
1912 Orders :—

"The King Emperor is graciously pleased to approve of the title of the Corps being changed from 'Queen's Own' to 'Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides (Lumsden's).'"

In February 1913, two dafadars, two lance-dafadars and ten sowars of the Guides Cavalry had been sent to Meshed to furnish the Consular escort there. In

the following July the Commandant published in orders a despatch received
1913 by the Commander-in-Chief from H.M. Consul-General at Meshed, reporting that the escort of the Guides Cavalry, while on its way there, had captured a notorious outlaw and his gang, and adding that "Dafadar Sher Muhammad and the members of the escort displayed considerable courage and initiative."

The Commander-in-Chief, in communicating this despatch to the Corps, remarked as follows : "His Excellency has read the report with much satisfaction. The prompt manner in which Duffadar Sher Muhammad and the members of the escort acted, and the courage they displayed, has produced a good political effect. The Commander-in-Chief is glad to state that the Government of India have been pleased to confer the Indian Distinguished Service Medal on the duffadar."

In July of this year there was again a slight change in the title of the Corps which was altered to "Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides, Frontier Force (Lumsden's)."

In September there seemed a possibility of some little trouble arising in Dir, and both the Cavalry and Infantry of the Corps were ordered to mobilize and be ready to move at a moment's notice. On the 17th the Infantry of the Corps—six British officers, nine Indian officers and 397 other ranks—marched under command of Major A. H. Buist, M.V.O., to Jalala as extra escorting regiment to the Chitral reliefs, their place at Mardan being taken by a detachment of the 51st Sikhs from Peshawar ; and on the 21st the Cavalry—strength, six British officers, nine Indian officers and 227 sabres—also marched for Jalala to join the Infantry of the Corps and the Malakand Movable Column. Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, the Commandant, also moved out and took command of the Corps. The Infantry accompanied the Chitral Relief Column as far as Mirkhanni in Chitral. The Cavalry remained with the Malakand Movable Column at Chakdara. The anticipated disturbance did not, however, take place, and both Cavalry and Infantry were back in Mardan before the end of October.

Early in 1914 the system of coloured squadrons was introduced in the Cavalry with a view to stimulating emulation and keenness among the men :—

- 1914** "A" Squadron (Brown) mounted on blacks, browns and dark bays.
 "B" Squadron (Bay), mounted on bays.
 "C" Squadron (Chestnut), mounted on chestnuts and light bays.

The Frontier had for some little time past been tolerably peaceful, but there was trouble early in the year 1914. An outrage by the Utman Khels led to a brief

blockade of the tribe, and in this operation 200 men of the Guides Infantry were employed under Captain Sandeman, holding the line of the Swat canal from Mardan to Narai. Later there were two serious raids by the Bunerwals, in which eight British subjects were killed and a considerable amount of property carried off. In consequence of this, a squadron of the Guides Cavalry, under Major Blois-Johnson with Second-Lieutenant Dane, was ordered out on 11 February in aid of the Civil Power, and proceeded towards Rustam to blockade the passes leading into Buner. Then, on the 21st, the Infantry of the Corps, under Captain H. Campbell, M.V.O., who had with him Captains Kirkpatrick, Sandeman and Banks, Lieutenants Prendergast and Anderson and Second-Lieutenant Grant, eleven Indian officers and 400 rifles, marched from Nowshera, where they had been engaged in manœuvres, and bivouacked in pouring rain at Baho Dheri, there joining the 2nd Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General R. Bannatine-Allason, C.B., then *en route* for Rustam. The rest of the Guides Cavalry was also ordered to the same place, and Major Blois-Johnson now had under him seven British officers—Captains Clementi, McLeod and Browne, Lieutenant Hammond, Second-Lieutenants Dane and Cameron and Captain McNeill, I.M.S., six Indian officers and 224 other ranks. Lieutenant-Colonel Davies joined the Corps at Rustam.

The 2nd Brigade arrived at Rustam early on the afternoon of the 22nd, but the rain had made the road very heavy and the baggage did not get in until 8.30 p.m. The force was now known as the Malakand Movable Column and the 2nd Brigade was supported by the 3rd in camp near Hamzakot.

At 11 p.m. the same night the Guides Infantry fell in and moved off as advanced guard to the brigade, the Cavalry bringing up the rear. The objective was the Malandrai Pass. The village of Pitao Malandrai was reached at 6 a.m. on the 23rd and an hour later the Guides began the ascent of the pass with orders to seize the *Kotal* and piquet the crest line on either side. Two companies under Lieutenant Anderson were detached and sent up a spur to the left and occupied a high point about a thousand yards from the pass. The remainder of the Infantry started up the pass under Captain Campbell, but on the enemy opening fire from some of the lower spurs, it proceeded up a spur on the left of the pass, followed by the 24th Punjabis in support. The ascent was steep and through scrub jungle, but the crest was occupied about 8 a.m. and the hills to right and left duly piqueted by the Infantry.

The 24th and 82nd Punjabis and some Sappers now passed through into the valley and burnt two villages, and though the Guides Cavalry had also reached the crest, leading their horses, it was decided not to send the Cavalry forward. The two Punjabi regiments withdrew about 1.45 p.m. and at 3.45, when the brigade was reported clear of the pass, the Guides Infantry were ordered to retire, which they did without interference, and camp at Rustam was reached at 8.30 that night.

The following day the officers of the Guides Infantry were sent for to receive the commendation of the Brigade Commander.

The Guides Infantry and one squadron of the Cavalry remained at Rustam and a detachment of twenty-five sabres at Katlang until 1 April, by which date the Bunerwals had submitted and paid the fines levied upon them.

CHAPTER XIV

1914-1917

THE GREAT WAR

OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT WAR—DRAFTS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE—THE CAVALRY IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MOHMANDS AND THE SWATIS—THE INFANTRY IN BUNER—ATTACKS BY GHAZIS—RENEWED TROUBLE WITH THE MOHMANDS—THE MOHMAND BLOCKADE.

See Maps : Mohmand and Khyber, Swat and Bajour, and Black Mountain, all in pocket.

WHEN on 4 August 1914, war was declared against Germany, the Corps of Guides was at its usual hot-weather establishment of British and Indian officers and other ranks. Steps were at once taken to recall those who were on leave or furlough in India, and all such at once rejoined. The expansion of the army in England and the need for replacement in staff appointments in India at once deprived the Guides of the services of many officers belonging to the Corps. Thus, Major Buist,¹ M.V.O., Captains Clementi and Trail and Lieutenant Murray were detained in England for duty, and all went to France, Captain Trail being killed there while serving with the Jodhpur Lancers. Major Bogle² was called to Simla to take up an appointment, and Captain McLeod went to France with the Lahore Division, while Lieutenant Blacker, who was away in Kashgar when war broke out, intending to walk over the Pamirs to Constantinople, made his way home by way of Russia and Finland and on arrival in England was posted to the Royal Flying Corps.

Other calls were speedily made upon the Corps. Captain H. Campbell, M.V.O., was summoned to Patiala to do duty with Imperial Service troops proceeding overseas. Captain Wyllly, V.C., had barely rejoined from the Staff College at Quetta when he left again to take up the appointment of Staff Captain 5th Cavalry Brigade in France ; and Captain Browne,³ Lieutenant Hankin, Jemadar Natha Khan and forty-eight rank and file left to join the 15th Lancers of the Indian Corps as a reinforcement. Lieutenant Hankin was later attached to the Royal Flying Corps and was shot down in combat with two enemy planes, remaining for two and a half years a prisoner in Germany.

General Sir James Willcocks was the commander of the Northern Army when the Great War broke out and was appointed to command the Indian Corps under orders to proceed to France. One of his last official acts in India was to publish the following report on the Corps of Guides for the year 1913-14 :—

" CAVALRY. I saw the Corps last autumn at Mardan and again in the winter at Divisional manoeuvres. I have known them for many long years. There is no

¹ Major Buist was actually staying with friends in Germany at the outbreak of war.

² Major Bogle went later to Egypt with Imperial Service Troops.

³ Killed in France with the 15th Lancers.

finer Native Cavalry Regiment in the Native Army. Nerve and keenness cannot be beaten. The Guides Cavalry is fit to go anywhere and do anything.

"INFANTRY. I have known them longer than anyone now serving in the Corps. They are still as ever impossible to beat. The same fine spirit animates all ranks. I wish the Guides a sad farewell and I know the Battalion will acquit itself well wherever sent."

Early in September the Reservists of the Guides Cavalry were called up and embodied, and on 24 November the Governor-General, with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, sanctioned as a temporary measure the formation of a fourth squadron in the Guides Cavalry.

Then, on 20 December, the Reservists of the Guides Infantry were called up and embodied, but out of 302 who presented themselves only 190 were passed fit for service and retained with the Corps.

On 2 January a draft of 211 other ranks, composed half of Sikhs and half of Yusufzai Pathans under Captain P. d'A. Banks were dispatched to join the 57th Rifles, Frontier Force, in France. This brought the Infantry below war 1915 strength, and recruiting was at once taken seriously in hand. This proved a very necessary precaution, as, in addition to replacing the men sent on drafts, it was found necessary to replace the Afridi half-company with Punjabi Mussulmans, owing to wholesale Afridi desertions. These desertions were at first chiefly amongst men who were away on leave or recruiting duty, but it was soon discovered that the Afridis were not to be relied upon, so to test their *bona fides* batches of twenty-five at a time were warned for the next draft and sent on two weeks' leave prior to their departure. Of the four batches thus sent off only the two Indian officers and two or three old soldiers returned and the remainder were struck off the strength as deserters. When the Battalion finally went overseas two years later, Subadar Khyal Gul, Malikdin Khel, was the only Afridi who accompanied it, and he was murdered on his return to Tirah by his fellow Afridis for having remained loyal. Their places were, however, speedily filled by Punjabi Muhammadan recruits, who came forward readily for enlistment. Within six months of the outbreak of war the Infantry recruits on the "Square" had increased from eighty to over 400.

On 16 January 1916, Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott-Lockhart, D.S.O., was appointed to command the 59th Rifles and left to join his new unit in France, where he was killed in action within three months of sailing from India. "He had done his service in that fine Corps the Guides, and had only recently got his new command. He was one of the most refined, gallant, and attractive men you could meet. In him we lost a tower of strength, and his battalion deeply felt the blow."¹

By this time the Indian Army Reserve of Officers, which had been recently established, had begun to supply officers for service with the Corps. Some of them did not stay very long with the Guides, the many casualties in all theatres of war among the commissioned ranks creating a large and increasing demand everywhere for officers to fill gaps.

¹ Sir James Willcocks, "With the Indians in France."

On 2 April a second draft, consisting of Subadar Bahadur Khan and forty-nine other ranks—twenty-five Dogras and twenty-four Khattaks—left the Guides to reinforce the 57th Rifles in France.

In April trouble arose on the North-West Frontier and the Guides were called, as so often in the past, to help to hold back the more aggressive of the tribesmen of the Border.

The trouble was due to fanatical mullahs who preached against the British in Mohmand country, and on 13 April a report was received that Mohmands were collecting with a view to raiding Shabkadar. Accordingly, on the 15th the Khyber Movable Column marched from Peshawar to Shabkadar and Major Carey with 100 sabres and Lieutenant Erskine with 100 rifles of the Guides, marched to Abazai to reinforce the garrison of that fort, which consisted of a detachment of the Guides. Next day a patrol of seven men of the Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant Erskine, which was reconnoitring along the foothills near the Ali Kandi Pass, was fired on at close range. One horse was killed, the rider of which was brought away at great personal risk by a young recruit named Sher Muhammad who was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. It was afterwards discovered that the ambush of this patrol had been the work of a well-known Mohmand raider, Muhasil of Khudu Khel, in the destruction of whose village the Guides had taken part in the Mohmand Expedition of 1908.

On the 18th the Khyber Movable Column fought an action against Mohmand tribesmen in the vicinity of Hafiz Kor in which the detachment at Abazai, without waiting for orders, joined and rendered valuable assistance by operating against the enemy's flank.

Meanwhile, at Mardan the remainder of the Corps had been mobilized, and at 9 p.m. on the 18th a telegram was received ordering the Guides Infantry to march as soon as possible to reinforce the 1st Brigade of the Khyber Movable Column on the Mohmand frontier. No time was lost and the troops—eight British officers, five Indian officers and 303 rank and file got off at midnight under Lieutenant-Colonel Davies. Two hundred were carried in *tumtums* and reached Abazai about 7 a.m. on the 19th, and the remainder covered the thirty miles on foot in ten and a half hours, arriving at 10.30 a.m. The advance party under Lieutenant Erskine was now at once pushed on to Shabkadar, where the rest of the Battalion, less two companies which remained at Abazai, arrived at 5.30 the same afternoon, the crossing of the Swat river taking five hours as only two ferry-boats were available. The Maxim-gun detachment and the transport marched all the way—thirty-eight miles—and no men fell out nor were any of the mules found to be suffering from sore backs on completion of the march—a fine performance.

Meanwhile, the Mohmand tribesmen were reported to be dispersing and the Guides Infantry, after spending a few days in Shabkadar marched back to Mardan on the 25th, leaving the two companies at Abazai under Lieutenant Grant.

On 26 April news was received that, of the detachment sent by the Guides to reinforce the 57th Rifles in France, Captain P. d'A. Banks, Jemadar Wadhawa Singh and ten rank and file had been killed and fifty-two rank and file wounded.

The Frontier did not remain quiet for long, and within a month of the Guides returning to Mardan signs of trouble became apparent in Swat where the tribes were engaged in inter-tribal quarrels. Matters came to a head in June when the advance of a tribal *lashkar* on Adinzai, the tract of country just north of Chakdara, threatened the safety of that fort and also of the Chitral road. Accordingly the Malakand Movable Column was concentrated at Chakdara, composed of the Guides Cavalry, No. 25 Mountain Battery, 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry, 46th Punjabis and the 82nd Punjabis. The Guides Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Davies, left Mardan at 4 a.m. on 19 June, reached Dargai at 9 a.m., halted there during the hottest part of the day and, marching again at 2 p.m., reached Chakdara at 6 p.m. having covered forty-two miles in nine marching hours. Meanwhile the other units of the column moved by train to Dargai and thence on foot. This rapid concentration of the troops had an excellent effect and prevented any outbreak at the time, though some trouble was experienced later.

The next two months were passed in peace, the column remaining at Chakdara and being reinforced by the 35th Sikhs and the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles, but on 21 August camp was shifted to a position just west of the Landakai spur to deal with a tribal gathering under the Sandaki mullah, a notorious firebrand, which was reported to be advancing down the Swat river on Chakdara. On the night of the 28th the enemy made a faint-hearted attack on the camp piquets which was easily repulsed. The following day the brigade moved out with two squadrons of the Guides Cavalry as advanced guard. These squadrons were ordered to take up a position on a ridge to the south of the village of Melogan, while the guns were engaging a mud fort named Kak on the opposite bank of the river.

The brigadier now sent for Major Blois-Johnson and asked him to try to get some of his men across the river to complete the destruction of the fort. Major Blois-Johnson returned to his squadron and called for volunteers who were good swimmers. Jemadar Ganda Singh and fourteen men came forward and with these Major Blois-Johnson set off down the left bank to look for a crossing. This was no easy matter, as the river was deep with a strong stream running, and the party was immediately fired at by some enemy on the north side. Eventually they managed to cross, but immediately got into bad ground where one horse was bogged and extricated with great difficulty. On reaching higher ground, the party dismounted and advanced on the fort on foot. The fort was found to have been evacuated, but four tribesmen, who were hiding in the adjacent crops and opened fire on our men, were all killed. The fort was then set alight and the party returned to the brigade by the same crossing, bringing with them three Martini-Henry rifles and two bandoliers.

On 5 September the column returned to camp north of Chakdara, remaining more or less inactive until the early morning of 27 October, when it moved out on receiving information that the tribesmen had crossed the Panjkora river and were marching on Wuch. The Guides Cavalry on this day were acting as independent cavalry and marched in the dark to the spur south of Wuch, where they were fired on. They then made a detour through Wuch and, turning west towards the Katgala Pass,

formed the flank guard of the column. Meanwhile the 82nd Punjabis had crossed the hills on the left and they, with the 46th Punjabis, covered by the guns of the Field and Mountain Batteries, advanced towards the Katgala Pass along the hills, with the Durham Light Infantry on the low ground. The guns drove the enemy back headlong, and at noon the retirement was begun, the Guides Cavalry forming the rearguard, and reaching camp at 5 p.m. No opportunity arose this day for shock action, but good use was made of dismounted rifle and machine-gun fire. The Guides had no casualties.

We must now turn to another part of the Border where, during this time, the Infantry of the Corps of Guides was actively engaged.

The people of Buner remained quiet until 15 August, when information was received that a certain mullah, known as the Haji Sahib of Turangzai, was in the neighbourhood of the Ambeyla Pass with several thousand men, including a number of those perennial firebrands, the Hindustani Fanatics, and was preparing to invade British territory. Accordingly, 270 rank and file of the Guides Infantry, under Major A. H. Buist, M.V.O., recently rejoined from France, with whom were Captain Sandeman and Lieutenants Anderson, Grant and Macnamara, moved out to Rustam on the Buner border, accompanied by fifty-seven lances of the 14th Lancers under Captain Ogilvie, Guides Cavalry. On reaching Rustam on 16 August the troops entrenched and were joined later in the same day by General S. F. Crocker with two squadrons of the 13th and one of the 14th Lancers, while in the evening another 163 men of the Guides Infantry marched in under Lieutenant Erskine.

General Crocker now had the following troops at his disposal: 13th Lancers, numbering 143; 14th Lancers, 328; the Guides Infantry, 440; a total of 911, exclusive of British officers.

In a letter to the Commandant of the Corps, Major Buist gives the following account of the action which took place on 17 August and of the events preceding it:—

“On that day [the 16th] we dug for all we were worth, as we got one rumour after another of Bunerwals advancing down towards Rustam from Surkhawi, Malandri and Pirsai. The totals worked out into thousands, and I sent out patrols to all the three passes to find out how far the rumours were true. They all reported large gatherings of tribes, so we thought we were in for a busy night of it. That evening General Crocker arrived with three squadrons (two of 13th and one of 14th), and our perimeter was rather upset as we had to hold a large portion of their front. We again kept awake all night expecting to be attacked, but nothing happened, although reports came in that the enemy were collecting in increasing numbers and were marching on Rustam from Surkhawi, Pirsai and Malandri.

“Next morning the hills were reported as being covered with the enemy and our patrols corroborated these rumours. Suddenly, at 1.30 p.m., we saw a tremendous *lashkar* coming down the nullah from Surkhawi about two miles from our camp—we counted no less than twenty-five standards. They were advancing in a line about sixty yards deep and two miles wide and moving straight on Rustam. Crocker at once decided to attack and moved out the cavalry on both sides of the Surkhawi nullah. One double company, with Anderson, I sent across the nullah

to head the enemy off at Rustam, and with the other two double companies I moved on the flank of the enemy. At the very moment that we started off the guns [91st Field Battery] arrived, dead beat.¹ The horses managed to pull the guns about half a mile beyond the camp on to a ridge, and there they opened fire over our heads. The range was 1,700 yards, so you can understand that they got well into them. The tribes scattered and streamed up the hills. Our flank attack, two double companies, doubled across the nullah, but we could only pick off a few of them at about 500 yards. As we advanced several of the enemy lay low in the deep and narrow nullahs and suddenly rushed out at our supports and reserves from about five yards distance. We had several of these onslaughts by *ghazis*, and in each case we killed every one of them. How on earth we escaped with only four casualties defeats me, for we killed no less than eighteen in five different bouts.

"On the road back the same thing happened, and it was just like partridge shooting—only the partridge in each case got in the first shot!

"We drove the enemy right up to the top of the hills and at 2 p.m. started our retirement. . . . Although we had two casualties on our return journey and two *ghazi* rushes, we got back into camp at about five all safe and sound without being followed up.

"Poor Macnamara was killed in the foothills; we had to go down and up the cross-nullahs, and it was while crossing one of these nullahs that seven *ghazis* rushed on him and his orderly and killed him. He was badly cut in the face, and it took us about five minutes to kill the lot. That night there was no sniping and all was quiet. The next morning the tribes acknowledged a loss of seventy killed and seventy wounded.²

"All this morning and afternoon [the 18th] reports came in saying the tribes were collecting in thousands—5,000 at Surkhawi, 5,000 at Malandri, and 2,000 at Pirsai and a movement at Swabi; we sent half a squadron to Swabi. That night the tribes closed in on us and attacked immediately the sun went down, but they didn't put up much of a show and did no damage. . . . Our men did awfully well, and all the British officers did splendidly. . . . I wish you had been here; it ought to have been your show and you would have enjoyed every bit of it."

Captain Ogilvie, Guides Cavalry, was present on the 17th and narrowly escaped being killed by two Ghazis hidden in a nullah. He was fired at at point-blank range when jumping the nullah, but emptied his revolver at his assailants, and two dead or dying men were later taken out of the nullah.

On the 18th the O.C. Guides Infantry received the following from Brigadier-General Crocker, commanding the troops at Rustam:—

"The following telegram has been received by me from the Government of India with reference to the action of the 17th, when a considerable force of the enemy

¹ The horses of this battery were terribly distressed, having by a great effort made a forced march in excessive heat.

² The Infantry casualties were one British officer and one man killed, and two men wounded, one of whom died of his wounds. A blanket would have covered Macnamara, his dog, his orderly Basanta and the seven fanatics. Macnamara's revolver had a couple of fired cartridges. His son is now with the Guides Infantry.

was utterly routed : ' Please accept the cordial congratulations of the Foreign and Political Department on your most successful repulse of the Bunerwal incursion ; the effect of your success should be very salutary.'

" With reference to the above telegram I should like to put on record my great appreciation of the work of the Guides on this occasion. The manner in which they attacked gave me the greatest confidence and the very gratifying results which were achieved were largely due to the skilful way in which they were handled by their officers and to the gallantry of their men."

Major Buist made the following report on one of his non-commissioned officers who was awarded the Indian Order of Merit (Second Class) :—

" On the 17th of August during the Guides' retirement from the foothills east of Rustam, Havildar Kishen Singh, Guides Infantry, whilst carrying out the retirement of his section across a nullah was suddenly attacked by three ghazis. . . . He turned about and closed with them. Having bayoneted two, although severely wounded by sword-cuts in four places, he succeeded in killing the third ghazi with a downward blow of his rifle on the man's head, smashing his rifle in the act. His wounds are such as to make it very probable that he will be invalided out of the Service."

Major Battye and fifty more men of the Guides Infantry marched into Rustam after the action, and on the 19th several reinforcements joined the force—No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.G.A., the 1st Battalion The Royal Sussex Regiment, the 81st Pioneers and the 2/6th Gurkhas—when the Rustam force was merged in the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Nigel Woodyatt, with Brigadier-General Crocker in command of the Cavalry and Captain Blood of the Guides as Staff Officer to the Brigade.

Again, on the night of 25 August, the camp at Rustam was heavily sniped for an hour, and on the following morning the force, leaving the 81st Pioneers in charge of the camp, moved out to the mouth of the Ambeyla Pass. " We were advanced guard on the march out," wrote Major Buist to the Commandant of the Corps at Mardan, " and eventually moved off up the left of the valley and occupied the hills overlooking Surkhawi and into Buner. . . . The Gurkhas searched the village of Surkhawi and then took the high ground beyond. We had a certain amount of jungle fighting and the Gurkhas and ourselves eventually bagged twenty dead between us—mostly Hindustani Fanatics. We had no casualties and the Gurkhas had one officer wounded and one man. The artillery shelled the whole valley, and we heard that the enemy had forty-eight casualties—thirty-four killed. We got into camp without being followed up.

" On the 28th we marched up the Malandri Valley, the Regiment doing rear-guard. The General had intended to go as far as Malandri Surai and Malandri Pitao, but the advance was too slow, and we had to stop three miles short of the nearest village. There were very few of the enemy to be seen, and the guns frightened the few that made an attempt to stop us. The day was very hot. . . . We were covering the retirement and had a big job bringing in all the sick, the

Bearer Company was hopeless and the men were too bad to ride mules, so it ended up by our men carrying most of the sick. They worked like fiends and eventually brought in every man by 3 p.m. We left camp at 6 a.m., so had a long and hot day. The Sussex were awfully pleased with our men, and the C.O. sent over his adjutant to thank us for all we had done. . . . General Woodyatt also seems very pleased with us."

General Nigel Woodyatt, in his book, "Under Ten Viceroyes," records that "so many British soldiers fell down with heatstroke that the rearguard could hardly move. The stretcher-bearers were so overcome themselves that they were useless. It was then that the splendid Guides, and later the 84th Pioneers, came forward and volunteered to carry the sick, while officers, mounted and dismounted, as well as men in the ranks, took over the rifles and accoutrements of those *hors de combat*."

There was renewed fighting with the tribesmen on 31 August, which brought the operations about Rustam to a close. This fighting is described as follows by Major Buist :—

"The General Officer Commanding decided at midnight on the 30th–31st that he would attack and burn the two villages at the foot of the Malandri Pass, and we were ordered to rendezvous at a village called Baringan at six, and there received orders to form the advanced guard. We marched up the valley searching every bit of the ground as we advanced ; this was a long and tedious job, as the whole valley was full of nullahs and covered with high scrub jungle. When we got within two miles of the village we started piqueting the heights and then the enemy opened fire on us, we covering the advance of the piquets by rifle fire and later with the Maxims and Mountain Battery. In this manner we advanced to within half a mile of the village having had only one casualty.

"When close to the village I sent Anderson up a spur to occupy a place for a piquet ; when nearing his destination he suddenly raised a 'covey' of six of the enemy who made for his party. Anderson downed one with his revolver at two yards distance and put another bullet into a second man, and, after about three minutes' skirmishing, they managed to bag the lot amongst the rocks and trees. We had, however, two casualties over this show. . . . We piqueted all the hills round the village, Malandri Pitao, and then with the remaining men—about one company—we started burning the village. . . . We watched the village burning for about an hour and picked up one or two snipers during the process, especially one man who insisted on dancing on the top of a rock, brandishing his sword and defying us.

"We started our retirement about 10 a.m., when we were told off as rearguard. One piquet of the Sussex Regiment eventually held us up for an hour and a quarter owing to their retiring too late and two of their party going sick with heatstroke. The enemy started following us up, but we kept up a brisk fire and dropped a few shells amongst them which eventually choked them off. After retiring about one and a half miles, we were kept waiting for an hour and a half on account of the piquet. We sent back some of our men to bring in the two sick men and then continued our retirement only to find the road strewn with men down with heatstroke. The

Bearer Company was no use and we had used up all our riding mules, so there was nothing left for us to do but to carry the men in ourselves. I don't know how many men we carried back, but all I know is this, that nearly every one of our men was carrying two rifles or a stretcher and all the British officers three rifles. In this manner we got back to Baringan—three miles from camp, where we handed them all over to the 81st Pioneers at 3 p.m. None of our men fell out, they were really splendid.

"In the evening General Woodyatt sent me a line saying he wanted to see the British officers and Indian officers in front of our mess, and there he thanked us for all we had done ; he said he knew we ' had a big reputation to keep up and that we had more than justified it '—we are all delighted."

In his despatch Major-General Woodyatt wrote as follows of the Guides Infantry :—

" At this juncture I may mention that the grand Infantry of the Guides, although they had borne the brunt of the fighting all day in very difficult ground, at once volunteered, as they have done before, to carry the stretchers of British soldiers. . . . I have already referred to the Guides. Their handling by Major A. H. Buist, M.V.O., and the extraordinary efficiency of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men in any situation, makes me fully realize my good fortune in having them under my command."

There was no more fighting at Rustam, but the Guides Infantry remained there until 21 September, when they marched to join the 3rd Infantry Brigade at Adozai for service against the Mohmands who had now again begun to raise the standard of revolt. Leaving Rustam at 7.30 in the morning and marching in great heat, they reached Mardan at 2.30 p.m. Marching again at 3 a.m. on the 22nd the battalion entrained at Nowshera for Peshawar at 8 a.m., arrived there at 2.30 in the afternoon, left again on the morning of the 23rd at four, and completed a very hot and dusty march of sixteen miles to Adozai by 10 a.m. Since leaving Rustam on the 21st (excluding the rail journey), the Guides Infantry had covered fifty-four miles in fifty-one hours, during which time they had had to load and unload the baggage no fewer than ten times. They were tired and footsore, but cheery on arrival, and there were only two admissions to hospital.

The 3rd Brigade now contained the 1st Bn. Royal Sussex Regiment, the Guides Infantry and the 2/1st Gurkhas and was commanded by Brigadier-General Woodyatt.

General Sir F. Campbell, K.C.B., D.S.O., commanding the 1st Peshawar Division, resolved to attack a big Mohmand gathering in the neighbourhood of Shabkadar, and in accordance with the above the 3rd Brigade marched early on the morning of 8 October from Adozai to Sabhankwar, where Lieutenant-Colonel Davies joined the Guides. The British attack was directed on Hafiz Kor, the 4th Brigade being on the right, the 1st in the centre and the 3rd on the left. The Guides Infantry formed the left battalion of the last-named brigade. The force advanced at 9 a.m. and the plateau was taken with little or no opposition, the Guides having their left on a nullah and being supported by the fire of a mountain battery. The 3rd Brigade

was ordered to hold the line arrived at, while the guns shelled the enemy who were on a ridge and hill to the front. At about 11.45 a.m. the G.O.C. 1st Brigade, becoming anxious about his left flank, which at the moment was not directly protected, asked the G.O.C. 3rd Brigade to occupy an eminence known as Tower Hill. General Campbell concurring, two double companies of the Guides Infantry were sent up, supported by the Royal Sussex Regiment and a half-battalion of the 2/1st Gurkhas.

The two double companies advanced, the right, No. 2, or "C" and "E" Companies (Punjabi Mussulmans and Gurkhas), under Captain Erskine, the left, or "A" and "B" Companies (Dogras and Yusafzais), under Major Battye, moving in echelon formation, the right leading. After the left company had advanced some considerable distance, it suddenly came under heavy fire from a nullah on the left, whereupon Major Battye slightly changed his direction to the left with the Yusafzais under Subadar-Major Alam Khan on the extreme left, and almost at once two Yusafzais were killed. Major Battye tried to bring in the bodies of these men, but exposing himself at short range, was severely wounded in the stomach.¹ No one knew that he had been hit, and he quietly went on for some time evacuating the wounded. Eventually, however, he had to be carried to the rear. Orders were then received to withdraw. After the retirement had begun, Subadar-Major Alam Khan, finding that four rifles had been left behind, crawled back, recovered them and brought them in. Excellent support was given by the Dogras on the right, but Subadar Romala² was seriously wounded, and this was the cause of half the casualties, as he was a big, heavy man to bring away. All the dead and wounded were eventually brought in, the original line was reoccupied, and at 4 p.m. the withdrawal to camp began.

The following specially distinguished themselves this day: Major Battye, Second-Lieutenant Blandy, Subadar-Major Alam Khan Bahadur, Subadar Romala, Jemadar Khushal, Havildar Taj Muhammad and Sepoy Jugtu; Subadar Romala was mortally wounded, six men were killed or died of wounds, and Major Battye and twelve rank and file were wounded. The enemy had, however, suffered severely, and on the next day the Mohmand gathering melted away. On 1 November the Guides Infantry returned to Mardan.

For exceptionally fine leadership in action on the Mohmand and Buner borders, and for conspicuous bravery in action at Hafiz Kor on 8 October 1915, Major Battye was awarded the D.S.O., Subadar-Major Alam Khan Bahadur, I.O.M., was promoted to the First Class of the Order, while Havildar Taj Muhammad and Sepoy Jugtu were awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal for gallantry in action at Hafiz Kor. Major Buist received a mention in despatches.

On 8 January 1916, the Infantry of the Corps was called upon to furnish a reinforcement for the 24th Punjabis in Mesopotamia. The draft was composed of

¹ Major Battye probably owed his life to the fact that, as he was suffering from dysentery, he had eaten nothing for two days.

² Subadar Romala and a Sepoy, also shot through the stomach, unfortunately drank some milk at the Field Ambulance and died next day. Major Battye wisely refused it.

Second-Lieutenant Gilbert, Subadar Daya Singh, Jemadar Khawas Shah (subsequently killed) and ninety-eight rank and file (one section each of Sikhs, Dogras, Punjabi Muhammadans and Khattaks).

1916 In this month there was a threatening of further disturbance on the Border, and the Cavalry of the Guides joined the troops of the Risalpur Cavalry Brigade in a "round-up" of the Mohmands and Utman Khels north of the Swat Canal near Narai, one company of the Guides Infantry also proceeding to Rustam on the Buner border in aid of the Civil Power. About the same time the right wing of the Infantry marched under Major Battye to Chakdara to relieve the 94th Infantry with the Malakand Movable Column.

During the next few months there were no events of outstanding importance connected with the Corps, but there was a constant drain both upon the Cavalry and the Infantry to provide reinforcements for other units in Mesopotamia. Thus, on 9 February a draft of twenty-six rank and file of the Guides Cavalry left Mardan, under Second-Lieutenant Ross-Smith and Resaidar Ratan Chand, to join the 7th Lancers in Mesopotamia; on 9 March a draft of fifty rank and file of the Infantry left, under Second-Lieutenant Blandy, to reinforce the 53rd Sikhs; and this last was followed on 9 June by a second draft of equal strength to the same regiment. Later again, on 9 October, a third draft of two Indian officers and ninety-eight rank and file proceeded to join that regiment under Second-Lieutenant Scarth, who was killed later.

Towards the end of the year the Mohmands again began to give trouble, to prevent which and as a punishment for raids made by them into British territory, it was decided to blockade them. A chain of blockhouses, connected by barbed wire, was therefore constructed along their border from Abazai to Michni. In connection with this operation the Guides were given a separate task of furnishing protection for the construction of three towers on the Khazana Ghund hills on the right bank of the Swat river and overlooking the Lower Swat canal headworks.

Accordingly four Indian officers and 117 other ranks of the Infantry, under Captain Sandeman, marched from Mardan to Abazai on 17 October, followed on the 26th by the rest of the Infantry and the machine-gun troop of the Cavalry, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Buist, M.V.O. Attached to the Guides for this operation were a wing of the 81st Pioneers and a section of the 24th Mountain Battery. The Regiment was accompanied by Messrs. Burkitt and Bigsby, of the Public Works Department, old friends of the Guides, who gave them valuable assistance.

That evening the Guides encamped in the river bed on the right bank opposite Abazai, and at 9 p.m. moved out towards Khazana Ghund, a distance of two miles. The preliminaries of the operation, which had been carefully kept secret, had been worked out by Captain Sandeman and Subadar Khyal Gul, Afridi, both of whom had previously reconnoitred the ground, and to them was allotted the task of leading the column. The night was very dark, the going was rough, and the advance a difficult one, for, in addition to sandbags, gabions, barbed wire and other materials,

120 barbed wire "knife-rests," which had been previously made up, had to be carried to the top of the ridge. No opposition, however, was encountered, and by 1.30 a.m. on the 27th the ridge had been occupied and by dawn six strong piquets had been constructed and wired. The Mohmands were taken completely by surprise, and for the first three days no attempt was made to interfere with the strengthening of the position and the construction of the towers by the Pioneers. Later, Mohmands collected in large numbers on the surrounding hills, but took no action beyond desultory sniping.

On the 27th the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, under Brigadier-General L. C. Dunsterville, began the construction of the blockade line, work being taken in hand simultaneously all along the line. This operation also was unopposed except for a little sniping.

On 13 and 14 November, Mohmands began collecting in the vicinity of Hafiz Kor, and General Sir F. Campbell, who was now in charge of the operations, decided to operate against them by means of an artillery bombardment with aeroplane co-operation. Accordingly on the 15th the guns, covered by a screen of infantry, opened a heavy bombardment, while aeroplanes, flying low, bombed and machine-gunned the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties. The Guides Cavalry, who had marched from Mardan to Tangi the previous day, took part in this operation, but had no opportunity for action as no enemy ventured down into the plain.

On the 16th the tribesmen dispersed. A "live" wire¹ was now put up all along the blockade line, and on the 23rd the Infantry, who throughout had been holding the Khazana piquets, were ordered back to Mardan. For these operations Captain Sandeman and Subadar Khyal Gul were mentioned in despatches.

On 14 November the Guides Cavalry had sent a reinforcing draft of one Indian officer and fifty rank and file to the 10th Lancers in Mesopotamia.

On this date also the platoon system was introduced into the Guides Infantry.²

This chapter may close with the mention of an event which, though its implications were doubtless not appreciated at the time, may be regarded as the prelude to the termination of the Corps system under which the Guides had originally been raised seventy years previously, and to the final separation of the Corps. The question of adding another battalion to the Guides Infantry had already been under consideration for some little time past; and on 15 January 1917, a 2nd Battalion came officially into being, and the following officers were posted for duty with it :—

Major R. C. G. Pollock, 51st Sikhs; Lieutenant J. L. Coates, 5th Gurkha Rifles; and Lieutenant A. H. Kemm, I.C.S., Indian Army Reserve of Officers and 54th Sikhs. Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Bogle was recalled from Egypt to take command, which he did upon his arrival at Mardan.

From this time on this history will chronicle separately the services of the Cavalry and of the several Infantry battalions of the Corps of Guides.

¹ Almost its only victim was a mullah, whose body was found upon the wire next morning, with a copy of the Koran clasped in either hand.

² See Appendix VIII (B).

CHAPTER XV

1917-1921

THE GREAT WAR : THE GUIDES CAVALRY IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA

THE GUIDES CAVALRY ORDERED OVERSEAS—JOURNEY TO MESOPOTAMIA—MARCH FROM NAHR UMAR TO BAGHDAD—OPERATIONS ON THE EUPHRATES—DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH FORCES—CAPTURE OF ANA—OPERATIONS ON THE TIGRIS—CROSSING OF THE LESSER ZAB—DEFENCE OF THE "ASSYRIAN WALL"—SURRENDER OF THE TURKISH ARMY—OCCUPATION OF MOSUL—THE KURDISH REVOLT—ENCOUNTERS WITH THE BOLSHEVIKS—COLLAPSE OF THE PERSIAN COSSACKS—WINTER AT KASVIN—EVACUATION OF NORTH PERSIA—RETURN TO MARDAN—REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN CAVALRY.

See Map of Mesopotamia and North-west Persia, facing page 228.

FOR month after month of this year the Cavalry of the Guides pursued the even tenor of their way at Mardan, and many must have begun to wonder whether the greatest of all wars would come to an end without the Guides Cavalry having 1917 an opportunity to take part in it.

Meanwhile, as the time went by the calls made by other corps for officers and men were repeated and insistent. In January 1917, Lieutenant D. A. Cameron¹ left for France where he was attached to the Central India Horse, while Lieutenant A. V. Hammond sailed from India for Mesopotamia to join the 32nd Lancers, taking with him a draft of one Indian officer, Jemadar Ganda Singh, and fifty-five rank and file as a reinforcement for the 10th Lancers.

On 11 April H.E. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, visited Mardan on his way back to Nowshera from a trip to the Malakand, and the Guides Cavalry lined the road.

Early in August, Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Stewart, who had been on active service in France and Gallipoli with the Scottish Horse, rejoined the Corps and assumed command of the Cavalry in relief of Major J. E. Blois-Johnson, who had been officiating in command since the departure to Mesopotamia of the 1st Battalion Guides Infantry on 24 February.

When in the autumn of this year the usual Chitral reliefs were carried out, Major J. E. Blois-Johnson joined the Malakand Movable Column at Jalala with a detachment of seven British officers, eight Indian officers and 217 other ranks, but as in previous years the column did not proceed beyond Chakdara.

On 22 September the much-hoped-for orders were received for the Guides Cavalry to proceed on active service to Mesopotamia and to embark at Karachi on 2 October. There was plenty to be done, and the time was all too short. For example : the detachment had not yet returned to Mardan from Chakdara, and

¹ This officer won the M.C. and was killed at Cambrai.

many officers and other ranks were away on leave or furlough ; but these soon came pouring in, for, in the remarkable way in which rumour spreads in India, many of those who were away had heard that the Cavalry of the Guides had been warned for service before they received the telegrams which had been dispatched for their recall. The Chakdara detachment, on relief by the 1st Lancers on the 25th, started at once and arrived at Mardan—forty-three miles away—at 2 p.m. on the 26th.

Brigadier-General G. M. Baldwin, D.S.O., commanding the 10th Cavalry Brigade and an old Guide, came over to Mardan and inspected the Regiment.

On the 30th, Major-General Sir F. Campbell, K.C.B., D.S.O., commanding the 1st Peshawar Division—another old Guide—inspected the Regiment and gave a farewell address ; and on 3 October the Guides Cavalry marched out from Mardan, leaving in two wings at 8.30 and 10 a.m. respectively.

The close friendship which had long existed within the Brigade showed itself once more. As each wing reached the level crossing at Risalpur it was met by the mounted band of the 21st (Empress of India's) Lancers, who played the Guides Cavalry into Nowshera, also playing on the platform while the Regiment entrained. By 7 p.m. entrainment was completed and the Regiment left early on the morning of 4 October in three troop trains for Karachi. Before leaving Nowshera the Regiment was generously entertained by Ghulam Haidar Khan, father of Jemadar Saadat Hussain, and also by Jemadar Mohibulla of the Guides Cavalry ; while throughout the early stages of the journey as the train passed through the districts from which many of the men were recruited, they were met by cheering crowds of their relations and friends. At Jhelum again, Captain Jai Singh, Sardar Bahadur, a Mutiny veteran, a Subadar-Major of the Guides Infantry from 1880 to 1891, and father of Risaldar-Major Abnashi Ram, dispensed hospitality, as was also done on a lavish scale at Samasata by the Commander-in-Chief of the Bahawalpur Imperial Service Troops, a brother of Risaldar Muhammad Sarwar Khan.

Karachi was reached at 4 a.m. on 7 October, and the Regiment proceeded at once to the Rest Camp, where they had scarcely settled down when orders were received to embark as soon as possible at Kiamari. Laden with many comforts kindly provided by the ladies of Karachi, the Guides Cavalry left the Rest Camp at 2 p.m. and marched four miles to Kiamari where there was a fresh medical and veterinary inspection. Embarkation began at 4.30 p.m. in the hired transports *Torilla* and *Bandra*, and was completed in the record time of two and a half hours.

At noon on 8 October the transports sailed.

The embarking strength was thirteen British officers, seventeen Indian officers, and 545 Indian other ranks with 511 horses. The following are the names of the British and Indian officers who left India for Mesopotamia with the Regiment : Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Stewart ; Majors J. E. Blois-Johnson and C. W. Carey ; Captains J. F. W. Ogilvie and W. H. Blood ; Lieutenants C. H. H. Eales, M.C., M. L. Barrett, F. A. Davies and G. T. B. Harvey, I.A.R.O. ; Second-Lieutenants C. P. J. Prioleau, S. S. A. Shippard and W. J. Jackson, I.A.R.O., with Lieutenant B. S. Ashton, I.M.S., Medical Officer. Acting Risaldar-Major Abnashi Ram ;

Risaldars Nur Khan, Dayal Singh, and Muhammad Sarwar Khan ; Resaidars Zardad Khan, Ratan Chand, Jiwand Singh and Bhagwan Singh ; Jemadars Abdullah Khan, Rajah Ram (Woordie-Major), Saadat Hussain Khan, Beant Singh, Zarif Khan, Khan Bahadur, Wasawa Singh, Arjan Singh and Shah Pasand.

On the departure of the Guides Cavalry from Mardan a depot was formed, with the following British and Indian officers : Major J. Clementi¹ in Command, Lieutenant C. Wallis, Adjutant, Second-Lieutenants G. E. Howe, Quartermaster, H. L. Bucknall, H. B. Foster, J. S. Ker, and J. Reekie ; Risaldar-Major Bahadur Singh, Resaidar Gurdeo Singh, Jemadars Dhanpat Rai and Firdos Khan.

The weather on the voyage was good, and men and horses were comfortable and kept in good health. At seven o'clock on the morning of 13 October the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab was reached and the transports arrived off Basra at noon and at Margil, the Base Ordnance Depot, very shortly afterwards. After a delay of a couple of hours in mid-stream the *Torilla* resumed her journey to Nahr Umar, some thirty miles up-stream, where disembarkation was to take place, but those of the Guides who were accommodated in the *Bandra* had to tranship into barges and be towed up the river, as their ship had cargo to discharge at Margil. The Guides Cavalry was the first regiment to use Nahr Umar as a place of disembarkation and camp, and probably for this reason arrangements were rather embryonic, there being no piers or appliances for the landing of troops ; but huge bales of compressed " bhoosa " were provided as a substitute and used as rests for the gangways.

The voyage in the *Torilla* from Margil to Nahr Umar was not without incident, as the steering-gear failed twice and the ship charged the bank of the Shatt-el-Arab. Eventually Nahr Umar was reached safely at 5.15 p.m., too late for the troops to land that night.

The barges conveying the men from the *Bandra* arrived at 6.30 a.m. on the 14th, when they landed and went into camp one and a half miles up-stream on the right bank. Disembarkation from the *Torilla* began about the same time, and by eight o'clock all were ashore.

The Guides Cavalry arrived in Mesopotamia at a time when the campaign had taken a very favourable turn. Early in the spring of 1917 Kut had been captured and Baghdad had fallen, and before the summer heat arrived the British troops, advancing north of Baghdad, had captured Samarra and had driven the remnants of the Turkish forces into the fastnesses of the Jebel Hamrin. During the great heat of the summer months operations had perforce been at a standstill, and the bulk of the British troops were withdrawn to camps along the Tigris.

In August the troops had again advanced, and when in early November Tikrit fell, Maude was only some 100 miles from Mosul and was preparing to clear away the Turkish advanced posts of Kifri and Kirkuk, seventy miles east and north-east of Tikrit.

After landing at Nahr Umar on 14 October there followed for the Guides Cavalry four days given up to refitting, rendered all the more difficult as much that

¹ Major Clementi had returned from service in France in September 1917.

was needed had to be sent for from Basra, communication with which was very difficult. The railway was not yet completed and only country boats could be relied on for the journey down-stream, with the chance of a river steamer for the up-river journey.

Low-velocity rifles and Mark VI ammunition were now exchanged for high-velocity rifles and Mark VII ammunition with the new pointed bullet.

On 26 October the Guides Cavalry experienced their first casualty, Risaldar Dayal Singh dying in hospital at Basra. He had given twenty-seven and a half years of most distinguished service to the Corps and had been a very able Woordie-Major. He had been ailing before leaving Mardan, but refused to give in, and it was not until the Regiment reached Nahr Umar that he was obliged to go to hospital, dying two days after admission.

The Regiment was now refitted, the horses in good case and all ready for the long march to Baghdad which began on 27 October. The strength of the Guides Cavalry was twelve British and seventeen Indian officers, 455 other ranks and 546 horses, with a mobile veterinary section and a transport echelon, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart.

The march to Amara was without incident, the stages, each of roughly ten miles, being Shafi, Qurnah, Sakricha, Ezra's Tomb, Mantaris, Qala Salih, Abu Sidrah and Amara; at each post there were comfortable standing camps on the bank of the river, and the watering arrangements were satisfactory. At Qala Salih, Major C. E. Morris, 1st Guides, then commanding a battalion of Burma infantry, met the Regiment, and here the column crossed to the left bank by a very shaky bridge of boats. A halt was made for three days at Amara, which was reached on 3 November, during which time Captain Ogilvie and Lieutenant Jackson, with "A" Squadron, were detached from the column to take a remount echelon on to Baghdad.

On the 6th the Guides Cavalry, less "A" Squadron, continued their march, moving by Taiyif, Abadali, Shaikshi, Jibniyeh, Jilaat Hussain, Ali Gharbi, Beit Jaliad, Masamdag, Sheikh Saad, Hanna and Sawada, and arriving at Kut-al-Amara on the 17th, where they halted for two days.

The march from Sheikh Saad to Hanna afforded an opportunity of seeing the elaborate entrenchments of a modern field of battle. Between Hanna and Sawada the Sannayat position was passed and the men were shown the intricate defences where the Turks had held up the British forces endeavouring to relieve Kut. At Kut itself the defences of the beleaguered garrison were inspected.

On 20 November the Guides Cavalry marched on again by Shumran, Imam Mahdi, Samar, Said Haif and Jabul to Aziziya, which was reached on the 25th, and here the Regiment was joined by Jemadar Natha Khan and six other ranks, who were the only survivors of a draft sent from Mardan to the 15th Lancers in France early in the war, and who had afterwards served with the 10th Lancers in Mesopotamia.

Marching on by Kotaniyeh, Lajj and Bawi, they reached Diala on the 29th, and here the Regiment was inspected by Brigadier-General R. A. Cassels,

commanding the 11th Cavalry Brigade, to which the Guides Cavalry had been posted. Finally, Baghdad was reached on 30 November after thirty-five days' marching, including halts. During the march the heat was not excessive after the first week, while good shooting was obtained, sand-grouse and black partridge being particularly plentiful; only a few gazelle were seen and some pig in the neighbourhood of Kotaniyeh.

The Guides Cavalry were now in camp at Hinaidi, to the south of the road from Hinaidi station to Baghdad, some two miles distant. Here the 11th Cavalry Brigade was to be formed composed of the 7th Hussars, the Guides Cavalry, the 23rd Cavalry and "W" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, with a machine-gun squadron, a troop of the Sappers and Miners, a signal troop and administrative details. At Hinaidi the Corps of Guides, Cavalry and Infantry, met for the first and only time outside India during the Great War.

Regimental and squadron training was at once started in the open, undulating country lying to the east of the camp, and details gradually joined the Regiment from the base and from other units. Thus "A" Squadron rejoined under Captain Ogilvie on 2 December, shortly after a draft of eighty-three Indian ranks arrived from the base, and later came two small parties under Jemadar Ganda Singh, from the draft which had originally gone to the 10th Lancers.

On 4 January 1918, the Regiment was inspected by Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall, who had succeeded to the command of the army in Mesopotamia on the death from cholera in the previous November of General Sir Stanley 1918 Maude.

Rumours now began to come in of the probability of Turkish air raids on Baghdad. Anti-aircraft guns were emplaced and other precautions taken, while all tents were stained mud colour so as not to stand out conspicuously in the moonlight. The first air raid took place on the evening of 10 February, when several bombs were dropped from a single aeroplane. The anti-aircraft guns opened fire and the raider flew away, having done a certain amount of damage to the northern portion of the city of Baghdad, three bombs falling on a hospital on the right bank and killing five or six of the patients.

By 1 March, the 11th Cavalry Brigade was concentrated, the Horse Battery being rearmed with eighteen-pounders in order to get more fire-power, and being given extra gun-teams; the Cavalry Field Ambulance was in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Cruddas, I.M.S., who for many years was medical officer to the Guides at Mardan.

Meanwhile there had been constant rumours that the 11th Cavalry Brigade might shortly be engaged in operations on the Euphrates, and on 7 March orders arrived for a move. Next day the Brigade marched out to the Iron Bridge, five and a half miles distant on the right bank of the Tigris, where during the next ten days final preparations for the projected movement were made, excess baggage being cut down and superfluous tentage returned into store.

The Guides Cavalry detailed a depot of seventy-three other ranks to remain behind under Risaldar Jiwand Singh, and on 18 March the Regiment, with a strength

of twelve British officers, nineteen Indian officers and 470 rank and file, marched with the Brigade some twenty-one miles to Khan Nuqtah and next day another nineteen miles to Falluja. Here the Brigade took over a camping-ground which had previously been occupied by a brigade of artillery, and, with a view to concealing the fact that fresh troops had arrived, the standings of the artillery camp were occupied and wagons placed where the guns had previously been parked. Consequently when two enemy aeroplanes came over shortly after the arrival of the Regiment, they reported on their return, as was afterwards learnt from a captured Turkish staff officer, that the artillery brigade was still in camp at Falluja and that the cavalry brigade had not moved from Baghdad.

For the coming operations the 11th Cavalry Brigade had been augmented by two anti-aircraft pom-poms on lorries, an Australian wireless troop, twelve armoured cars and a half-company of Ford vans.

After a day's halt at Falluja the Brigade moved on to Sinn-adh-Dhibban and thence on the 23rd to Ramadi, its mission being to co-operate with the 15th Division under Major-General Brooking against the Turkish forces in the area Hit-Khan Baghdadi. The general purpose and scope of the resulting operations are described as follows in General Marshall's despatch of 15 April 1918 :—

" During December and January it was evident that the Turks were being reinforced, the bulk of their troops being near Hit, and as their strength grew their patrols were pushed down stream as far as Qubbah and Nafata. I accordingly issued orders to Major-General Sir H. T. Brooking, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., commanding the troops on the Euphrates front, to capture Hit and its garrison as soon as his arrangements were completed and the state of the ground permitted. My opinion was that there would be no difficulty in capturing the town and driving the Turks out of their positions, but that the capture of the Turkish force would be a matter of extreme difficulty, in consequence of their previous experience at Ramadi.

" On the 19th of February troops were pushed forward to Uqbah, which was found evacuated, and it was ascertained that the Turkish main position was two miles above Hit, behind a depression known as the Broad Wadi, while about two-thirds of his troops were fifteen miles further up-stream at Sahiliya. . . . On March the 8th it was discovered that the Turks had vacated their Broad Wadi position and were falling back on Sahiliya. . . . Hit was occupied on the 9th and Sahiliya on the 10th, the Turks retreating to Khan Baghdadi. I then issued orders to drive the enemy as far as possible from Hit, and to inflict all possible damage on him. To assist in this object additional mobile troops, including a cavalry brigade and light armoured motors, were ordered to Hit, with instructions to move by night and conceal themselves by day, so that the enemy might think that no further advance by my troops was intended ; in many other ways, efforts, apparently successful, were made to deceive the Turks as to our intentions.

" On the 26th the plan of operations was to make an attack in strength against the enemy's left and to send the cavalry and armoured cars round his right flank."

In accordance with these orders, when the Brigade moved on it camped by day in date-palm groves so as to avoid discovery by the enemy aircraft. Qubbah was reached on the 24th, and from this day on marches were made only by night. Moving on again at 10.45 the same night, the column passed through Hit and arrived in the early morning of the 25th at Sahiliya, an unpleasant march of nineteen miles during which, owing to the presence of bitumen and sulphur springs, the whole atmosphere was charged with sulphuretted hydrogen, producing an appalling smell as of rotten eggs. At the end of this march the Brigade was only six miles in rear of the forward troops of the 15th Division, and at 3 a.m. on the 26th the Brigade moved forward, the Guides Cavalry leading, along the Aleppo road. The 15th Division was already in action, attacking the enemy who was holding three strong positions at Khan Baghdadi. The cavalry brigade was to make a wide outflanking movement, cutting in on the Aleppo road in the rear of the Turks. It was, of course, essential that this enveloping movement should be unobserved, and accordingly the Cavalry Brigade now left the road and moved for some seven miles in a westerly direction, "D" Squadron Guides Cavalry, under Major Blois-Johnson, forming the advanced guard, with which aeroplanes co-operated.

At 7.50 a.m. direction was changed from west to north-by-west. It was known by this time that certain enemy troops had left the Tigris front, and as these had not since been located it was expected that they had moved to the Euphrates. The most suitable place for crossing the river to get to Khan Baghdadi was at Haditha, some twenty miles to the north. In order, therefore, to protect the rear of the Cavalry Brigade when once it should have cut in to the rear of the Turks on the Aleppo road, and also to help to clear up the obscure situation to the north, Major Carey, with "B" Squadron, was sent on a special mission towards Haditha.

At 8.15 a.m. the Brigade, which was then due west of the main Turkish position, was shelled, and again later when near Wadi Baghdadi. But as the range was considerable and the troops were in artillery formation, no casualties were experienced.

Some mention should here be made of the nature of the country over which the Brigade was operating. For mile after mile the country was open—long stretches of hard sandy plateaux some 100 feet above the level of the Euphrates, intersected by *wadis* or semi-dry water-courses, with steep but not precipitous banks, very liable to sudden floods. At intervals there were areas of broken ground similar to that on the north bank of the Kabul river between Akhora and Jehangira. There was no cultivation, no villages were to be seen, and water was very scarce. The maps provided were found to be inaccurate, landmarks were few, and direction had to be maintained by compass assisted by observers in aeroplanes.

At noon on the 26th a further move north was made for an hour, when the Brigade turned east. At 3 p.m. touch was gained with the enemy's right, and from a small piece of rising ground it was noticed that a large force of Turks was entrenching about 2,000 yards to the east, while in rear of these a general move north appeared to be taking place.

Captain Ogilvie, with "A" Squadron of the Guides Cavalry and the 7th

Hussars, was ordered to attack, but owing to the nature of the ground this attack could not be pressed home.

In the meantime the remaining squadrons of the Guides were detailed to contain the Turkish flankguard, estimated at a battalion and eight machine guns, which was in occupation of a ridge 2,200 yards to the right front, while the rest of the Brigade moved round to the east to cut off the main enemy force retreating before the 15th Division.

To fulfil the mission entrusted to them the Guides Cavalry had to hold a ridge some 1,200 yards to the right front, and as the intervening ground was very much exposed it was galloped by "C" and "D" Squadrons in extended order. Having reached the ridge, Major Blois-Johnson was hit, the bullet entering through the right lower pocket of his tunic and coming out within about four inches of his spine. At the time he thought he was hit by no more than a spent bullet or flying stone; he was not knocked off his horse, nor was he in any great pain, and he was able to continue at duty. He was the only casualty. The ridge, half a mile in length and 800 yards in front of the Turks, was occupied and held.

Heavy firing was kept up by the enemy till dark, but casualties were not heavy as the cover was good, while no further advance was necessary to fulfil the object of the movement, which was to prevent the escape of the Turks. At 7 p.m. "A" Squadron rejoined, and it was now possible to water the horses for the first time since the previous day.

During this time the remainder of the Brigade had been moving east under a certain amount of fire, but had found that the Aleppo road lay some five miles farther east than had been thought, and it was just dark when all got into position.

During the night the Turkish right flank retired eastwards.

About 11 p.m. there was the sound of very heavy firing to the left of the position occupied by the Guides Cavalry. It was afterwards learnt that the Turks who had been opposed to the Regiment, as also those who had been driven out of the main Khan Baghdadi position by the advance of the 15th Division, had marched in column of route straight into the arms of General Cassels's Brigade. The general result of the day was that some 5,500 Turks had been killed or captured and that the enemy forces on the Euphrates—the 50th Turkish Division—were destroyed.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 27th orders were received for the Regiment to rejoin the Brigade and it moved off in a northerly direction towards Alus Bend, watering the horses on the way in the Wadi Hauran. After marching for an hour and a half the remnant of an enemy battery was encountered, but such of the personnel as remained were too demoralized to open fire and the battery was galloped, three Krupp field guns, two limbers and six carts being captured. One of these guns now stands outside the quarter-guard of the Guides Cavalry at Mardan.

The Brigade had already marched north to clear up the situation and was not caught up by the Regiment till Alus Bend was reached at 11.45 a.m. As the Guides Cavalry moved up the Aleppo road an unforgettable sight presented itself—the rout of an army: dead men, dead horses, camels and mules; wrecked ambulances

still filled with dead and dying ; baggage of every description and equipment strewn all over the road, with here and there batches of dejected prisoners. Arrived at Alus Bend rations were drawn, horses fed and watered, and such sick men and animals as were unlikely to be able to keep up with the rapid movements now expected to follow, were left behind.

Ana was the next objective, and at 1.35 p.m. the Brigade moved forward along the desert route for Fuhaimah, Major Carey, with " B " Squadron, remaining behind at Alus Bend. Every now and then during the march Turkish soldiers who had fled from the scene of action were picked up, without wounds—simply dead from exhaustion.

Fuhaimah was reached late that night and the march resumed early on the 28th to Ana (twenty-one miles) the Guides Cavalry leading. The country was very hilly and difficult, and some slight opposition was encountered, but neither delayed the advance. The Aleppo road was soon reached, and it was found that the farther to the north-west the column advanced, the better became the road ; the water-courses were crossed by masonry bridges and the road was metalled, being about eighteen feet in width and properly graded.

Ana was found to be a town of some 5,000 inhabitants stretching along both banks of the Euphrates for a mile or more, and intersected with well-kept gardens, while on the banks were large water-wheels for raising water from the river, running thirty or forty feet below, to the patches of cultivation. There was a wireless station which had been erected and staffed by Germans, and a hospital containing some seventy Turkish patients, who had all been robbed by the Arabs as soon as the Germans and the Turkish garrison disappeared.

In a cave a mile or so along the road and in a caravanserai in the town were found two enormous dumps of ammunition and equipment, stored in readiness for the spring offensive which the Turks had intended to launch for the recapture of Baghdad. In the caravanserai were 3,500,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 25,000 rounds of field-gun ammunition, crates containing machine guns, rolls of barbed wire, and rooms full of equipment and explosives. The cave was entirely filled with six-inch gun and howitzer ammunition. These dumps were blown up—and a large part of Ana with them.

The Brigade now moved back by Haditha to Alus Bend, where the squadron under Major Carey had engaged and beaten off a body of Arabs who were looting an abandoned Turkish gunboat located by patrols on the far side of the river. Many interesting documents were found on board, including maps and charts of the Euphrates, also a telescope and the ensign of the boat embroidered with the Iron Cross. This last now forms one of the war trophies in the Guides mess at Mardan.

The night passed at Alus Bend was a very uncomfortable one ; there was a high wind in which no tent could remain standing, while rain fell in torrents.

Many congratulatory messages were now received, including one from His Majesty the King in a telegram dated 31 March, which ran as follows :—

"In the midst of the great struggle in Western Europe I wish to assure you that I follow with constant interest the splendid progress made by the gallant troops under your command. I congratulate you and all ranks on the success of your latest achievement."

In his despatch on these operations, General Marshall wrote that

"the magnificent work done by the cavalry brigade under Brig.-General R. A. Cassels, as well as by the light armoured motor batteries, both in cutting off the enemy's line of retreat as well as in the pursuit to and beyond Ana, was a notable feat."

The next day was spent at Khan Baghdadi. The crossing of the Wadi Hauran on the march there presented many difficulties, owing to the water coming down in spate, and on 2 April Hit was reached in high wind and piercing cold. Marching on, the Regiment moved into a summer camp at Sinn-adh-Dhibban, and by the 12th had settled down to ordinary camp routine.

Captain Blood, who had been Adjutant since August 1914, now returned to India and was appointed D.A.Q.M.G. Peshawar Division.

The summer months of 1918 passed without incident, so far as the Guides Cavalry was concerned, except that in the latter part of July there was here, as elsewhere, a serious outbreak of influenza. Happily, however, there were no deaths.

Late in the evening of 4 October orders were received to get ready at once to march out on operation scale. At 7 a.m. on the 6th the Regiment moved with the 11th Cavalry Brigade a distance of twenty-three miles to the neighbourhood of Khan Nuqtah. The marching-out strength of the Guides Cavalry being thirteen British officers, fourteen Indian officers and 430 other ranks; the British officers were: Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Stewart, in Command, Lieutenant M. L. Barrett, Officiating Adjutant, and Lieutenant B. C. Ashton, I.M.S., Medical Officer.

"A" Squadron: Captain A. V. Hammond, Lieutenants C. Wallis and W. F. Jackson.

"B" Squadron: Lieutenants C. Campbell-Harris and F. A. Davies.

"C" Squadron: Major H. C. Kay, Lieutenants G. T. B. Harvey and S. S. A. Shippard.

"D" Squadron: Captain J. F. W. Ogilvie and Lieutenant C. P. J. Prioleau.

The reasons for the operations in which the 11th Cavalry Brigade was now about to take part are given in detail in General Marshall's despatch of 1 February 1919, and briefly stated were as follows: He had decided to take the offensive against the Turkish 6th Army, calculated at 9,000 men and fifty-nine guns, holding a position of great natural strength astride the Fat-ha Gorge on the Tigris. The enemy had been here nearly eighteen months and had thoroughly prepared the position for a protracted defence. The right, from the gorge to Sherqat, was protected by two ranges of hills, the Jebel Makhul and the Jebel Khanuka, and could not be turned owing to the lack of water in the desert. On the left bank of the Tigris the position extended for some five miles along the crest of the Jebel

Hamrin, while "opposite the junction of the Lesser Zab with the Tigris, the Turks had constructed a second strong position astride the Jebel Khanuka and Jebel Makhul, as well as trenches to defend the line of the Lesser Zab, a bridge at El Humr giving them free movement between both banks of the Tigris."

The conduct of the main operations on the Tigris was entrusted to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Cobbe, who had under his command the 17th and 18th Infantry Divisions and the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades, and the plan adopted was to turn the left of the enemy position on the Tigris and force a crossing of the Lesser Zab, and then, having cleared the left bank of the enemy, to cut his line of retreat on Mosul with cavalry working up the left bank and light armoured cars moving round his right.

On the 7th the Brigade marched twenty-eight miles to Iron Bridge, Baghdad, where a day was spent and all necessary arrangements were completed. Starting again on the 9th, they marched by Tajidiyeh, Fort-el-Kermeah, Beled and Istabulat and reached El Ajik in four days—a distance of ninety-five miles; here eight days were spent, and Captain I. N. Jones, R.A.M.C., relieved Lieutenant Ashton as Medical Officer with the Guides Cavalry. The advance was resumed on 21 October with a march of thirty miles to Tikrit, where the Tigris was crossed and the force bivouacked on the left bank. Here transport and all kits were still further reduced and Lieutenant Shippard was left with stores and lame horses. From Tikrit on the 23rd the Cavalry Brigade marched to the Ain Nukhaila pass in the Jebel Hamrin, the march of thirty-four miles being completed and all in camp by 2 p.m. As the only water to be met with at this camp was strongly impregnated with Epsom salts, canvas tanks had been erected and a supply of water for the men brought in by a convoy of Ford cars from Tikrit. The horses, however, had to drink this impregnated water, which had an unhappy effect on them next day.

The column set out at 2.30 a.m. on the 24th with the intention of crossing the Lesser Zab at Uthmaniyeh where there was a ford; the 7th Hussars were leading and the Guides Cavalry bringing up the rear. Gharah was reached at the end of twelve miles, and here the horses were watered from some very inadequate springs. A further march of twenty miles brought the Regiment to Hajil, where it had been hoped that the horses could again be watered from a couple of wells, but by the time the Regiment arrived the wells had run almost dry and little remained but liquid mud. A final stage brought the Guides at 8.30 p.m. to Uthmaniyeh, where the 7th Hussars had had a slight encounter with the enemy at the ford, and "A" Squadron now took up part of the Brigade outpost-line facing west.

Next day, the 25th, while the 23rd Cavalry made a reconnaissance downstream on the right bank of the Lesser Zab, the Guides Cavalry took over the protection of the Brigade on the left bank, "C" Squadron supplying the piquet line, while "A" and "B" were employed in improving the approaches to the ford. On the 26th the advance was continued, the Regiment providing the advanced guard, "D" Squadron leading, as far as the Tigris, thirteen miles north of Sherqat. The river was reached at 12.30 p.m., but it was not until some hours later that a crossing was discovered about eight miles up-stream where the river divided into

five branches ; of these, four were easy to pass, but the fifth was very deep and with a strong current in which some few men of other units were drowned. Before the discovery of the ford a troop of the Guides Cavalry, under Resaidar Bhagwan Singh, swam the river and cut the Turkish telegraph line to Mosul.

As soon as the ford was found the Regiment crossed and " B " Squadron captured a complete Turkish hospital. Then, under the personal supervision of Brigadier-General Cassels, it moved down-stream until a suitable position was taken up near Huwaish, astride the Tikrit-Mosul road. Here the high ground leaves the river in a wide sweep, and the road from Tikrit, after dropping into a nullah, debouches into the riverain plateau. The Regiment took up a position with its left (" B " Squadron) resting on the river and the right (" D " Squadron) on the high ground, " C " Squadron being in the centre on the low ground and " A " on the high ground, where were the Brigade and Regimental Headquarters. These arrangements were only just completed when darkness fell. The Horse Battery and 23rd Cavalry also crossed by the ford and occupied a position in reserve ; when passing over the guns were entirely submerged.

Next day the position was consolidated and trenches were dug, while the 23rd Cavalry made a demonstration to the right front but were driven back by increasing numbers of the enemy, who made repeated attacks, but were prevented from pressing these home by the accurate fire of the battery. After nightfall the 23rd Cavalry, having had two British officers killed and three wounded, were withdrawn behind the main position.

It was later discovered that this bold move on the part of General Cassels, in attacking the far stronger enemy force, caused the Turkish commander to estimate the force opposed to him at two complete cavalry brigades instead of one.

During the night of the 27th-28th a few enemy snipers came forward and concealed themselves on the far slopes of the *wadi* in front of the Brigade. Next morning these were ejected by a party of ten men under Lieutenant Davies.

At the same time two squadrons of the 7th Hussars were sent north along the Mosul road in order to check the advance of 3,000 Turks who were coming up as reinforcements, while the other two squadrons demonstrated against the enemy's left flank. By midday, however, the Hussars had been driven back and forced to continue the defensive line along the " Assyrian Wall "—an L-shaped earthen embankment about ten feet high facing south and west on the extreme right flank. In the meanwhile the 7th Cavalry Brigade and a brigade of infantry—the 53rd—were approaching on the left bank of the Tigris.

" A " Squadron of the Guides Cavalry was to have been relieved by a company of the 1/7th Gurkhas, but before this relief was effected the squadron was ordered to go at once to the assistance of the two squadrons of the 7th Hussars on the " Assyrian Wall " which were being heavily shelled by a section of Turkish 4.8 guns, the fire of which was particularly accurate. " A " Squadron moved at once and took over the defence of the southern face of the Wall up to and including the south-west corner, while as soon as a company of Gurkhas took the place of " D " Squadron, this also moved up to the right and took over the defence of the western Wall.

There was, however, but indifferent cover available for the led horses, and there were fairly severe casualties among them.

Until nightfall "A" and "D" Squadrons, particularly "D," were under heavy fire, for, lying exposed on the top of this mound, they offered an excellent target to the Turkish battery and were unable to dig themselves in owing to the attentions of the enemy infantry. "D" Squadron went into action seventy-five strong, and within two hours had twenty men and a Hotchkiss gun put out of action and forty-five horses killed—chiefly by shrapnel. Late in the afternoon the 7th Cavalry Brigade, under General Norton, which had been marching hard for twenty-four hours, was seen on the far bank of the Tigris making preparations to cross. This they effected that night and extended the line of the 11th Cavalry Brigade towards the north.

At 6 p.m. "B" and "C" Squadrons were relieved by the same battalion of Gurkhas and reinforced "A" and "D" after dark. During the night the enemy attacked repeatedly, at times getting to within a hundred yards of the position. At 9.30 on the morning of 29 October the Guides Cavalry were relieved by the 1/39th Garhwal Rifles, and remained for the rest of the day in reserve under cover of the high ground.

In his despatch General Marshall writes that during the night (28th-29th) the Turks made repeated attempts to break through to the north, but were each time repulsed.

"During this fighting the Guides Cavalry and the 1st Bn. 7th Gurkha Rifles distinguished themselves by their staunchness."

The 17th Division had attacked the enemy in their strong position north of Sherqat, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade had dealt effectively with a body of reinforcements moving from the direction of Mosul against the right flank of the 11th Cavalry Brigade, and now, "gripped as in a vice, with his men packed in ravines which were raked by our guns from across the Tigris, Ismail Hakki, the Turkish Commander, found himself in a hopeless position. All attempts to break through had failed, communication with the Turkish Commander-in-Chief at Mosul had been rendered impossible, and no relief was in sight. At dawn on 30 October, just as our troops were about to renew the attack, white flags appeared all along the Turkish lines, and later on Ismail Hakki surrendered in person. A close was thus brought to the last battle to be fought in this war by a Turkish Army."

On the surrender of the Turks three squadrons of the Guides Cavalry were sent out to clear the battlefield, and the Regiment camped that night at the ferry about two miles above Huwaish.

The casualties suffered by the Guides in this last action were : killed or died of wounds : Lieutenant W. F. Jackson, Resaidar Abdullah Khan and three other ranks ; wounded : Lieutenant C. P. J. Prioleau, Captain I. N. Jones, R.A.M.C., and twenty-six other ranks ; the casualties among the horses totalled fifty-one.

The total captures during the operations amounted to 11,322 prisoners, including 643 officers, 51 guns, 130 machine guns and over 2,000 animals, and three paddle-

steamers, besides large quantities of gun and rifle ammunition, bombs, a complete bridging train and war *matériel* of all kinds.

Immediately the news of the Turkish surrender on the Tigris was received General Marshall determined to exploit the victory to the full by pushing on immediately to Mosul, the headquarters of the 6th Turkish Army. A column was accordingly formed consisting of the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades and the 54th Infantry Brigade, as well as artillery, under the command of Major-General Fanshawe.

Leaving "C" Squadron behind as transport guard, the Guides Cavalry marched on towards Mosul, reaching Qaiyara on 31 October, Hammam Ali next day, and the neighbourhood of Abu Jawari on 2 November. Here it was heard that some 3,000 Turks were holding a position in the foothills across the road a few miles to the north. On the 3rd, just as orders were being issued for an attack on this force, information was received that an armistice had been concluded, and the cavalry of General Fanshawe's force pushed on six miles to Mosul, where the Regiment encamped two miles south of the town, the Turkish troops having withdrawn to Nisibin.

It had been decided to give the Turks fourteen days to evacuate Mosul, failing compliance with which terms force was to be applied, and this resulted in considerable discussion with the commander of the Turkish forces; but the last Turkish soldiers left on the night of 13 November, passing *en route* through "A" Squadron of the Guides Cavalry under Captain Hammond, which had been posted on the Mosul-Nisibin road to report all enemy movements. A sentry of this squadron held up the column, refusing to allow it to pass until permission was received from Captain Hammond.

The new year found the Guides Cavalry stationed at Baghdad as part of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, but movement was rendered almost impossible by the heavy rainfall in January. In February the regiments were brought up to a 1919 strength of sixteen British officers, in order to open leave for the post-war garrison of Mesopotamia, and seven officers were posted to the Guides Cavalry from other units returning to India. Captain C. H. H. Eales, M.C., also rejoined from his appointment as A.D.C. to the G.O.C. 18th Division. In April the Kurdish revolt broke out at Suleimaniyah, and the Guides Cavalry moved to Baiji and encamped on Laq Laq Island. There they remained amid much dust and discomfort till 6 June, when three parties marched off to relieve detachments at Sherqat, Kirkuk and Erbil, all reaching their destinations between the 7th and 9th, despite the intense heat which prevailed during the march. A troop of "A" Squadron, operating from Kare Anjir with the 7th Gurkha Rifles, assisted in the destruction of three hostile villages and carried out a reconnaissance as far as the Bazian Pass, nearly fifty miles from Kirkuk, and rejoined the rest of the squadron at Chamchemal Post, from which daily patrols were carried out.

After the defeat of the Kurds on 18 June "A" Squadron moved to the Bazian Pass and escorted over 300 Kurdish prisoners to Kirkuk, where it remained for the next three weeks, till it rejoined Headquarters at Baiji. Meanwhile, Captain

Barrett and thirteen other ranks had been sent across the Zab Desert—a distance of ninety miles—from Kirkuk to Fat-ha Gorge, to report on the presence of water along this route ; but none was found and the party returned on the 23rd.

On 12 August Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod left the Regiment to assume temporary command of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, leaving Major Connell in command.

On 26 September orders were received for one squadron to proceed to Kasvin in Persia to join what was known as "Norper Force," and on the 30th "D" Squadron entrained at Baiji for Baghdad—strength, 125 sabres—with Captain J. H. Gradidge, Lieutenant H. Pigot and four Indian officers.

At Baghdad the squadron entrained for Quraitu, the Persian railhead, and on arrival there on 3 October joined an echelon under Major R. H. A. D. Love, D.S.O., Royal Horse Artillery, consisting of Headquarters and four guns of "A" Battery, R.H.A., and the squadron of the Guides Cavalry, and started next day on the long march of 378 miles to Kasvin. The route lay through Sar-i-pul, Paitak, Sirmil, Kerind, Harunabad, Hassanabad, Mahidasht, Kermanshah, Bisitun, Saneh, Kangavar, Asadabad, Yangi Khan, Hamadan, Hindishi, Ruan, Amerieh, Manian, Aveh, Ab-i-garm, Nahavand and Siah-Dehan. Kasvin was reached on 30 October.

While "D" Squadron was marching to Kasvin a draft of 100 men had reached Headquarters at Baiji, and on 12 October "A" Squadron left to join "D" at Kasvin with two British officers—Major J. V. A. Connell and Captain L. C. Palk—two Indian officers and 112 other ranks. Kasvin was reached on 10 November, and Major Connell assumed charge of both squadrons, which were quartered in the camel serais. The whole winter was passed at Kasvin. No operations took place and the wing of the Guides Cavalry settled down in tolerable comfort, this being the first time for many months that either officers or men had had a roof over their heads. The cold was intense, and on most nights during the winter the temperature was well below zero.

At the beginning of December the Guides Cavalry was disposed as follows :—

At Baiji, two British officers, four Indian officers, and 129 other ranks.

At Sherqat, one Indian officer, and twenty-six other ranks.

At Kasvin, four British officers, eight Indian officers and 233 other ranks.

At the end of March the strength of the Kasvin detachment was increased by the arrival of several British officers—Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Stewart and Captain F. A. Davies joining from Baghdad, and Captain D. A. de Freitas and
 1920 Lieutenant J. C. Mawhood from the Depot in India, while "B" Squadron and Regimental Headquarters, with Captain A. V. Hammond, left Hinaidi on 27 April and arrived at Kasvin exactly a month later.

In May, two troops of the Guides Cavalry, under Captain de Freitas, were with "Norper Force" at Enzeli and Kazian on the Caspian Sea, a port which, since the withdrawal of General Dunsterville's Force in 1918, had become a base for the volunteer fleet and for some remnants of General Denikin's army. The troops there were under the command of Brigadier-General H. B. Bateman-Champain.

On the arrival of twenty-three ships of the Bolshevik fleet on the 18th of this month with their overwhelming superiority in gun-fire, the British force was compelled to withdraw to Menjil, where it remained for the next two months. During July, the two troops of the Guides Cavalry under Captain de Freitas were relieved by one troop with a Hotchkiss gun from "A" Squadron.

This troop joined the force now known as "Menjcol," which consisted of the troop from "A" Squadron, four guns of a pack battery, the 2/2nd Gurkhas and the 122nd Infantry. The remainder of "A" Squadron was sent on special service with the gendarmerie to prevent a noted Persian outlaw, Kuchik Khan, from combining with the Bolsheviks; and "D" Squadron moved out to Zinjan to protect the left flank and the communications of "Norper Force." On 13 July "C" Squadron arrived at Kasvin from Baghdad.

On 20 July the Guides detachment at Menjil while on patrol encountered about a hundred dismounted men of the enemy and engaged them from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. Two days later a patrol, having with it four machine guns, also became engaged with an enemy body and was reinforced and extricated in a most spirited manner by Jemadar Sher Afzul and nine men. Finally, at 9.45 p.m. on 30 July "Menjcol" evacuated the position and retreated, arriving at Agababa, fifteen miles from Kasvin, on 3 August.

The force hitherto known as "Menjcol" was now withdrawn and replaced by one designated "Strawforce," this being composed of "B" Squadron of the Guides Cavalry under Captain Gradidge and Lieutenant Pigot, two guns of "A" Battery, R.H.A., and one company of the York and Lancaster Regiment, commanded by Major van Straubenzee, D.S.O. This force took up a position at Kuhin, which is on the edge of the Iranian plateau where the road dips down into the pass through the Elburz Mountains, twenty-two miles from Kasvin. The squadron of the Guides left camp soon after midnight on 14 August by a track through the hills, with the idea of surprising the enemy at dawn at Yuz Bashi Chai, about fifteen miles down the road. One platoon of the York and Lancaster Regiment took up a position on the main road in support. The country to be passed over was found, however, to be more difficult than had been expected, and at dawn on the 15th the squadron was still some distance from the enemy. But the Bolshevik troops, estimated at about 150 cavalry, 200 infantry and four guns, had also selected this day to advance, and being surprised while entangled in the hills, they fell back as soon as fire was opened on them at about 5.15 a.m., losing forty men and three Lewis guns captured, while they abandoned one 4.2 gun, the team of which had been destroyed by Hotchkiss gun-fire. At midday "A" Squadron, under Captain Hammond, was ordered up from Kasvin as a reinforcement, arriving at Kuhin the same evening.

On the 16th an advance was made to Yuz Bashi Chai, but no opposition was encountered and the force went on and occupied the Menjil position. On the 19th "A" Squadron returned to Kasvin, followed on the 24th by "B" Squadron less one troop.

In the meanwhile—on 4 August—one troop of the Guides and two platoons of the force at Zinjan had proceeded to Yusafabad, on the south side of the Shibil Pass,

twenty-five miles from Tabriz, to meet and escort the British women and children from Tabriz.

The following is an extract from a memorandum, dated 16 August, from the O.C. Kuhin to the O.C. Kasvin :—

“ I would like you to inform the General Officer Commanding of the very high standard of discipline displayed by the officers and men of the Guides Cavalry (F.F.) in the trying circumstances of being hung up in precipitous country in the dark. Following a stiff climb they came into action with the greatest keenness against the enemy, worthily maintaining the high traditions of their Corps.”

This was followed by a memorandum dated 18 August, from the Headquarters 36th Indian Brigade to the O.C. Guides Cavalry :—

“ The General Officer Commanding wishes me to convey to you his high appreciation of the excellent work done by the officers and men of your Regiment.”

September was an uneventful month for the Guides Cavalry, the outbreak of the Arab rebellion involving their detachments in much marching and counter-marching, but not in any active operations. The 14th was, however, a very special occasion. It was the sixty-third anniversary of the assault on Delhi and the first occasion on which the Guides and the 2nd Gurkhas had served together since those epoch-making days. The day was celebrated by a joint gymkhana in the afternoon, followed in the evening by a dinner in the “ Kasvin Club.”

On 27 October news of a somewhat disturbing character reached Kasvin to the effect that the Persian Cossacks had fallen back and disintegrated; that the Bolshevik troops had occupied Resht, and that our advanced position in that direction was exposed to intermittent shelling. At midday on the 29th orders were received to send twenty sabres and two Hotchkiss guns to the Toll Gate on the Kasvin-Resht road, two miles from Kasvin, and to report on all armed Persians moving towards Kasvin, while the rest of the Regiment was to be held ready to move at half an hour's notice. At 3.10 p.m. the Guides were directed to march at once in order to intercept a body of some 200 Cossacks with two machine and two mountain guns, said to be moving round the north of the town and making for Teheran. This party was to be turned back by force if necessary. The Regiment started in twenty-five minutes and came upon the Cossacks in a village about five miles distant and *persuaded* them to return quietly.

These Cossacks, never very satisfactory as allies, had been completely demoralized by a band of Russian adventurers who were supposed to command them; and almost the first act of General Sir E. Ironside, who arrived about this time from Constantinople to take over command of “ Norper Force,” had been to eject all Russians neck and crop from the country.

The first fall of winter snow was experienced at this time, and from now on to the third week in March there were constant falls. Great difficulty was experienced in keeping the road open, and from 24 December to the beginning of March 1921, no mails were received at Kasvin. When at last the road was reopened for traffic, the carts and lorries passed through a drift from twelve to fifteen feet high in the plain between Kasvin and Siah-Dehan, while a tunnel was dug through a twenty-

eight-foot drift on the Aveh Pass. The cold was intense, and for six weeks the water channels were so thick with snow and ice that water could not be brought to the billets. The horses had to be watered once a day only, and that at a stream five miles distant where the natural temperature of the water was rather higher. All active operations ceased perforce during these weeks, and the men were continually employed in clearing away the snow and breaking up the ice on the roads and water channels.

On 6 December "B" Squadron moved into newly-built temporary barracks at Sultanabad, about five miles distant, and on the 29th Lieutenant Mawhood left to assume command of the detachment with "Menjcol" and to be staff officer to the column.

During the early part of 1921 there were some departures and arrivals of officers, and Captain A. V. Hammond assumed command of the Regiment, being relieved later by Lieutenant-Colonel Carey.

1921 At the beginning of April there were several bad storms, a thaw set in and the snow began suddenly and quickly to disappear. This caused serious floods and damage to roads and billets, some roofs collapsing, causing the death of Dafadar Muhammad Jan and injury to four men of the Regiment.

On 12 April orders were received for the evacuation of north Persia by the British troops. The Guides Cavalry were detailed to provide the rearguard, and on the morning of the 14th marched out twenty-two miles to Kuhin and took up a position there to cover the retirement of "Menjcol." Owing to the terrible state of the road due to floods, camp was not reached until 3 p.m., and the hired Persian transport did not get in until after dark. The column passed through the Guides on the 15th and, the detachment of the Regiment with it having rejoined, the Guides Cavalry moved on as part of the rearguard. The retirement was greatly delayed by the necessity for repairing all bridges on the road, but the enemy did not follow up, and, by very slow marches, Hussanabad was reached on 24 April, and Sultanabad, five miles south of Kasvin, on the 26th.

On the 8th the column marched again with "C" Squadron as rearguard, the Regiment leaving twenty-four hours later, having first provided consular guards at Kermanshah and at Hamadan.

From 11 to 18 May there was almost continuous rain, but on the 21st the Regiment came up with the rearguard at Paitak where "C" Squadron rejoined, and on the 23rd the Guides Cavalry arrived within three miles of railhead at Quraitu. The Regiment had been given orders that during the retirement it was responsible for the destruction of all stores which could not be brought away, and the amount of material thus destroyed was enormous, including some 8,000 to 10,000 gallons of petrol.

On arrival at Khanikin road on the 29th the Regiment entrained in two parties for Baghdad, where the whole Regiment assembled in camp at Hinaidi. On 6 June it was inspected by the G.O.C., and on the 10th entrained in two trains for Kut-al-Amara, the journey from there to Basra being completed in one paddle-steamer with a barge lashed on either side, all horses being left behind.

On 18 June the Regiment embarked for India in the s.s. *Coconada*, and after an uneventful voyage reached Karachi on the 23rd. On 10 July it arrived in Mardan where the 1st Battalion and 2nd Battalion Depot turned out to line the road and escort it back to the lines.

The Guides Cavalry returned to India at a time when far-reaching changes in the organization of the Indian Army were impending. In the year 1919 the Secretary of State for India had appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Esher to inquire into and report upon the organization and administration of the Indian Army. Their report was published in 1920, and the suggestions for reorganization being accepted, practically *en bloc*, by the Indian Government, a scheme was at once sanctioned for the amalgamation of the cavalry regiments of the Indian Army and their conversion to a *non-silladar* basis. Later, a committee of representative officers of the Indian Cavalry was called together at Delhi for the consideration of a renumbering scheme based on :—

- (a) The Army List order of precedence.
- (b) The order of seniority by dates of original raising.
- (c) The new system of grouping units.

The Committee was further instructed to consider the question of titles to be borne.

Renumbering in accordance with (a) and (b) was considered impracticable, since units had already been selected for amalgamation by reason of their historical association or class composition and without reference to their seniority.

The twenty-one reconstituted regiments of Indian Cavalry were associated in seven groups, each comprising three units of identical class composition. Each group was based on a certain locality forming the permanent group centre where one regiment of the group was normally located. On mobilization the regiment at the group centre would automatically take over the training of recruits and the provision of reinforcements for the other two, in addition to certain internal-security duties.

On the date when the Guides Cavalry reached Mardan from Mesopotamia all these far-reaching changes had not yet been carried into execution, but immediately on arrival orders were received for the conversion of the Regiment to a *non-silladar* basis and for its reorganization to be put in hand forthwith. This was completed by 1 November. Under this reorganization scheme only Dogras, Sikhs, Punjabi Mussulmans and Cis-Frontier Pathans were to be retained, while Muhiyals, Hazaras, Farsiwans and Punjabi Hindus were to be demobilized.

On 5 January 1922 the following correspondence was received at Mardan :—

Copy of a letter dated 16 December 1921 from A.G. India to Northern Command :—

" With reference to your No. 6344/1/A/1 dated the 16th November, 1921, I am directed to inform you that it has been decided that the Q.V.O. Corps of Guides will not be reconstituted as a Corps.


" The Cavalry Regiment and Infantry Battalion will be separate units with the normal establishment of Officers in each case."

The Guides Cavalry was now posted under the new scheme to the 4th Group, Indian Cavalry, which contained also the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 25th Cavalry, Frontier Force ; but while these last four regiments were amalgamated in pairs—the 21st with the 23rd and the 22nd with the 25th—the Guides Cavalry remained as a single unit, its full designation now being :—

“ 10th Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides Cavalry (Frontier Force).”

The Group centre was Rawalpindi.

The date on which these orders were received carries this record beyond that at which this history closes, but the correspondence is here included for the double reason that it was initiated in 1921 and that the decision which it announces marks the end of an organization which had endured during nearly three-quarters of a century, not without glory to the British arms and advantage to the Indian Empire.



[Photo: R. B. Holmes & Co., Peshawar.]

OFFICERS OF THE 1ST BATTALION GUIDES INFANTRY, 1917.

Back Row.—Lieut. P. Grant. 2/Lieut. W. R. P. Spurway. 2/Lieut. E. A. Cave-Penny. 2/Lieut. C. Doncaster, I.A.R.O. Attached Officer. 2/Lieut. J. G. Wainwright.
Sitting.—Capt. J. V. C. Anderson. Lieut.-Col. A. H. Bulist, M.V.O. Major I. U. Battye, D.S.O. Capt. D. G. Sandeman. Capt. G. B. Hanna, I.M.S.
Front Row.—Capt. C. E. T. Erskine. 4*absent.*—Lieut. H. Grose-Hodge, I.C.S., I.A.R.O.

CHAPTER XVI

1917-1921

THE GREAT WAR: THE GUIDES INFANTRY, 1ST BATTALION: MESOPOTAMIA, EGYPT, PALESTINE AND SYRIA

DEPARTURE OF THE 1ST GUIDES TO MESOPOTAMIA—ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION AT AZIZIYA—SUMMER AT SAMARRA—CAPTURE OF TIKRIT—MARCH TO AKAB—DEPARTURE FOR PALESTINE—IN THE COASTAL SECTOR—THE LINE ADVANCED—BATTLE OF "THE SISTERS"—A DAYLIGHT RAID—PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT ADVANCE—BATTLE OF SHARON—CAPTURE OF BEIT LID—MARCH TO TRIPOLI—ROAD-MAKING—IN CAMP AT BAALBEK—RETURN TO EGYPT—GARRISON DUTY—RETURN TO INDIA—RECONSTITUTION OF THE CORPS.

See Maps : Mesopotamia and North-west Persia, facing page 228 ; Palestine 1918, in pocket ; Syria and Palestine, facing page 252 ; Egypt, in pocket.

The Guides Infantry had only just returned from a training camp in the neighbourhood of Nowshera, when on 6 February 1917, orders were received to mobilize preparatory to leaving India and joining Indian Expeditionary Force " D " 1917 in Mesopotamia. Mobilization was carried out in temporary huts erected in rear of the left-wing lines which had been taken over by the Battalion's Depot, the newly-raised 2nd Battalion moving into the fort. On 24 February the 1st Battalion left Mardan by rail for Karachi in two trains at a strength of twelve British and seventeen Indian officers, 785 rank and file and fifty-nine followers.

The British officers were : Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Buist, M.V.O., in Command ; Major I. U. Battye, D.S.O. ; Captains D. Sandeman, C. E. T. Erskine and J. V. C. Anderson ; Lieutenants H. H. Fagnani, C. Doncaster, I.A.R.O., J. C. Coates, H. Grose-Hodge, I.C.S., I.A.R.O., and E. A. Cave-Penny ; Second-Lieutenant W. R. P. Spurway ; and Lieutenant G. B. Hanna, I.M.S., Medical Officer. Indian officers : Subadar-Major Man Bir ; Subadars Taj Muhammad, Afzal, Alam Khan, Gulab Singh, Khyal Gul, Saida Khan and Kehr Singh ; Jemadars Khushal, Kaman Sing, Mangtu, Mula, Sher Singh, Samundar, Narain Singh, Nur Muhammad and Wazir.

The Depot, strength about 500, was at first under the command of Lieutenant P. Grant, but on 2 April this officer was relieved by Captain L. V. S. Blacker on his return from field service in France. On the departure of the Battalion, its place at Mardan was taken by the 55th Coke's Rifles, F.F.

On 27 February the Battalion arrived at Kiamari, where the first case of an epidemic of mumps, which continued for several months, occurred in the Battalion. Embarkation took place the same evening in the captured German transport *Franz Ferdinand*, which sailed at once and reached Basra on 4 March. There the Battalion was transhipped to a river steamer with a barge on either side, proceeding

up-river the same evening. Before leaving Basra the Battalion met Major J. S. Bogle, who was on his way back to Mardan from field service in Egypt to command the 2nd Battalion of the Guides Infantry.

The passage up the river was uneventful. On 5 March, and again two days later, the steamer tied up to the river bank for a few hours, during which the men were allowed on shore to stretch their legs and cook food. On both occasions parties of officers went shooting in the neighbourhood, and good bags of black partridges and a few hares were made. In addition a wild pig was shot by Subadar Khyal Gul, Afridi, and was surreptitiously brought on to the ship by the Gurkhas, who had a great feast that night.

When the Battalion left Basra the British forces were nearing Baghdad, and it was hoped that the Battalion would be sent straight forward to join one of the leading divisions. It was therefore a great disappointment when, on arrival at Aziziya on 13 March, orders were received to disembark and take over the line of communication previously held by the 105th Infantry.

Nearly six weeks were spent at Aziziya, during which intensive training, particularly in bombing and Lewis gunnery, was carried out. Troops were constantly passing through the camp on their way up-river, and thus the Regiment met Lieutenants A. V. Hammond and H. D. K. Money of the Guides who were attached to other corps. The only excitements provided for the troops at Aziziya were on one occasion when Major Battye and "A" Company accompanied the Political Officer on a "round-up" of Arab villages, and again when there was a report of trouble among certain Arab tribes, which necessitated a demonstration of force. The officers got some good sand-grouse and black-partridge shooting on the river bank and also caught a number of fish in the river.

Just before the Battalion reached Aziziya, Baghdad had been captured and, as the result of the fighting during the month of April, the enemy's 13th and 18th Corps were driven back into the Jebel Hamrin and to Tikrit respectively.

Early in May the 1st Battalion Guides Infantry received orders to proceed up-river to Samarra, their place at Aziziya being taken by the 9th Bhopal Regiment from Baghdad. The move was carried out by half battalions, Headquarters, with "B" and "D" Companies, moving by river steamer as far as Akab and thence marching by road, while the other two companies disembarked at Baghdad and came up to Samarra in the first British troop train run on the Baghdad Railway. At Samarra the Battalion joined the 21st Brigade of the Meerut Division, commanded by Major-General V. B. Fane, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. The Brigade comprised the 2nd Battalion The Black Watch, the 1st Battalion Guides Infantry, the 20th Punjabis, and the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles, and was commanded by Brigadier-General Leslie, C.M.G., D.S.O.

At Samarra the Battalion remained throughout the summer, carrying on a vigorous system of training, and working on the Samarra defences on both banks of the river. During June dust-storms were a daily occurrence, and during July and August the heat was intense, rising on one or two occasions as high as 132° in the E.P. tents. Fortunately, however, the nights were cool, and in spite of the heat

and constant dust-storms the health of the troops remained excellent, while drafts came out regularly from the Depot at Mardan.

For the first month the Battalion was camped on a regular dust-heap on the right bank of the Tigris, but was afterwards moved to a clean and sanitary spot on the other side of the river. Games were organized, and both officers and men amused themselves in their spare time by bathing and fishing. The only excitement was provided by a Turkish aeroplane which frequently flew over the camp and was ineffectually fired at by our anti-aircraft guns.

In July Major Battye was appointed Acting Commandant of the 1st Battalion 8th Gurkha Rifles, with which battalion he remained until he returned to command the 1st Battalion Guides Infantry in 1921.

In September the Turks on the Tigris undertook a demonstration against our troops and advanced as far as El Huweslat, eight miles north of Samarra, where they proceeded to entrench themselves. On the 22nd information having been received at Samarra that a force of Turks had occupied Eski Baghdad, on the left bank of the river, Major Sandeman was sent out with two companies of the Guides to clear up the situation. The enemy proved to be in force, and their guns fired some sixty rounds of shrapnel but without inflicting any casualties. The Guides returned to camp that night, and on the following day the operation was repeated by two companies under Captain Anderson with much the same result, the companies being ineffectively shelled. That night, as the companies were returning to camp, a Mills bomb accidentally exploded, wounding twelve men of the Guides, one of whom died of his injuries. Next day the Turks hurriedly evacuated El Huweslat and fell back on Tikrit, thirty miles up-river.

On 1 November the 7th Division and one brigade of the 3rd Division began an advance in the direction of Tikrit, the 21st Brigade moving up the left bank and the remainder of the force by the right bank. At 5.30 a.m. next morning the 21st Brigade deployed to attack the advanced Turkish position at Qantarat, but this turned out to be held by no more than a small Turkish cavalry patrol which fell back after firing a few shots. The advance was then continued to Tel Banat, where a few more Turks were met and dispersed. Here the Brigade halted and threw out a line of outposts from Tel Banat to the river, a front of some 2,500 yards.

Meanwhile, the troops on the right bank had encountered stouter resistance, and the 21st Brigade had an excellent view of their fighting. One enemy aeroplane came over during the day and dropped a few bombs, which inflicted considerable damage on the transport column. During the afternoon Captain Anderson, with "D" Company, pushed on about four miles, blew up a Turkish boat and returned, having met none of the enemy.

On the 3rd the 21st Brigade advanced a distance of five miles to Dahri Rocks, where a halt was made and outposts put out. No enemy were encountered on this bank, and those on the other side of the river had also retired.

On the evening of the 4th the advance on Tikrit was resumed, and early on the morning of the 5th the Brigade reached a point opposite Tikrit where it halted and the Guides Infantry found the outposts covering the front. Beyond occasional

visits from aircraft and a few shells fired from enemy guns no opposition was encountered on the left bank. There was, however, heavy fighting on the right bank and detonations from exploding dumps in the Turkish position could be heard, while hundreds of Turks with guns could be seen retreating along the cliffs, affording good targets for the artillery with the 21st Brigade. That night the remainder of the Turkish army retreated thirty miles up the river, their casualties numbering 2,000 with 300 killed.

On the morning of the 6th white flags were to be seen fluttering all over Tikrit, and our troops occupied the town, which, like the ground in its neighbourhood, was found to be indescribably filthy. The 21st Brigade now crossed to the right bank and went into bivouac. The next two days were spent in clearing the battlefield, and the Brigade then marched back to Samarra, where it arrived on the 13th. During the operations the Brigade had incurred only five casualties, but Lieutenant F. B. Roseveare, of the Corps of Guides, who was attached to the 59th Scinde Rifles, was killed in action on the 5th.

On the return of the 7th Division from Tikrit, the 3rd Division was ordered to take over the Samarra defences from them, the exchange being carried out with all possible secrecy. In accordance with these instructions the 21st Brigade proceeded by route march to Akab, at the junction of the Tigris and Adhaim rivers, the move being conducted on two successive nights. This move was actually a preliminary to the transfer of the 7th Division to Palestine, though the fact was not known in the Battalion until some three weeks later. The cold during the night marches was intense, but on arrival at Akab an excellent camping-ground was found, and here the Battalion remained for the next three weeks, taking its turn at occupying the Adhaim defences and carrying on the usual training.


On 7 December orders were received from the 7th Division to concentrate at Baghdad *en route* for Palestine, and the journey was made by the 21st Brigade in four marches, which brought them to Hinaidi, the port of Baghdad, on the 11th. As the Battalion was marching into Hinaidi camp they were welcomed by the officers and men of the Guides Cavalry, who had just arrived from India, and that night there was a great reunion of old comrades, meeting on the first campaign in which either branch of the Corps had served overseas.

Next day the move to Basra was continued, by train as far as Kut-al-Amara, thence by river steamer to Amara, and again by train from Amara to Nahr Umar, a camp outside Basra, which was reached on the 17th. Here the Battalion spent three days refitting, and on 20 December embarked on the transport *Shuja*, in company with the Headquarters of the 7th Division and the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles. From Basra they sailed to Muscat where the troops were transhipped to the transport *Saxon* and from Muscat with a convoy to Suez, where they arrived on 7 January 1918. On disembarking at Suez the Battalion was at once entrained
1918 for Moascar, near Ismailia, where the 7th Division was concentrating. The strength of the Battalion was now twelve British and seventeen Indian officers with 1,164 other ranks.

The 21st Brigade was now commanded by Brigadier-General A. G. Kemball,

TAMIA

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CHAILA
Sule to N. W. Persia 1919-20.

PERSIAN GULF

To face page 228

who had taken over from Brigadier-General Leslie just before the Brigade left Mesopotamia.

At Moascar the Battalion spent nearly two and a half months undergoing much useful training. The camp was next to that of the Australian and New Zealand base depots, and the men of the Battalion, particularly the Gurkhas, soon established friendly relations with the "Anzacs." Most of the British officers took the opportunity of going to Cairo and Alexandria on short leave. On 6 March the Battalion was inspected by General Sir E. Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., and on the 12th by H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught. At Moascar Lieutenant-Colonel H. Campbell, who was employed with the Alwar State forces, visited the Regiment. Before leaving for Palestine the bandolier equipment was handed into store and the web equipment substituted.

On 24 March the move to Palestine began, the Battalion marching in two stages to Kantara on the Suez Canal, then the base of the Palestine Expeditionary Force, and there entraining two days later for Ludd, which was railhead and the advanced base. Here several days were spent while the 21st Brigade was collecting its various components, and Major Sandeman and Captain Anderson were sent on ahead to study conditions in the front line. On 1 April the Brigade marched to Sarona, the German suburb of the town of Jaffa, and then encamped among the famous orange groves.

On the evening of the following day the Battalion went up to the front line, a most trying march through heavy sand, and took over the sector near the village of Jelil from the 6th Battalion Highland Light Infantry. This unit formed part of the 52nd Division which, with several other formations, was ordered to France in consequence of the success of the German offensive which had opened on 21 March.

The 7th Division was now in the XXI Corps, under Lieutenant-General Sir E. S. Bulfin, K.C.B., C.V.O., which was holding the coastal sector and contained the 3rd and 7th (Indian) Divisions and the 54th and 75th (British) Divisions. The trench system consisted of a chain of strong posts, connected by communication trenches where the configuration of the ground did not allow of a covered approach, the whole front being protected by a continuous belt of barbed wire. When the 7th Division took over the sector the average width of "no man's land" was from 2,500–5,000 yards, and its main duty was the patrolling of this area during the hours of darkness. The country consisted of low, rolling downs and sandhills, clothed with coarse grass and countless wild flowers, and gave no cover such as to allow any movement during the day time. When the Battalion was in the front line, it was usual to have three companies in front and one company in reserve at Battalion Headquarters about 300 to 600 yards in rear. Each brigade usually did six weeks in the line and three in reserve, when it was engaged in intensive training and in supplying working parties. The front of the 7th Division area ran from the sea some three miles inland.

Shortly after going into the line an incident occurred which might have had serious results and from which the Battalion learnt a lesson which they did not forget. A strong patrol, consisting of four British officers and about twenty men, went out one night from the right of the line held by the Battalion to reconnoitre

the ground half a mile in advance with a view to selecting positions for posts in the event of the line being pushed forward, as was at that time projected. Having reached their objective a few shots were fired by some enemy concealed in a wood to a flank and the patrol started to withdraw. As they were coming back fire was opened by one of the Guides Infantry posts on the left of our line, at a Turkish patrol which had bumped into them. This fire was taken up by other posts until eventually the whole line was firing. Someone—it was never discovered who—let off the S.O.S. signal, which consisted of red and green Very lights fired alternately, with the result that the guns and machine guns of the 21st Brigade opened fire on their night lines. Meanwhile, the patrol was held up in the open some 500 yards from the line. The officers decided to stay where they were until the firing stopped, when the patrol returned with, fortunately, the loss of only one man slightly wounded. It was afterwards discovered that the firing had actually been stopped by Lieutenant Doncaster who, unknown to the others, had walked straight through the barrage up to our nearest post and had shouted to the men to stop firing.

On 22 May "B" Company of the Battalion, with Captain Fagnani, Lieutenant Wainwright, Subadar Nur Muhammad and Jemadar Kirtiman, was transferred as part of the nucleus of the 3/151st Infantry,¹ one of the new Indian battalions formed at this time in Palestine to meet the drain of British troops sent to France. Lieutenant H. Grose-Hodge, I.C.S., had meanwhile rejoined from Mesopotamia, where he had been left behind sick.

At the end of this month, while the 21st Brigade was in Divisional Reserve, the front of the 7th Division was advanced, the line being pushed up to within 600–800 yards of the Turkish trenches. The Battalion went into the line again on 31 May, and "D" Company under Captain Anderson suffered some half-dozen casualties while holding "Piffer Redoubt," an advanced post which had been captured by the 53rd Sikhs, Frontier Force, a few days before and which was regularly shelled by the Turks. On relief from this part of the line four days later, the Battalion was moved to the coastal sector, where "A" and "C" Companies held "Dud Post" and "Brown Ridge" respectively, two advanced posts within 500 yards of the Turkish line and about 1,000 yards in front of the remainder of the Battalion. The former of these posts was situated in a hollow below the enemy observation post on a range of sandhills known as "The Sisters" and was constantly shelled. Here "A" Company, under Major Sandeman, suffered fourteen casualties the first day. An amusing incident occurred here the next night when Captain Rich, the Quartermaster, was bringing up rations and a large empty barrel for water storage. In the dark Captain Rich missed "Dud Post," went past it, and very nearly rolled the barrel into the Turkish trenches.

On 6 June Captain P. Grant joined from Mesopotamia.

As the result of the previous advance the position of the 7th Division on the coastal sector was very much exposed, being overlooked from a ridge which the

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Renny, Commanding the 3/151st Infantry, subsequently wrote a most eulogistic report of the work of this company in Palestine and Waziristan.

enemy held in strength, and from which all British movements were visible by day. This ridge was known as "The Sisters." It was L-shaped, the longer arm running at right-angles to the sea and meeting the shorter arm at a point known as the "North Sister." The shorter arm ran south into the plain through the "South Sister," a separate sandhill, to "Dud Post." It was therefore now proposed to make a further advance with a view to capturing the ridge; and two battalions, the 1st Guides Infantry and the 2nd Black Watch, were detailed for the operation. In the plan of attack it was arranged that the Guides should advance from "Dud Post" through the "South Sister" and to the "North Sister," thence wheeling to the left along the top of the ridge, while the Black Watch was to capture the enemy defences nearest the sea and then wheel right along the ridge to meet the Guides.

For this operation the Battalion paraded three companies of seven British officers, eight Indian officers and 500 other ranks, the fourth company being detailed to hold "Dud Post." The British officers engaged at the outset were Lieutenant-Colonel Buist, M.V.O., Commanding, Captain Erskine, Adjutant, Captains Anderson and Doncaster and Lieutenant Cave-Penny commanding "D," "A," and "C" Companies respectively, Lieutenants Leaman and Coates, Company Officers, and Captain Hanna, I.M.S., Medical Officer.

At 1.10 a.m. on 8 June the Battalion marched off to the starting position at "Dud Post" and there deployed for the attack, which had been planned as follows: "D" Company was to advance and capture the "North Sister," dropping a platoon on the "South Sister" *en route*; "A" Company was to follow "D" Company and extend westwards along the top of the ridge until the Black Watch, who were to start simultaneously, were met; "C" Company, carrying picks and shovels, was in Battalion Reserve. The formation adopted at the start for all companies was four lines of half-platoons in file at fifty paces interval and distance, "A" Company being echeloned behind the left of "D."

At zero hour, 3.30 a.m., under a very heavy creeping barrage, which was at once replied to by the Turks, Captain Anderson led "D" Company straight up the ridge, dropping No. 16 Platoon under Lieutenant Coates at the "South Sister" to consolidate, and with the rest of the company capturing the "North Sister," where Captain Anderson was at once hit and killed. Thereupon "A" Company, led by Captain Doncaster and Lieutenant Leaman and echeloned in rear of "D," pushed along the ridge according to plan and had just reached their objective when Captain Doncaster was killed and Lieutenant Leaman wounded. The attack had been carried out absolutely according to plan, and the rapid and successful capture of all objectives was largely due to the gallantry and good leadership of Captains Anderson and Doncaster.

Lieutenants Cave-Penny and Coates, who were the only British officers left with the three companies, now began the task of consolidation, a particularly difficult one, as the soil was either soft sand or hard clay and the captured Turkish trenches were very deep and so sited as to give little or no assistance to the captors. Further, after a short interval of intermittent shelling, the enemy put down a very heavy bombardment, while his snipers were numerous and active behind, as well as in

front of the captured positions. At about 6.40 a.m. the Turks counter-attacked in great strength. The brunt of the attack fell on the Guides, whose scattered line of digging men had by this time been greatly thinned by the heavy shelling and rifle fire. The enemy gained a footing on our trenches but was promptly bombed out by the survivors of "D" Company, very gallantly led by Lieutenant Coates and Naik Allah Khan, Akora Khattak. During this counter-attack Lieutenant Cave-Penny, the only surviving company commander, was killed. After the attack had been repulsed two platoons of the Black Watch arrived on the scene and filled the large gap caused by casualties, and the sight of the "Jocks" in their midst had a very heartening effect on the men. Later these two platoons were replaced by two companies of the 51st Sikhs, Frontier Force, sent up under Captains E. P. Watts and L. E. Macgregor. About 8 a.m. Captain Grant and Lieutenant Grose-Hodge came up as reinforcements.

Shelling was incessant throughout the day and consolidation could not be completed, for the high ground now held by the Guides stood up above the surrounding country, and being a right-angled salient formed a veritable shell trap, while the long grass in front helped the Turkish snipers, who came forward boldly and made all movement hazardous even for those who were under cover from the Turkish attacks. Later in the day the enemy opened an oblique fire from their left flank with all their guns, which could plainly be seen from the "South Sister" in the act of firing. Both those in the front line and carrying parties in rear suffered very heavily from this shell fire, and on one occasion a salvo of Turkish shells landed directly in a trench occupied by some of the Battalion and knocked out the whole of No. 15 Platoon except for one man. When night came on the trenches were improved and the front lightly wired, while touch was regained with the Black Watch and also with a party of twenty-five Yusafzais under Havildars Nowsheri and Faujun, who had been holding out stoutly, though isolated from the Battalion and cut off on both flanks.

The Guides continued to hold the position until the night of the 10th-11th, when they were relieved by the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles and went back to rest on the seashore at Jelil. The enemy made no further attempt to retake the position, but shelling throughout the 9th and 10th was heavy and continuous. During the three days the Battalion had sustained casualties amounting to 40 per cent. of those engaged. Three British officers and thirty-three Indian other ranks had been killed or died of wounds; one British officer, six Indian officers and 147 other ranks were wounded, while nineteen men were missing. In Captain Anderson the Battalion lost a particularly fine soldier and a good comrade who was loved by all ranks; Captain Doncaster had gained universal respect for his devotion to duty, and Lieutenant Cave-Penny was a young officer of great promise and ability much above the average. These three officers were all buried on the 9th in a cemetery between Jaffa and "The Sisters."

Congratulatory telegrams were received from the Divisional and Corps Commanders, while General Sir E. Allenby, describing this operation in his despatch of 18 September, stated :—

"The enemy's losses were considerable and 4 officers and 101 other ranks were captured. The capture of these positions not only prevented the enemy from overlooking a considerable length of our Defences and the ground in rear, but secured observation of the approaches to the enemy's position, with the result that his movements by day have been considerably restricted."

Several recommendations were put forward and the following awards were made : Captain C. E. T. Erskine and Lieutenant J. C. Coates the Military Cross, the former for devotion to duty and repeated gallantry during the three days the Battalion was in action, and the latter for the part he played in dislodging the Turks from our trenches ; Subadar-Major Man Bir the Indian Order of Merit ; and Subadar Saida Khan, Naik Allah Khan, Lance-Naik Man Bahadur and Sepoy Kabi Raj the Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

The Battalion remained for ten days in Brigade Reserve at Jelil, moving up every night behind the new line as a support in case of the enemy attempting the recapture of his lost trenches, while by day the reorganization of the Battalion, which now consisted only of three companies and eleven platoons, was carried out. On the 23rd the same front-line trenches on "The Sisters" were taken over again, the line now being within 150-250 yards of the Turks and forming a salient into which the enemy could fire from the front, right and right rear. During this tour of twenty-five days in the front line the Guides put in much hard work at the further consolidation of the trenches and lost men at the rate of two a day, Lieutenant R. V. Chapman and Jemadar Mangtu being wounded, and Subadar Saida Khan, who had proved a magnificent Indian officer, being killed.

On 13 July a most successful daylight raid was carried out by Lieutenant C. A. Winton and a party of twenty Gurkha volunteers, including Havildars Dhan Jit and Puran Bahadur, Naik Karma Dhoj and Lance-Naik Hasta Ram. The objectives were two strong points in front of the right of the Battalion line and 150-200 yards from it. The raid, which had been carefully planned and rehearsed, took place at 1 p.m., the time of day when the Turks were usually most inactive. The raiders left our trenches and creeping down a *wadi* in "no man's land" for about 100 yards then advanced across the open to their first objective. As the Gurkhas neared the enemy's line they drew their kukris and leaping down upon the astonished Turks speedily cleared the trench, seven Turks being killed here, while five prisoners and a machine gun were captured. The party then advanced and cleared the other strong point, a separate redoubt, fifteen Turks in all being killed and fifteen prisoners (five wounded and ten unwounded), being taken. The raiders then returned across the 150 yards of "no man's land" to "North Sister," the operation having worked exactly to plan and having taken only twelve minutes from start to finish. Only three of the party were wounded. Lieutenant Winton was awarded the Military Cross and Havildar Dhan Jit the Indian Distinguished Service Medal. This raid was thus referred to in an English newspaper :—

"Decapitated with a kukri."

"A Subaltern in charge of a party had an extraordinary experience. He had

stuck his bayonet into a Turk, but was unable to disengage owing to the narrowness of the trench. Another Turk beyond began jabbing the butt end of his rifle into the ribs of the officer, and seemed likely to inflict an injury, when the officer saw his assailant's head leap from his shoulders, a Gurkha having dexterously decapitated him with his kukri, which is an invaluable weapon at such close quarters."

This was the actual experience of Lieutenant Winton during the raid just described, and the Gurkha referred to was Sepoy Mardani of the Guides.

The execution of this raid was considered so instructive that details regarding it were circulated to all units in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

The same night the enemy opened a very heavy bombardment on the trenches held by the Guides and 1/8th Gurkha Rifles, but the greater number of the shells landed in the open and casualties were few. Lieutenant Chapman, however, was wounded for the second time while in the "North Sister" Observation Post.

During the next few weeks no event of any outstanding importance occurred, duty in the front line being varied by periods of rest in rear, while reinforcements came out to replace the daily wastage.

On 13 August, when the Battalion was holding the coastal sector of the front line, Jemadar Harnam Singh was killed while out on a "clearing patrol" at dawn, and Lance-Naik Gopal Singh was severely wounded trying to bring him in, this being finally accomplished successfully by Sepoy Kartar Singh who was awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal. On 18 August the 125th Rifles carried out a raid at dawn in front of the trenches held by the Guides. This brought in return the inevitable bombardment by the Turks of our front-line trenches, and the Guides had eleven casualties, including Jemadar Ran Bir killed. On 9 September, while up in the line, a patrol of "C" Company unfortunately exploded a land mine which knocked out Havildar Ghulam Muhammad (Satti) and Lance-Naik Abdul Latif. The former was not seen until daylight next day, when he was very bravely recovered and brought in, severely wounded, by Subadar Muhammad Khan. The lance-naik was never seen again.

On 16 September a large draft, consisting of two Indian officers and 262 other ranks, arrived as reinforcements. Though it was much needed to replace casualties and normal wastage, the arrival of this draft was not especially timely, for preparations were now being made for the final offensive, and the coming of so large a number of new men tended to some extent to complicate the task.

It was now the eve of General Allenby's great offensive, the result of which was to end the war so far as Turkey was concerned. In Force Order No. 68 it was stated that "The Army, pivoting on its positions in the Jordan Valley, will attack on the front between the high ground east of El Mugheir and the sea, with the object of inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy and driving him from the line Nablus-Tul Keram-Caesarea." After the break-through by the infantry, the cavalry was to pass rapidly into the Plain of Esdraelon and get behind the Turks holding the line farther east. The XXI Corps (3rd, 7th, 54th and 75th Divisions) was to attack the enemy's position in the coastal area and was now strengthened for the purpose by the

addition of the 60th (London) Division, the Australian Light Horse Brigade and a composite French detachment, as well as numerous mountain, medium and heavy batteries bringing the total of pieces of all calibres to over 300.

The Turkish line on the plain, as seen from the Guides' trenches on "The Sisters," consisted of two defensive positions, well constructed and wired, some 3,000 yards apart, and known respectively as the Tabsor and the El Tireh positions. The Tabsor position was 3,000 yards in depth, and each consisted of a series of works connected by a continuous network of fire trenches.

The 7th Division was to attack with the 60th Division between it and the sea and the 75th Division on its right. Its first objective, the Tabsor position, was a difficult one, as the opposing trenches were numerous and provided with well-sited machine and field-gun emplacements which enfiladed the advancing troops. The ground was intersected by several water-courses, and there was but little cover. After clearing the first trench system the Division had to advance along the Wadi Hurab-el-Miskeh to the western edge of a swamp called Birket Ramadan, separated by a neck of dry ground from the impassable marsh of Zerkiyeh. Once past this the Division was to advance east and capture the El Tireh defences some 3,000 yards farther on, and then to close on its right so as to leave the Zerkiyeh-Hudeira road free for the mounted troops.

For the advance transport had been reduced to a minimum, only ammunition, stores, rations and water being carried. British officers were allowed ten pounds only, while the other ranks from now on until their arrival at Tripoli six weeks later had nothing but what they carried on their backs.

On 18 September a large force of bombing aeroplanes was directed over Nablus, where it was known that the enemy had his main telephone and telegraph exchange. This was completely destroyed, a fact which played an important part in enabling the British cavalry to reach the Plain of Esdraelon before the enemy commander knew that they had broken through.

At dawn on 19 September the attack was launched by the five divisions and the great offensive had begun. The 19th Infantry Brigade, with two battalions attached—the 1st Guides Infantry and 20th Punjabis—formed the main 7th Division column of attack on a front of 400 yards facing the Turkish position in the coastal area at Tabsor. On reaching the position of deployment on a very misty morning, the Guides formed up in rear of the 1st Seaforth Highlanders in four lines of platoons at fifty yards' interval and distance. At 4.25 a.m. the advance began, and on the Seaforth Highlanders reaching their first objectives the Guides passed through to their own objectives beyond, finding the Turkish trenches terribly battered by the British barrage which crept forward at an average rate of a hundred yards in two minutes. The Turks were taken completely by surprise, and practically no opposition was met with except from the Turkish barrage at "W" Trench, where Lieutenant Arnott, Jemadar Mangal Singh and some twenty men became casualties. The Guides and the Seaforth Highlanders now pushed on to the second objective, the main El Tireh position, consisting of newly-dug and unused trenches. This was occupied without much opposition, and the advance continued for another mile

when an outpost line was put out and a halt called until the 75th Division came up on the right.

At 9.30 a.m. the Desert Mounted Corps passed through on the left, pouring on at a canter over the rolling downs, while the shells from the ships of the Royal Navy close inshore were bursting over the Turkish back areas, and swarms of aeroplanes were passing north to bomb the enemy communications.

The Guides who had advanced some seven miles at a fast rate and had long since lost communication with their own Brigade, now turned east and marched on El Tireh village, arriving there at 5.20 p.m. and finding the rest of the 21st Brigade engaged with the Turks among the foothills. The advance was continued until 11 p.m., when the Battalion bivouacked in a nullah and the men were at last able to fill their water-bottles. It had been a long and tiring day and, owing to the heat and dust, the men had suffered terribly from thirst.

Early on the 20th the 21st Brigade fell in behind the 19th Brigade and moved forward into the Judean hills. This day's march was one of no slight hardship. All ranks had been marching and fighting with little respite since the morning of the 19th, carrying heavy loads, and again this day water was scarce. The road consisted of a rough and stony track—up steep hillsides and down into sweltering valleys—along which the unwieldy column could not move more than two abreast. The march continued all day, and at 5.30 p.m. the 19th Brigade in front was completely checked by enemy fire from Beit Lid ; this small village, composed of stone houses perched on a ridge which commanded the road, being held by a body of resolute men with fourteen machine guns.

The situation was an unpleasant one : the 19th Brigade had tried a frontal attack and failed at the cost of many casualties ; and the other regiments of the 21st Brigade—the Guides were in the rear—were too much exhausted to go farther. Colonel Buist, however, volunteered to outflank the enemy's position, and the 1st Guides were now ordered to move round by the right, climb the ridge behind the village and take it in rear. The advance led up a very steep and rocky nullah, " C " and " B " Companies being sent up spurs towards the village and establishing touch with the 19th Brigade, while " A " and " D " Companies climbed the main ridge. As the Guides closed in on the enemy's position the Turks bolted, leaving the road clear for the farther advance of the 7th Division which had been held up here for several hours.

This advance by the Guides, which was accomplished with the loss of only twenty casualties, was a very fine one, entailing, as it did, a long climb over very rough country at the end of a long and arduous march. The Turks detached several of their machine guns to oppose the Battalion, which must have suffered severe losses had they not taken every advantage of the cover afforded by the rugged nature of the hillside. Here their previous training in frontier warfare stood them in good stead. By the time the men reached the crest of the ridge they were completely exhausted by thirst, but happily a spring was discovered by a runner sent to establish communication between " A " and " C " Companies and water-bottles were refilled for the first time since the early hours of the morning. Piquets were

now thrown out and the line gained was held by the Guides during the night, giving the exhausted men a chance to rest among the rocks and thorn-bushes, among which crawled centipedes six inches long. On the morning of the 21st the rest of the 21st Brigade closed up and the advance was resumed across the Nablus-Tul Keram road to Messudie Junction, where the Brigade bivouacked and transport animals were watered for the first time in forty-eight hours.

The following British officers took part in these operations with the Battalion : Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Buist, M.V.O. ; Major D. Sandeman ; Captains P. Grant, J. E. Redding, J. C. Coates, M.C., J. N. M. Hodgins, E. P. Rich and H. Grose-Hodge, I.C.S. ; Lieutenants R. Lee, R. L. I. Arnott, C. Winton, M.C., and N. G. Devonshire, with Captain G. B. Hanna, I.M.S. ; while Captain C. E. T. Erskine, M.C., was attached to the XXI Corps staff.

The casualties during these days were as follows : killed, Lieutenant R. L. I. Arnott and three other ranks ; wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Buist (slightly), Captain Hodgins, Lieutenant Lee, Jemadar Mangal Singh and fifty-nine other ranks ; while two men were missing. Lieutenant Arnott was a young officer who, though he had only been with the Battalion a few months, had greatly endeared himself to all ranks.

The following awards were made : Havildars Gama and Faujun, the Indian Distinguished Service Medal ; Major Sandeman, Subadar Devi Ram and Naik Atta Muhammad, mentioned in despatches. On 26 September General Sir E. Allenby published the following message :—

“ I desire to convey to all ranks and all arms of the Force under my command my admiration and thanks for their great deeds of the past week, and my appreciation of their gallantry and determination, which have resulted in the total destruction of the Seventh and Eighth Turkish Armies opposed to us. Such a complete victory has seldom been known in all the history of war.”

On the 22nd the Brigade marched to Samaria, where it bivouacked for the night, and on the following evening retraced its steps to Tul Keram, over a road which had been heavily bombed by British airmen during the pursuit and which for fifteen miles was so choked with broken transport, dead men and dead horses—the *débris* of the Turkish Army—as to be passable only with difficulty and horror.

The 7th Division was now ordered to march northwards via the coast road on Beirut and Tripoli. Starting on the 24th and marching via Hudeira and Zimmarin, it reached the coast at Athlit on the 26th, a total march of thirty-seven miles. Within a few minutes of the arrival of each unit in succession, every man and beast was bathing in the exquisite little bay beneath the walls of a Crusader castle, this being the first opportunity of a real wash they had had for a week. From Athlit the 1st Guides Infantry was pushed on in advance of the rest of the 21st Brigade to Haifa, and there took over from the Cavalry the outposts on Mount Carmel—a line of some three miles. At Haifa the Battalion met two sepoys of the 2nd Guides Infantry, who had become separated from their battalion during the attack on the 19th and had been wandering about the country for over a week looking for it. The 2nd Guides were at that time some sixty miles farther south !

The 21st Brigade remained in bivouac at Haifa until 4 October, and the rest was greatly appreciated, for the march had been a hot and arduous one and the men had suffered much from lack of water. The Division then marched on by the historic coast road, which has been the route of every invader of Palestine from the Egyptians and the Assyrians, whose inscriptions could be seen cut on rocks by the roadside, to the present day. The first day's march was round the Bay of Acre, and from the top of Carmel the head of the column could be seen moving on to the new camping area as its rear was leaving the old area more than ten miles behind. From Acre they marched to Musheirafeh, Ras-el-Ain—crossing here the famous "Ladder of Tyre," which as the Battalion passed was being converted by pioneers into a motor road—by Saida and El Damur, reaching Beirut on 10 October. During this long and strenuous march of ninety-six miles in a week, influenza had broken out in the Battalion, resulting in the evacuation to hospital of a number of officers and men. The troops bivouacked at each halting place *en route*, billets in the houses of local inhabitants often being available for the British officers; and at each town and village passed the local inhabitants turned out *en masse* to welcome the British Army, which they were obviously glad to see arriving in their country. The Brigade remained for twelve days in Beirut, during which one and a half companies of the Guides were on outpost duty, billeted in villages on the Lebanon mountains some 4,000 feet above and overlooking the town. While at Beirut many more men were evacuated to hospital suffering from influenza.

The 21st Brigade was the first infantry unit to enter Beirut, but the actual capture of the town must be credited to the Corps Commander in person. An amusing account is given in a letter from Captain C. E. T. Erskine, M.C., who was at this time serving on his staff and took part in the incident :—

"When it became apparent that our attack (at Sharon) was definitely successful, we were told that it was of the first importance that we should occupy Beirut before the Sherifian Army got there. The Corps Commander (General Bulfin) and a portion of his staff therefore made a dash for the town, ahead of the troops. Our reception was most cordial. The streets were crowded, and the populace cheered and squirted scent at us. We put up at the Dusseldorf Hotel, which only a few hours before had been the Headquarters of the Turkish VIII Army Corps. The Arabs entered the town a few hours after us, and next morning all the main buildings flew the Sherifian flag.

"As it was well known that any form of diplomacy with the Arabs would fail, I was given a platoon of British infantry and was told to go round by night and remove the more offending flags. This we duly did. Our bag was seven flags, of which the platoon commander kept one, I kept another (which is now in the Guides mess at Mardan), and five were duly handed in to Corps Headquarters. No protest was lodged by the Arabs."

On 22 October the advance was continued by Dabaye, Junie, Jebeil, Batrun, Beshmezzin to Ras-el-Lados, a camp some four miles north of Tripoli town, the last part of the march being made in heavy rain. Here ended, as far as the 1st Guides Infantry was concerned, the long pursuit which had taken them 270 miles of

marching in twenty-two marching days since 19 September; for on 31 October, the day after their arrival at Tripoli, news was received of the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey.

The first indication that the news of the armistice with Germany had been received was at dinner time on 11 November, when Very lights were seen going up from the ships in Tripoli harbour, and shortly afterwards a telephone message was received from Divisional Headquarters. The news spread like wild-fire, and there was great rejoicing in camp that night, every battalion letting off all its store of Very lights and all the officers in the Brigade eventually foregathering in the Black Watch mess.

In view of the probability of a prolonged stay at Tripoli, preparations were made for hutting, kits were completed as far as possible, and the gaps caused by sickness were filled by two drafts, each of 179 other ranks, which arrived on 11 and 20 November; in addition a batch of nine British officers, who had been kept in reserve as reinforcements in case of heavy casualties, now joined the Battalion. At this time Captain H. Grose-Hodge, I.C.S., I.A.R.O., left to join the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, having served continuously with the Battalion since August, 1916.

The Battalion remained in camp at Ras-el-Lados for the next six weeks, and on 19 December Headquarters and three companies moved to El Mina, the port of Tripoli, where Christmas and the New Year were spent. The officers and 1919 men were billeted in the town, and the Battalion took over the guards and duties and supplied working parties for the supply and ordnance dumps.

The following is a summary of the casualties sustained by the 1st Guides Infantry during the Great War, excluding those which occurred in drafts sent to other regiments :—

<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Killed or Died of Wounds.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.¹</i>	<i>Total.</i>
British officers ...	7	6	—	13
Indian officers ...	7	12	—	19
Indian other ranks ...	113	521	9	643
Totals ...	127	539	9	675

In January the Battalion was sent north to Jisi Ayash, and there spent a fortnight working on the main road from Tripoli to Homs, which was the only communication with north Syria. This road, the surface of which was naturally bad, had been reduced by heavy lorry traffic and incessant rain to a ribbon of mud, in some places two feet thick, and the Battalion was allotted a particularly bad stretch to keep in repair. Violent winds were experienced at Jisi Ayash, and the tents were frequently blown down. On the 18th the Battalion marched back to Tripoli, and a few days afterwards a draft of eighty-eight other ranks joined the Battalion from the depot. Training and recreation were now taken seriously in hand, musketry was started and everything was done to keep all ranks occupied and happy.

¹ Includes only those who were not prisoners.

On 2 April the 21st Brigade moved camp to Mejdalaya in the foothills above Tripoli, and here the 2nd Battalion Guides Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Bogle, D.S.O., joined the Brigade in place of the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles.

On 3 June orders were received for the 1st Battalion to march to Homs and there entrain for Baalbek. The march to Homs occupied five days, on the last of which, as the Battalion was nearing the town, large numbers of Arab sheikhs, mounted on beautiful Arab ponies, were seen riding into Homs to meet Feisal, King of the Hedjaz, who was passing through on his way to Aleppo. Baalbek was reached on the 12th, and the change to this ideal station, situated on a plateau 3,500 feet above sea-level between the two Lebanons, was much appreciated. The officers' mess was established in the annexe of an hotel,¹ while the men were accommodated at an old Turkish School of Instruction. While quartered here the new scheme of education for Indian ranks was inaugurated, field training was started, and hutting was taken in hand with the help of the 121st Pioneers sent for the purpose.

Opportunities were also afforded for playing games, and at the Northern Force Sports Meeting at Damascus the 1st Guides Infantry represented their Brigade in hockey, football and in the Khud race.

In July Major Sandeman, who had served with the Battalion throughout the whole period of the Great War, left for India to take up an Intelligence appointment on the North-West Frontier.

In November orders were received that Syria was to be evacuated by British troops and handed over to the French. Accordingly, on 17 November, the advanced party of the Guides left Baalbek, and on the 27th the Battalion with the rest of the 21st Brigade joined the 7th Division at Beirut, where, on the 29th, it was inspected by General Gouraud, the French Commander-in-Chief in the Levant. A fortnight was spent here, and on 14 December the 1st Guides Infantry embarked in the *Abbassieh* for Port Said, where it arrived two days later and proceeded by rail to Kantara. Here the Battalion was kept in quarantine until the 19th and was joined by a large draft of eight Indian officers and 184 other ranks from the Indian base depot. On release from quarantine the whole of the 7th Division was concentrated in camp in the vicinity of Kantara, where it remained for Christmas and the New Year.

At this time the revolutionary movement in Egypt, which had been simmering for some years, had come to a head and had culminated in outrages, chiefly directed against Europeans, in different parts of the country. On New Year's day 1920 the Battalion received orders to join the 10th Division at Tantah, the third largest town in Lower Egypt, and believed to be seething with sedition. The advanced party left next day and was followed on the evening of the 4th by the rest of the Battalion which arrived at Tantah on the 5th, and was at once distributed as follows: Headquarters, with "B" and "C" Companies, at Tantah; "D" Company to Damanhour; "A" Company to Mohallat-el-Kuhrat; while next day Nos. 11 and 12 Platoons were sent to Benha and Kafr-el-Zayat respectively to guard the railway bridges over the Nile.

¹ The hotel itself had been used by Turkish troops, and was so badly infested with fleas as to be uninhabitable.

The Battalion was now in the 29th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Blake, C.M.G., D.S.O., the headquarters of which were at Alexandria. The other battalions in the Brigade were the 2nd Sherwood Foresters, the 46th Punjabis and the 2/56th Rifles.

On 15 January a regrettable incident occurred in the Kafr-el-Zayat detachment, Subadar Sher Singh and Sepoy Dasranda Singh being shot dead and Naik Bishen Singh being wounded. Exhaustive enquiries were made, but it was never discovered who had committed these outrages.

At this time local Nationalist feeling was running very high in the Tantah district, which was now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Buist, and anti-British demonstrations were of almost daily occurrence, but meetings were broken up by the troops without casualties.

On 19 March the Battalion was relieved at Tantal and the outposts by the 2/72nd Punjabis from India and proceeded to Mex, seven miles west of Alexandria, the main Base Ammunition Depot for the whole of the Egypt Expeditionary Force, where duties were very heavy and where the Battalion remained for the next eight months. At the end of March "B" Company went on detachment to Famagusta in the island of Cyprus to relieve a company of the 2nd Battalion Sherwood Foresters, and remained there guarding Russian refugees until November, when it rejoined the Battalion at Mex.

During the winter of 1919-20 the following Indian ranks of the 1st Guides Infantry received awards: Subadar-Major Man Bir and Subadar Afzal, *Jangi Inams* to the value of Rs.600 annually; Naik Ragpat, the I.D.S.M. for gallantry in Waziristan, where he was serving with the 3rd Battalion Guides Infantry; while the following were awarded Meritorious Service Medals for good work during the Great War: Havildars Bahadur Jung, Pardhan Singh, Azim, Shah Wali, Karma Dhoj, Umar, Karna Sing, Shankar, Ambar and Nowsheri; Naiks Nawab, Ghulam Muhammad, Asal Din, Jagtu, Gulistan, Atta Muhammad, Nur Muhammad, Baldeo Singh, Adil Shah, and Man Bahadur; Lance-Naiks Mao Khan, Gobinda, Hazara Singh, Musahib and Lal Bahadur.

In November an incident occurred at Mex in which an Indian officer and some men of the Guides evinced great courage and presence of mind. By some unexplained means a railway truck containing Very-light cartridges caught fire near the Mex ammunition dump, which contained over 20,000 tons of explosives. A working party of another unit, which was engaged in unloading the trucks at the time, all bolted, and Subadar Muhammad Khan, seeing the danger, at once called up the guard of the Guides who ran to the spot and promptly extinguished the fire at great personal risk.

The time had now come for the 1st Guides Infantry to return to India, and on 8 December it proceeded by rail to Suez and there embarked next day in the *Franz Ferdinand*,¹ reaching Karachi on the 19th. Before leaving Egypt Colonel Buist received a letter from Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, who expressed his high

¹ This same transport had conveyed them from Karachi to Basra nearly four years before. See p. 225.

appreciation of the services rendered by the Battalion and their admirable spirit and conduct in all circumstances, and on arrival at Karachi a telegram was received from General Lord Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief in India, welcoming the Battalion back and congratulating all ranks on their gallantry and devotion to duty.

On arrival at Mardan the Battalion absorbed the depot, and on 3 January was inspected by General Lord Rawlinson, who stated that he had never seen a finer body of men during his inspections, and particularly noted the fine bearing **1921** and excellent turn-out of the men. On 7 January a party of two Indian officers and sixty-eight other ranks—all of them Gurkhas—returned to the Battalion from duty with the 3/151st Infantry in Waziristan.


General leave was now opened for all who had returned from service overseas, and demobilization began. Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. Buist, M.V.O., gave up command of the Corps on 4 January and retired on pension. He was the last Commandant of the Corps of Guides, and he was the only officer who originally left India with the 1st Battalion and also returned with it. He had served uninterruptedly with the Battalion, except for very brief periods, and was in command in every action of the Great War in which the Battalion took part—a fine sportsman and good comrade, who had gained the deep affection and respect of all ranks. He was temporarily succeeded in command by Major H. Campbell, D.S.O., M.V.O., who was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel on 1 February, while in August Lieutenant-Colonel I. U. Battye, D.S.O., returned from the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles to take over permanent command and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell proceeded to Palestine to command the 2nd Battalion Guides Infantry.

In March the following awards for good service during the Great War and afterwards were announced: Meritorious Service Medals, Sepoys Bhan Singh and Kali Rana; *Jangi Inams* at Rs.10 per mensem, Subadar-Major Khan Bahadur and Jemadar Kans Bir; *Jangi Inams* at Rs.5 per mensem, Havildars Azim, Barkat Shah, Sher Dast, Shankar and Sher Zaman, Naiks Baldeo and Gungar.

At the end of this month orders were received outlining the Group system, under which all Gurkhas of the Guides were to be mustered out and their places taken by other classes, in order that the composition of the Battalion might be brought into line with that of other battalions of the group. Up to this time the Guides were the only regular regiment in the Indian Army, other than the Gurkha battalions, who had had Gurkhas permanently in their ranks and their loss was deeply felt. They were liked and respected by all classes, and during the Great War they had proved themselves to be second to none as fighting men. That they themselves appreciated serving in the Guides is proved by the fact that of those who were serving at the time only eleven accepted transfer to other regiments, the remainder preferring to be demobilized.¹

In this month, too, the Corps of Guides ceased to exist as a single unit, and the 1st Guides Infantry became the 5th Battalion 12th Frontier Force Regiment (Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides). The Battalion was actually the senior of the five battalions in the group, but had offered to take the number five in order that the four Sikh battalions might retain their original numbers, one to four.

¹ See Appendix VIII (B) for further changes in the composition of the Battalion at this time.



OFFICERS OF THE 2ND BATTALION GUIDES INFANTRY, 1919.

Back Row.—Lieut. S. B. Good. Lieut. C. R. Hughes. 2/Lieut. W. H. Goulstone. Lieut. J. F. T. Trevitt. Lieut. S. G. S. Rose.
Centre Row.—Attached Officer. Lieut. Duff. Lieut. Buckingham. Lieut. V. A. Monies. Attached Officer. Lieut. C. H. Mitchell.
Front Row.—Lieut. V. Fox-Strangways. Major F. K. Hensley. Lieut.-Col. J. S. Bogle. Lieut. L. V. Dart, M.C. Lieut. A. H. Keum, M.C., I.C.S.

CHAPTER XVII

1917-1922

THE GREAT WAR: THE GUIDES INFANTRY, 2ND BATTALION: PALESTINE AND SYRIA

FORMATION OF THE 2ND BATTALION—ARRIVAL IN EGYPT—IN THE FRONT LINE AT TELFIT—PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT ADVANCE—THE BATTLE OF SHARON—CASUALTIES AND AWARDS—RETURN TO EGYPT—GARRISON DUTY IN SYRIA—WINTER IN EGYPT—DEPARTURE FOR INDIA—FAREWELL MESSAGES—RECONSTITUTION AS A TRAINING BATTALION.

See Maps : Palestine 1918, in pocket ; Egypt, in pocket ; Syria and Palestine, facing page 252.

THE 2nd Battalion Guides Infantry came into existence officially on 15 January 1917, and was organized as follows :—

"A" Company: Two platoons, Dogras from the 1st Guides and the 1917 55th Rifles. One platoon, Yusafzais from the 1st Guides. One platoon, Punjabi Mussulmans from the 52nd Sikhs.

"B" Company: Two platoons, Punjabi Mussulmans from the 1st Guides, the 52nd Sikhs, the 54th Sikhs, and 55th Rifles. Two platoons, Gurkhas from the 1st Guides and the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles.

"C" Company: Two platoons, Punjabi Mussulmans from the 1st Guides, the 52nd Sikhs, the 54th Sikhs and 55th Rifles. Two platoons, Gurkhas from the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles.

"D" Company: Two platoons, Khattaks from the 1st Guides. Two platoons, Sikhs from the 1st Guides, 52nd Sikhs and 55th Rifles.

On 16 March the Battalion moved from Mardan to the Malakand at a strength of three British and six Indian officers and 487 other ranks. The following day Major J. S. Bogle arrived from field service in Egypt with the Alwar Imperial Service Troops and assumed command of the Battalion, while some few weeks later Major F. K. Hensley, 1st Guides, who had been doing duty with the Assam Military Police in Assam was posted as Second-in-Command.

The next eleven months were spent in training for the war, and it was not until 10 February 1918 that the Battalion, then at Nowshera, received orders to mobilize.

Actually it did not entrain for service until 20 May, and left Bombay in the 1918 hired transport *Karagola* on the 28th. The strength of the Battalion was then thirteen British officers, eighteen Indian officers, 984 other ranks and fifty followers; the British officers being: Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Bogle (Commandant); Major F. K. Hensley; Captains C. W. Molony and A. L. W. Neave; Lieutenants L. V. Dart, M.C., C. R. Hughes and A. H. Kemm, I.C.S.; Second-Lieutenants C. H. Mitchell, V. Fox-Strangways, W. H. Goulstone, S. G. S. Rose and I. A. Thew, and Lieutenant Sher Singh, I.M.S. The Indian officers were

Subadar-Major Bahadur Khan, Subadars Shadi Khan, Gujar Khan, Ahmad Khan, Parshed Gurung, Ismail Khan and Fauja Singh; Jemadars Jaimal Singh, Lal Khan, Mustafa Khan, Nur Bai Gurung, Amar Singh, Santa Bir, Tarlok Singh, Lahoru, Haider Ali Shah, Ahmad Yar, and Mian Nur.

Major R. C. G. Pollock, 52nd Sikhs, was detailed to remain in command of the Depot in India. He had served with the Battalion from the day it was formed, and its success was in large measure due to the efficiency of his organization both during the period of training in India and subsequently during the operations in Palestine.

The 2nd Guides disembarked at Suez on 9 June, and, entraining the same day, proceeded to Tel-el-Kebir, the scene of the action against the army of Arabi Pasha in 1882. Platoon, company and battalion training was at once resumed, while specialist courses were also started for the instruction of Lewis gunners, signallers, bombers, runners and stretcher-bearers and in anti-gas measures. Rifles and web equipment were issued, and four Lewis guns were drawn from the Ordnance for training purposes.

The Battalion was allotted to the 180th Brigade of the 60th (London) Division. The Brigadier was Brigadier-General C. F. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O., while the Divisional Commander was Major-General Sir J. M. S. Shea, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O. The Division had originally been composed entirely of London Territorial battalions, but had lately been reorganized when seven battalions were withdrawn for service in France, while two others were disbanded, the vacancies being filled by units of the Indian Army, chiefly newly raised battalions. The 180th Brigade contained the 2/19th London Regiment, the 2nd Battalion Guides Infantry, the 1/50th Kumaon Rifles and the 2/30th Punjabis. At the date of their arrival in Egypt the 60th Division was with General Allenby's force on the Jordan river.

On 3 July the Battalion received orders to move and, entraining early on the 5th, proceeded to Kantara West, where all baggage was transferred over the Suez Canal to Kantara East, only one lorry being available for the purpose. At 10 p.m. all was ready and the Battalion left by train for Ludd, arriving about 3 p.m. on the 6th, and marching some three miles to a bivouac at Surafend. The next two days were spent in drawing and fitting equipment for men and harness for transport mules, and on the 9th they marched some thirteen miles to Latrun, arriving there after midnight. Marching on to Beit Nuba and Deir Izbzia in great heat and by a bad and hilly road, the Battalion was inspected *en route* by the Divisional Commander and later again by the Brigadier. Eventually it went into bivouac on the 17th and took over a section of the defences in the Telfit area. Here the men and animals were kept under the cover of the olive groves and fig trees, and officers and other ranks were sent in small parties up to the line for instruction with the 2/19th London Regiment.

Between 17 and 25 July the Battalion took over from the 38th Royal Fusiliers the sector near Jiljilia. It was not until 7 August 1918, that the first casualty was sustained in the Battalion, one man being wounded by rifle fire from an enemy patrol which had come close to the wire. On 12 August the 29th Infantry Brigade passed through "A" Company at Alwein to carry out a raid on Churabai Ridge.

Our barrage started at 9.55 p.m., and the enemy replied with an intermittent bombardment, wounding one man in "A" Company.

The sector was handed over to the 2/30th Punjabis between 13 and 15 August ; and on the 18th preparations were made for a move to Beit Nuba which took place on 19 and 20 August. During the whole of this time intensive training was carried out, and while the Battalion was at Beit Nuba Lance-Naik Gujar Singh won the Corps Commander's Lewis Gun Competition. At the 180th Brigade's sports the Battalion won five first, three second and two third prizes.

On 14 September verbal orders were received at 2 p.m. from the 180th Brigade to march from Beit Nuba to an unknown destination. The Battalion marched at 6.43 p.m. in the Brigade column and reached Surafend at 2 a.m. on the 15th. On the night of the 16th a similar march was made to Sarona where the Brigade was concealed in orange groves. No man was allowed to appear in the open during the hours of daylight, and fires were not to be lighted either by day or night.

It was now apparent that the 2nd Battalion Guides Infantry was to take part in General Allenby's great offensive, the general plan of which has already been outlined in Chapter XVI. The 60th Division was placed on the extreme left of the line with the sea-shore on its left. On its right was the 7th Division containing the 1st Battalion Guides Infantry.

The rôle of the 60th Division on 19 September, the date decided upon for the general British advance, was to drive the Turks from an intricate trench system three lines deep near the coast north of Arsuf, the scene of the victory of Richard Cœur de Lion over the Saracens in 1191, and then to move on and capture a number of small posts south of the Wadi Falik and establish a bridge-head north of the Wadi. The cavalry was then to pass through the 60th Division which would follow on to Tul Keram.

On 16 September the 180th Brigade moved by night to the sea-shore near Sheikh Muannis, and at 11 p.m. the Commanding Officer received warning that the Battalion would move up to the line on the next day. At 9 a.m. on the 17th orders were received from the Brigade to relieve the 56th Rifles F.F. from the sea as far as "Doncaster Wadi,"¹ and at noon the Battalion advanced by platoons at 300 yards' distance, beginning with Headquarters and "D" Company. "B" Company (Captain Kemm) relieved the left company of the 56th, the left flank of which rested on the shore, while "D" Company (Captain Neave) relieved the right company. "A" Company (Captain Hughes) was placed in "Black Watch Wadi" in support of "B" Company, while "C" Company (Captain Molony) supported "D" Company. Battalion Headquarters marched at 6 p.m. and bivouacked north-east of Arsuf at 10 p.m.

On the 18th orders were received at 8 a.m. to prepare to attack the Turkish trenches, and the day was spent in reconnoitring our line with a view to finding the

¹ So named after Captain Doncaster, I.A.R.O., 1st Guides, who was killed near the spot during the battle of "The Sisters," on 8 June 1918. See Chap. XVI, p. 231. The position now occupied by the 2nd Guides was part of that held since 8 June by the 1st Guides and the Black Watch.

best places to get through our wire and to deploy preparatory to the attack. On this day Major-General Sir John Shea, commanding the 60th Division, addressed the Battalion. He stated that the time had come when he would shortly issue orders for the attack and he hoped that the Battalion would live up to the best traditions of the 1st Guides.

The dispositions of the 180th Brigade were as follows : the 2nd Guides were to be supported by the 2/19th London Regiment and had orders to go straight through to their objective, the third line of Turkish trenches, when the Londoners would pass through them. The 1/50th Kumaon Rifles were to be supported by the 2/97th Infantry from the 179th Brigade and were to attack on the right of the Guides. A frontage of about 200 yards was allotted to each of the leading regiments, the dividing line between them being a track known as "Y Road." The 2/30th Punjabis were to be in reserve.

The Turks occupied an intricate system of trenches on sandy hillocks with their right resting on the sea. The shore was here bounded by steep cliffs and sand-dunes, and these cliffs formed a succession of positions about 400 yards broad and some 200 feet above sea-level. East of these sand-dunes the plain opened out into a large expanse of undulating grassy country through which the Turkish trenches were prolonged landwards. The strength of the enemy opposed to the Guides was not exactly known, but there were many machine guns opposing them and a trench-mortar battery manned by a detachment of Germans.

The three lines of trenches to be attacked by the Guides were on sandy hillocks falling almost sheer to the beach. Their capture was timed to take place at zero *plus* 10 minutes, zero *plus* 40 minutes and zero *plus* 70 minutes respectively, while zero *minus* 20 minutes was given as the time at which deployment was to be completed. Orders for the attack were given verbally and directed that "D" and "B" Companies, forming the front line, were to capture the first objective, "Y Road" to Beach Post, and the second objective, "Y Road" to the sea, while "C" and "A" Companies in support were to pass through the leading companies at the second objective and capture the third. Three trench mortars of the 180th Trench Mortar Battery were to open fire at zero hour on the enemy machine gun at Beach Post, while the remaining mortar was held in readiness to advance with the infantry and come into action on the left flank at the second objective. One section of the 180th Machine Gun Company was also to move in rear of the supports and come into action against the second objective as soon as the light permitted.

In the early hours of 19 September, by moonlight, the companies deployed in front of our wire. "D" Company was on the right (Captain A. L. W. Neave) supported by "C" Company (Captain C. W. Molony and Lieutenant V. Fox-Strangways), while "B" Company (Captain Kemm), supported by "A" Company (Captain C. R. Hughes), was on the left.

The Battalion was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Bogle, whose British officers were Captain L. V. Dart, M.C., Adjutant, Lieutenant W. H. Goulstone, I.A.R.O., Signalling Officer, Second-Lieutenant S. G. S. Rose, Quartermaster, Second-Lieutenant I. A. Thew, Transport Officer, and Lieutenant Sher Singh,

Medical Officer. Major F. K. Hensley, Second-in-Command, acted as Liaison Officer between Brigade and Battalion Headquarters.

The barrage was timed to open at 4.30 a.m., and shortly before this hour the moon set, but the ground between our trenches and those of the Turks—here only 150 or 200 yards apart—was brilliantly lit by a continual rain of Very lights, many of which fell among the men of the 2nd Guides. The Battalion was ordered to be in the positions of deployment by 4.10, and for this purpose it was necessary to begin getting the companies out of their trenches as early as 3 a.m., since there were only four places where the wire could be cut without being in full view of the enemy. Further, the men were not familiar with the trenches and there was a danger of their losing the way ; while owing to the fact that the trench frontage was greater than the attack frontage, the whole of " D " and " C " Companies had to file out at one end of the trench and move diagonally across the enemy's front. This constituted a most intricate manoeuvre, as it could not take place opposite their appointed place of deployment. As a result some men were in " no man's land " for over an hour and the Turks, who seemed to be fully aware of the impending attack, concentrated a heavy machine-gun and rifle fire on the position of deployment.

Punctually at 4.30 a.m. the British barrage opened from the Jordan to the sea. Three minutes later the Turkish barrage replied and fell upon Black Watch Wadi, a deep and precipitous *nullah* crammed at the moment with Battalion Headquarters, the Headquarters' mules and signalling equipment and all the Battalion Lewis gun mules. The Turkish fire brought down the sides of the wadi in an avalanche, seven mules were killed and much equipment blown to pieces, while all the signalling equipment was destroyed. Thus at the very outset of the attack all communications were dislocated and Battalion Headquarters was completely cut off from the companies. In addition, one havildar was killed and some seven or eight other casualties occurred. A platoon of the 19th Londons was wiped out, and all men of the machine-gun section attached to the Guides were killed or wounded except one, thus leaving no guns in action. Jemadar Haidar Ali Shah was buried alive, but was eventually dug out badly shaken. Luckily the aid post escaped, though it was nearly buried by falling earth, and the Medical Officer, Lieutenant Sher Singh, did fine work in attending to the wounded, while an N.C.O. of the 19th London Regiment bandaged at least forty of the injured Guides.

The advance of the Guides began simultaneously with the opening of our barrage. " D " Company suffered heavily both from the enemy shells and from short bursts of our own, fifty-six men dropping as they advanced. The survivors, however, advanced steadily, a gap in their line being promptly filled by Captain Molony with " C " Company, and together they charged through the wire into the first position. " B " Company on the left, followed closely by " A " Company, dashed forward simultaneously, and at zero "*plus 10*" red flares announced the capture of the first objective. On the right of the Battalion " D " and " C " Companies went straight on to the second objective without a pause.

On the left, " B " and " A " Companies were momentarily checked by a deep

ravine topped on the enemy's side with wire. These companies at once went down into the ravine and scaled the far side just in time to escape the fire of the Turkish machine guns, which could not be sufficiently depressed to engage the attackers, and which were now captured. Approaching this second objective, Captain Kemm was hit on the side of the neck by a rifle bullet, but he carried on to the end of the day. Captain Neave was standing over some prisoners when he was shot at and wounded from a neighbouring trench. Gallantly charging his assailants with a fixed bayonet he was again hit, and fell into the enemy's trench mortally wounded by two rifle bullets. His death was a great loss to the Battalion, whose keen and popular Adjutant he had been ever since it was raised.¹

The casualties, so far, had been about 20 per cent. of the Battalion, but beyond this point, which had been reached at "zero *plus* 40," there was little loss. "C" and "A" Companies now took the lead and the third objective was captured with small loss at "zero *plus* 70" according to plan. The 2/19th London Regiment, who now passed through the 2nd Guides, experienced little further opposition and were followed by the 2nd Guides, as soon as they had re-formed, to Nahr-el-Faliq, some four miles from the starting point. Here the 179th Brigade passed through and the cavalry coming on to the scene carried on the pursuit of the fleeing Turks. The 180th Brigade now halted for an hour and then advanced towards Tul Keram, the Battalion bivouacking that night at Burin Wells, two miles west of Tul Keram.

During the action the captures made by the 2nd Guides totalled 250 prisoners, including thirty Germans, five machine guns and three trench mortars, while the casualties were Captain A. L. W. Neave and seventeen other ranks killed, six other ranks died of wounds, Captain A. H. Kemm, Subadar Ahmad Khan, Jemadars Mian Nur and Tarlok Singh and 109 other ranks wounded and ten men missing.

On the 20th, the 180th Brigade moved to a point about a mile west of Tul Keram, and on the following day marched up a valley which was a veritable shambles—strewn with dead Turks and animals—to Anebta where it bivouacked. The 2nd Guides piqueted the ridge between the bivouac and Kefr-el-Lebad to intercept Turkish fugitives, but only captured one prisoner.

The Battalion paraded on the 22nd for inspection by the Divisional Commander, who heartily congratulated all ranks on the good work they had done, saying it was "their dash and heroism in capturing the first three positions without a check that had enabled the cavalry to get through before the Turks had time to reorganize and form a rearguard." He concluded his address to the Battalion by saying: "You have worthily upheld the traditions of the Corps of Guides and have proved that no better Regiment exists in the whole of the army."

¹ Captain Neave was admittedly one of the finest all-round athletes in the Army. He won the Public Schools heavy-weight boxing championship in 1912 and represented the Royal Military College at Rugby football, athletics and revolver shooting. In 1913 he played football for the Army, and after obtaining his "trial" cap was selected to represent England *v.* Scotland. He was, however, ordered to India before the match. He joined the Durham Light Infantry and served with them in Mesopotamia, being wounded at Shaiba. He joined the Guides in November 1915.

That night was spent near Shuweikeh in the Plain of Sharon. On the 23rd the Battalion moved south with the Brigade, camping at Kaikileh and the next day and night at Fejja, where there was a welcome two-days halt.

On the 26th the Indian regiments of the Brigade moved to the coastal area, the Battalion bivouacking in the neighbourhood of El Jebil. Here they remained until the end of October, mainly engaged in salvage work of all kinds (incidentally salvaging some greatly needed tents for themselves) and undergoing a certain amount of training.

On arrival at El Jebil the Battalion received General Sir E. Allenby's message which has already been quoted in the previous chapter.

On 31 October news was received that an armistice had been concluded with Turkey, and on 1 November the 60th Division left this area, marching *via* Yazur to Ludd, where it arrived on the following day.

On 7 November the Battalion learnt that it was shortly to proceed to Kantara, and on the 10th this move was made in two trains.

Next day came the news of the conclusion of the armistice with Germany and that the Great War was at an end.

At Kantara a draft of thirty-two Indian other ranks arrived from the 1st Guides, 3rd Guides and 2/10th Gurkhas, and all settled down to steady training in which a certain amount of practice in ceremonial drill was included.

On 16 November the Battalion arrived at Alexandria and encamped at Sidi Bishr. On 3 December they lined a portion of the road from Sidi Gaber railway station to the racecourse on the occasion of the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir E. Allenby, and then marched past with the rest of the Division. They were congratulated on their steadiness and smartness.

The strength of the Battalion on arrival at Alexandria was :—British officers, 10 ; British other ranks, 9 ; Indian officers, 11 ; Indian other ranks, 834 ; and followers, 21.

On 20 November the following awards were announced for " acts of gallantry and devotion to duty in the field " : The Distinguished Service Order to Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Bogle ; the Military Cross to Captain C. W. Molony and Lieutenant (acting Captain) A. H. Kemm, I.C.S., I.A.R.O. ; the bar to the Indian Distinguished Service Medal to Subadar Fauja Singh ; the Indian Distinguished Service Medal to Havildar Hussain Khan, Lance-Naik Zamir Khan, Sepoy Ahmad Khan and Sepoy Amir Ali. Lieutenant V. Fox-Strangways was mentioned in despatches.

On 10 March the Battalion was inspected by General Sir John Shea, commanding the XX Corps. After expressing his appreciation of the efficient state of the Battalion, he went on to say : " From the time the 2nd Guides has been
1919 raised all ranks have worked with one object—namely, that the Battalion might take its place on equal terms with the 1st Battalion Guides Infantry. I am of opinion that, both in the field and in camp, this Battalion has honourably acquitted itself and may be considered in all respects equal to the 1st Guides."

Since the beginning of the year leave to India had been opened, while Mecca was sufficiently near to allow parties of Muhammadan soldiers to make the Pilgrimage.

At the end of March the unrest in Egypt came to a head, necessitating the dispatch to different places, affected by the preaching of sedition, of armed parties from the Battalion. Altogether four detachments, varying in strength from fifty to 135 rifles, all under the command of British officers, were sent off in aid of the Civil Power.

The time had now come for the 2nd Guides to leave Lower Egypt and take their turn of garrison duty in Syria, and on 2 April the Battalion, having called in all outlying detachments, embarked at Alexandria in the hired transport *Bermudian*, at a strength of eighteen British officers, twelve Indian officers, 801 other ranks and forty-seven followers.

Beirut was reached on 4 April, and here "C" Company—two British officers, three Indian officers and 179 men—was disembarked and remained on detachment, while the *Bermudian*, proceeding on her way, arrived at Tripoli on the 6th and the Regiment marched to a summer camp where it was brigaded with the 1st Guides Infantry.

Here Lieutenant-Colonel Bogle received the following letter from Major-General Sir V. B. Fane, the General Officer Commanding the XXI Corps, dated 16 April 1919 :—

"I write you a line myself to tell you how very struck I am with your guards. Their turn-out and handling of arms is all A 1, and it makes me very proud of having your regiment under my command and in my Division, though I am temporarily commanding the XXI Corps. The French General, General Hamelin, this evening on your guard turning out to him was so much impressed with them that he said : ' Just look what fine men they are and how smart they look.' "

The Battalion had been at Tripoli for little more than a month when orders were received for a move to Beirut. Leaving the summer camp on 10 May, it marched by Beshmezzin, Batrun, Jebeil and Junie and arrived at its destination soon after midday on the 14th. The Battalion was now in the 7th Indian Division and the 21st Brigade.

After a fortnight at Beirut it marched to a new camp near Pigeon Rocks on 29 May, remaining here until 10 June, when, in consequence of orders received from the 7th Indian Division, it marched for Rayak *via* Mexaa Mahmud, Ain Sofar and Hoshtora, reaching Rayak on the 13th, where it was only ten miles away from the 1st Guides at Baalbek. There were thus many opportunities for an exchange of visits between the sister battalions.

From here on 3 July Subadar-Major Bahadur Khan and two Indian other ranks left to attend the Peace Celebrations in London.

An incident worth recording happened during this summer a few miles west of Rayak at a place where the 2nd Guides supplied a post manned by Yusafzai Pathans. The country was in a very unsettled condition and there was amongst others a brigand chief who had a stronghold in the mountains of Anti-Lebanon.

One morning when the men were engaged in physical training near the main road, a man was seen riding along it from the east. Presently three shots were heard and the man fell dead from his pony. Three men who had been hiding got up. The Yusafzais ran towards them, whereupon the brigands opened fire, so the Pathans ran back and got their rifles, while the brigands ran off up the road. One of the Pathans took up a kneeling position on the highway and, with his first shot, dropped one of the brigands with a bullet through his brain at 300 yards. The other two were hit as they made off up the hillside and the local constabulary, who appeared on the scene, gathered them both.

The 2nd Guides remained at Rayak, carrying out training of all kinds, until 25 November, when they started on their return march to Beirut as part of the main body of the 21st Indian Brigade group. They reached Beirut on the 27th, and two days later were inspected by the French General Gouraud.

On 13 December the Battalion was on the move again, embarking for Port Said in the *Abbassieh* and arriving two days later at Kantara, where it was placed in a segregation camp, remaining there until the 19th. The strength of the 2nd Guides on arrival at Kantara was : seven British officers, seven Indian officers and 506 other ranks.

On 4 January 1920 the Battalion entrained at Kantara West for Kom Abu Rade, situated on the railway between El Wasta and Abuxa in the Fayoum, while " A "

Company, followed a week later by " C " Company, was sent into the Fayoum itself. The stay at Kom Abu Rade was not a very long one, for on 9 February 1920 the Headquarters Wing marched to Beni Suef, where one of the companies rejoined next day from the Fayoum, the other proceeding to Minia, very much farther up the Nile. Beni Suef was visited on the 14th by the Commander-in-Chief, when the Battalion provided a guard of honour at the railway station under Lieutenant Good.

At the end of March " A " Company, under Captain Hughes, was again sent on detachment into the Fayoum. The autumn and winter of this year were passed by the 2nd Guides at Maadi in the neighbourhood of Cairo.

In the spring of 1921 the 2nd Guides were again moved to Palestine, where the summer was spent. They had their headquarters at Roshpina, north of the Sea of Galilee, and furnished detachments at Nazareth, Beisan and Samakh.

1921 Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Bogle now went on leave to England pending retirement, having served for twenty-seven years with the Guides, and having commanded the 2nd Battalion overseas.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. Campbell, D.S.O., M.V.O., who was in temporary command of the 1st Guides, was relieved by Lieutenant-Colonel I. U. Battye, D.S.O., and assumed command of the 2nd Guides from 8 August 1921, joining them at Roshpina. While there he received the following letter from Colonel Bramley, D.P.S., dated Government House, Jerusalem, 21 November 1921 :—

" I had hoped before you left Palestine to have visited Roshpinah and to have thanked you personally for all your courtesy and trouble in connection with the instruction of the Gendarmerie Company, which you so kindly undertook, but was

for many reasons, unfortunately, unable to carry out this intention. The Gendarmerie have under your command received most careful instruction and attention for which we are most grateful to you and the Guides. It has been a matter of great satisfaction to me, as an old Indian Police Officer, to feel that this new formation came, at its very inception, under the care of so distinguished an Indian unit as yours. . . . Thank you once again. The fact that this company received its first instruction and military education under you is one that will never be forgotten by the Gendarmerie in Palestine."

A few days before the Battalion left for Egypt the following was received from Major-General A. E. Wardrop, written from Headquarters British Forces, Bir Salim, Palestine :—

"I am very sorry indeed to have lost your fine Battalion. I wish you, your officers and your men *bon voyage* and all good luck in the coming year."

On arrival in Egypt the Battalion was hurriedly moved from Kantara to Cairo, in view of the unsettled state of the country, and once again came under the 10th Division at Camp Helmhieh, seven miles from Cairo. On more than one occasion they were called out in aid of the Civil Power and had to be in a state of constant readiness.

The winter was passed in training, and in the spring the Battalion was directed to give a demonstration in frontier warfare in the Mokattam Hills, which was witnessed by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary **1922** Force, all the Generals, Commanding Officers and Seconds-in-Command of all units in Palestine and Egypt. The troops engaged were as follows : one squadron 9th Royal Lancers, the Ulster Rifles, the 2nd Guides, a mountain battery, two field guns and two aeroplanes, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. Campbell. The Battalion was highly complimented at the end of the exercise by Lieutenant-General Sir W. Congreve, V.C., K.C.B., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.


In April 1922 the 2nd Guides finally left Egypt and what still remained of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Before its departure it was inspected by Major-General Hon. J. F. Gathorne-Hardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding the 10th Division and Field Troops in Egypt, who addressed the Battalion in very complimentary terms. After praising its state of discipline and efficiency he ended his address as follows :—


"I have throughout my service served in the Guards, a regiment that considered smartness both in turn-out and on parade an essential preliminary to efficiency in the field. I am glad to find the same ideal in so distinguished a regiment as the Guides, an ideal, too, which has not only been sought after but so successfully attained."

Previous to embarkation a farewell letter was received from Lieutenant-General Sir W. N. Congreve, V.C., K.C.B.

On arrival in Mardan, and in accordance with a letter of the Adjutant-General in India dated 10 May 1922, the 2nd Battalion Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides, Frontier Force, became the Training Battalion of the 12th Frontier Force Regiment

FINE

72 Miles




To face page 252

with effect from 1 July 1922, with the designation 10th Battalion, 12th Frontier Force Regiment (Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides). At the time of reorganization fifteen Indian officers and 748 Indian other ranks of the 2nd Guides volunteered to continue to serve and were absorbed into the Training Battalion.

The following British officers of the old 2nd Guides formed the nucleus of the new Training Battalion : Lieutenant-Colonel H. Campbell, D.S.O., M.V.O., Commandant ; Major R. C. G. Pollock, Second-in-Command ; Captain L. V. Dart, M.C., Captain S. B. Good, Adjutant, Lieutenant I. A. Thew, Lieutenant A. H. Marshall, Quartermaster, Lieutenant Taj Mohd Khan, M.B.E.

So ends the history of the 2nd Guides Infantry, a Battalion which, though hastily raised and trained in time of war, among all the difficulties which this implies, maintained during the six years of its existence the highest traditions of the Corps of Guides and proved itself to be a thoroughly efficient Battalion both in peace and in war. These traditions it now carries on as a Training Battalion.

CHAPTER XVIII

1917-1921

THE GREAT WAR : GUIDES INFANTRY, 3RD BATTALION : KURRAM AND WAZIRISTAN

FORMATION OF THE 3RD BATTALION—TROUBLE IN AFGHANISTAN—ATTACK ON THE KURRAM BY NADIR KHAN—CAPTURE OF AMIR THANA POST—AMBUSH AT KAUR BRIDGE—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHSUDS—ACTION AT SPINKAI GHASH—PUNITIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHSUDS—RETURN TO MARDAN—THE BATTALION DISBANDED.


See Map of Waziristan, in pocket.

THE 3rd Battalion of the Guides Infantry was raised on 22 October 1917 at Mardan by Lieutenant-Colonel W. Villiers-Stuart of the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles. A nucleus of seven Indian officers and thirty other ranks was received from the 1st Battalion depot and six Indian officers and thirty other ranks from the 2nd Battalion Depot ; while later on thirty more old soldiers who had returned from service overseas were transferred from the 1st Battalion Depot. The composition of the Battalion was a half-company each of Sikhs and Dogras and one company each of Gurkhas, Pathans and Punjabi Mussulmans. On 15 March 1918, Major J. Clementi took over the command from Colonel Villiers-Stuart. Under him the 3rd Battalion remained in Mardan and the neighbourhood, training for the war which seemed to be passing it by, until the end of the cold weather of 1918-19, when events called it to take part in repelling something in the nature of an invasion of India.

After many years of peace with Afghanistan, Amir Habibullah, who had always been a loyal friend to Great Britain, was murdered on 22 February 1919, and the throne was seized by his third son, Amanullah. The latter began his reign by announcing that it was his intention to preserve the tradition of friendship with the British, but it was not long before his attitude changed to one of open hostility ; and early in May an Afghan force, which had been concentrated at Dakka, crossed the Durand line at Toi Khan and occupied the Bagh Springs, inside British territory.

On 5 May orders were issued for the mobilization of the Field Army, which in the first instance was organized in two forces, the North-West Frontier Force, commanded by General Sir A. Barrett, and the Baluchistan Force under Lieutenant-General R. Wapshare. Later the troops in the Bannu and Derajat areas were separated from the North-West Frontier Force and placed under the orders of Major-General S. H. Climo, being designated the Waziristan Force.

Mobilization orders reached the 3rd Guides Infantry at Mardan at 2.35 p.m.



OFFICERS OF THE 3RD BATTALION GUIDES INFANTRY, 1919.

Back Row.—Lieut. W. E. P. Harrison. Lieut. H. A. Long.
Standing.—Lieut. A. E. Meston. Lieut. E. Parker. Capt. A. J. H. Bourke. Lieut. H. R. M. Jeffries. Lieut. E. Robins, D.C.M. Lieut. T. H. F. Le Mesurier.
Sitting.—Capt. F. Ferguson, M.C. Capt. L. R. Knight, M.C. Major D. Bainbridge, M.C. Lieut.-Col. J. Clementi, O.B.E. Capt. C. W. Free, M.C.
Front Row.—Lieut. A. H. McFarlane. 2/Lieut. D. H. Q. Agnew.

on 6 May, and within forty-eight hours the Battalion had entrained for Kohat at a strength of thirteen British officers, thirteen Indian officers, and 452 other ranks, with fifty-four public and private followers ; this strength was supplemented a few days later by a draft of fifty-one other ranks who had rejoined from furlough. The names of the British officers were as follows : Colonel J. Clementi, Commanding, Major D. Bainbridge, Second-in-Command, Captain C. W. Free, Adjutant, Lieutenant H. R. M. Jeffries, Quartermaster, Captain Kitchen, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer, Captain Pritchard and Lieutenant Robins ("A" Company), Captain Jameson and Lieutenant Bourke ("B" Company), Captain Knight and Lieutenant Fraser ("C" Company) and Captain Ferguson and Lieutenant Harrison ("D" Company).

Kohat was reached on the morning of 10 May, and here the Battalion remained until the 15th, when under verbal orders from Major-General A. H. Eustace, commanding the Kohat Brigade, it entrained in two parties for Thal. The Battalion remained three days in Thal, during which time it was busily employed in the preparation of a perimeter camp. On the evening of the 18th it was ordered to proceed to Alizai, in the Kurram valley, with a column composed as follows under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. Clementi of the 3rd Guides : one section 28th Mountain Battery, one troop 37th Lancers, 3rd Guides Infantry, 5th Government Camel Corps, detachment 57th Rifles F.F., and one section 45th Field Ambulance.

Marching *via* Manduri the column reached Alizai on the 19th and was here met by Major-General Eustace with orders to send back the cavalry to Thal and to move next day on Parachinar. The column marched on up the Kurram valley, *via* Sadda, to Parachinar, which was reached on the 22nd. Here the guns and other detachments rejoined their own units, and the Battalion went into a perimeter camp west of the fort, being attached to the 60th Mobile Brigade under the command of Brigadier-General E. A. Fagan. On 24 May a draft of two British officers and forty-eight other ranks joined from the depot.

The events in the Kurram which led up to these movements were as follows : In consequence of reports from Parachinar that the Afghans were reinforcing their troops on the Peiwar Kotal, Major-General Eustace dispatched a small column of all arms from Thal to Parachinar on 5 May to reinforce the Kurram Militia. On the 14th the Afghans were reported to have concentrated two battalions on the Peiwar and three more battalions with guns in support at Ali Khel. A detachment of the Kurram Militia with their two mountain guns was accordingly moved to Ali Mangal, at the foot of the Peiwar, and Kohat was reinforced by four additional battalions and a mountain battery. As troops became available they were sent on from Kohat to Thal and the Kurram, and by 26 May two battalions, one mountain battery and one squadron of cavalry had been concentrated at Parachinar.

On the 24th news was received that General Nadir Khan, the Afghan Commander in Khost and ex-Commander-in-Chief,¹ was in Matun in Khost, whence he was threatening to advance either into the Tochi or the Kurram, and that Afghan troops were actually moving on Spinwam. Major-General Eustace therefore went to Thal in person and ordered one more battalion and two more mountain guns from

¹ He became Amir of Afghanistan in 1929.

Kohat to Thal, thus bringing the garrison of Thal up to four battalions, four mountain batteries, one squadron of cavalry and a company of sappers and miners.

On the 25th the Battalion received orders to send back to the depot at Mardan any surplus British officers present over the establishment of twelve, and accordingly Lieutenant F. Entwistle, D.S.O., M.C., and Second-Lieutenant N. D. Douglas started on their way back to Mardan, but returned joyously next day with the report that the road was blocked between Alizai and Thal by Afghan forces. On the 27th a considerable force of Afghan troops with artillery and a large following of tribesmen advanced on Thal city and occupied the hills to the north, east and south of Thal fort. The enemy's guns and the majority of his regulars were on the south bank of the Kurram river, and his guns, two of which were 3.8-inch German howitzers brought down on elephants, subjected the fort and camp to considerable shelling. For the next four days the troops in Thal were besieged by the Afghans, but on 1 June pressure was relieved by the arrival of a relief force from Kohat under Brigadier-General R. E. H. Dyer, General Nadir Khan hurriedly returning with his forces to Matun.

Meanwhile, a column under Lieutenant-Colonel Clementi, consisting of the 3rd Guides and various attached troops, had been hurriedly got together at Parachinar and ordered to march to Alizai. These orders were cancelled, and "B" Company only of the Guides, under Captain J. H. Jameson with ten sowars of the Kurram Militia and a section of machine guns, was sent off to Alizai, while a draft of 184 men of the Guides, under Lieutenant E. Parker, which had reached Sadda *en route* for Parachinar, was ordered to remain there to strengthen the post. No sooner had these orders been carried out than on 29 May the G.O.C. decided to recall the Guides detachments at Sadda and Alizai, with the exception of one British officer and fifty Gurkhas at Alizai, and to send ten more men of the Guides to reinforce Chhapri Post. At the same time preparations in the lower Kurram were made for the defence of Parachinar itself, and a perimeter wall to the camp near the fort was begun, while in view of a possible shortness of supplies, the *atta* ration was reduced by 75 per cent., rice being issued instead. During the next two days the recalled detachments arrived from Sadda and Alizai, bringing the strength of the Battalion up to sixteen British officers, fifteen Indian officers and 723 other ranks.

On 31 May orders were issued for a raid to take place at dawn on 2 June on the Afghan post of Amir Thana and the *sangars* held by the Afghans on a ridge west of the post. The troops detailed for the raid consisted of one section machine guns, one section 28th Mountain Battery, "A" Squadron, 37th Lancers, "A" Company, 3rd Guides Infantry, and a detachment of the Kurram Militia, all under the command of Major P. C. R. Dodd, the Commandant of the Kurram Militia. At 6.30 p.m. on the evening of 1 June "A" Company of the 3rd Guides (strength three British officers, four Indian officers and 160 other ranks) marched out from Parachinar, arriving late that night at the Kurram Militia post at Kharlachi, eight miles from Parachinar, some 600 yards from Amir Thana. At dawn next morning the raid was carried out and was entirely successful. The Guides who operated in the right flank of the attack, encountered no opposition except on the extreme right flank

near the village of Kuz Istia, where a hostile band of 150 tribesmen were met with and put to flight, with some twenty casualties, while the Guides suffered no loss. Meanwhile the Kurram Militia surrounded Amir Thana post, the garrison of which, consisting of fifty Afghan regulars, surrendered to a man. Next day the troops returned to Parachinar.

The road to Thal now being open again and the tension somewhat relaxed, two officers supernumerary to establishment—Lieutenant E. Robins, D.C.M., and Second-Lieutenant N. D. Douglas—left to join the Depot at Mardan, while Lieutenant A. J. H. Bourke and the fifty Gurkhas on detachment at Alizai rejoined the Battalion, having experienced no trouble either there or on the road.

On 20 June the Battalion was ordered to relieve the 57th Rifles, F.F., holding the piquets below the Peiwar Kotal and marched next day to Ali Mangal, where it took over nine piquets, six of them commanded by British officers and varying in strength from twenty to forty-five rifles. Some of these posts commanded a good view of the Peiwar Kotal and the Afghans could be seen working on their defences.

On 24 June a reconnaissance of Dar Wekkai ridge by Captains Jameson and Pritchard and four men revealed several *sangars* now unoccupied but bearing signs of recent occupation, from one of which a good view was obtained of the main Afghan position from Utsaar to Bagawi. Considerable movement was discernible along the whole front, and some 800 yards away an Afghan gun could be distinctly seen pointing across the Peiwar Kotal.

On 25 June two more reconnaissances were carried out with a view to finding a practicable route by which the right of the Afghans' position might be turned. One of these parties, composed of Captain Free, two Indian officers and thirty-eight rifles, reconnoitred the Margho Kandao and found a suitable route, practicable for transport animals, whence a battalion moving along the Durand line could turn the enemy position without much difficulty, as the Afghan *sangars* were all built facing east. The patrol reached its objective unobserved, but on retirement was fired at from the north at a range of 1,600 yards by a small party of the enemy. The other party, composed of Lieutenant Roberts, one Indian officer and thirty-three rifles, reconnoitred the mountain lying between Hakdarra and Sursurang, on the summit of which roughly built *sangars* were found in three places, but they were unoccupied. A good view was obtained, and the Afghans could be seen in the distance working hard on their defences. This patrol withdrew unmolested.

The Afghans now began to show signs of increased activity, a minor night attack on one of the Sursurang piquets being followed by sniping at night at other positions. On the night of 28–29 June a more determined attack was made on Sursurang by two parties of the enemy of about fifty men each with a covering party who managed to get within twenty yards of one of the Guides' piquets, but were beaten off with loss. After this there were signs that Afghans were withdrawing behind the Durand line.

By this time British aeroplanes had bombed Jalalabad and Kabul, and the Amir had entered into negotiations for peace with the British Government. In the Kurram hostilities did not cease immediately, but precautionary measures were

in some degree relaxed and on 4 July the Battalion was relieved in the posts below the Peiwar by the Kurram Militia and marched back to Parachinar.

Leave was now opened, and on 24 July a draft from Mardan composed of Lieutenant McFarlane, two Indian officers and ninety-seven other ranks arrived, bringing with it a report from the O.C. Base Details, Rawalpindi, that this was the best-disciplined and best-turned-out draft which had yet passed through that camp.

On 26 July a Peace Conference opened at Rawalpindi, but the unrest stirred up by the Afghans amongst the tribesmen was not to be easily calmed, and on the 29th an Orakzai *lashkar* was reported to be collecting near Sadda post. British aeroplanes were sent to bomb the tribesmen, and on the night of the 30th " B " and " D " Companies of the 3rd Guides, at a strength of five British officers, three Indian officers and 279 other ranks, under Captain Jameson, marched for Sadda accompanied by two field guns, two mountain guns and forty sowars of the Kurram Militia. The column marched all night, reached Sadda at 8 a.m. (a distance of twenty-two miles) and moved out again at midday a further two miles to Badama post. Here, while the guns shelled the ridges, the salvage of an aeroplane which had come down near Badama post was completed and a piquet of twenty-five men of the Battalion under Jemadar Lal Bahadur Gurung was sent up the hill on the left of the nullah, a climb of two and a half hours in intense heat. The enemy retired under the fire of the guns and the column fell back on Sadda, arriving at 7 p.m., having been on the move for nineteen hours and having marched twenty-six miles.

On 2 August Major Bainbridge arrived in Sadda to take over command of the column, which was recalled two days later, arriving at Parachinar on the 4th after a very hot and exhausting march. A preliminary peace treaty was signed at Rawalpindi on 8 August and finally ratified a month later. On 14 August His Excellency the Viceroy, accompanied by the G.O.C. Northern Army, visited Parachinar, and the 3rd Guides provided a guard of honour consisting of two Indian officers and 100 other ranks under Captain F. Entwistle, D.S.O., M.C.

On 27 August orders were received for the 3rd Guides to proceed to Thal. The Battalion left Parachinar on the 30th, and marching by Sadda and Alizai arrived at Chhapri on 2 September. Here a halt was ordered with a view to punitive operations against Butto Killi, a village on the other bank of the Kurram river which had been harbouring Wazir raiders and which the O.C. Guides was ordered to surround at dawn on the 3rd. This operation, however, did not take place, as a violent storm that night brought the Kurram river down in flood. Next day it was found that the news of the intended raid had leaked out and it had therefore to be cancelled.

The Guides marched on to Thal on 4 September and there received orders to proceed to Tank. On the 7th the Battalion entrained for Kohat, where it remained for a fortnight in an isolation camp on account of two cases of cholera amongst the men. At Kohat Second-Lieutenant H. A. Barnes joined the Battalion, and Captain Kitchen's place as Medical Officer was taken by Captain N. B. Morris, I.M.S. On

the 21st the journey to Darya Khan was resumed by train, whence the Battalion marched in great heat and dust to Tank by Dera Ismail Khan, Potah and Hathala.

On 1 October a mixed company, 136 strong, was sent out under Captain Knight to Gul Imam to endeavour to cut off some raiders who had burnt the village of Parapure. The company was to hold the line from Gul Imam to Drakki while the Frontier Constabulary and *chigas* were to carry it on to Pezu and so prevent the raiders from getting back into the hills. The raiders, however, got through at Chunda before the cordon was completed and escaped with the loss of one man captured and one wounded. The column returned that evening to Pezu and next day to Tank.

A few days later, on 6 October, another mixed company (two Indian officers and 155 other ranks), under Captain F. E. Ferguson, M.C., moved out and joined a column commanded by Major Bostock, Bhopal Lancers. This small force, which had been ordered to proceed to Kaur Bridge with the object of bringing in the wounded and burying those who had been killed in the previous day's action, was composed of : one squadron Bhopal Lancers, one company 1/109th Infantry, one company 3rd Guides Infantry. On arrival at Manjhi post some of the enemy made their appearance, but were driven off by long-range rifle fire, and the column then moved east along the Luni road, the Guides marching with the main body. On arrival some of the dead were buried and the wounded placed in camel *khajawas*. It was at this time, when the Guides company was at the rear of the main body, extended in two lines with a distance of fifty yards between them, with the first-line transport and camels behind the second line, that the enemy ambushed the flank and rearguard found by the Bhopal Imperial Service Lancers and 1/109th Infantry, causing heavy casualties. The flank-guards fell back on the rearguard, while the Lancers rode round the right flank of the column towards the rear ; but having arrived there they did not charge, but moved off to Kot Azam. The main body was thus suddenly deprived of all protection at a critical moment, and in a few moments twenty men were killed and some ten or twelve wounded.

Captain Ferguson grasped the situation, occupied some low sand-hills and formed a defensive flank ; then, seeing that the platoon in rear of the mules and camels was hard pressed, he went across to it, being wounded *en route*, and ordered a charge with the bayonet, urging on the men with a hunting horn. He was then again hit and fell. Seeing now that a withdrawal had become inevitable, Captain Ferguson continued with the utmost gallantry to give all necessary orders, but he was hit a third time and killed before the retirement began. The command of the company then devolved on Subadar Sukhbir Gurung (Gurkha) and Jemadar Sultan Muhammad (Yusafzai), and these Indian officers conducted the withdrawal to Kot Azam.

The casualties in the Guides company in this unfortunate affair amounted to one British officer—Captain F. E. Ferguson, M.C.—and two other ranks killed, twenty-two men wounded and twenty-six missing, believed killed.

On 15 October orders were issued for the 3rd Guides and four guns of the 27th Mountain Battery to concentrate at Kaur Bridge at 9 a.m. on the 18th. The Battalion accordingly marched to Kaur Bridge, where it bivouacked and dug an

entrenched position in a violent dust-storm which continued to rage for several hours. Soon after their arrival, however, it was discovered that the enemy had cut off the water supply and the Battalion thereupon retraced its steps to Tank.

On 24 October a column again marched out from Tank to Kot Azam under Lieutenant-Colonel Clementi, composed of two guns 27th Mountain Battery, the 3rd Guides and the 2/102nd Grenadiers. Again operations were seriously hindered by violent dust-storms, and actually nothing could be attempted beyond a visit to the neighbourhood of Manjhi post by Lieutenant-Colonel Clementi with the 21st Cavalry. The bodies of all who had fallen in the action of 6 October, including that of Captain Ferguson, were recovered and buried.

The Government of India had meanwhile resolved to deal with the tribes of Waziristan which had made common cause with the Afghans earlier in this year, and both the Tochi Wazirs and the Mahsuds had been summoned to attend *jirgas* to be held early in November, to hear the terms which the Government intended to impose upon them. In the event of the terms not being accepted it was intended to deal first with the Wazirs and later with the Mahsuds. Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O., was appointed to conduct the operations, a force of nearly 30,000 of all arms being placed at his disposal.

The Wazir *jirga*, on being summoned, agreed to the Government terms and no operations were undertaken against them. The Mahsud *jirga* was summoned to assemble at Khirgi, seven miles east of Jandola, on 3 November, and the Battalion now marched there, reaching Khirgi on 1 November.

On the day appointed Major-General Climo received a tolerably representative *jirga*, the Battalion furnishing the usual guard of honour under Lieutenant H. R. M. Jeffries and Subadars Khaista Khan and Lal Bahadur Thapa, while British aeroplanes were sent to drop notices over the country warning the Mahsuds of all that non-compliance would entail. On 11 November there was a second informal *jirga* when the friendly Mahsud *maliks* intimated that they were unable to persuade the tribesmen to agree to our terms. Accordingly from the 13th to the 21st the principal Mahsud villages, including Kaniguram, Makin and Marobi were bombed from the air. Any large tribal concentration was thereby prevented, and for some time this particular area was tolerably free from raids.

During the next month the Battalion were not seriously employed in the field, though on more than one occasion they moved out from Khirgi to clear up the situation in the immediate neighbourhood, notably on 21 November, when they reconnoitred towards the Zadai Nullah, and on the 24th when they marched out with a small column to locate a gathering of Mahsuds about Spinkai Raghza. On the 28th the Battalion moved to Jandola, where it was accommodated in the fort and was employed in constructing positions for piquets about the Hinnis Tangi and in supplying covering parties for this work.

By 13 December the concentration of the troops, now known as the Derajat Column, on the line Tank-Jandola was completed, and preparations for the advance up the Takki Zam were begun. In order to prepare and improve the road for the

projected advance a small column was sent out on the 11th to make good the Spinkai Raghza, one and a half miles north of Jandola Camp. This column comprised the greater part of the 68th Brigade—two guns of the 27th Mountain Battery, the 3rd Guides and the 76th Punjabis. The Guides provided the advanced guard under Lieutenant-Colonel Clementi. The advance could only be slow as it was necessary to piquet the route throughout, but the vanguard reached a position overlooking the Palosina Plain. Here the vanguard commander, seeing the rest of the advanced guard debouching into the plain behind him, pushed out two piquets on each side of the Spinkai Ghash supported by the remainder of the vanguard. As these piquets were moving up the sides of the Spinkai Ghash orders were received to stop the advance and hold the position reached. Sniping now began from the higher ground north of the Spinkai Ghash and was continued until the retirement commenced.

Orders to retire were issued at noon. The piquets of the vanguard were successfully withdrawn, but it was found necessary to send forward a company of the 2/76th Punjabis to reinforce the advanced guard. It was reported that a strong body of Mahsuds was working down from Mandanna Kach along the bank of the Takki Zam, so the vanguard was reinforced by a platoon in support of its left flank. The retirement was then carried out rapidly without loss for some time, though firing was heavy and sustained from the hills overlooking the Palosina Plain. On arrival at a spot known as "Point 2510," a company of the 3rd Guides, admirably handled by Captain Jeffries, took up a position on the hill-side to the south in order to assist the retirement through the gap. The piquets fell back without casualties, but on re-entering the Spinkai Raghza plain it was found that the tribesmen had managed to get up very close, especially from the nullah to the north.

At this time the heights above Captain Jeffries were in enemy occupation, and this officer, finding his position no longer tenable, skilfully withdrew. The piquets on the left also fell back, and the retirement was continued under fire from all sides until the old Militia post on the north bank of the Takki Zam was reached.

A party of the enemy, however, who had worked up nullahs to the east attacked the right of the Guides as they withdrew, killing Second-Lieutenant N. D. Douglas and one sepoy. Immediately on hearing this, Captain Knight gallantly counter-attacked with such men as he could get together and recovered the body of Second-Lieutenant Douglas which was then in the hands of the tribesmen. The body of the sepoy was also recovered and carried some distance, but owing to the violence of the Mahsud attack it had later to be abandoned.

Just as No. 3 Piquet was ordered to retire, Subadar Nadir Khan in command was killed. The naik now in charge ordered four men to carry down the subadar's body in advance of the retiring piquet. This party retreated down a nullah, where it was attacked by Mahsuds and all four men were killed. The rest of the piquet withdrew under covering fire from its support to the Takki Zam with the loss of one man killed.

Two companies of the 2/76th now advanced and recovered the bodies of three of the killed, but owing to the failing light it was impossible to recover the others.

The final retirement across the Takki Zam began at 5.15 p.m., the rearguard reaching camp before six o'clock.

The casualties this day sustained by the Battalion were: killed, Second-Lieutenant N. D. Douglas, Subadar Nadir Khan and five other ranks; wounded, eight men; and missing, one.

The very next day the Battalion was called out again, the G.O.C. intimating that he had information that about one hundred Mahsuds were occupying Sarkai Ridge, and that he proposed to drive them off and to select a site for a permanent post. The same force moved out as on the previous day with the addition of the 1/109th Infantry. The Guides were leading, with orders to advance towards the Sarkai Ridge and seize the foothills, when the 1/109th would pass through and move on to the top of the ridge. A few of the enemy were seen and some shots were fired, but the 1/109th reached the crest of the ridge without opposition, though Jemadar Shadi Khan on the right of the Guides' position reported enemy concentrating in a nullah to the right of the 1/109th, to whom the news was passed.

Nothing further happened until the 1/109th had retired to the Spinkai Raghza plain, when they came under heavy fire from this nullah. "D" Company of the Guides opened rifle fire on the enemy, who offered an excellent target until they became so closely involved with the 1/109th that the firing had to be stopped. The situation was now critical and confused. The 1/109th counter-attacked to recover their dead, assisted by the right flankguard of the Guides, under Jemadar Sultan Mahmud, who was shot through the heart and killed. The 1/109th then retired, closely followed by the Mahsuds, who again offered a fine target to the Lewis gun and rifles of "D" Company and, after suffering many casualties, bolted into the big nullah. The 1/109th by this time had extricated themselves, and the final withdrawal of the Guides was carried through with only slight interference.

No further operations were undertaken during this month, but the piquet duty was very heavy, as many as 200 of the Battalion being thus employed daily. On the 29th another *jirga* came into Jandola with the object of effecting a settlement. Complete submission was offered and accepted, but the *maliks* were told that, pending payment of the original fine demanded and surrender of the increased number of rifles now required, our advance would be continued.

During the first half of January the Derajat Column, under Major-General Skeen, advanced from Palosina to Kotkai, captured the Ahnai Tangi and fought on 14 January at Asa Khan an action which proved to be the most stubbornly 1920 contested of the whole campaign, the British casualties amounting to 382 of all ranks killed and wounded. On the 18th the advance was continued to Saro Rogha. On arrival there the Battalion joined the column from the 68th Brigade and were put under the orders of the G.O.C. Column as "Column Troops."

"The period 29 December 1919 to 20 January 1920, formed the second phase of the operations against the Mahsuds. It was a phase of steady progress and hard fighting which broke down the resistance of the enemy. During these twenty-two days there had been twenty actions, in nearly all of which more than one brigade had been employed. Although this had naturally imposed a great strain on

battalions already depleted in numbers, it was a period of practical training for all ranks and many lessons were learnt. The initial phase of five of the larger operations had been successfully carried out in the dark, during the early hours of the morning and over difficult country. This alone was a high test of discipline and efficiency. These numerous and successful actions inspired the troops with confidence and made the column a really formidable force, ready to undertake with determination the most difficult operation."¹

During the greater part of their stay at Saro Rogha the 3rd Guides were mainly employed in providing escorts for convoys or covering parties for the instalment of piquets, but on the 28th they took their place in the column that resumed the march into the Mahsud country. The initial operation was the capture of the Barari Tangi, of which position the following is a description :—

"About one and a quarter miles north of Sorarogha Camp the Takhi Zam cuts through the Sarkai Ghar Ridge forming a gorge called the Barari Tangi. The latter is some 300 yards in length and sixty yards wide, with sides which rise precipitously to an average height of 100 feet. The bed of the river here runs almost due west and is joined by the Barari Algad from a north-easterly direction. After passing through the Tangi there are three important features which command any advances up the Takhi Zam. These are 'Barari Centre,' the 'Barrier' between the Barari Algad and the Takhi Zam, and 'Gibraltar' opposite the latter on the right bank of the river. The last-named feature is a rocky and bushy bluff, whose existence was not discovered during the preliminary reconnaissance from Sorarogha Camp. Before attacking 'Barari Centre' it was necessary to secure the Sarkai Ghar Ridge on both sides of the river. The part of the ridge on the right bank, though the more formidable, was higher and less exposed to danger than the part on the left bank and gave observation over the latter and its intricate surroundings."²

For the operations of 28 January, "C" and "D" Companies of the Battalion, under Captain Knight, were attached to the 43rd Brigade and were ordered to be in position by 7.30 a.m. on "Barari Centre." Headquarters, with the remaining two companies, formed part of the main body and were directed to place first two platoons, and later, two companies, to watch the mouth of the Barari Algad. The mouth of the Algad was wired and then, the second-line mule transport having passed through, "A" and "B" Companies rejoined the main body, leaving one platoon behind pending the arrival of the camel transport.

About 12.30 p.m. the G.O.C. sent orders for two companies of the Battalion to move to the foot of the hill west of Ahmadwam known as "Gibraltar," which was held by the 2/9th Gurkhas and 57th Rifles, and to construct a position for a piquet south of this hill. "B" Company accordingly moved off to construct a piquet for twenty rifles, "A" Company covering their advance up the hill. The movement was opposed by enemy rifle fire from a nullah to the south and from a hill south-west of the 2/9th Gurkhas' and 57th Rifles' position. These two battalions were under heavy fire, and though "Gibraltar" had been captured, consolidation was not yet

¹ "Operations in Waziristan, 1919-20," 2nd ed., p. 127.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 128-9.

completed. The G.O.C. was in some anxiety about the situation, and now gave verbal instructions to the O.C. Guides to hasten the completion of the piquet post, and directed that if the other two battalions were driven off the hill, "B" Company of the Guides was to give all possible help and then to retire, while if the positions were held the piquet was to be established and garrisoned, whereupon the remainder of the Guides were to retire. The post was completed and garrisoned by 5.45 p.m. some five men having been wounded during the operation.

"That night the column camped at Ahmadwam, just north of Barari Tangi, but as the camp was very limited in area the bulk of the transport had to be sent back to Sorarogha. The Battalion supplied a second small piquet south-east of the camp at Ahmadwam and also held a piquet line north to north-east of the camp with 'C' and 'D' Companies, while the remainder occupied 420 yards of the perimeter.

"During 29 January the construction of posts in the positions selected for permanent piquets was completed. During the day considerable numbers of the enemy were seen up the Takhi Zam, and confirmation was obtained of the reports previously received that a Wana Wazir *lashkar*, accompanied by the local Afghan commander, Shah Daula, with two mountain guns had joined the Mahsud *lashkar*. These two six-pounder guns, firing fixed ammunition, came into action against us for the first time at Shin Kor, but did no harm to our troops.

"Heavy rain during the night of the 29th-30th made the camp a morass and impassable for the transport. Operations had therefore to be postponed until 1 February. On 31 January all preparations for the advance were completed, the 10th Infantry having taken over all the permanent piquets in this area."¹

On 1 February the advance on Aka Khel was resumed, and as considerable opposition was expected a very early start was made. An advanced force of three battalions moved out at 3.15 a.m. and, going forward some two miles unobserved and unexpected, piqueted the difficult ground overlooking the right bank of the river by daylight. Another small force, consisting of two guns, the Guides and a half-battalion of the 2/5th Gurkhas, left camp an hour later to piquet the left bank of the river, the Guides providing piquets on "Table Mountain," "Slug Hill" and "Bangiwallah Hill" and clearing the caves about "Tree Town." By daybreak all objectives had been secured and the work of strengthening them put in hand. The enemy was completely taken by surprise and made no stand, but there was much sniping and the casualties this day in the Battalion were one man killed and one Indian officer and two men wounded.

At midnight on 2-3 February the Battalion occupied "Cliff End" village and tower, followed by the 2/5th Gurkhas who left camp an hour later to secure "Cloud End." But a biting wind rose accompanied by mist and it was realized that further operations would be impracticable; so the Gurkhas were recalled while the Guides consolidated their position, suffering greatly from the cold. The advance was not continued until the 5th when "A" Company of the Battalion, under Captain Knight, was attached to the 43rd Brigade as a reserve, the remainder accompanying

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 132, 133.

the main column and providing the advanced guard as far as Janjai, where the column was concentrated by 5 p.m. On 6 February the march was continued to Piazhia Raghza, where the Battalion was called upon to furnish five piquets. The column remained here until the 14th collecting a reserve of supplies by means of convoys from Saro Rogha, improving the roads to the river-bed and destroying neighbouring villages by long-range fire. During these days the Guides had one man killed and three men wounded.

On 14 February a welcome draft arrived from the depot of one Indian officer and fifty-five other ranks.

During the halt at Piazhia Raghza the Mahsuds had been informed that, as a result of their continued hostility, the original terms offered were now cancelled, that no negotiations would be considered until all fines had been paid in full and the stipulated number of rifles handed in, and further, that Kaniguram and Makin would be destroyed.

The 43rd Brigade Headquarters were now left at Piazhia Raghza and on 15 February a column marched on Makin via Marobi and Tauda China, composed of the following units: No. 6 Mountain Battery, No. 27 Mountain Battery, 55th Field Company Sappers and Miners, 4/3rd Gurkha Rifles, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles, 2/9th Gurkha Rifles, 1/55th Rifles, 3rd Guides and 3/34th Sikh Pioneers, while some additional troops also moved out early and piqueted the ridge on the left of the advance.

When the column advanced the Guides occupied Romano village, where it was at first intended that they should remain; but as the main column experienced considerable opposition, the Guides were sent for and ordered to join the rearguard. They arrived in Marobi at 7.50 p.m., and were at once required to take over ten piquets. Next day when the column marched on Tauda China, the Battalion established and garrisoned seven road piquets, which required three British officers, seven Indian officers and 240 other ranks with seven Lewis guns. The rest of the Battalion joined the rearguard and marched on with it to Tauda China, where again 100 men for outlying piquets were asked for.

On the 19th punitive measures began in the Makin area—a valley extending some two and a half miles up-stream from the camp. Each day some prominent feature was occupied by troops while the neighbouring villages were dealt with. The work was systematically carried out, though considerably harassed by the Mahsuds, who sniped constantly and persistently followed up every retirement. Marobi itself, the home of the recalcitrant Mullah Fazal Din and of his even more fanatical father, the Mullah Powinda, was razed to the ground, and by the 28th the total destruction in this area amounted to fifty-one fortified towers and about 450 important houses. It was now decided to evacuate Makin and to advance on Kaniguram, and on 29 February all arrangements for withdrawal were perfected.

When Makin was evacuated on 1 March the Battalion was detailed as the advanced guard, and so did not suffer from the attentions of the Mahsuds as did some other units of the column, the rearguard of which was followed up to within a mile of Marobi. On arrival at Dwatoi, where the force encamped, the

Battalion selected and put out eight piquet posts, six of which were taken over later by other battalions.

On the morning of 2 March, Colonel Clementi took out the Guides, the 3/11th Gurkhas,¹ two and a half companies of Pioneers and two sections of Sappers and Miners and established two strong piquets on the Kaniguram road on the left and right bank of the stream, one of these being almost at once subjected to very heavy sniping, which the guns could do but little to reduce. When the piquets were completed and garrisoned Colonel Clementi withdrew the rest of his force to Dwatoi. The Battalion had fifteen men killed and wounded during this day.

The advance towards Ladha *en route* to Kaniguram began on the early morning of 3 March, when the Battalion formed the advanced guard to the column with two guns, one company of Pioneers and two sections of Sappers, with orders to construct, and to find the garrisons for, five piquets which previous reconnaissance had shown to be necessary. Parties for constructing, covering and holding three of these piquets had been sent up the hills, and the other two had started to advance, when the enemy, hidden in the rocky and bush-covered slopes on the right bank of the Baddar Toi, opened a heavy fire on the advanced guard which now consisted of only two companies. Sending back a request for more troops, Colonel Clementi pushed on up the bed of the nullah and secured "The Dam," a spur from the Maidan plateau projecting between the Baddar Toi and the Maidan Algad. The able handling of the advanced guard by Colonel Clementi secured the series of rocky bluffs commanding the route at short range, which on account of their ruggedness and steep, bush-covered slopes made this portion of the route the most difficult of the whole series of the *Tangis* traversed by the column since leaving Jandola.

The 67th Brigade now passed through the advanced guard, which maintained its position until the rearguard came up, when it moved on into camp at Ladha. This day eight men of the Battalion were wounded.

At Ladha the piquet duty was very heavy, as many as 469 of all ranks of the Battalion being on duty at once. The Battalion also took over the "Strong Point" at Ladha, while the greater part of the remainder of the column advanced to Kaniguram.

Most of the tribesmen in the immediate neighbourhood now began at last to make genuine efforts to collect and pay their shares of the money fine and their proportion of rifles, but those who considered themselves less accessible still held out. Consequently punitive operations were carried out up the Baddar Toi, beginning on 6 April, when a number of towers were demolished, and the column then returned on the 8th to Kaniguram, having experienced a certain amount of opposition and sustained some casualties.

The Battalion remained at Ladha throughout the month of April, furnishing guards for convoys, piqueting the roads and assisting in the construction of a permanent camp for the Brigade which it was proposed to leave here when the bulk of the troops should be withdrawn towards India. On 3 May the Battalion left Ladha, severing their connection with the Derajat Column, and marched for Piazza

¹ The 3/11th Gurkhas had joined the main column at Tauda China.

Raghza. Major-General Skeen, C.M.G., halted the Battalion in the centre of the camp and made a farewell speech, bidding them goodbye in very complimentary terms. The Battalion arrived in camp at 5.45 p.m. and, continuing the march next day by Saro Rogha and Kotkai, reached Palosina early on the afternoon of the 5th. Headquarters and two companies remained here while "C" and "D," under Captain Knight, proceeded to Jandola and there relieved two companies of the 2/41st Dogras. Here the usual piquets were found for camp protection, while parties were daily provided for the protection of the Labour Corps working on the construction of a new road. On the 19th Headquarters and "A" and "B" Companies, on relief at Palosina by the 102nd Infantry, joined the wing at Jandola, where some considerable time was now passed.

During the latter part of May very heavy rain fell, and at one time convoy duty had to be entirely suspended as the roads were washed away, while in June intense heat was experienced.

On 19 June the newly appointed commander of 68th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., arrived at Jandola and inspected the post. During this month a list was published of nine Indian officers and nineteen non-commissioned officers who had been awarded certificates from the Force Commander for gallantry in action and devotion to duty. Eight of them received their certificates personally from Major-General Leslie, C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding the Waziristan Force, at a ceremonial parade held at Jandola on 7 July.

The Battalion remained at Jandola until the middle of August in the performance of very heavy piqueting and convoy duties conducted under conditions of great heat, heavy rain and dust-storms, which caused much damage to defences and communications. Further, while the active operations against the Mahsuds had nominally come to an end, precautionary measures could not be relaxed, for reports constantly came in of tribal gatherings in the neighbourhood, while piquets and convoys were continually fired upon. The numbers available for these heavy duties were kept low by the exigencies of leave and by a certain amount of sickness due to fever, and latterly by demobilization, which was started in August.

Nobody in the Battalion in fact felt any real regret when, on 14 August, the Commanding Officer was informed over the telephone that the Battalion would begin its march towards Tank next morning. The Battalion got off by 11.30 a.m. and, marching by Khirgi and Manzai, reached Tank on the 17th. The Battalion left again in two parties on the 18th and 19th, but owing to a break in the line beyond Pezu the journey was considerably delayed; the Indus was not crossed, and the Battalion concentrated in the Rest Camp on the left bank until the 22nd. There was a certain amount of sickness due to continued exposure to the sun, and a mild form of influenza also developed.

Mari Indus was left at 6.30 p.m. on 23 August, and the Battalion reached Nowshera early the next morning. Leaving shortly afterwards in three special trains, the Battalion arrived at Mardan on the afternoon of the 24th. The detraining strength of the Battalion was 6 British officers, 8 Indian officers, 547 other

ranks and 48 followers, while 5 British officers, 6 Indian officers and 154 other ranks were on leave at this date.

The following had been killed or had died of wounds or disease, while serving with the 3rd Guides :—British officers : Captain F. E. Ferguson, M.C., Lieutenant N. D. Douglas, Second-Lieutenant C. A. D. Fraser. Indian officers : Subadar Nadir Khan, Jemadar Sultan Muhammad. Indian other ranks : 52 ; followers, 3. Total, 60.

Of the remaining period of the existence of the Battalion there is but little to record. It remained at Mardan, its strength gradually dwindling as men were demobilized or transferred. Eventually three Indian officers and sixty-eight other ranks, for the most part Dogras, were transferred to the 1st Battalion, and on 2 August 1921, the 3rd Battalion of the Guides Infantry was finally disbanded, after having been in existence for only three and a half years. Eight of its officers continued to serve with the Corps—Captain C. W. Free, M.C., with the Cavalry ; Captains L. R. Knight, M.C., H. D. K. Money and M. V. Smelt, Lieutenants R. R. Wilkinson and N. G. Devonshire with the 1st Battalion ; Lieutenant Taj Muhammad Khan, with the 2nd Battalion ; and Captain D. Bainbridge, M.C., with the 2nd Battalion Depot.

Although the war did not last long enough to give the 3rd Guides a chance of service overseas, they had the responsible task of maintaining in India the reputation of their Corps, acquired in three-quarters of a century of continuous service upon the Frontier.

CHAPTER XIX

1914-1918

THE GREAT WAR : THE WAR SERVICES OF DRAFTS FROM THE GUIDES

CAVALRY DRAFTS : TO THE 15TH LANCERS IN FRANCE ; TO THE 7TH AND 10TH LANCERS IN MESOPOTAMIA ; TO THE 23RD CAVALRY ON THE FRONTIER—INFANTRY DRAFTS : TO THE 57TH RIFLES IN FRANCE—NEUVE CHAPELLE—SECOND YPRES—DEATH OF CAPTAIN BANKS—FESTUBERT—EAST AFRICA—DRAFTS TO THE 53RD SIKHS IN MESOPOTAMIA—THE ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD—DRAFTS TO THE 151ST PUNJABIS—MILITARY MISSION TO CHINESE TURKESTAN.

THE account which follows must necessarily be somewhat incomplete, since it is drawn wholly from such records as have been preserved by the British officers who accompanied the drafts from the Guides to other Indian corps, or from the records of the regiments with which such drafts served.

CAVALRY DRAFTS.

15th Lancers

On 22 November 1914, Jemadar Natha Khan and forty-eight Indian other ranks, all Punjabi Mussulmans and all volunteers, with two followers, left Mardan to join the 15th Lancers in France, being followed on the 25th by Captain C. P. Browne and Lieutenant H. M. Hankin. This detachment joined the 15th Lancers between 5 and 22 January 1915 in France, and during the time that it served with them the 15th Lancers were employed as Divisional Cavalry to the 3rd (Lahore) Division, but owing to trench-warfare conditions they were used continuously not as cavalry but as infantry, holding redoubts or support trenches, and digging communication trenches, etc., as well as taking part with the infantry in the actual fighting. The Guides draft took part with them in the following actions : Festubert 1914 and 1915, Givenchy 1914, Neuve Chapelle 1914 and 1915, the Second Battle of Ypres 1915, Aubers 1915.

The Officer Commanding the regiment reported of the draft that " it was a pleasure to command them ; they were a very good example of first-class Indian cavalry soldiers, and by their example kept up the very fine record of the Guides Cavalry."

On 20 March 1915, Captain C. P. Browne was placed in charge of the regimental machine guns, and on 3 April he was slightly wounded while employed in making a sketch of the position of the enemy. Just over a week later this officer, during the withdrawal of the machine-gun section, was shot through the head, dying shortly afterwards. By his death the Regiment lost the services of a gallant and popular

officer, who will long be remembered as the best water-colour artist the Guides have ever had.

In December 1915 the 15th Lancers left France for Mesopotamia, and two squadrons were employed in south Persia from 1916 to 1918. Ten rank and file of the Guides Cavalry were with these squadrons and took part in the fighting during the operations.

7th Lancers

On 9 February 1916 a draft of twenty-six Indian other ranks, all Dogras, under Second-Lieutenant W. Ross-Smith, I.A.R.O., and Resaidar Rattan Chand, left Mardan to join the 7th Lancers, Force "D," in Mesopotamia. They rejoined the Regiment at Mardan on 1 March 1917, having incurred no casualties. Lieutenant Ross-Smith remained with the 7th Lancers.

10th Lancers

The third draft to leave the Guides Cavalry for a theatre of war was composed of one Indian officer—Jemadar Ganda Singh—and forty-nine other ranks, all Sikhs and all volunteers, with two followers. This party marched out of Mardan on 23 January 1917, and joined the 10th Lancers in Mesopotamia in the following month, when they were reported on by the Officer Commanding the 10th Lancers as "a smart, well-trained and disciplined draft." These men saw no service with the 10th Lancers and rejoined the Guides Cavalry on its arrival at Baghdad in December 1917.

23rd Cavalry

The fourth and last party of cavalry drafts went to Peshawar on 4 July 1919, joining there the 23rd Cavalry and remaining with that regiment until 27 September of that year. This draft was under the command of Jemadar Sher Muhammad Khan and was composed of ninety-nine Indian other ranks with seven followers; but beyond taking part in operations in and beyond the Frontier against raiders, it did not see any active service.

The cavalry drafts, therefore, sent from the Guides to other corps amounted to 230 all ranks, British and Indian, distributed as follows :—

To France	51
To Mesopotamia	78
To the North-West Frontier	100
							—
Total	229

INFANTRY DRAFTS.

57th Rifles

On 2 January 1915 a draft left the Guides Infantry for France to reinforce the 57th Rifles who were in the Ferozepore Brigade,¹ Lahore Division, of the Indian

¹ Commanded by Brigadier-General R. G. Egerton, C.B., formerly Commandant of the Guides.

Army Corps. This party was under the command of Captain P. d'A. Banks and was composed of four Indian officers—Subadars Afzal and Kala Singh, Jemadars Alladad and Wadhawa Singh—106 Yusafzais and 105 Sikhs, or a total of 216 all ranks, of whom twelve were killed and fifty-two wounded. This draft was very soon followed—on 2 April in the same year—by a second reinforcement to the same corps consisting of twenty-five Dogras and twenty-four Khattaks, under the command of Subadar Bahadur Khan. Captain Banks and his party joined the 57th Rifles at Calonne-sur-le-Lys; and the Guides draft now became No. 4 Company of the 57th, bringing the strength of that regiment up to 657.

On the day after the arrival of the Guides the Battalion moved forward through Vieille Chapelle to the Richebourg St. Vaast section of the front line and relieved the 2/3rd Gurkhas in the Rue du Bois.

The 57th remained in these parts during February, but in the early days of March was moved about a good deal in preparation for the battle of Neuve Chapelle, in which the main attack was to be carried out by the 8th (British) and Meerut Divisions supported by the 7th (British) and Lahore Divisions respectively. "During the battle" writes Sir James Willcocks, "I had ridden into the village of Richebourg St. Vaast, and came on a company of my old friends the Guides, just arrived as a reinforcement from India. The village was at the time being shelled, but our meeting was all the more opportune. I spoke to the men and had a handshake with the Indian officers. One of the sepoys, who had once served as my orderly in the Peshawar Division, said as I rode down the ranks, 'General Sahib, if you are in need of an orderly I am with you, but I must just see one *pukka larai* (real fight) first, then I am ready to come.'"¹

The rôle of the Ferozepore Brigade was to confirm any success gained by the leading brigades. On 14 March the 57th took over a section of the front line on the edge of the Bois de Biez, and here they remained under heavy shell fire until the 22nd. It was during these days that the men of the Guides suffered their first serious casualties, two men being killed and eleven wounded, including Subadar Afzal, who was very severely hit by a fragment of shell, but remained on duty till he was able to hand over command of his platoon to his successor. His wound was so severe that he was invalided to India, but afterwards did excellent work with the 1st Guides Infantry in Palestine. Sepoy Mehr Singh was wounded no less than three times, but survived to see still more service, and finally took his discharge as a havildar after serving in the Afghan and Mahsud operations.

After a brief rest, orders were received on 23 April for the Lahore Division to hold itself in readiness to move to the north, and marched on the following day, arriving at the hutments near Ouderdom, about four miles north-west of Ypres, at noon on the 25th, the men footsore and tired after plodding in heavy rain for about thirty miles over *pavé* roads. The Germans had made their first gas attack three days previously, and portions of the allied line had given way, so that all fresh units as they came up from the south had to be put straight into the firing line.

¹ "With the Indians in France," by General Sir J. Willcocks, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., LL.D.

The Lahore Division had now come under the orders of the Second Army by whom an attack was ordered for the afternoon of the 26th, and at 5.30 a.m. on this day the Ferozepore Brigade moved by way of Vlamertinghe to St. Jean, coming *en route* under heavy shell fire which caused many casualties. The position of assembly for the attack was reached at 1.15 p.m. and was 400 yards from La Bricque, a village three-quarters of a mile north of Ypres. Only a very short time was available for giving hurried instructions to the company commanders and for the issue of tools and bombs, and the Battalion was then formed up in column of platoons, the Guides Company being on the right of the front line. The ground to be advanced over was devoid of all cover and completely commanded from the enemy trenches on the ridge 1,500 yards in front, while the British artillery support was practically negligible.

During the first 750 yards of the advance the casualties were considerable, but after crossing the ridge just north of the road, the attack was met by a perfect hail of rifle, machine-gun and gas-shell fire, and the losses rapidly mounted. The advance, however, continued to within a few yards of the German line, the Guides Company getting so close to it that several men, including Captain Banks who was at the head of his men, were killed by German hand-grenades. Finally the attack was checked by the sudden discharge of chlorine gas, carried obliquely across the front from left to right and causing many casualties. Some of the men actually reached the German trenches where the Connaught Rangers and men of the 47th Sikhs and 57th Rifles were intermingled. Among these were some of the Yusafzais and Sikhs of the Guides Company, of whom Havildar (later Subadar) Sirdar Khan and Reservist (later Colour-Havildar) Shamatai of Toru particularly distinguished themselves; the latter, an old soldier of fine character and physique, being responsible for bringing in Captain Fellowes of the 47th Sikhs who was lying wounded under the German parapet.

The commander of the Indian Army Corps makes special mention of the Guides Company in the following words:¹ "Here, too, fell Captain P. d'A. Banks of the Guides, attached 57th, an officer of particular and varied attainments, and one who was marked out for distinction. His orderly, Bhan Singh, notwithstanding a severe wound he had received, carried Banks through a storm of bullets until he fell from overstrain; but some mark of his officer he must retain, and being unable to do more, he took off his accoutrements and brought them back. Just like the Guides!"

The casualties suffered by the Guides Company in this action amounted to thirteen killed, two missing and fifty-four wounded.

In Captain Banks the Guides lost a fine soldier and athlete who, during the short time he survived in France, proved himself to be a magnificent leader of men.

Lieutenant L. V. S. Blacker of the Guides now joined the 57th and took over the command of the Guides Company, and also for a time, of the Battalion, which had lost in this action seven British and ten Indian officers killed and wounded.

The 57th Rifles remained two days longer in the open in front of the enemy line,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

heavily shelled and without blankets, and was then withdrawn and sent to the rear, meeting, while on the southward march to Estaires and Quentin, a draft of the Guides under Subadar Bahadur Khan. The new draft and the battered remains of the regiment it was to reinforce came suddenly upon one another at a turning in a country lane.

The Battalion, which now consisted of men from six different regiments, was reorganized, and while the Guides Company no longer existed henceforth as a separate unit, the bulk of it remained in No. 3 Company.

During the attack on 9 May on Aubers Ridge during the Battle of Festubert, the 57th remained in support in the old German trench, captured in March, immediately in rear of the village of Neuve Chapelle ; but No. 3 Company was detailed to support the 4th Suffolk Regiment and the 40th Pathans, and during the night was brought up into the front line to repel a German counter-attack directed against " Port Arthur." Here the shelling was heavy and casualties considerable, attacks being continually made and bloodily repulsed. The 57th remained in trenches in front of Neuve Chapelle or in a support line near that village until the 30th, when they were sent back to billets at Riez Bailleul. This respite only lasted a brief twenty-four hours, however, since on 31 May the Battalion was ordered up to take over a new section of the line in the Rue du Bois. There were no trenches here, but only breastworks. The enemy were between 70 and 150 yards distant ; and the intervening " no man's land " was piled with corpses, left from the recent attacks, the Rivière des Layes being choked with them. Here the first four days of June were passed.

In this sector the men of the Guides held a small post within forty yards of the enemy's parapet known as the " Pope's Nose," an object of special attention to the German gunners, and here Havildars Mangtu and Ditta greatly distinguished themselves by the stubbornness of their defence. The position was three times captured and recaptured, being finally handed over intact to the 1/4th Gurkhas on the 29th.

During June the Guides had suffered some twenty casualties, and in the next few weeks Captain Blacker and six Indian other ranks were wounded.

In September the 57th were back again in the Rue du Bois, where between the 22nd and 25th feint attacks were made in order to assist the Meerut Division in a subsidiary attack made by it in connection with the Battle of Loos. In these operations the Guides had five men killed and twelve men wounded (one for the third time), and a few men gassed.

After forty-two consecutive days in the line, the Battalion went back into " rest " on 4 October. On returning to the line it was engaged in another feint attack, to which the German retaliation was sharp and effective, causing some twenty casualties amongst the Guides, including four killed. This practically concluded the active participation of the 57th Rifles in the operations in the Western Theatre, as it was now decided to withdraw the Indian Corps from France.

When the Indian Corps was relieved Field-Marshal Sir John French issued a special complimentary order of the day, and a message of farewell and congratulation

from the King-Emperor was delivered to representatives of the Indian Corps at Mazinghem on 25 November by H.R.H. The Prince of Wales.

The 57th Rifles reached Port Said on 23 December, when the Battalion disembarked and went by train to Suez. After remaining there for some days it marched on the 28th to Shalufa and on 9 January 1916 to Khubri East. During its stay in Egypt the Battalion held various posts in the neighbourhood of Darb-el-Haj and El Shatt, and took part at the end of March in a reconnaissance of the Mitla Pass; but on 24 June orders were received to embark for East Africa, and the 57th finally sailed from Suez in the *Ingoma* on the 28th. Mombasa was reached early on 12 July and the Battalion disembarked and was sent by rail to Mauri, finally concentrating at Korogwe on the 18th.

Starting from Korogwe on the 19th the Battalion was sent off "on its own" to effect the capture of the seaport Pangani, marching there *via* Amani, Muhazu and Madugure. "The Hun," writes an officer who was present, "who could easily have smashed our rather tired Battalion into a jelly with the number of machine guns he had, lost his nerve and 'skinned out,' so we had almost a bloodless victory." Pangani was taken on 23 July, two German prisoners being captured. On 1 August the Battalion joined the 2nd East African Brigade at Handeni and marched south with it, No. 2 Company of the 57th Rifles being heavily engaged with the enemy on the 10th near Matomondo and incurring over thirty casualties, including two sepoy of the Guides Infantry. The column then marched on to the Ruwe river, meeting considerable opposition *en route*.


Early in September operations were set on foot for the capture of Nkessa on the Central Railway. In the course of these the Battalion had several more casualties between 11 and 19 September, some fifteen men being killed and wounded, including five men of the Guides, among them the gallant Bhan Singh, who was killed.

At the end of September the Battalion was at Nkessa, and early in October at Tulo, and during the next three months they were engaged in minor operations. Those on the Rufigi river were especially arduous, carried out as they were under exceptional difficulties of supply, so that when at the end of March of this year a halt was called at Utete, the Battalion had been reduced by sickness to 198, all Indian ranks. The next four and a half months were passed at Chemera, whence a move was made to Kisiwani in August; but the end of the East African campaign was now very near; and on 2 September the 57th embarked in the *Ingoma* and was carried to Dar-es-Salaam, re-embarking there in the *Princess* on the 28th and sailing for India.

On arrival in that country, the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Guides—or what remained of them—rejoined their own Corps.

53rd Sikhs

On 8 January 1916 a draft of 100 men was sent from the Guides Infantry to join the 24th Punjabis in Mesopotamia. This draft was composed of four parties, each twenty-five strong, of Sikhs, Dogras, Khattaks and Punjabi Mussulmans,



OFFICERS OF THE CORPS, 1922.

Standing.—Capt. S. B. Good, Capt. C. H. H. Eales, M.C., Hon. Lieut. R. M. Nur Khan, Capt. W. J. C. Duncan, D.S.O., M.C.
 Capt. E. P. Rich, Capt. G. V. L. Coleman, Capt. C. P. J. Prioleau, Capt. M. H. H. Bailey.
Sitting.—Major H. M. Hankin, Capt. J. E. Redding, Lieut. E. K. Wood, Capt. L. V. Dart, M.C., Capt. A. V. Hammond.
 Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, D.S.O., M.V.O., Major F. R. Hensley, Major G. G. E. Wylly, V.C., D.S.O., Lieut.-Col. I. U. Batty, D.S.O.
 Lieut.-Col. C. W. Carey, Major N. H. Prendergast, D.S.O.

and was commanded by Second-Lieutenant W. G. L. Gilbert, who had with him Subadar Daya Singh and Jemadar Khawas Shah. Immediately on arrival in the field, however, this draft was attached to the 53rd Sikhs, with which regiment it took part in the following actions: the Dujailah Redoubt on 8 March 1916, the first battle for Sannayat on 7 April 1916, and the second battle for Sannayat on 22 April 1916.

The whole of the draft was in action on 8 March, when Jemadar Khawas Shah was killed, and during the two actions that followed in April the casualties numbered about forty; consequently some fifty-seven only of the original draft, under Jemadar Arsala Khan, were available for transfer to the 2nd Battalion 22nd Punjab Infantry on 1 June of this year, of whom twenty-six had been wounded and two had returned after being invalided. Thus, of the 103 of all ranks who left the Guides on 8 January, eight had been killed, fifty had been wounded and twelve had been invalided within rather less than six months.

Jemadar—then Havildar—Arsala Khan was awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal for gallant leading in the action at the Dujailah Redoubt, when the 53rd Sikhs had nearly 200 casualties out of a strength of only 450.

On 9 March 1916 a second draft was sent direct from the Guides Infantry to the 53rd Sikhs made up of twenty-five Yusufzais, twelve Sikhs and thirteen Dogras, under the command of Second-Lieutenant R. B. Blandy. This party reached Basra on 17 March and joined the Regiment in the trenches at Sannayat early in May shortly after the fall of Kut, but was not engaged in any action until late in February 1917. During these ten months, however, some twenty-nine casualties occurred, and Second-Lieutenant Blandy was invalided to India in June.

Thus, of the original fifty men composing this second draft sent to the 53rd Sikhs only thirty-one remained to share with the Regiment in the final advance on Baghdad, and of these two were killed and six wounded in the first advance on 22 February 1917, the remainder taking part in the following actions: Baghdad on 9 March 1917, Shawi Khan on 14 March 1917, Beled on 8 April 1917, Istabulat on 22 April 1917.

There remained at the close of this last action only thirteen of the draft, of whom three had been wounded, and these rejoined the 1st Guides Infantry in May at Samarra.

On 9 June 1916, a third party of fifty non-commissioned officers and men left Mardan, joining the 53rd Sikhs in the trenches at Sannayat in July. Of this party twenty-three were invalided before the advance on Baghdad began, one was killed and two were wounded; the remainder accompanied the 53rd in the advance and were present in the actions named in an earlier paragraph when the further casualties sustained amounted to four killed or died of wounds and six wounded, so that only fourteen, two of whom had been wounded, remained for retransfer to the Guides at Samarra in May 1917.

The fourth and last reinforcement dispatched from the Guides Infantry to the 53rd Sikhs left Mardan on 9 October 1916, under Second-Lieutenant A. E. Scarth and consisted of 100 Gurkhas with Subadar Chattar Singh and Jemadar Chandra Bir.

This party joined the 53rd in December in the trenches at Sannayat. Before the advance on Baghdad sixteen of the draft were invalidated, leaving eighty-four and their British officer to start with the Regiment in the general advance, and among these the casualties were as follows :—

Killed or died of wounds	12
Died of disease	4
Wounded and invalidated	18
Wounded and remained	11
					<hr/>
Total	45

There remained for retransfer to the Guides fifty, of whom eleven had been wounded. Among the killed were Second-Lieutenant A. E. Scarth, a very promising young officer, and Subadar Chattar Singh. This last draft did particularly fine work, and the Commandant of the Guides was later congratulated by the Brigade, Divisional and Corps Commanders on the behaviour of the Gurkhas of the Corps.

151st Punjabis

During May 1918 a number of additional Indian infantry battalions were formed in Egypt by withdrawing companies from twenty-four of the Indian battalions already in the force, and on 22 May " B " Company of the 1st Guides Infantry was in this way transferred to the 3rd Battalion 151st Punjabis, then serving in the 179th Brigade of the 60th Division in Palestine.¹ With this company were Lieutenants H. H. Fagnani and J. G. Wainwright, Subadars Nur Muhammad and Kirtiman, Jemadars Khan Bahadur and Birna Bir ; and it took part with the 3/151st in all the September fighting of this year, when the Regiment especially distinguished itself on 20 September at the capture of Anebta and of the Bir Asur tunnel.

About the same time that this company was sent to join the 3/151st Punjabis in Palestine, the Guides Depot sent a nucleus of 100 other ranks to the depot of the 3/151st in India under the command of Jemadar Samundar Khan.

Sir George Macartney's Mission

On 7 February 1918, Captain L. V. S. Blacker, with a party of the Guides, proceeded on field service to Chinese Turkestan. This officer was detailed as commander of the soldiers of a mission, the head of which was Sir George Macartney, and which was ordered to Chinese Turkestan—one of the many missions of varying sizes and objectives which at this time had been organized to oppose the activities of the new regime in Russia.

The soldiers detailed for service under Captain Blacker were sixteen in number, and all but two of these belonged to the Corps of Guides. " The exact part that this cadre would play could not be foreseen, so care was taken to include men with the most varied accomplishments and qualifications. There were linguists, speakers of

¹ See Chap. xvi, p. 230.

Russian, Turkish, Persian, Arabic and even of French ; a bomber, a machine-gunner, a signaller, a carrier-pigeon expert, two or three skilled topographic scouts, a first-aid man and a veterinarian."¹ Of these no less than twelve received decorations, Captain L. V. S. Blacker, Havildar Awul Nur and Dafadar Ghulam Ali of the Guides being awarded the MacGregor Memorial Medal.

The party went from the Punjab over the northern passes of Kashmir to Gilgit and thence to Hunza and so on to Kashgar, where a month was spent until permission was received for the mission to go on to Tashkend, the capital of Russian Turkestan. From Tashkend the party went back through the Kuen-Lun and the Muztagh Pass and so on to Yarkand and the Merv front, and then after exploring to the north-east and spending a winter in Bajgiran, back again to India and peace soldiering in August 1920.

¹ Blacker, "On Secret Patrol in High Asia," p. 8.

CHAPTER XX

SPORTS AND PASTIMES

THE CHANGING COUNTRYSIDE—HAWKING—POLO—SHOOTING—TROPHIES IN THE MESS—
SKILL-AT-ARMS AND ATHLETICS—GAMES.

See Map of Yusafzai, in pocket.

PHYSICAL fitness and an eye for country are indispensable to the Frontier soldier, as readers of the achievements recorded in this volume will be the first to recognize. Games and sports have therefore been regarded as an integral part of training and not merely as a recreation, and have played an important part in the life of the Guides. Opportunities have varied a good deal from time to time as the country has become more cultivated and the claims of a strictly military training more exacting ; and the record contained in this chapter will show how the officers and men of the Corps have adapted themselves to changing local conditions.

The old map of Yusafzai, in the pocket, gives an idea of the condition of the country when the Corps was first established at Mardan in 1853. Here the Yusafzai plain is found to be a sparsely populated area with few roads and fewer villages, the country being merely a bare plain intersected by nullahs. During this period hawking was the chief sport, with a certain amount of small-game shooting confined to sand-grouse and quail in the plains and chikor and see-see in the hills.

As for games, polo was played on the dusty plain used as an infantry parade ground and subsequently on the land now occupied by the Church polo ground. There was also a cricket ground, dependent on well water, in the centre of the cantonment, and a racquet court in the mess garden.

Then came the Lower Swat canal, which was opened in 1885. This canal brought a large area under crop, and the irrigation rendered much of the country unrideable ; this meant that hawking was confined to the unirrigated tracts of country outside the range of the canal. Irrigation brought its compensations in the shape of grass polo grounds and a consequent improvement in polo, and, in addition, the shooting was improved by the arrival of duck and snipe in the flooded areas which were formed by canal water. Finally, the opening of the Upper Swat canal in 1914, bringing a further large tract under cultivation, practically put an end to hawking so far as riding after hawks was concerned. On the other hand, the area for duck and snipe shooting was still further enlarged.

Concurrently with these changes came the gradual " regularization " of the Corps so far as military training was concerned. Instead of an irregular force under civil control, constantly out after raiders or engaged in dealing with recalcitrant

villages along the Border, we find the Corps becoming part of the large Frontier garrison of regular troops, and it is now a regular unit taking its place in the cavalry and infantry brigades which are established at Risalpur and Nowshera. In consequence the officers have less opportunity for travelling round the district on hawking and shooting expeditions. Most of the cold weather is now devoted to training camps and manœuvres, shooting trips being confined to an occasional Thursday or Sunday holiday, with perhaps a few days' leave during the Christmas holidays which are occupied by either a shoot or a polo tournament.

HAWKING

In the early days hawking took the place which pig-sticking occupies in India proper, for as there are no pig in the plains on the Frontier the officers of the Corps have never been able to indulge in this, the greatest of all Indian sports.

Hawking was started by the first Commandant, Sir Harry Lumsden. He was an expert, having learnt the art from the Afghans during his stay in Kandahar. On his return from there he received drafts of hawks every autumn until the Second Afghan War, and his chief sport was hawking gazelle or ravine deer with the aid of hounds. Lumsden found that the hounds imported from Afghanistan (similar to the fashionable Salukis of the present day) were not fast enough, so he imported English greyhounds, the best known of which was a dog called "Tom," whose descendants survived in Yusafzai for many years.

After the Afghan War hawking was continued with Indian hawks and shikaris. Most of the latter came from Pindigheb, men who were skilled in the care of hawks and were wonderful walkers, being able to keep up with the riders all day. The officers of the Corps kept a number of hawks, each paying a few rupees a month towards their maintenance; and one officer was appointed Master of the Hawks, his duty being to supervise the training and care of the birds and to fly them from horseback in the field.

The hawking meets were quite an occasion, and a large contingent often came out from Nowshera when the meets were near there. The Master rode in front with a hawk ready to fly. Two hawkinen carrying two hawks apiece walked about 100 yards on each side of him, and the line was further extended by a few sowars to a length of about three-quarters of a mile. About 200 yards behind the Master came the field, to whom the Master gave the signal to gallop when the hawk was well away after her quarry. A run with hawks meant a long hard gallop with eyes fixed on the hawk in the air, quite an exciting sport when one takes into consideration the nature of the ground over which the gallops usually took place.

As already explained, the increasing cultivation and irrigation of the country gradually reduced the hawking area so that regimental hawks were given up many years ago. The last officer to keep hawks was J. S. Bogle, who showed excellent sport in the country south-east of Mardan up to 1914. Now that the Upper Swat canal irrigates this area it is unlikely that hawking will be revived as a regimental sport.

POLO

Polo was introduced by G. Stewart, who came to the Corps from Manipur, the original home of polo, on the north-east frontier of India, and the first polo match recorded was played at Mardan in 1876 against the 11th Bengal Lancers.

The teams were :—

Guides.—Major Stewart, Captain Wigram Battye, Captain Hammond, Walter Hamilton, Sowar Khan Baba.

11th Bengal Lancers.—Major Prinsep, E. E. Money, H. Health, H. Burn, Resaidar Hardatt Singh.

An amusing account of this match appears in the polo records of the 11th Bengal Lancers (now Probyn's Horse). The account is accompanied by photographs of five of the officers who took part, including Wigram Battye and Walter Hamilton, both of whom were killed in Afghanistan soon afterwards. The game is described as a good and fast one and ended in a win for the Guides by one goal to nil.

The next match of which there is any record was played at Kabul in 1880 against the 9th Lancers.

The teams were :—

Guides.—A. G. Hammond, H. Hughes, George Daly, R. Adams.

9th Lancers.—Gough, Trower, Little, Cameron.

Of the Guides' team Hughes and Daly both met with fatal accidents, the one at polo and the other in a steeplechase. The other two members of the team were both destined to earn the Victoria Cross, and both commanded the Corps in after years.

When the Corps returned to Mardan from the Afghan War in the autumn of 1880 polo was started in earnest. The infantry parade ground was used, a hard and dusty ground which faced the wrong way. The next ground to be made was on the site now occupied by the Church ground. In those days this area was covered with mounds and tussocks on which grew thorn-bushes. This was all cleared and levelled. It was full-sized and ran north and south, instead of into the setting sun, and in this way was a great improvement on the infantry parade ground.

The first grass grounds to be made after the canal was opened were sited south of the Charsadda road and just east of the new canal. These grounds were not satisfactory, and it was eventually decided to make a new grass ground on the site of the old ground. This ground was levelled and turfed by Fred Davies. A few years later Davies made the second ground near the range, by taking a slice off the Cavalry parade ground. These two grounds were the best grounds in northern India for many years, and may still be classed among the best in the country.

It took the Corps a long time to work up a good polo team. It is always a struggle, requiring much hard work, before a regiment can produce a first-class polo team, and though the early teams often did well, it was many years before they were

good enough to win any of the big tournaments. Apart from other considerations the officers were faced with the disadvantages due to their isolated position on the Frontier and the difficulty they had in getting away to play against other teams. They gradually worked their way up in the open tournaments, and in the year 1894 the Cavalry were in the semi-finals of the Bengal Cavalry Tournament and a Corps team was beaten in the Punjab Tournament by Patiala, who eventually won.

In 1895 the Chitral expedition put a stop to polo, and 1896 was the next polo year. The Cavalry reached the final of the Bengal Cavalry Tournament this year, and the Corps won the Punjab Tournament with a team consisting of G. M. Baldwin, F. Davies, H. MacLean and G. B. Hodson.

Then came the Frontier rising of 1897-8, so the next polo year was 1899. The Guides entered for the Punjab Tournament again this year and were beaten in the final by the famous Patiala team : (1) General Pritam Singh, (2) H.H. The Maharaja, (3) Colonel Chanda Singh, (4) Colonel Hira Singh.

Baldwin was hurt in a practice game just before the tournament and could not play, so the team was C. W. Carey (1), F. G. Davies (2), A. H. Buist (3), and G. B. Hodson. In those days the Punjab Tournament at Lahore was an open tournament which attracted all the first-class teams in northern India, so that this tournament forms a good criterion of the standard of Corps polo at the time.

In 1899 the Guides won the Indian Infantry Tournament, which they have since won no less than nine times.

The Punjab Frontier Force Tournament is another in which the Corps has had a long record of successes ; in fact, 1904 was the first year in which the Guides entered for this tournament without winning it.

The Tradesmen's Cup at Rawalpindi was another open tournament for which a Corps team usually entered. They won it in 1904 and were beaten in the final in 1905. These two finals rank among the best games in the polo records. In 1904 a Corps team beat the 9th Lancers " A " Team by a goal in the final, snatching the victory from them by scoring a goal and two subsidiaries in the last three minutes of play and so winning by a goal. In 1905 the 9th Lancers reversed the process. Two minutes before time the score was one goal all, when they scored a subsidiary and a goal in rapid succession thus winning by two goals and one subsidiary to one goal.

The Corps teams in these two games were :—

1904 : H. Campbell, J. Clementi (replaced by C. L. Norman), G. B. Hodson,
C. W. Carey.

1905 : H. Campbell, F. Davies, J. E. Blois-Johnson, C. W. Carey.

The 9th Lancers' teams during these years included such well-known players as Noel Edwards (who afterwards played against America), Sadleir-Jackson, Grenfell and David Campbell.

The year 1906 was one to remember, for the Cavalry won both the Bengal Cavalry Polo and the Tent-pegging. They first entered for the Bengal Cavalry Polo in 1888, and though they reached the final in 1896 they did not win until 1906.

The Cavalry also won the Punjab Frontier Force Tournament this year. The team was: C. L. Norman (1), F. Davies (2), J. E. Blois-Johnson (3) and C. W. Carey (back).

In addition to the open tournaments described, teams have entered regularly for all the smaller tournaments at Peshawar, Abbottabad, Nowshera and, of course, for the Guides' Annual Spring Tournament at Mardan.

In 1910 H. Campbell played for Calcutta, the winning team, in the Indian Championship Tournament.

Up till 1914 the Corps continued to produce good teams, and polo was going strong when the Great War broke out. During the war the Cavalry got some polo in Mesopotamia, and the Infantry played in Egypt and Palestine. An infantry team entered for the Alexandria Tournament in 1920.

After the war the position was much the same as in 1880 after the Afghan War—many of the older players had left and the war had deprived us of several promising young players, notably P. d'A. Banks and J. V. C. Anderson. But polo teams are not made in a year or two, and it will require a great deal of hard work to build up first-class teams again. The Corps is fortunate in having two of the best polo grounds in India at Mardan, and the presence of two cavalry regiments at Risalpur gives teams a good opportunity for practice.

SHOOTING

The small-game shooting round Mardan has never been very good, but there has always been enough rough shooting to provide a pleasant day's sport in the cold weather.

In the days before canal irrigation the only crops which existed were small patches watered from wells near the villages, which were few and far between. These patches were crammed with quail at intervals during the spring and autumn migrations and provided big bags. On the open plains lived numbers of sand-grouse which gave good sport when they came in to their watering places at daylight. In the border hills chikor and see-see can always be shot in small numbers; this shooting means much hard walking, and the birds are often difficult to retrieve.

The advent of the canal changed the character of the shooting altogether. Duck, teal and snipe came into the swamps formed by canal irrigation, and the sand-grouse moved away to unirrigated areas. The quail which used to crowd into the few small patches of crop now spread over the whole country, so that big bags of quail are no longer so easy to obtain even with the assistance of call-birds.

A study of the game-book shows that, since 1892, the bags have included geese, duck, teal, snipe, partridge (grey and black), sand-grouse, quail, chikor, see-see, pigeon and hares. It is interesting to note that a Bewick's swan was shot near Kasim Dheri in December 1910; at that time the only other recorded instance of this bird in India was one shot near Jacobabad in 1907.

The best shooting season so far recorded is the year 1897-8, when 3,662 head of game were shot. Included in this total are 3 geese, 217 duck, 61 teal, 1,108 snipe, 1,940 quail and 233 partridges.

The Upper Swat canal, opened in 1914, brought another large tract of country under irrigation, so that of late years the snipe shooting has improved in spite of the fact that motor-cars now bring numerous sportsmen from Nowshera and Risalpur into the areas which in the old days were the "preserve" of the officers at Mardan.

The only big game in the vicinity of Mardan are the extremely elusive markhor on Pajja Mountain, very few of which have been shot.

Mention may also be made of a leopard killed near Jamalgarhi in 1912, bayoneted by a party of the Guides Infantry who were doing company training in the area.¹

The mess contains a very fine collection of heads and trophies shot by officers when on leave. Kashmir has naturally provided most of the sport, as it is within easy reach of Mardan. The ibex, markhor, and Kashmiri stag form the bulk of the collection—a large number of them were shot by H. W. Codrington. One ibex measuring 54½ inches held the record for many years; this head was picked up by R. C. Hutchinson near Gilgit. Among other Indian heads shot by officers of the Corps are *ovis ammon* and *ovis poli*, yak, tahr, goral, straight-horned markhor, Indian, Thibetan and Persian gazelle, oorial, Burhel, Nilgheri ibex, black buck, sambhur, chital, Thibetan antelope, snow leopard, leopard, bear, tiger, bison, buffalo and rhinoceros. From Burma there are thamin, takin, tsaine, barking deer, sambhur, bison and elephant.

There is also a collection of African heads shot by officers while serving in Somaliland or with the King's African Rifles in East Africa, or when on leave from India and Aden. One of the finest African trophies recorded is the tusk, weighing 72 lb., of an elephant shot by Ivan Battye, and the game-book records greater and lesser kudu, Cooke's hartebeeste, Mrs. Gray's kob, buffalo, Grant's gazelle, Thomson's gazelle, white-bearded gnu, springbok, eland, dik-dik, rhinoceros and hippotamus.

SKILL-AT-ARMS AND ATHLETICS

It is impossible to do more than mention some of the more important events in which officers and men of the Corps have distinguished themselves in skill-at-arms and athletics.

Rifle shooting occupies a prominent place in the records, for the Corps has produced some fine shots. Fred Campbell shot for the Army in 1888 and several years afterwards. G. B. Hodson won the gold medal at the All-India Rifle Meeting three years running. H. W. Codrington, who did so much big-game shooting, was also a fine match shot. Among the Indian ranks who were well-known shots in their day were Bahadur Singh, afterwards Risaldar-Major of the Cavalry, and Alam Khan who became Subadar-Major of the Infantry.

Among the all-India rifle matches won may be mentioned the Officers' Cup, won twice by the Guides Infantry in 1895 and 1897, and the Cawnpore Woollen Mills Cup won four times by the Guides Infantry; on the last occasion ninety-seven teams competed.

¹ See Chap. XXI, p. 292.

The outstanding success in athletic sports was the performance of the Cavalry in winning the Indian Army Running Championship Shield in 1901 and again in 1903. This was due to the running of Kote-Dafadar Muhammad Khan and Lance-Dafadar Kala Singh, who were both splendid performers at 100, 300 and 600 yards.

The Cavalry usually sends in a team for the Indian Cavalry Tent-pegging, and once won this event three years in succession, in 1905, 1906 and 1907.

GAMES

Before this chapter closes mention must be made of the games, other than polo, which have been played by the officers and men of the Corps at Mardan.

Cricket was started by Wigram Battye, who made a ground in the centre of the cantonment on the site now occupied by the tennis courts. This ground was watered by a well and was at that time the only piece of turf in the place.

Matches were played against the regiments at Nowshera, and as there were not enough British officers to make up a team some of the Indian ranks also played. The best-known of these was Sherbat Ali, who afterwards became a risaldar. For practice at the nets men from the Afridi Company were employed; they could throw hard and straight, and were not a bad substitute for fast bowlers.

Roller skating appears to have been popular about the time of the Second Afghan War; and it is interesting to note that in those early days there was a roller-skating rink paved with slabs of slate in the mess garden. This rink was next to the old racquet court which was built in the sixties and remained in use till 1914, but it has now been demolished.

In addition to the eight grass tennis courts made by A. H. Buist on the old cricket ground there are four courts in the mess garden. Lawn tennis has now become very popular, and a tournament is included among the events of the Mardan week in April each year. Amongst the best lawn-tennis players in the Corps were A. H. Buist, G. B. Hodson and F. Davies who were also prominent at polo and other games. Buist won the men's golf championship (Championship of Northern India) at Gulmarg three times, in 1904, 1907 and 1908. Our other golf successes at Gulmarg include the Army Golf Challenge Cup (1913) and the School Foursomes (1911).

The old football ground near the mess has been replaced by other grounds nearer the men's lines where games of hockey or football take place on Thursday and Sunday afternoons; and the Cavalry and Infantry compete regularly in the Punjab Frontier Force Hockey and Football Tournaments, the Hockey Tournament having been won by the Guides Infantry in 1921. The visit of teams to Kohat for the Punjab Frontier Force Tournament affords officers and men of the Corps an opportunity of meeting their comrades, and helps to keep alive the old spirit of the Frontier Force.



MARDAN FROM THE AIR—THE FORT.

CHAPTER XXI

MARDAN

MARDAN IN HISTORY—THE BUILDING OF THE FORT—HODSON'S LETTERS—GROWTH OF THE CANTONMENT—RECENT ADDITIONS—THE MESS AND ITS GARDEN—THE GRÆCO-BUDDHIST SCULPTURES—TROPHIES AND PORTRAITS—THE CHAPEL AND ITS MEMORIALS—ROAD NAMES.

IN order to trace the growth, from the midst of a barren plain, of the now peaceful and beautiful home of the Guides at Mardan it may be well to give some account of the history of the Yusafzai plain and its inhabitants.

The tribe of Yusafzai, originally of Afghan descent, left their homes near Kandahar in the fifteenth century and overran Peshawar and Swat, eventually settling within their present limits. It was hardly to be expected that in those troubled times they would be left in undisputed possession of their newly acquired territory, and their whole history up to the nineteenth century is a story of constant resistance to superior might. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Moghul emperors were their chief oppressors, until in 1747 Nadir Shah on his victorious way to Delhi established a Durani dynasty in Peshawar. To these Durani kings the Yusafzais paid tribute through their two chief Khans, of whom one was the Khan of Hoti. At least two direct descendants of this royal Durani house later became Indian officers in the Guides. In 1818 the threat of Sikh invasion was sufficient to unite all the Pathan tribes of the neighbourhood, but a crushing defeat was inflicted on them by Maharajah Ranjit Singh. There followed for Yusafzai a period of sore oppression. Revenues were collected and retribution inflicted by Sikh columns so ruthless in their visitations that within ten years it was written: "From the Lund Khwar to the Indus there is scarce a village that has not been burnt or plundered."

The victory of Gujerat¹ in 1849 marked the end of the Second Sikh War and the final establishment of British rule at Peshawar. Colonel George Lawrence became the first Deputy Commissioner at Peshawar, and under his orders the Guides were sent to restore law and order in Yusafzai. At this time the inhabitants were notorious for their lawlessness and turbulence. Village warred with village, and no Khan was immune from the constant threat of attack.

Up to 1853 the Guides were continuously on the move within the plain of Yusafzai, and had as yet nothing in the nature of a permanent camp. In that year, however, rough shelters were erected near Gujargarhi, and these were very soon moved to near Baghdada. Plans for a more permanent home were considered

¹ See Chap. I, p. 16.

and the site of a fort at Mardan was selected. Mardan was then, as now, the junction of tracks from Swat and from Buner. Its central situation enabled troops from Mardan to strike rapidly at any point in the Yusafzai plain, and the proximity of the Kalpani river ensured the water supply of the garrison.

In December 1853 both the Cavalry and the Infantry of the Corps were concentrated at Baghdada, and in that month work on the Mardan Fort was begun. Eleven hundred local labourers were employed, the normal daily rate of pay for an ordinary labourer being two annas. Hodson was then in command of the Corps, and was also Assistant Commissioner of Yusafzai. With him were his wife and baby daughter—a sign of the times! Extracts from the letters of Hodson and his wife convey excellent impressions of the building of the fort and of the daily life of the first British family in Mardan.

In January 1854, Mrs. Hodson writes from Mardan: "Picture to yourself an immense plain, flat as a billiard table, but not as green, with here and there a dotting of camel-thorn about eighteen inches high by way of vegetation. This, far as the eye can see, on the east, west and south of us, but on the north the lasting snows of the mighty Himalayas above the lower range which is close to our camp. What would you say to life in such a wilderness? Or how would you stare to see the officers sit down to table with sword and pistol? The baby never goes for an airing without an escort of armed horsemen. What a sensation such a cortege would cause in Hyde Park."

In May 1854, Hodson writes to his father: "I have had to build a fort to give shelter to 876 wild men and 300 wild horses, including also within its limits three houses for English officers, a police station, and a native collector's office. He who builds in India builds not in the comfortable acceptance of the term which obtained at home . . . but he builds as Noah may have builded the Ark. Down to the minutest details of carpentry, masonry, smithery, and 'muddery' too, for that matter, he must know what he is about and show others what to do, or say goodbye to his house for ever."

At the same period Mrs. Hodson writes: "The history of one day will be a picture of every one, with little variation. At the first bugle soon after daylight, William (*i.e.*, Hodson) gets up and goes to parade, and from there to superintend the proceedings at the fort. By nine we are both ready for breakfast, after which W. disappears into his business tent, where he receives regimental reports, examines recruits—whether men or horses—superintends stores and equipments, hears complaints, etc. The regimental business first despatched, then comes 'Kutcherry' or civil court matters, receiving petitions, adjusting claims, etc. During the month of March he disposed of twenty-one serious criminal cases . . . and nearly 300 of felony, etc.

"At two o'clock he comes in for a look at his bairn and a glass of wine. Soon after five a cup of tea and then we order our horses and in the saddle till nearly eight, when we go with him again to the fort, the garden, and the roads, diverging occasionally to fix the site of a new village or well or a watercourse. . . . On our return to camp W. hears more reports till dinner. . . . When we are alone, as

soon as dinner is over, the letters which have arrived in the evening are examined, classified, and descanted on, sometimes answered, and I receive my instructions for next day's work in copying papers, answering letters, etc. . . . I shall be very grateful when this Mardan Kote is finished, for it will relieve my poor husband of half his labour.

"By way of variety we have native sports on holidays—such as throwing the spear at a mark or *Nezabazi* . . . or putting an orange on the top of a bamboo a yard high and cutting it through with a sword at full gallop. W. is very clever at this. . . . The scene is most picturesque; the flying horsemen in their flowing, many-coloured garments and the grouping of the lookers-on. . . . We are still in our temporary huts and tents."

Writing in 1854 Hodson says: "The new fort . . . is nearly finished and my new house therein will be habitable before my wife comes down from Murree." In October he writes: "We are now in our new houses in this fort The European officers' houses project from the general front of the works at the angles of the bastions and are private and away from the noisy soldiers. We have, for India, a very pretty view of the hills and plain around us. . . . A wide plain without a break or tree, thirty miles long by fifteen to twenty miles wide, forms our immediate foreground on one side, and an endless mass of mountains on the other."

In these early days the Infantry of the Corps were all accommodated inside the fort. The Cavalry, then numbering two strong troops, occupied lines between the fort and the present hospital. The hospital and the Corps office were situated under the walls of the fort close to the old cemetery. A hornwork surrounded by a high mud wall adjoining the south face of the fort housed the transport and followers. The "police station and a native collector's office" mentioned in Hodson's letter were on the west bastion of the fort, known as Lumsden Bastion. The other bastions were the Hodson Bastion facing north, the Daly Bastion near the old graveyard, the Sam Browne Bastion facing the bazaar, and the Magazine Bastion. Curtain walls enclosed the fort bastions. For some years the little community lived in this restricted space until the return of the Corps from Delhi after the Mutiny. The Cavalry had now doubled their strength; the hornwork was increased and the guard house near the present Kabul Memorial was erected. The cantonment bazaar was also built at this period and was later roofed in.

Between 1865 and 1869 the first bungalow outside the fort was built. This was situated close to where the present mess stands and was intended to be the officers' mess, but as the rent was very high and bachelor officers were few, Sir Sam and Lady Browne occupied it as their residence. Within Hodson's garden also were built the swimming bath and a racquet court, beside the main road. This racquet court was one of the earliest in northern India and was the subject of considerable interest on the part of passers-by.

In 1870 a further move from the fort was made by the Assistant Commissioner, who built his bungalow and offices on their present sites. At the same time the mess, which had hitherto been housed in the bungalow on the Hodson Bastion, was moved to the building vacated by Sir Sam Browne. Few improvements were

carried out during the seventies, though an earthquake in 1874 necessitated the rebuilding of the mess and the bungalow on the north bastion, and two years later, when the Corps office collapsed, a new office was built and gradually enlarged.

Up to this time all the ground where the majority of the officers' bungalows are now situated had been a bare and unrelieved tract from the fort to Baghdada. During the seventies Captain Hammond dug a well and started a garden on the site of the present double-storeyed bungalow ; it was he who planted most of the older trees in that part of Mardan.

It was not until after 1885 that any of the present bungalows were built. This year, during which the Lower Swat canal brought irrigation to the district, marks the beginning of Mardan as we know it to-day. Officers of the canal service took up their quarters in Mardan and the civil lines quickly came into being. The Band Bungalow was built by Colonel R. B. Campbell, and Captain Fred Campbell and Lieutenant Bretherton built themselves a bungalow near it. A few years later Colonel Fred Battye made a garden north of the present Chapel and planted the avenue of chenar trees there. The old curtain walls round the fort bungalow had been pulled down, gardens spread themselves over the old glacis, grass had been planted in many parts of the cantonment and by 1904 Mardan was beginning to assume its present park-like appearance.

In 1892 the Chapel was built and in a few years more bungalows were built between the Chapel and the Kalpani. Lieutenant Ivan Battye built a small bungalow there and Captain Fred Davies built the double-storeyed house on the site of "Hammond Sahib's Garden." The construction of polo grounds, as described in the previous chapter, improved the appearance as well as the amenities of Mardan. Cricket was played on the grass north of the fort. Later the present lawn-tennis courts were laid out by Captain Buist on the original cricket ground ; and it is this change which is responsible for the curious habit which still lingers in Mardan of referring to lawn tennis in the vernacular as "cricket." During the 1900's Elliott-Lockhart built the bungalow behind the Chapel, Captain B. R. Graham built a bungalow facing the Kalpani and at the same time the Polo Bungalow was built.

During this period facilities for travelling had greatly improved. The Attock bridge had been built in 1884 and in 1897, as a result of the operations of the Malakand Field Force, a narrow-gauge railway line had been constructed from Nowshera to Dargai. This was converted to broad gauge after the Great War.

Meanwhile, congestion in the fort and hornwork had led to extension of the accommodation for the troops. In 1885 a new hospital had been built on its present site, and three years later new lines were built for the left wing of the Infantry outside and west of the hornwork, which was shortly afterwards demolished. When two fresh troops of Cavalry were raised, lines were built for them, and the horse hospital was built nearby at the same time. The site of these buildings was the old cemetery of Mardan village. This has now almost entirely disappeared but a trace remains in the Zamin Shah Ziarat at the south end of the Infantry lines. In 1902 the Cavalry lines were rebuilt and in 1915 were replaced by the present

government lines. The building of these lines marked the disappearance of the old Cavalry barracks near the bazaar.

Shortly before the Great War it had been decided to demolish the fort and build new lines for the Infantry right wing, but with the outbreak of war all available accommodation was required. After 1915 temporary barracks to accommodate increased personnel were erected in various parts of Mardan.

During the years of the Great War and the subsequent operations against Waziristan and Afghanistan, Mardan saw many changes and much congestion. Cavalry and Infantry went overseas, leaving their depots in Mardan. New battalions of the Guides Infantry were raised and trained, standing camps came into being, other units and transport corps made their temporary homes in the cantonment. During these years Mardan was the scene of many departures and reunions, whether of individuals, reinforcement drafts or portions of the Corps now organized as independent units. Generally there was not lacking at least one older Guides officer to watch over the home interests of the Corps against the day when the restoration of peace should see the Guides once more established in their old home.

By the summer of 1922 the Cavalry and the Infantry had returned to Mardan and also the 2nd Battalion of the Infantry, destined to become the Training Battalion of the 12th Frontier Force Regiment. These three units have constituted the garrison of Mardan till quite recently, and their presence caused considerable congestion. The construction of the lines for the right wing of the infantry on the site of one of the old squadron lines was carried out shortly after the end of the war. The fort and some of the temporary barracks were given a new lease of life to accommodate the Training Battalion.

It may be said with truth that in the normal setting of a regiment's everyday life the outward signs of its past history and achievements are nowhere so visible as in the officers' mess. While this is conspicuously true of the Guides mess, its interest and charm are further enhanced by the archæological treasures it contains and by the beauty of its surroundings. Situated towards the northern end of a garden some five acres in extent, the building faces east and presents a fine view over the Kalpani river to the hills of the Buner border, standing out amongst which is the bold peak of Pajja, rising to 6,747 feet—a prominent landmark for all Yusafzai. Southwards stretch green lawns and magnificent trees which suggest an English park rather than an Indian compound.

The mess garden was originally laid out by Hodson in 1854. Many of the older trees were planted shortly afterwards and carefully nourished with well water that they might attain the lofty growth so much appreciated by later generations. Before the advent of irrigation an annual allowance was made by the Punjab Government for the upkeep of wells to water the garden, which was in consequence much frequented by local inhabitants. It was then commonly known as the "Company Bagh," signifying one of the public gardens instituted by the East India Company; the name survives to this day in the vernacular. Since 1894, however, the cost of its upkeep has been borne entirely by the members of the mess and a greater measure of privacy has been obtained.

On the lawn in front of the mess itself stands a short avenue of pine trees forming a vista towards the Ambeyla Pass. These trees were brought from Upper Swat by Lumsden's orders. As Lumsden had left the Corps two years before the Ambeyla campaign it is uncertain whether these trees were aligned with this intention or whether they were transplanted later. Added effect was subsequently given to this vista by the erection of a sundial in the centre of the avenue.

Mention has already been made of the swimming bath in the mess garden. Shaded by surrounding trees and a thatched roof, but open to the air on all sides, this bath has lightened the burden of many a hot weather. By its side stands a wire-gauze structure known as "The Bird Cage." Originally this was in fact an aviary, and a number of strange birds were kept in it. One evening some misguided person added a raven to the collection, with the result that, next morning, the raven was the sole survivor. Perhaps the building is more appreciated as it is now, for in it breakfast is served in the hot weather to the accompaniment of cool-sounding splashes from the adjoining bath. Water for the bath is drawn from a deep well by means of bullocks working a Persian wheel. The recent substitution of iron well gear in place of the former combination of woodwork, ropes and earthenware pots has reduced the time necessary to fill the bath from four days to thirty-six hours.

The present mess building had two predecessors on much the same site. Colonel Sam Browne's house which later became the mess was taken over by the Government of India in 1872, just two years before an earthquake necessitated its being rebuilt. In 1886 an entirely new mess was constructed. This, with certain alterations, is the one which stands to-day. Originally only two main rooms were used, an ante-room and a dining room, along each side of which was an officer's quarter. The dining room was extended westward to its present size in about 1888. Soon afterwards the officers' quarters were given up and they have since formed an addition to the ante-room with a connecting archway, while other side rooms were converted into a billiard room, library and guest room. In more recent years, after the Great War, Major Wylly bestowed much care on improvements to the mess, notably the replacement by a cosy fireplace of the draughty door at the garden end of the billiard room, and the half-panelling of the same room. It was also due to his initiative that two little-used rooms adjoining the dining room were later made into a pleasant breakfast room with side windows overlooking the garden. Much-needed light has lately been admitted into several rooms by the construction of skylights.

An unusual, perhaps a unique, feature of the mess is the number of stone figures in the ante-room and dining room, several of which are of great archaeological interest. In order to account for them it is necessary to go back to the third century B.C. when Alexander the Great left Greek governors and colonists in the Peshawar valley, then the home of Buddhist culture under the name of Gandhara. Shortly before the birth of Christ, Scytho-Parthians from Asia Minor replaced the Greeks in Gandhara. Under them the art of Gandhara reached its height ; but after A.D. 50 much of the purer Greek strain was lost and sculpture grew more Asiatic in character.

This later period is represented by the figure on the southern side of the dining-room archway, while a finely modelled head in the ante-room is remarkable for the pure Greek character of its sculpture. The majority of these figures came to light during the excavations of the Lower Swat river canal, shortly before 1885 ; others were found some ten years earlier at Thakht Bai and in Swat. But perhaps the finest example of Græco-Buddhist sculpture is the mantelpiece on the north wall of the dining room, which takes the form of a series of reliefs depicting scenes from the life of Buddha and has been the object of world-wide study.

For some time the sculptures lay about in different parts of the mess and its verandas. But one morning in about the year 1884 an official letter arrived in Mardan saying that Government understood that there were a number of Buddhist sculptures in the Guides mess, and would the Officer Commanding be good enough to send them at once to the Lahore Museum. Faced with this situation, Colonel Jenkins decided to convert the sculptures in question from movable to immovable fixtures with the minimum of delay. All available masons were summoned, and meanwhile a dozen possible and impossible schemes were considered. The problem was solved as the first of the masons arrived, and they were commissioned to build the fireplace forthwith, and before long most of the other figures too were in their places as they are to-day. The officers concerned may well be forgiven if the scenes from Buddha's life in the dining room mantelpiece are not in their strict chronological order.

Other subjects of interest in the mess cover a wide range of campaigning, sport and travel. Round the walls of the main rooms hangs a varied collection of heads and other trophies of the chase described in the previous chapter.

One of the most treasured relics is the Delhi table in the ante-room. This is one of three leaves of a table in the Hindu Rao's house on the Ridge which was the headquarters of the sector held by the Guides, the 1st Battalion 60th Rifles and the 2nd Gurkha Rifles. Each of these regiments took one leaf of the table. The one in the Guides mess bears carved symbols representing the three regiments—a Maltese Cross with the motto " Celer et Audax " for the 60th, crossed kukris and " Stout and Steady " for the Gurkhas ; crossed Pathan knives and " Rough and Ready " for the Guides. Above this table hangs a Ghilzai standard captured in the brilliant cavalry charge at Fattehabad when Hamilton won his V.C. and Wigram Battye met his death. Close by is a painting of the dramatic incident at Landakai in 1897, described in Chapter XI. The picture, painted by Colonel Hobday, R.E., an eyewitness of the scene, represents Lord Fincastle trying to lift the body of Lieutenant Greaves on to Colonel Adams's horse, while Hector MacLean, who was killed, is hastening to their assistance from the *ziarat* on the left.

On another wall of the ante-room hangs a collection of swords and knives, among which may be mentioned a heavy Crusader's sword taken from a dead Arab and acquired by Younghusband while campaigning in Egypt in the eighties and, hanging above it, two curiously shaped sacrificial swords from Nepal. Over the smaller fireplace hang two swords taken from *Ghazis* who cut down Lieutenant

Macnamara at Rustam in 1915. Near them are two drums captured during the campaign of 1897. In a recess near this fireplace stands a copper-work dragon covered with thick gold leaf, once a gargoyle of a temple in the Royal Hunting Park outside Pekin. This was brought back by Hector Campbell after the Boxer Rising of 1900.

A number of water-colours in the ante-room are by Captain C. P. Browne, of the Corps, who was responsible for many sketches in the scrap-book. Another subject of much admiration is a bronze equestrian group presented by Sir Raleigh Egerton. The carved mantelpieces in the ante-room and the side cupboard in the dining room are from Hashtnagar in Yusafzai, while the screen in the upper part of the archway between these two rooms is of Kashmiri origin.

The billiard room also contains objects of varied interest. Over one fireplace hangs a German naval ensign taken by Major Carey's squadron from a Turkish monitor on the Euphrates in 1918. Below it is a block of wood whereon are carved the names of officers present with the 1st Guides Infantry in Palestine on Armistice Day, 1918. On the farther mantelpiece are two plates from the Czar's dinner service in the Royal Palace at Merv, brought back by Major Blacker after his adventures with the North Persian Cordon after the Great War. Flanking these are four silver-bound ships' buckets, replicas of those on the Royal Yacht, presented by Hector Campbell. Hanging on the walls are J. S. Bogle's painting of Subadar Bahadur Singh, a noted athlete, and coloured sketches representing different classes and uniforms of the Corps.

On the wall of the billiard room is the skin of a small leopard which encountered a double company of Guides carrying out field training at Jamalgarhi in 1912. With rifles loaded and bayonets fixed, the men advanced in line towards some high crops where the animal was hidden. The leopard, emerging from his retreat, was met with a hail of bullets and charged straight at Lieutenant Prendergast, only to impale itself on that officer's bayonet. The scene has been fittingly depicted in the mess scrap-book.

Trophies of more orthodox sport in the billiard room are a fine 10-lb. English trout caught by Lieutenant Blood in Kashmir, a record for over twelve years for fly-fishing in that country, and a Syrian chub caught in the Jordan in 1921 by Captain Fox-Strangways.

In the dining room stands the table presented by the 3rd Battalion Guides Infantry on their disbandment. This table is a survival of the siege of Ladysmith and was obtained from the 18th Hussars. On the walls hang the portraits of many famous soldiers. In a commanding position at the head of the table is an oil painting of Sir Harry Lumsden. On the north wall are photographs of certain deceased officers of the Corps. None of them died in his bed. In some cases the officer's sword hangs on the wall above his photograph. One of these swords belonged to Hamilton, though it is probably a parade sword and not the one with which he fought so gallantly at Kabul. On the south wall hang the portraits of past Commandants of the Corps.

The mess silver includes many trophies of polo, shooting and other activities.

Among other pieces of plate is a statuette representing Lieutenant Walter Hamilton, V.C., in his last glorious fight in defence of the Kabul Residency in 1879. This is a model of a piece of sculpture in Dublin Museum.¹ Other statuettes are those of King Edward VII, who was Colonel-in-Chief of the Corps; Subadar-Major Sarfaraz Khan, descendant of the famous Risaldar Fatteh Khan and father of Lieutenant Taj Muhammad who rose from Subadar-Major to a King's Commission in the Guides Infantry. Other interesting pieces are a Queen Anne jug presented by Colonel Jenkins, a menu-holder attached to a "shoe" of Chinese money, a cigar lighter made from grape-shot picked up on the Ridge at Delhi, and a collection consisting of a cigar-box, lighter and snuff-box which once formed the fittings of a ram's head and were presented by Sir Harry Lumsden in 1859.

Among tall trees near the centre of the cantonment stands the Guides Chapel, a small, homely building which forms an irresistible reminder of many a little country Church in England. The need of a Chapel had long been felt in Mardan, where services had been held on Sunday afternoons in the mess. Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Hutchinson had been especially anxious for a Chapel to be built, and after his death in action in 1886 funds were raised so that the Chapel should be in part a memorial to him. Subscriptions were confined chiefly to officers of the Corps past and present and civil officers who had served in the neighbourhood.

The interior of the Chapel is unique in India as a Corps memorial. The grey stone walls bear tablets recalling many a gallant name. The east window is in memory of Colonel Hutchinson, while a row of brass tablets near the altar perpetuates the memory of past Commandants of the Corps. Above these is a tablet to the memory of Sir Harry Lumsden, bearing on it the eulogy of Lord Dalhousie, "a braver or a better soldier never drew sword." Memories of Lumsden's more homelike pursuits are recalled by the wooden cover of the font, carved as well as presented by himself.

The west window is a memorial to Quentin, Wigram and Fred Battye. One large brass tablet on the north wall bears the names of twenty-two officers of the Corps who fell in the Great War, many of them while serving with other units. Other brasses bear names famous in the history of the Corps and recall many a deed of valour related in these pages.

Round the Chapel may be seen the graves of past officers of the Corps and members of their families. Other graves include those of officers and other ranks of British regiments killed during the actions in Chitral and Malakand in 1895 and 1897.

Near the fort is the old cemetery, where lie the bodies of many heroes of the Ambeyla campaign. In one corner lies that of Colonel Hutchinson; nearby are the graves of Wigram and Fred Battye. On the northern side is that of Colonel Spottiswoode of the 55th Native Infantry, hard by the place where he met his tragic end. His regiment came to relieve the Guides in 1857, but mutinied at Mardan. Their Colonel was unable to bear the disgrace and took his own life beneath the mulberry tree which still stands at the point where the Hoti road branches off, close to Guides House.

¹ Now in the hall of the Royal Dublin Society.

At the south end of the cantonment bazaar stands the Kabul Memorial, an oriental archway and bathing tank built by Government to remind succeeding generations of the steadfast loyalty of the little band of Guides who defended the Residency at Kabul to the last man. Close by the archway stands a brass cannon captured by the Corps at Munda in 1895.¹ Another relic of Munda is a part of the door of the fort which now fulfils the more humble rôle of a table near the tennis courts, from which tea and other refreshments are dispensed.

Close by the Memorial is the spot where Lieutenant A. M. Ommaney was assassinated in 1865. The scene is still known as the Ommaney Cross-roads. Lumsden Road, running westward from the mess, and known for many years as Godby Road, recalls the murderous attack on General C. J. Godby, then commanding the Cavalry. Some men of the Guides who were at hand promptly pulled up the pegs of a nearby tent and knocked down the Ghazi in time to save Godby's life, although he was severely wounded.

As in most cantonments the roads of Mardan are named after great soldiers of times gone by. Lumsden, Wilde, Battye, Hammond, Campbell, Hutchinson, Ommaney, MacLean, Hamilton—men whose deeds fill these pages. As Sir George Younghusband says, in his "Story of the Guides": "Great names these all, and spreading still their soldier influence, perhaps insensibly, over the spirit of their old home and Regiment "; and since these words were written a road has been named after him, too.

Such is the home of the Guides, very dear to them, abounding as it does in memories of great men and great days that are past ; and for those that come after enshrining, as no written record can, the history of their Corps.

¹ See Chap. x.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I (A)

This Roll shows Officers (i) Posted and attached to the Corps from its inception to 30 April 1922, when the Corps was reorganized on its present basis ;

(ii) Posted to Cavalry and Infantry between 1923 and 1938.

Officers have been grouped into the following categories :—

(a) Permanently posted to the Corps.

(b) Attached during the Mutiny.

(c) Attached from 1858 to 1914.

(d) Attached from 1914 to 1922.

NOTE.—From 1846 to 1891 the senior appointments in the Corps were as follows :—
Commandant ;
Second-in-Command (commanded Infantry) ;
Next senior (commanded Cavalry).

1891 to 1922 Commanders of Cavalry and Infantry were of equal standing—i.e., the senior was Second-in-Command of the Corps.

1848 to 1 April 1888 the Adjutant was " Adjutant of the Corps " only.

1 April 1888 to 1922 the Cavalry and Infantry each had their own Adjutant, referred to as Adjutant Cavalry or Adjutant Infantry.

OFFICERS POSTED AND ATTACHED TO THE CORPS FROM ITS INCEPTION TO 30 APRIL 1938.

No.	Name with Rank on joining.	Date of Commission.	Date of Joining.	Became Non-Effective.	Cause and last Rank held with Corps.	Remarks.
1.	Lieut. H. B. Lumsden, 59th N.I.	1/3/38	14/12/46	3/3/62	Appointed to command Hyderabad Contingent.	FIRST COMMANDANT 14/12/46 to 26/1/53 and 3/1/56 to 3/3/62. Later Lieut.-General Sir Harry Lumsden, K.C.S.I., C.B. Died 12/8/96.
2.	Lieut. W. S. R. Hodson, 1st Eur. Bom. Fus.	13/9/45	by/5/48	23/7/57	Lieutenant-Colonel. To raise Hodson's Horse.	First Adjutant 1848 to 1849. Acting Commandant 1/11/52 to 26/1/53. SECOND COMMANDANT 27/1/53 to 1/4/55. Temporary Commandant 20/6/57 to 23/7/57. Killed at Lucknow 12/3/58
3.	Lieut. G. N. Hardinge, 45 N.I.	—	19/6/49	25/2/56	To 1st Punjab Cav.	Commandant of Sowars 3/8/50. Second-in-Command 23/11/52. Adjutant 19/6/49.
4.	Lieut. H. N. Miller, 1st Eur. Bom. Fus.	—	25/10/49	Before 1/1/53	—	—
5.	Lieut. O. Wilkinson, 10th L.C.	—	11/7/49	Before Oct. 1849	—	—
6.	Ensign H. J. Hawes	24/2/46	25/9/49	10/5/52	Lieutenant.	Adjutant 25/9/49 to 10/5/52.
7.	Lieut. R. R. Adams, 12th N.I.	—	5/10/49	1/4/50	To Political Dept.	Assassinated when District Commissioner, Peshawar, 1864. Father of Major-General R. B. Adams (No. 39).

8. Ensign F. McC. Turner, 29th N.I.	26/7/45	11/5/52	Apr. 1856	To 5th Punjab Cav. Lieutenant.	Adjutant 11/5/52 to 1/2/56.
9. Lieut. C. J. Godby, 36th N.I.	—	11/12/52	28/4/59	To 4th Punjab Cav.	Afterwards Major-General and Commandant, P.F.F.
10. Lieut. T. G. Kennedy, 62nd N.I.	—	21/11/54	16/2/65	To 2nd Punjab Cav. Captain	Commandant of Cavalry at Delhi. Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir T. Kennedy, K.C.B., and Commandant, P.F.F. Officiating Commandant 2/4/55 to 2/1/56.
11. Major R. G. Taylor, 2nd L.C.	—	2/4/55	2/1/56	—	Second-in-Command at Delhi. Brother of Wigram and Fred Battye (Nos. 21 and 31). Uncle of I. U. Battye (No. 65).
12. Lieut. Quentin Battye, 56th N.I.	—	2/4/55	10/6/57	Killed in action during the siege of Delhi.	Adjutant at Delhi. Cavalry Commandant 29/7/59 to 9/5/64.
13. Lieut. C. W. Hawes, 43rd L.I.	—	17/5/56	9/5/64	—	Raised 1st Punjab Cav. Acting Commandant 13/3/57 to 1/6/58 at Delhi. Afterwards Commandant C.I.H. 1861 to 1866, and later General Sir Henry Daly, G.C.B., C.I.E. Father of No. 40.
14. Captain H. D. Daly, 1st Eur. Bom. Fus.	1840	13/3/57	1/6/58	To command Hodson's Horse.	—
15. Lieut. E. E. B. Bond, 57th N.I.	—	1/7/57	30/5/63	To Punjab Police.	Afterwards Colonel.
16. Lieut. H. C. E. Ward, 5th N.I.	—	27/9/57	10/7/60	To 5th N.I.	Adjutant.
17. Lieut. W. J. Furlong, 55th N.I.	—	15/6/58	9/6/70	To 1st Punjab Cav. Captain.	Second-in-Command, 1863. Sixth Commandant 12/5/70 to 31/1/84. Later Colonel Sir Francis Jenkins, K.C.B., A.D.C.
18. Lieut. F. H. Jenkins, 57th N.I.	20/12/51	20/8/60	1/2/84	Retired. Colonel.	THIRD COMMANDANT 4/3/62 to 7/2/65. Raised Wilde's Rifles [now 4/13th F.F. Rifles (Wilde's)]. Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir A. T. Wilde, K.C.B., C.S.I., and Commandant, P.F.F. Father of No. 60.
19. Lt.-Col. A. T. Wilde, C.B., 4th P.I.	—	4/3/62	21/12/63	To command Punjab F.F. Colonel.	Uncle of No. 58.
20. Lieut. A. M. Ommancey, 17th N.I.	—	6/2/63	3/10/65	Assassinated in Mandan by a fanatic.	Adjutant 1876. Brother of Quentin Battye (No. 12) and of Fred Battye (No. 31), and uncle of I. U. Battye (No. 65).
21. Lieut. Wigram Battye, 6th E. Regt.	6/1/59	11/5/63	2/4/79	Killed in action near Fattahabad, Afghanistan. Major.	Second-in-Command 1887-1891. EIGHTH COMMANDANT 1/2/91 to 11/10/95. Afterwards Colonel Sir Arthur Hammond, V.C., K.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C. Father of A. V. Hammond (No. 98).
22. Lieut. A. G. Hammond, General List, Inf.	7/6/61	16/9/63	11/10/95	Bt. Colonel. Colonel on the Staff.	

APPENDIX I (A)—*continued*.

No.	Name with Rank on joining.	Date of Commission.	Date of joining.	Became Non-Effective.	Cause and last Rank held with Corps.	Remarks.
23.	Lt.-Col. S. J. Browne, C.B., V.C., and P.C.	—	22/12/63	18/3/69	To C.I.H. Colonel.	Officiating Commandant 22/12/63 to 7/2/65. FOURTH COMMANDANT 8/2/65 to 18/3/69. Afterwards General Sir Samuel Browne, G.C.B., K.C.S.I., V.C. Commandant of Cavalry 1864-1870. Second-in-Command 1870-1884. SEVENTH COMMANDANT 1/2/84 to 31/1/91. Father of H. Campbell (No. 68). Brother-in-law of F. Campbell (No. 43). Afterwards Major-General, C.B.
24.	Lieut. R. B. P. P. Campbell, 2nd P.C.	4/9/55	10/5/64	31/1/91	Colonel.	—
25.	Ensign A. J. Nicholson	2/1/62	16/9/64	17/10/76	Retired. Captain.	Officiating Commandant. Afterwards Major-General Sir John McQueen, G.C.B., and Commandant, P.F.F.
26.	Captain J. W. McQueen, 4th P.I.	4/4/54	26/7/66 23/7/71	26/11/67 17/3/73	To 4th P.I. To 5th P.I.	—
27.	Lieut. H. Wylie	4/10/61	26/10/66	18/5/72	To 4th Punjab Cav. Captain.	Adjutant, 1871.
28.	Lieut. C. E. Hunter, General List, Inf.	8/6/61	21/12/66	Dec. 1875	Died in Calcutta whilst on the Viceroy's Staff.	FIFTH COMMANDANT 19/3/69 to 30/4/70. Afterwards General Sir Charles Keyes, K.C.B. Father of C. V. Keyes (No. 66) and of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes.
29.	Lt.-Col. C. P. Keyes, 1st P.I.	—	19/3/69	30/4/70	To command Punjab F.F.	Commandant of Cavalry 1870-1884. Second-in-Command 1884-1887. Afterwards Major-General, C.B. Colonel of the Corps of Guides 13/5/04 to 12/1/28.
30.	Capt. G. Stewart, 1st P.C.	20/9/56	29/4/69	Nov. 1887	To 1st Punjab Cav. Colonel.	Adjutant. Commandant of Cavalry 1886-1891. Second-in-Command 1/2/91 to 13/4/95. Brother of Quentin and Wigram Batty (Nos. 12 and 21), and uncle of I. U. Batty (No. 65).
31.	Ensign F. D. Batty, 62nd Regt.	11/1/67	13/5/70	13/4/95	Killed in action on the Panjkora River. Lieut.-Colonel.	Commandant of Cavalry 1884-9/1/86.
32.	Lieut. R. C. Hutchinson, 1st P.C.	9/12/59	9/6/70	9/1/86	Mortally wounded in action at the Malandri Pass. Lieutenant-Colonel.	—
33.	Lieut. M. J. King Harman, R.A.	2/10/60	3/10/71	May 1873	To 2nd Gurkhas.	—
34.	Lieut. M. C. Cooke-Collis, 92nd Foot.	30/12/71	9/7/75	Apr. 1891	To 34th Pioneers. Major.	—

35. Lieut. C. G. Mansel, 63rd Foot.	8/7/68	18/8/76	Feb. 1877	To 4th Punjab Cav.	—
36. Lieut. W. R. P. Hamilton, 70th Foot.	28/2/74	25/8/76	3/9/79	Killed during de- fence of Kabul Residency. Lieutenant. To C.I.H.	V.C.
37. Lieut. H. W. Hughes, 18th Foot.	15/4/74	28/9/77	1882		Killed at polo.
38. Lieut. I. de C. Meade	9/11/73	19/7/79	June 1880	To Bengal Cav.	—
39. Lieut. R. B. Adams, 12th Foot.	11/9/76	19/9/79	18/1/04	To command Dera Ismail Khan Bde. Colonel.	Adjutant 1884. Commanding Cavalry 1891 to 31/3/99. TENTH COMMANDANT. 1/4/99 to 18/1/04. Afterwards Major- General Sir Robert Adams, V.C., K.C.B., A.D.C. Son of No. 7. Killed Steeplechasing. Son of Sir H. Daly (No. 14).
40. Sub.-Lieut. G. K. Daly, 15th Foot.	11/11/76	11/11/79	1880	Lieutenant.	ELEVENTH COMMANDANT 19/1/04 to 15/2/09 Afterwards Major-General Sir George Younghusband, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.B., <i>p.s.c.</i> Colonel of the Corps of Guides 13/1/28 to 8/7/29. Keeper of the Crown Jewels, Tower of London.
41. 2/Lieut. G. J. Young- husband, 1/17th Foot.	1/5/78	5/10/80	15/2/09	To command Dera Ismail Khan Bde. Colonel.	TWELFTH COMMANDANT 16/2/09 to 13/11/11. Last Adjutant of Corps 11/9/87. First Adjutant, Cavalry, 1/4/88. Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Raleigh Egerton, K.C.B., K.C.I.E. Colonel of the Corps of Guides 9/7/29 to 24/9/30. Cousin of No. 64. Father of D. G. Egerton (4C.) First Adjutant, Infantry. Commanding Infantry 13/4/95 to 1899. Brother-in- law of R. B. P. P. Campbell (No. 24) and uncle of H. Campbell (No. 68) and C. H. Campbell (No. 83). Afterwards General Sir Frederick Campbell, K.C.B., D.S.O.
42. Lieut. R. G. Egerton, Leics. Regt.	13/8/79	10/2/82	13/11/11	To command Fero- zepore Bde. Colonel.	Drowned during Tibet Expedition, 25/7/04.
43. Lieut. F. Campbell, S. Lancs. Regt.	13/8/79	18/9/82	1899	To command 40th Pathans. Major.	—
44. Lieut. G. H. Bretherton, R.I.R.	27/7/82	15/2/84	1893	To Commissariat Dept. Lieutenant. To Cantonment Dept. Captain.	
45. Lieut. C. L. M. Rich, E. Lancs. Regt.	8/6/81	10/4/85	1900		
46. Lieut. F. J. H. Barton, Wilts. Regt.	23/4/81	16/4/85	30/10/02	Killed playing polo at Mardan. Major.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Commanding Cavalry 31/3/99 to 30/10/02.
47. 2/Lieut. H. S. Fox- Strangways, E. Lancs. Regt.	29/8/85	30/5/87	1891	To Political Dept. Lieutenant.	—

APPENDIX I (A)—*continued*.

No.	Name with Rank on Joining.	Date of Commission.	Date of Joining.	Became Non-Effective.	Cause and last Rank held with Corps.	Remarks.
48.	Lieut. G. B. Hodson, Oxf. L.I.	10/5/82	27/9/87	30/3/05	To command 57th Rifles, F.F. Major.	Adjutant, Infantry. Commanding Infantry 1899-29/3/05. Brigadier-General. D.S.O. Died of wounds received at Gallipoli 26/1/16. Second Cousin of W. S. R. Hodson (No. 2).
49.	Lieut. F. G. H. Davies, Wilts. Regt.	29/8/85	27/9/87	13/11/16	To command Risalpur Cavalry Bde. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Commanding Cavalry 30/10/02 to 13/11/11. THIRTEENTH COMMANDANT 14/11/11 to 13/11/16. Afterwards Brigadier-General, C.B.
50.	2/Lieut. H. W. Codrington, Liverpool Regt.	30/3/87	9/4/88	1912	To command 13th Rajputs. Major.	Adjutant, Infantry. Commanding Infantry 13/11/05 to 19/9/12. Afterwards Brigadier-General, C.B.
51.	Capt. H. F. V. Gaitskell, P.I.	7/7/69	30/7/89	14/12/90	Died. Major.	—
52.	Lieut. G. M. Baldwin, N. Lancs. Regt.	30/1/86	29/9/90.	1913	To command 25th Cavalry, F.F. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Commanding Cavalry 1911-13. Afterwards Brigadier-General, D.S.O. Colonel of the Corps of Guides 25/9/30 to 23/3/35. Afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel.
53.	Lieut. A. R. H. Garden, Dorset Regt.	11/2/88	24/1/91	1914	Retired. Major.	Afterwards Sir Armine Dew, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.
54.	Lieut. A. B. Dew, R. Innis. Fus.	10/11/88	5/2/91	1898	To Political Dept. Killed in action at Landakai. Lieutenant.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Awarded posthumous V.C.
55.	2/Lieut. H. L. S. MacLean, North'd Fus.	24/4/89	17/2/91	17/8/97	Killed in action at Chilas. Major.	—
56.	Major A. Daniell, 1st P.I.	23/9/71	6/9/91	Mar. 1893	To command 59th Rifles, F.F. Major.	Commanding Infantry 1912-28/1/15. Killed at Neuve Chapelle in France 12/3/15. D.S.O. Father of W. Elliott-Lockhart (No. 5C.) Nephew of No. 20.
57.	Lieut. P. C. Elliott-Lockhart, West Ind. Regt.	23/11/87	31/8/92	29/1/15	To Madras Infantry. Captain.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Commanding Cavalry 1913-1920. D.S.O.
58.	2/Lieut. A. H. Ommaney, Wilts. Regt.	5/12/91	13/2/93	1904	Retired. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Son of Lieut.-General A. T. Wilde (No. 19).
59.	Lieut. A. C. Stewart, Oxf. L.I.	27/1/92	21/3/93	9/10/20	Died at Murree. Retired.	Raised and commanded 2nd Guides Infantry 18/2/17 to 1/2/21. D.S.O. Afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel.
60.	2/Lieut. H. N. Wilde, W. York. Regt.	20/2/92	24/4/93	11/6/94	Retired. Lieutenant-Colonel.	—
61.	2/Lieut. J. S. Bogle, U.I.	23/11/92	10/3/94	1/2/21	To 75th Carnatic Infantry. Captain.	—
62.	Lieut. J. C. H. McCaskill, R.I.R.	27/1/92	3/1/95	1909	—	—

63. 2/Lieut. J. E. Blois-Johnson. U.L.	30/8/93	5/2/95	27/6/18	To command 21st Cavalry, F.F. Major.	Afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel.
64. Colonel C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., 3rd P.C.	8/6/67	12/10/95	31/3/99	To command Punjab F.F.	NINTH COMMANDANT 12/10/95 to 31/3/99. Afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Charles Egerton, G.C.B., D.S.O. Cousin of No. 42.
65. 2/Lieut. I. U. Battye, U.L.	16/1/95	23/6/96	1/11/25	Tocommand S.A.S., Pachmarhi. Colonel.	Commandant, Infantry, 5/1/21 to 31/10/25, Brigadier, C.B., D.S.O. Nephew of Nos. 12, 21 and 31.
66. Lieut. C. V. Keyes, U.L.	16/1/95	14/7/97	21/6/01	Assassinated in Nigeria when attached to W.A. F.F.	Son of General Sir Charles Keyes (No. 29) and brother of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes.
67. Lieut. B. R. Graham, U.L.	16/1/95	22/7/98	10/3/16	Lieutenant. Killed in action in German East Africa.	Adjutant, Infantry. Commandant, 3rd King's African Rifles.
68. 2/Lieut. H. Campbell, U.L.	20/1/97	27/7/98	31/1/26	Lieutenant-Colonel. Colonel.	Adjutant, Infantry. Commandant, 2nd Guides Infantry, 1/2/21 to 31/1/26. Son of Major-General R. B. P. Campbell, C.B. (No. 24), and nephew of General Sir F. Campbell (No. 43). Afterwards Brigadier, C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O. Colonel of the Corps of Guides 30/8/35.
69. 2/Lieut. D. L. R. Lorimer, U.L.	5/8/96	20/9/98	1903	To Political Dept. Lieutenant.	—
70. Lieut. C. W. Carey, U.L.	10/10/94	10/6/99	10/9/24	Retired. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Commandant, Cavalry 10/10/20 to 10/9/24.
71. Lieut. A. H. Buist, R. Scots Fus.	9/9/91	31/8/99	4/1/21	Retired. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Commanding Infantry 28/1/15 to 13/11/16. FOURTEENTH AND LAST COMMANDANT 14/11/16 to 4/1/21. M.V.O.
72. Lieut. C. L. Norman, U.L.	22/1/96	6/11/99	30/8/21	To command Equitation School.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Afterwards Brigadier-General, D.S.O., M.V.O., A.D.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>
73. Lieut. P. Howell, U.L.	4/8/97	25/6/00	1913	Transferred to 4th Hussars. Captain.	Afterwards Brigadier-General, C.M.G., <i>p.s.c.</i> Killed in action in France, 7/11/16.
74. Lieut. J. Clementi, Hampshire Regt.	8/9/97	25/6/00	2/8/21	Transferred to 10/5th Mahrattas. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Raised and commanded 3rd Guides Infantry 22/10/17 to 2/8/21. O.B.E.
75. 2/Lieut. A. S. B. Roberts, U.L.	20/7/98	14/11/00	1904	To Civil Burma.	—
76. Lieut. C. J. B. Hay, U.L.	4/8/97	28/11/00	1920	To 19th Punjabis.	Afterwards Major-General, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>

APPENDIX I (A)—*continued*.

No.	Name with Rank on joining.	Date of Commission.	Date of Joining.	Became Non-Effective.	Cause and last Rank held with Corps.	Remarks.
77.	2/Lieut. C. Kirkpatrick, U.L.	27/7/98	5/12/00	1920	To command 53rd Sikhs, F.F. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Afterwards Major-General, C.B., C.B.E., <i>p.s.c.</i>
78.	Lieut. R. G. A. Trail, U.L.	20/1/00	6/5/02	1/12/17	Killed in action. Captain.	With Jodhpur Lancers in France.
79.	Lieut. H. Butler, S.W. Borders.	12/8/99	7/6/02	19/1/14	Assassinated at Wana by a fanatic. Captain.	Adjutant, Cavalry.
80.	Lieut. G. G. E. Wyllie, V.C., 24th P.I.	5/12/00	12/2/04	27/3/25	To command 6th D.C.O. Lancers. Major.	Later Colonel, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>
81.	Lieut. F. K. Hensley, U.L.	8/1/01	23/2/04	27/4/28	Retired. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Commandant, Infantry, 1/11/25 to 27/4/28.
82.	Lieut. C. E. Morris, U.L.	4/12/01	26/4/04	1921	To Burma Rifles. Major.	D.S.O.
83.	2/Lieut. C. H. Campbell, U.L.	27/8/02	2/5/04	1919	Retired. Major.	Adjutant, Infantry. Nephew of F. Campbell (No. 43).
84.	2/Lieut. D. G. Sandeman, U.L.	21/1/03	9/12/04	15/8/31	To Kitchener College (Comdt.). Lieutenant-Colonel.	Adjutant, Infantry. Commandant, Infantry, 28/4/28 to 15/8/31. C.I.E.
85.	Lieut. P. d'A. Banks, Wilts. Regt.	10/10/03	18/6/05	26/4/15	Killed in action. Captain.	With 57th Rifles, F.F., in France.
86.	2/Lieut. D. K. McLeod, U.L.	19/8/03	1/1/06	10/9/32	Lieutenant-Colonel.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Commandant, Cavalry, 11/9/28 to 10/9/32. Now Major-General, C.B., D.S.O., <i>p.s.c.</i>
87.	2/Lieut. C. P. Browne, U.L.	9/1/04	28/2/06	11/4/16	Killed in action. Lieutenant.	With 15th Lancers in France.
88.	2/Lieut. J. F. W. Ogilvie, U.L.	18/1/05	19/3/06	23/1/25	Retired. Major.	Died in England, 1928.
89.	2/Lieut. W. H. Blood, U.L.	5/8/05	20/5/07	11/9/36	Retired. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Adjutant, Cavalry. Commandant, Cavalry, 11/9/32 to 11/9/36. M.V.O., <i>s.c.</i>
90.	2/Lieut. L. S. Wells, U.L.	5/8/05	3/4/07	25/5/08	Died of cholera.	Mohmand Expedition, 1908.
91.	2/Lieut. N. H. Prendergast, U.L.	24/1/06	4/9/07	16/8/35	Lieutenant-Colonel.	Commandant, Infantry, 16/8/31 to 16/8/35. D.S.O., M.V.O. Recruiting Officer, Lahore.
92.	2/Lieut. C. E. T. Erskine, U.L.	29/8/06	9/11/07	10/6/31	To command 10/12th F.F. Regt. (Trg. Bn.). Lieutenant-Colonel.	Adjutant, Infantry. Colonel. Inspecting Officer, Frontier Corps. C.I.E., D.S.O., M.C.

93. Lieut. J. V. C. Anderson, Dorset Regt.	4/5/07	24/7/09	8/6/18	Killed in action. Captain.	Palestine.
94. Lieut. E. M. Murray, Black Watch.	29/8/06	25/7/09	1/4/20	To R.A.F. Captain.	D.S.O., M.C.
95. Lieut. L. V. S. Blacker, U.L.	19/1/07	27/3/10	1933 (?)	Retired. Major.	Lieutenant-Colonel, O.B.E.
96. Lieut. H. M. Hankin, R.A.	23/7/07	14/10/11	1932	To 16th Lt. Cav. Major.	Lieutenant-Colonel on General List.
97. 2/Lieut. M. L. Woolcombe, U.L.	3/9/10	11/11/11	1912	To 27th Lt. Cav.	—
98. 2/Lieut. A. V. Hammond, U.L.	6/9/11	2/12/12	Serving	—	Adjutant, Cavalry. Commandant, Cavalry, 15/10/36. Son of Colonel Sir Arthur Hammond (No. 22). Bt. Lieutenant- Colonel, <i>p.s.c.</i>
99. 2/Lieut. P. Grant, U.L.	20/1/12	18/2/13	23/6/37	Killed in action in Waziristan. Lieutenant-Colonel.	Commandant, Infantry, 10/11/35 to 23/6/37. Bt. Lieutenant-Colonel.
100. 2/Lieut. D. A. Cameron, U.L.	24/8/12	16/10/13	1/12/17	Killed in action at Cambrai. Lieutenant.	With C.I.H. in France. M.C.
101. 2/Lieut. H. Dane, U.L.	24/8/12	18/11/13	4/8/23	Resigned. Captain.	—
102. 2/Lieut. A. W. L. Neave, U.L.	14/1/14	18/11/15	19/9/18	Killed in action. Lieutenant.	With 2nd Guides in Palestine (Adjutant).
103. 2/Lieut. E. P. Rich, U.L.	15/11/15	19/11/15	Serving	—	—
104. 2/Lieut. M. L. Barrett, U.L.	15/11/15	19/11/15	1929	Invalided. Captain.	Died in Europe.
105. 2/Lieut. H. D. K. Money, U.L.	15/8/14	10/12/15	1/11/22	Transferred to Royal Scots. Captain.	—
106. Lieut. C. H. H. Eales, M.C., U.L.	15/8/14	10/2/16	Serving	—	—
107. 2/Lieut. F. A. Davies, U.L.	26/1/16	19/3/16	17/10/29	Resigned. Captain.	—
108. 2/Lieut. C. P. J. Prioleau, U.L.	18/6/17	25/6/17	Serving	—	Adjutant, Cavalry.
109. 2/Lieut. I. A. Thew, U.L.	27/10/17	5/11/17	1930	Transferred to I.A.S.C. Captain.	—
110. Lieut. C. W. Free, M.C., New Zealand Forces	5/8/14	10/12/17	1/7/37	S.U.L. Major.	Bt. Major, <i>p.s.c.</i> , <i>a.s.c.</i>
111. Lieut. L. V. Dart, M.C., Welch Regt.	22/4/15	16/2/18	19/9/35	Retired. Major.	—
112. Lieut. J. H. Gradidge, N. Somerset Yeo.	12/10/14	18/2/18	Serving	—	O.B.E.

APPENDIX I (A)—*continued*.

No.	Name with Rank on joining.	Date of Commission.	Date of joining.	Became Non-Effective.	Cause and last Rank held with Corps.	Remarks.
113.	Lieut. H. Pigot, C.I.H.	14/11/16	18/2/18	9/10/28	To I.A.S.C. Captain.	—
114.	Lieut. L. R. Knight, The King's Regt.	19/9/14	2/3/18	1/4/36	Retired. Major.	M.C.
115.	Lieut. J. E. Redding, The King's Regt.	22/5/15	17/8/18	Serving	—	Adjutant, Infantry.
116.	Lieut. M. V. Smelt, U.L.	27/8/15	1/9/18	6/10/26	Transferred to R. Corps of Signals. Captain.	Adjutant, Infantry.
117.	Lieut. G. F. Taylor, London Yeomanry.	22/8/17	11/11/18	Serving	—	—
118.	Lieut. S. B. Good, C.I.H.	14/11/16	12/11/18	Serving	—	Adjutant, Training Battalion. O.B.E.
119.	Lieut. D. A. de Freitas, U.L.	23/11/15	18/11/18	9/7/22	Transferred to I.A.S.C. Captain.	Since died.
120.	2/Lieut. G. V. L. Coleman, U.L.	1/10/18	15/12/18	Serving	—	Adjutant, Infantry, <i>p.s.c.</i>
121.	Lieut. W. J. C. Duncan, D.S.O., M.C., Australian Forces.	1/1/16	18/1/19	Serving	—	D.S.O. (Bar).
122.	2/Lieut. M. D. W. Bird, U.L.	21/1/18	17/3/19	13/8/22	Transferred to 2/16th Punjab Regt. Lieutenant.	Subsequently killed in a motor accident.
123.	2/Lieut. L. M. Barlow, U.L.	15/4/19	22/4/19	Serving	—	Adjutant, Infantry. M.C. and Bar.
124.	2/Lieut. H. A. Barnes, U.L.	15/4/19	23/4/19	23/6/26	Transferred to Political Dept. Captain.	—
125.	2/Lieut. Taj Muhammad Khan, I.A.	7/10/19	7/10/19	23/4/25	Retired. Lieutenant.	M.B.E. Promoted from Subadar-Major, 3rd Guides. Son of Subadar-Major Sarfaraz Khan (1891-1909). See App. II B (ii).
126.	2/Lieut. E. K. Wood	29/1/20	12/2/30	1/11/35	Retired. Captain.	—
127.	2/Lieut. Abdul Rahim Khan	17/7/20	1/12/20	1/6/25	To Political Dept. Lieutenant.	—
128.	2/Lieut. R. R. T. Burn, U.L.	24/4/20	31/3/22	4/9/29	To 3rd Cav. Lieutenant.	—
129.	Major H. Denning, 25th Cavalry, F.F.	1/9/97	22/4/22	10/9/28	Lieutenant-Colonel.	Commandant, Cavalry, 11/9/24 to 10/9/28. Died 1933.

JOINED BETWEEN 1923 AND 1938.

CAVALRY.

No.	Name with Rank on Joining.	Date of Commission.	Date of Joining.	Became Non-Effective.	Cause and last Rank held with Corps.	Remarks.
1C.	2/Lieut. A. J. Dring, U.L.	1/2/23	20/3/24	10/6/27	To Political Dept. Lieutenant.	—
2C.	Major F. A. Hamilton, 3rd Cavalry	8/1/01	6/5/25	20/1/27	To 3rd Cav. Major.	Second-in-Command. Father of G. J. Hamilton (No. 117.). Adjutant.
3C.	Captain F. Walton, 4/6th Raj. Rif.	16/12/18	22/7/25	Serving	—	—
4C.	2/Lieut. D. G. Egerton, U.L.	27/8/24	5/10/25	Serving	—	Son of Lieut.-General Sir R. G. Egerton (No. 42).
5C.	2/Lieut. W. Elliott-Lockhart, U.L.	4/2/26	28/3/27	Serving	—	Adjutant. Son of P. C. Elliott-Lockhart (No. 57).
6C.	2/Lieut. The Hon. R. A. H. Plunkett, U.L.	3/2/28	21/3/29	Serving	—	—
7C.	Lieut. W. A. Gimson, R.A.	20/9/18	8/3/30	Serving	—	Adjutant.
8C.	2/Lieut. R. A. Shebbeare, U.L.	28/8/29	25/10/30	Serving	—	—
9C.	2/Lieut. L. A. J. Roffey, U.L.	28/8/30	20/10/31	Serving	—	—
10C.	2/Lieut. G. D. G. Garforth-Bles, U.L.	30/1/30	18/10/32	Serving	—	—
11C.	2/Lieut. M. L. Tweedie, U.L.	27/8/31	26/10/33	31/3/34	Died at Bannu. Result of riding accident.	—
12C.	2/Lieut. G. M. Strover, U.L.	31/8/33	6/11/34	Serving	—	—
13C.	2/Lieut. M. La T. McCausland, U.L.	31/8/33	10/3/35	Serving	—	—
14C.	Capt. The Hon. W. Edwardes, 15th/19th Hussars.	30/8/24	17/11/35	Serving	—	—
15C.	Capt. R. Q. C. Mainwaring, Gordon Highlanders	31/8/22	7/2/36	Serving	—	—
16C.	2/Lieut. J. B. Reid, U.L.	31/1/35	19/3/36	Serving	—	—
17C.	Major E. St. J. Birnie, Sam Browne's Cavalry, F.F.	15/4/19	31/8/37	Serving	—	—
18C.	Lieut. R. A. Bailey, Sam Browne's Cavalry, F.F.	29/1/31	31/8/37	Serving	—	—

APPENDIX I (A)—*continued*.

JOINED BETWEEN 1923 AND 1938.

INFANTRY.

No.	Name with Rank on Joining.	Date of Commission.	Date of Joining.	Became Non-Effective.	Cause and last Rank held with Corps.	Remarks.
1I.	Lieut. M. H. H. Baily, 3/10th Baluch Regt.	14/7/21	9/10/23	Serving	—	—
2I.	Lieut. P. R. Macnamara, U.L.	31/8/22	11/11/23	Serving	—	Son of 2/Lieut. C. R. Macnamara. See App. I (D) (1st Battalion), <i>p.s.c.</i>
3I.	Captain W. J. Cumming, S.W. Militia.	29/6/16	1/1/24	Serving	—	—
4I.	Major R. S. Abbott, M.C., C.I.H.	4/6/04	10/8/24	27/1/30	Transferred to 10/12th F.F. Regt.	Now Brigadier.
5I.	2/Lieut. A. K. Murcott, U.L.	31/1/24	15/4/25	Serving	Bt. Lieut.-Colonel.	—
6I.	2/Lieut. G. Meynell, K.S.L.I.	31/1/24	6/10/26	29/9/35	Killed in action at Nahakki.	V.C., M.C. Adjutant.
7I.	2/Lieut. G. B. Still, U.L.	1/9/27	25/10/28	14/11/34	Transferred to 19th Lancers. Lieutenant.	—
8I.	2/Lieut. A. C. S. Moore, U.L.	28/8/29	21/10/30	Serving	—	—
9I.	2/Lieut. A. P. S. Rendall, U.L.	28/8/30	24/10/31	29/9/35	Killed in action at Nahakki.	M.C. —
10I.	2/Lieut. C. G. Campbell, U.L.	28/1/32	8/3/33	Serving	—	—
11I.	2/Lieut. G. J. Hamilton, U.L.	1/9/32	3/11/33	Serving	—	D.S.O. Son of F. A. Hamilton (No. 2C.).
12I.	Lieut. R. R. Griffith, Devon Regt.	28/1/32	11/11/35	Serving	—	—
13I.	Capt. A. R. E. Pollard, Royal Scots Fus.	4/2/26	3/3/36	Serving	—	—
14I.	Capt. G. A. MacMunn, Royal Signals	2/2/28	1/4/36	Serving	—	Adjutant.
15I.	2/Lieut. W. G. Watt, U.L.	30/8/35	1/11/36	Serving	—	—
16I.	2/Lieut. R. V. E. Hodson, U.L.	30/8/34	19/2/37	Serving	—	—
17I.	Lt.-Col. K. A. Garrett, 1st Sikhs, F.F.	14/1/14	5/10/37	Serving	—	Commandant Infantry, 5/10/37. M.C., <i>p.s.c.</i>

APPENDIX I (B)

OFFICERS ATTACHED TO THE CORPS DURING THE MUTINY, IN 1857

Rank and Name	Date of Joining	Remarks
Lieut. R. H. Shebbeare, 66th N.I.	9/6/57	Officiating Commandant, Infantry, from 24/7/57 to 17/12/57. Wounded six times. Afterwards raised 15th Pioneer Regiment of Punjab Infantry, later 1st/3rd Sikh Pioneers, now disbanded.
Lieut. O. I. Chalmers, 3rd N.I. ...	9/6/57	Attached Infantry. Wounded.
Lieut. A. W. Murray, 42nd N.I....	12/6/57	Attached Infantry. Killed in action 14/9/57. Previously twice wounded.
Lieut. de Brett, 57th N.I. ...	10/7/57	Attached Infantry. Wounded.
Lieut. A. W. Craigie, 36th N.I. ...	6/7/57	Attached Cavalry. Killed in action.
Lieut. H. Hayley, 69th N.I. ...	7/7/57	Attached Cavalry.
Captain C. A. Sanford, 3rd L.C.	1/8/57	Wounded. Officiating Commandant, Cavalry. Killed at Lucknow.
Lieut. McLean	4/9/57	Attached Infantry. Wounded.
Lieut. C. J. S. Gough, 8th L.C. ...	1/8/57	Attached Cavalry. Afterwards General Sir Charles Gough, K.C.B., V.C.
Lieut. F. G. Willock	1/10/57	Attached Cavalry. Died of disease.
Lieut. A. R. D. Mackenzie ...	27/11/57	Attached Cavalry. Afterwards Col. Sir A. R. D. Mackenzie, C.B.
Lieut. A. W. J. Montgomerie ...	27/11/57	Attached Cavalry.

(Those living left the Corps on 17/12/57 on its return to the Frontier.)

APPENDIX I (C)

OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM 1858 TO 1914

Year	Rank and Name
1858	... Lieut. A. H. Millett, 69th N.I.
1859	... Captain Gordon, 10th P.I.
1860	... Lieut. Lewis, 7th Fusiliers.
1861	... Lieut. W. S. Brooke.
1863	... Lieut. W. C. Anderson, 3rd P.C.
1864	... Cornet W. A. Lawrence, 21st Hussars.
1865	... Lieut. A. H. Davis, Bombay Army.
1866	... Major D. Macotta, 3rd Sikh Infantry.
"	... Lieut. R. B. Lockwood, 3rd P.C.
1872	... Lieut. A. J. Shepherd, 4th P.I.
1879	... Lieut. A. R. Murray.
1880	... Lieut. J. de C. Meade, B.C. (at Depot).
1885	... Major L. R. H. D. Campbell, 1st P.I.
"	... Major E. A. Money, 2nd P.C.
1887	... Lieut. H. T. Dennys, Man. Regt.
"	... Lieut. C. O. Swanston, R.I.R.
1888	... Major J. B. Watts, 3rd P.C.
"	... Lieut. H. G. Brown.
"	... Captain F. P. L. White, 5th P.I.
"	... Lieut. G. Caldecott, R. War. Regt.
1889	... Lieut. N. G. H. Turner, R. Riding Regt.
1890	... Lieut.-Colonel J. Davidson, 3rd P.C. (Officiating Commandant).
"	... 2/Lieut. F. A. Thatcher, Hampshire Regt.
1891	... Lieut. C. H. Boisragon, 1st/5th Gurkhas. Later V.C.
"	... Major A. Daniell, 1st P.I.
"	... Lieut. W. Beadon, K.O.S.B.
"	... Lieut. MacHutchin.
1892	... Captain E. H. Rodwell, 2nd P.I.
"	... Captain L. E. Cooper, 5th P.I.
1895	... Lieut. F. A. Maxwell, 24th P.I. Later V.C.
"	... Lieut. H. C. Sandford, 1st P.I.
"	... Lieut. R. St. C. Battine, 1st P.C.
1896	... Bt. Colonel W. J. Vousden, V.C., 5th P.C. (Officiating Commandant).
1897	... Captain H. I. E. Palmer, 5th P.C.
"	... Captain R. C. O. Creagh, 5th P.I.
"	... Captain P. G. Brazier-Creagh, 9th B.L.
"	... Captain W. S. Fraser, 19th B.L.
"	... Captain W. H. Norman, 11th B.L.
"	... Lieut. F. McConaghey, 5th P.C.
"	... Lieut. Viscount Fincastle, 16th Lancers. Now Earl of Dunmore. Awarded V.C. on 17/8/97 whilst with the Guides Cavalry.
"	... Lieut. C. P. Wynter, 2nd P.I.
"	... Lieut. H. M. Allen, 5th P.C.
1900	... Major D. G. L. Shaw, 1st P.C.
"	... Captain H. C. Vesey, 2nd P.I.

APPENDIX I (D)

ATTACHED FROM 1914 TO 1922

Unless otherwise stated, all the following have been demobilized or have retired

CAVALRY

Rank and Name	Date of Joining	Remarks
2/Lieut. T. Carmichael	12/1/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. G. T. V. Pope	23/1/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. W. L. H. Thacker	10/2/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. J. H. Harrold	19/2/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. W. Ross Smith	6/5/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. A. B. Knowles	9/5/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. F. C. M. Cruikshank	8/7/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. G. Wilson	29/7/15 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. G. H. Rothera	14/3/16 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. C. A. Stanton	15/3/16 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. A. P. Collett, I.C.S.	10/5/16 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. T. B. Tate, I.S.E.	20/8/16 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. C. F. Wood, I.C.S.	24/9/16 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. G. T. B. Harvey	14/3/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. W. F. Jackson	8/5/17 ...	I.A.R.O. Killed in action.
Lieut. C. Wallis	10/5/17 ...	Now with 5th/7th Rajput Regt.
2/Lieut. H. B. Foster	5/6/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. S. S. A. Shippard	25/6/17 ...	—
2/Lieut. H. L. Bucknall	25/6/17 ...	To 22nd Cavalry.
2/Lieut. J. S. Ker	18/7/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. G. W. Howe	26/8/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. J. Reekie	26/8/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. W. J. Handcock	4/10/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. C. H. Marsh	31/10/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. C. Campbell-Harris	12/6/18 ...	Now with 7th Light Cavalry.
2/Lieut. J. C. Mawhood	4/9/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. W. M. Mather	10/11/18 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. L. C. Palk	10/11/18 ...	Now with 7th Light Cavalry.
Major J. V. A. Connell	1919 ...	From 13th Lancers.
2/Lieut. I. W. Beatty	6/1/20 ...	—
2/Lieut. H. N. Weber	17/12/20 ...	To 22nd Cavalry.

APPENDIX I (D)—*continued*.

INFANTRY

1ST BATTALION

Rank and Name		Date of Joining		Remarks
2/Lieut. C. C. Nott-Bower	2/10/14	...	I.A.R.O. Killed in action.
2/Lieut. C. A. Gordon	1915	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. A. H. Pilcher	15/3/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. E. B. Nelson	15/3/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. J. A. Rogerson	15/3/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. H. C. R. Hill	16/4/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. A. E. Scarth	18/4/15	...	I.A.R.O. Killed in action.
2/Lieut. W. G. L. Gilbert	18/4/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. R. P. Hankinson	12/5/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. C. R. Macnamara	1/7/15	...	I.A.R.O. Killed in action. Father of Captain P. R. Macnamara [Appendix I (A)], page 306.
2/Lieut. F. C. Head	20/7/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. R. D. Blandy	23/8/15	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. F. B. Roseveare	19/11/15	...	Killed in action.
2/Lieut. C. Doncaster	23/12/15	...	I.A.R.O. Killed in action.
2/Lieut. J. G. Wainwright	2/7/16	...	Now with 5th Royal Bn., 13th F.F.R.
2/Lieut. H. Grose-Hodge, I.C.S.	20/8/16	...	I.A.R.O. Now Headmaster, Bedford School.
2/Lieut. H. H. Fagnani	5/10/16	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. E. B. Shaw, I.C.S.	8/10/16	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. E. A. Cave-Penny	22/11/16	...	Killed in action.
2/Lieut. W. R. P. Spurway	6/2/17	...	—
2/Lieut. S. G. Thorne	6/2/17	...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. J. C. Coates	21/2/17	...	Now with 5th Royal Gurkhas. Awarded M.C.
2/Lieut. G. L. de Courcy	21/2/17	...	Invalided. Since died.
2/Lieut. C. G. N. Edwards	4/5/17	...	Now Political Department.
2/Lieut. R. C. Brooke Hunt	4/11/17	...	To R.A.F. Afterwards killed flying.
2/Lieut. A. Mann	10/11/17	...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. J. R. Hoade	1/12/17	...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. C. Winton	25/6/18	...	I.A.R.O. Awarded M.C.
Captain H. N. Heath	3/7/18	...	—
2/Lieut. G. D. Bryant	5/9/18	...	Now with 2nd/7th Rajput Regt.
Lieut. P. J. Don, M.M.	16/10/18	...	—
Captain A. K. Rice	18/10/18	...	—
Captain H. G. Sheldon	29/10/18	...	—
Captain C. B. Pecker	29/11/18	...	—
2/Lieut. K. E. M. Goode	Aug. 1921	...	—

2ND BATTALION*

* Officers who were permanently posted to the Corps and who served in this Battalion are shown in Appendix I (A).

Rank and Name	Date of Joining	Remarks
2/Lieut. W. J. Cumming	26/1/17 ...	Now with 1st Battalion.
Major R. C. G. Pollock	28/1/17 ...	Afterwards Commandant 2nd/12th F.F. Regt., 1926-1930.
2/Lieut. J. L. Barry	1/2/17 ...	Since died.
2/Lieut. A. A. Wallace	11/5/17 ...	—
2/Lieut. J. F. Petrie	3/2/17 ...	—
2/Lieut. A. Eldon	15/2/17 ...	I.A.R.O. Also served with 1st Battalion.
2/Lieut. J. N. M. Hodgins	6/4/17 ...	Also served with 1st Battalion.
2/Lieut. F. S. Collis	16/6/17 ...	—
2/Lieut. V. Fox-Strangways	20/6/17 ...	Adjutant after Capt. A. W. L. Neave was killed.
2/Lieut. W. A. B. Illif	26/6/17 ...	—
2/Lieut. C. S. Maclaren	26/6/17 ...	—
2/Lieut. C. H. Mitchell	19/8/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. H. W. Leamon	19/8/17 ...	I.A.R.O. Also served with 1st Battalion.
2/Lieut. W. A. Archer	9/10/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. W. H. Goulstone	14/10/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. A. H. Kemm, I.C.S.	4/12/17 ...	I.A.R.O. M.C.
Lieut. R. V. Chapman	10/12/17 ...	Also served with 1st Battalion.
2/Lieut. H. V. Firth	17/1/18 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. S. G. S. Rose	21/1/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. M. F. Gamble	15/2/18 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. C. R. Hughes	16/2/18 ...	Now with 2nd/12th F.F. Regt.
Lieut. G. E. Roberts	21/3/18 ...	Now with 4th/13th F.F. Rifles.
Lieut. G. H. A. Fowler	31/3/18 ...	—
Captain C. W. Molony, M.C., 57th Rifles	24/4/18 ...	—
Lieut. A. B. Lodge, D.S.O.	1/8/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. W. J. Malden	4/9/18 ...	—
Lieut. V. A. Monies	6/12/18 ...	—
Captain P. C. Lamb	17/1/19 ...	—
Lieut. J. S. C. Simpson	11/2/19 ...	—
Capt. J. H. L. Hindmarsh	5/3/19 ...	Now with 2nd/9th Jat Regt.
Lieut. A. H. Marshall	19/1/20 ...	Now with 4th/12th F.F. Regt.
Capt. W. H. Mason Spingway, M.C.	11/4/20 ...	—
Lieut. C. F. W. Greenwood	11/5/20 ...	I.A.R.O.
Captain J. H. Robinson	16/5/20 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. J. F. T. Trevitt	19/5/20 ...	—

APPENDIX I (D)—*continued*.

3RD BATTALION*

* Officers who were permanently posted to the Corps and who served in this Battalion are shown in Appendix I (A).

Rank and Name	Date of Joining	Remarks
Captain S. R. Shirley, 54th Sikhs	21/10/17 ...	With General Staff.
Major W. D. Villiers-Stuart, 5th Gurkha Rifles	22/10/17 ...	Retired. Lieut.-Colonel.
Major F. G. Swaine, 36th Sikhs ...	22/10/17 ...	Retired. Lieut.-Colonel.
Lieut. J. H. Jameson, D.S.O. ...	22/10/17 ...	Also served with 1st Battalion. First Adjutant. ¹ Since died.
2/Lieut. H. R. M. Jeffries ...	22/10/17 ...	I.A.R.O. M.C., Waziristan.
Lieut. J. C. Pearce ...	22/10/17 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. A. J. H. Bourke ...	22/10/17 ...	Now with 4th/8th Punjab Regt.
Captain D. Bainbridge, M.C., 57th Rifles, F.F.	7/1/18 ...	Retired. Major.
Lieut. A. H. McFarlane ...	19/1/18 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. H. A. Long ...	28/1/18 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. W. E. P. Harrison ...	1/2/18 ...	I.A.R.O.
2/Lieut. R. R. Wilkinson ...	7/2/18 ...	Also served with 1st Battalion.
2/Lieut. E. Parker ...	15/2/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. J. C. Griffiths ...	17/2/18 ...	—
Lieut. A. J. L. Pritchard, M.C. ...	2/3/18 ...	Third Adjutant. ¹
2/Lieut. N. G. Devonshire ...	22/3/18 ...	Also served with 1st Battalion.
2/Lieut. S. F. Evans ...	22/3/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. T. H. F. Le Mesurier ...	24/3/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. E. Robins, D.C.M. ...	28/3/18 ...	I.A.R.O.
Lieut. F. E. Ferguson, M.C. ...	15/7/18 ...	Killed in action, 6 October 1919.
2/Lieut. C. S. Price ...	4/9/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. R. E. S. Ingram Johnson	5/9/18 ...	Now with 2nd/17th Dogra Regt.
2/Lieut. F. R. Yare ...	28/10/18 ...	—
2/Lieut. D. Q. H. Agnew ...	29/12/18 ...	Now with 4th/19th Hyderabad Regt.
2/Lieut. O. A. D. Fraser ...	2/1/19 ...	Died on service.
2/Lieut. N. D. Douglas ...	10/1/19 ...	Killed in action, 11 December 1919.
Lieut. F. Entwistle, D.S.O., M.C.	17/1/19 ...	Killed in action, 1921, when with 92nd Punjabis.
2/Lieut. M. Hurley ...	19/1/19 ...	—
2/Lieut. A. R. Spurgin ...	19/1/19 ...	Afterwards Sikh Pioneers. Since died.
2/Lieut. U. de Burgh ...	5/12/19 ...	—
2/Lieut. D. J. C. Wiseman ...	4/1/20 ...	Now with 2nd/15th Punjab Regt.
2/Lieut. P. B. S. Fitzpatrick ...	13/2/20 ...	Now with 2nd/15th Punjab Regt.

¹ Captain C. W. Free, M.C., Guides Cavalry was the Second Adjutant.

APPENDIX II (A)

COMMANDANTS

PERMANENT COMMANDANTS

Rank and Name	From	To	Remarks
1. Lieut. H. B. Lumsden ...	14/12/46 3/1/56	26/1/53 3/3/62	Eventually Bt. Lieutenant-Colonel and C.B. whilst in command.
2. Lieut. W. S. R. Hodson ...	27/1/53	1/4/55	Bt. Major whilst in command.
3. Lt.-Col. A. T. Wilde, C.B. ...	4/3/62	7/2/65	—
4. Lt.-Col. S. J. Browne, C.B., V.C.	8/2/65	18/3/69	Eventually Colonel whilst in command.
5. Lt.-Col. C. P. Keyes, C.B. ...	19/3/69	30/4/70	Eventually Colonel whilst in command.
6. Captain F. H. Jenkins ...	12/5/70	31/1/84	Eventually Colonel, C.B., A.D.C., whilst in command.
7. Bt. Col. R. B. P. P. Campbell, C.B.	1/2/84	31/1/91	—
8. Bt. Col. A. G. Hammond, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C.	1/2/91	11/10/95	—
9. Col. C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.	12/10/95	31/3/99	—
10. Bt. Lt.-Col. R. B. Adams, C.B., V.C., A.D.C.	1/4/99	18/1/04	Eventually Colonel whilst in command.
11. Bt. Col. G. J. Younghusband, C.B.	19/1/04	15/2/09	—
12. Col. R. G. Egerton ...	16/2/09	13/11/11	—
13. Lt.-Col. F. G. H. Davies ...	14/11/11	13/11/16	—
14. Lt.-Col. A. H. Buist, M.V.O.	14/11/16	4/1/21	—

OFFICIATING COMMANDANTS

Major R. G. Taylor, 2nd L.C. ...	2/4/55	2/1/56	—
Captain H. Daly, 1st P.C. ...	13/3/57	1/6/58	—
Captain J. W. McQueen, 4th P.I.	26/7/66 23/3/71	26/11/67 17/3/73	— —
Captain R. B. P. P. Campbell, Guides Cavalry	1/5/70	28/6/70	—
Major R. B. P. P. Campbell, Guides Infantry	20/3/76	20/3/78	—
Lt.-Col. J. Davidson, 3rd P.C. ...	1890		
Bt. Col. W. J. Vousden, V.C., 5th P.C.	1896		

APPENDIX II (B)

ROLL OF RISALDAR-MAJORS AND SUBADAR-MAJORS

(N.B.—There is no record of these positions being held prior to 1862.)

(i) RISALDAR-MAJORS.

No.	Name	Relieved	From	To	Remarks
1.	Muhammad Khan, Bahadur, I.O.M. ...	4/3/47	4/8/62	30/4/71	Punjabi Mussulman Moghul.
2.	Khanan Khan, Bahadur, I.O.M. ...	4/1/47	1/5/71	9/4/79	Punjabi Mussulman Moghul.
3.	Prem Singh, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M. ...	1/8/50	10/4/79	18/4/86	Muhyal Brahmin. Father of No. 8.
4.	Duni Chand, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M. ...	1/11/50	19/4/86	31/12/90	Khatri, Hindu.
5.	Muhammad Khan, Sardar Bahadur ...	17/4/62	1/1/91	19/3/95	Punjabi Mussulman.
6.	Sunder Singh, Sardar Bahadur ...	1/5/72	20/3/95	31/7/02	Jat Sikh.
7.	Faiz Talab Khan, Sardar Bahadur ...	1/2/71	1/8/02	31/10/05	Yusafzai Pathan.
8.	Tirath Ram, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M. ...	1/5/76	1/11/05	31/1/09	Muhyal Brahmin. Son of No. 3.
9.	Bahadur Singh, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M.	6/9/80	1/2/09	15/10/19	Jat Sikh. Son of Jemadar Jiwand Singh, who was massacred and greatly distinguished himself at the defence of the Kabul Residency.
10.	Khawaja Muhammad Khan, Sardar Bahadur, I.D.S.M.	15/1/92	16/10/19		Yusafzai Pathan. Held seconded appointment with G. O.C. Northern Army. Brother of No. 13.
11.	Abnashi Ram, Bahadur ...	22/4/87	16/10/19	31/10/21	Muhyal Brahmin. Son of No. 3 on Subadar-Majors' Roll.
12.	Nur Khan, Sardar Bahadur ...	27/10/91	1/11/21	31/10/27	Punjabi Mussulman.
13.	Zardad Khan, Sardar Bahadur, I.D.S.M.	2/11/01	1/11/27	14/9/32	Yusafzai Pathan. Brother of No. 10.
14.	Rattan Chand ...	24/2/09	15/9/32	14/9/37	Katoch Dogra.
15.	Muhammad Tuhair ...	7/4/14	15/9/37		Serving Akora Khattak.

(ii) SUBADAR-MAJORS.

No.	Name	Enlisted	From	To	Remarks
1.	Bhowanidin, Sardar Bahadur	16/11/36	8/8/64	30/4/74	Brahmin. Transferred from 31st Native Infantry to Corps when first raised as 1st Native Adjutant.
2.	Ahmad Khan, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M.	4/3/47	1/5/74	31/3/80	Akora Khattak. Uncle of Sarfaraz (No. 4).
3.	Jai Singh, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M.	1/7/55	1/4/80	31/7/91	Muhiyal Brahmin. Father of No. 11 on Risaldar-Majors' Roll.
4.	Sarfaraz Khan, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M.	15/9/74	1/8/91	14/9/09	Akora Khattak. Father of Lieutenant Taj Muhammad Khan, No. 125, Roll of Officers, and No. 1 of 3rd Battalion (Infantry).
5.	Wadhawa Singh	18/6/83	15/9/09	30/6/13	Jat Sikh.
6.	Alam Khan, Sardar Bahadur, I.O.M.	19/4/86	1/7/13	31/10/17	Chilzai Pathan.
7.	Man Bir Thapa, Bahadur, I.O.M.	22/12/94	1/11/17	29/12/20	Gurkha.
8.	Alam Khan, Bahadur, I.D.S.M.	18/9/99	30/12/20	30/9/23	Saghri Khattak, Pathan.
9.	Wazir	22/2/98	1/10/23	31/1/24	Khattak Pathan.
10.	Muhammad Khan, Khan Sahib	29/3/98	1/2/24	30/11/26	Punjabi Mussulman Satti.
11.	Ahmed Khan, Bahadur, I.D.S.M.	5/5/00	1/12/26	5/5/30	Punjabi Mussulman Tinoli.
12.	Tarlok Singh	18/6/01	6/5/30	5/5/31	Jat Sikh.
13.	Shadi Khan, Sardar Bahadur	20/8/07	6/5/31	5/5/36	Khattak Pathan.
14.	Sapuran Singh	7/10/12	6/5/36	Serving	Jat Sikh.
2ND BATTALION.					
1.	Bahadur Khan, Sardar Bahadur	1/11/92	1/11/17	Disbandment.	Punjabi Mussulman.
3RD BATTALION.					
1.	Taj Muhammad Khan	9/6/05	25/12/17	30/11/20	Akora Khattak. Commissioned 2/Lieut. See App. I (A), No. 125.
2.	Afzal, Bahadur, Khan Sahib	12/6/92	1/12/20	Disbandment.	Yusafzai Pathan.

APPENDIX III

MEDICAL OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE CORPS

Year	Rank and Name							Remarks
1849	Assistant Surgeon	J. H. Cole		—
1850	"	" R. Lyell		—
1854	"	" T. Farquhar		—
1856	"	" H. W. Bellew		—
1857	"	" J. L. Stewart		—
1860	"	" J. E. Tuson		—
1862	"	" H. W. Bellew		—
1866	"	" J. R. Johnson		—
1867	"	" H. Thom	Officiating.	
	"	" J. R. Johnson		—
1871	"	" G. Griffith	Officiating.	
	"	" J. R. Johnson		—
	"	" S. C. Courtney		—
1873	"	" A. H. Kelly		—
1877	"	" M. Malline		—
1878	Surgeon	B. Doyle		—
1879	"	A. H. Kelly	Killed during defence of Kabul Residency, 3/9/79.	
	"	J. Lewtas		—
1881	"	G. A. Cones	Officiating.	
1882	"	J. G. Hancock	Officiating.	
	"	C. J. Bamber	Attached.	
	"	T. R. Mulroney	Attached.	
1883	"	A. H. Pierson	Attached.	
	"	J. Lewtas		—
1884	"	A. Silcock	Attached.	
1885	"	J. Lewtas		—
1887	"	J. Pisani	Officiating.	
1888	"	G. E. Sunder	Officiating.	
1889	"	Major J. Lewtas	Later Lieutenant-Colonel.	
1890	"	Major A. Duncan		—
1892	"	Captain A. J. MacNab	Officiating.	

APPENDICES

317

Year	Rank and Name					Remarks
1894	Surgeon	Captain A. J. MacNab	—
1895	„	Lieut. R. Heard	Officiating. Later Lieutenant-Colonel.
1896	„	Captain A. J. MacNab	—
1897	„	Captain J. N. MacLeod	Officiating.
1897	„	Captain A. J. MacNab	—
1900	„	Captain A. W. R. Cochrane	Officiating.
1901	„	Captain E. A. R. Newman	Officiating. Later Lieutenant-Colonel.
	„	Captain A. J. MacNab	Later Major-General (ret'd.), C.B., C.M.G.
1902	„	Lieut. J. Husband	Attached.
1903	„	Captain H. M. Cruddas	—
1906	„	Captain W. W. Jeudwine	Officiating.
1907	„	Captain H. M. Cruddas	—
1913	„	Captain A. A. C. McNeill	Officiating. Now Colonel.
1914	„	Captain H. M. Cruddas	Later Colonel (ret'd.), C.M.G.
	„	Lieut. J. W. Jones	Officiating.
	„	Major W. T. Finlayson	Officiating.
1916	„	Captain W. L. Harnett	Officiating.
	„	Captain R. B. Lloyd	Officiating.
1917	„	Lieut. G. B. Hanna	Officiating.

APPENDIX IV

RECIPIENTS OF THE VICTORIA CROSS

(A) OBTAINED WHILST WITH THE CORPS :

A. G. Hammond, No. 22 of Officers' Roll.
W. R. P. Hamilton, No. 36 of Officers' Roll.
R. B. Adams, No. 39 of Officers' Roll.
H. L. S. MacLean, No. 55 of Officers' Roll.
Viscount Fincastle, attached, 1897, 16th Lancers.
G. Meynell, No. 61 of Officers' Roll.

(B) OBTAINED BEFORE JOINING THE CORPS :

S. J. Browne, No. 23 of Officers' Roll.
G. G. E. Wyllly, No. 80 of Officers' Roll.

APPENDIX V

RECIPIENTS OF THE INDIAN ORDER OF MERIT

N.B.—The Indian Order of Merit was instituted in 1837. Until 1911 this was the highest decoration for personal bravery that was awardable to Indian Troops.

Year	Rank and Name					Remarks
1853	Subadar Kaur Sing	Gurkha.
	Sowar Dal Singh	—
1857	Risaldar Muhammad Khan	P.M. Moghul. Later Risaldar Major.
	Risaldar Sandil Singh	—
	Risaldar Khanan Khan	P.M. Moghul. Later Risaldar-Major.
	Sowar Ghazi Khan	—
13	Sowar Karim Khan	Muhammadzai Pathan.
	Sowar Abdul Rahman	—
	Risaldar Ashraf Khan	Hindustani Pathan.
	Dafadar Yakub Khan	—
	Dafadar Muhammad Hussain	—
	Dafadar Kamar-ud-Din	—
	Dafadar Kasim Ali Shah	—
	Dafadar Mirza Abdul Beg	Moghul.
	Risaldar Prem Singh	Muhyial Brahmin. Later Risaldar-Major.
	Dafadar Muktiyar Ali Shah	Hindustani.
	Sowar Autar Singh	—
	Dafadar Ishri Singh	—
	Sowar Nihla Singh	—
24	Sowar Kala Singh	Jat Sikh.
	Sowar Radha Singh	—
	Dafadar Fazal Khan	Afghan.
	Sowar Mirza Hussain Beg	—
	Subadar Ahmad Khan	Akora Khattak Pathan. Later Subadar-Major.
	Jemadar Tillok Singh	—
	Subadar Pir Bakhsh	Punjabi Mussulman.
52	Havildar Jai Singh	Punjabi Hindu. Later Subadar-Major.
55	Sepoy Bhup Singh	Jat Sikh.
	Bugler Gurdit Singh	Sikh Maipootra.
3	Jemadar Allah Dad	Durani Pathan.
	Subadar Kudrat Shah	Afghan.
26	Bugler Akhtar Biland	Kashmiri.
1860	Sepoy Ziarat	Yusafzai Pathan.
	Sepoy Allah Dad	Yusafzai Pathan.
	Sepoy Kamar Din	Yusafzai Pathan.

APPENDIX V—*continued.*

Year	Rank and Name					Remarks
1863	75	Havildar Bahadur	Gurkha.
	981	Sepoy Samundar	Ghilzai Pathan. Later Subadar.
	113	Sepoy Bawan Shah	Afghan.
		Sepoy Ahmad Gul	Ghilzai Pathan. Father of 981 Subadar Samundar and of Subadar-Major Alam Khan (3317).
	868	Sepoy Izzat	Afridi Pathan.
	43	Sepoy Sobah Singh	Sikh Suniyar.
		Jemadar Duni Chand	Khatrī Hindu. Later Risaldar-Major.
		Sowar Buta	—
	90	Havildar Sher Gul	Afridi Pathan.
	1053	Sepoy Multani	Yusafzai Pathan.
1878		Jemadar Jagat Singh	Jat Sikh. Later Subadar.
	47	Dafadar Tura Baz	Afridi Pathan. Later Risaldar. Father of Risaldar Moghal Baz.
1878	370	Dafadar Nand Singh	Jat Sikh.
1880	470	Sowar Jiwan Singh	Sikh.
	808	Sowar Kandu Singh	Dogra.
	653	Sowar Diwan Singh	Dogra.
	855	Sowar Yakut	Baluch.
	702	Sowar Zaidulla	Khattak Pathan.
	967	Havildar-Major Attar Singh	Jat Sikh. Later Subadar.
	778	Havildar Jag Bir	Gurkha.
	447	Havildar Jowala Singh	Jat Sikh. Later Subadar.
	1057	Havildar Jiwand Singh	Jat Sikh. Later Subadar.
		Havildar Umra	Kashmiri. Later Jemadar.
	1432	Naik Hazir	Durani Pathan.
	1214	Sepoy Dillia	Dogra.
	1358	Sepoy Lohnu	Dogra.
	1278	Sepoy Chandar Bir	Gurkha.
	1374	Sepoy Muhammad Shaffi	Ghilzai Pathan.
	1796	Sepoy Wariam Singh	Jat Sikh. Later Subadar.
	2211	Sepoy Gul Sher	Punjabi Mussulman Satti.
		2nd Class Hospital Assistant	Ghulam Haidar Khan.			—
		Dafadar Yunis	Pathan
	1815	Sepoy Izzat	Khattak Pathan.
1895	701	Dafadar Tota Singh	Jat Sikh.
	1070	Lance-Dafadar Suba Singh	Jat Sikh.
	3327	Naik Gul Dast	Afridi Pathan.
	3611	Sepoy Ghani Shah	Afridi Pathan.
		Subadar Rajah	Afridi Pathan.
	3375	Havildar Ali Gul	Afridi Pathan. Later Subadar. Also received 2nd Class I.O.M. and I.D.S.M.
	3683	Sepoy Makhmadin	Later Subadar.
	2736	Lance-Naik Senu	Dogra.
	1882	Havildar Sundar	Dogra. Later Subadar.
	3044	Naik Bela	Dogra. Later Subadar-Major in 40th Pathans.
		Jemadar Dayal Singh	Khatrī Sikh.

Year	Rank and Name	Remarks
1897	Risaldar Tirath Ram	Muhiyal Brahmin. Later Risaldar-Major.
1131½	Dafadar Tursam	Yusafzai Pathan.
1473	Sowar Sorandaz	Yusafzai Pathan.
1408	Sowar Nazir	Afridi Pathan.
1413	Sowar Gurdit Singh	Jat Sikh.
840	Kote-Dafadar Sadr-ud-Din	"Arab" Pathan.
1012	Dafadar Sham Singh	Jat Sikh.
1274	Sowar Pir Muhammad	Khattak Pathan.
1297	Sowar Punjaba	Dogra.
2246	Havildar Biaz	Saghri Khattak Pathan.
3394	Lance-Naik Mir Jafir	Saghri Khattak Pathan.
4223	Sepoy Sohbat Khan	Akora Khattak. Later re- ceived 2nd Class I.O.M.
	Subadar-Major Sarfaraz Khan	Akora Khattak.
	Subadar Shahi Jan	Afridi Pathan.
3195	Sepoy Nur Ahmad	Afridi Pathan.
1998	Sepoy Dar Jan	Afridi Pathan.
3446	Sepoy Jowahir Singh	Jat Sikh.
3485	Sepoy Bishan Singh	Jat Sikh.
	Jemadar Bahadur Singh	Jat Sikh. Later Risaldar- Major.
1142½	Dafadar Hayath Muhammad	P.M.
806½	Dafadar Bora Khan	P.M. Gakhar.
1455	Sowar Muhammad Khan	P.M. Gakhar.
1219½	Sowar Alaf Khan	P.M. Gakhar.
	Jemadar Sikandar Khan	Akora Khattak Pathan. Later Subadar.
3317	Havildar Alam Khan	Ghilzai Pathan. Later Subadar-Major.
4080	Sepoy Muhammad Khan	Punjabi Mussulman.
4214	Sepoy Kazim Khan	Saghri Khattak Pathan.
4236	Sepoy Darweza Khan	Saghri Khattak Pathan.
3909	Sepoy Khawaja Nur	Afridi Pathan.
3858	Sepoy Muhammad Afzal	Afridi Pathan.
3912	Sepoy Dewa Singh	Jat Sikh.
1904	4525 Sepoy Muhammad Kasim	Durani Afghan.
1908	3595 Havildar Manga	Punjabi Mussulman.
1915	4744 Havildar Kishan Singh	Jat Sikh.
1918	Subadar-Major Man Bir Thapa	Gurkha.
	Subadar-Major Alam Khan, Bahadur	Saghri Khattak.
	Risaldar Abdullah Khan	P.M. Awan.
	Jemadar Khan Bahadur	P.M. Awan.
1865	Dafadar Khan Bahadur	P.M. Awan.
2401	Acting Lance-Dafadar Shah Zada	Yusafzai Pathan.
156	C.Q.M. Havildar Awal Nur	Yusafzai Pathan.
12	Havildar Ghulam Muhammad	Punjabi Mussulman.
1932	1842 Naik Sohbat	Yusafzai Pathan.

APPENDIX VI

RECIPIENTS OF THE MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a Memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in Civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.

The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.

Year	Rank and Name
1896	Sepoy Ghulam Nabi.
1898	Havildar Adam Khan.
1903	Lance-Dafadar Ghulam Hussain.
1904	Dafadar Moghul Baz.
1906	Lance-Naik Ghafur Shah.
1912	Lance-Dafadar Mohibulla.
1920	Captain L. V. S. Blacker. C.Q.M. Havildar Awal Nur (special gratuity of Rs.200).
1922	Lance-Naik Nur Muhammad.
1929	Dafadar Ghulam Ali (specially awarded a silver medal).

APPENDIX VII

LIST OF HONOURS AND AWARDS, THE WAR, 1914-1921

(A) GRANTED TO THE GUIDES CAVALRY

Distinguished Service Order.

Lt.-Col. A. C. Stewart.
Major G. G. E. Wyllly.
Major D. K. McLeod.
Captain E. M. Murray.

Military Cross.

Captain J. F. W. Ogilvie.
Lieut. D. A. Cameron.

Mention in Despatches.

Lt.-Col. A. C. Stewart (twice).
Major G. G. E. Wyllly (three times).
Major H. C. Kay.
Major D. K. McLeod.
Captain W. H. Blood.
Captain A. V. Hammond.
Lieut. C. P. J. Prioleau.
Acting Risaldar-Major Abnashi Ram.
Risaldar Abdullah Khan.
Resaidar Bhagwan Singh.
Jemadar Raja Ram.
Kote-Dafadar Lal Chand.
Dafadar Muhammad Towahir.

Order of British India.

Risaldar Khwaja Muhammad Khan,
I.D.S.M., A.D.C.

Indian Order of Merit.

Risaldar Abdullah Khan.*
Jemadar Khan Bahadur.
2401 Acting Lance-Dafadar Shahzada.

Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

Risaldar Zardad Khan.
Resaidar Abdullah Khan.
1865 Kote-Dafadar Khan Bahadur.
2211 Lance-Dafadar Sharif.
2466 Sowar Sher Muhammad.

Meritorious Service Medal.

1895 Kote-Dafadar Muhammad Afzal.
1865 Dafadar Khan Bahadur.
1881 Dafadar Tungal Singh.
1884 Temp. Dafadar Ahmad Shah.
1926 Dafadar Nawab Khan.
1394 Dafadar Sawab Gul.
1930 Lance-Dafadar Mal Singh.
2002 Acting Lance-Dafadar Allah Dad Khan.

* His widow was also awarded an assignment of revenue of Rs.600 per annum.

(B) GRANTED TO THE GUIDES INFANTRY

Distinguished Service Order.

Major C. J. B. Hay.
Major I. U. Battye.
Major H. Campbell.
Lt.-Col. J. S. Bogle.
Captain N. H. Prendergast.

Military Cross.

Lieut. J. C. Coates.
Captain C. E. T. Erskine.
Lieut. C. Winton.

Mention in Despatches.

Captain N. H. Prendergast.
Major I. U. Battye (three times).
Major A. H. Buist.
Captain C. H. Campbell.

Lt.-Col. C. J. B. Hay (twice).
Major C. Kirkpatrick.
Captain H. H. Fagnani.
Lt.-Col. J. S. Bogle.
Major H. Campbell (twice).
Major D. G. Sandeman.

Order of British India.

Subadar Bahadur Khan.
Subadar Kajir Khan.

Indian Order of Merit.

4744 Havildar Kishan Singh.
Subadar-Major Alam Khan, Bahadur.
Subadar-Major Man Bir Thapa.
156 C.Q.M. Havildar Awal Nur.
12 Havildar Ghulam Muhammad.

APPENDIX VII—continued.

Indian Distinguished Service Medal.

- 5510 Sepoy Bhan Singh.
 4442 Havildar Taj Muhammad.
 5312 Sepoy Jagtu.
 4830 Havildar Arsala Khan.
 1016 Lance-Naik Alam Khan.
 5555 Naik Ahmad Khan.
 Subadar Bishen Singh.
 5303 Naik Mian Singh.
 Subadar Saida Khan.
 234 Havildar Allah Khan.
 1236 Sepoy Kabiraj.
 169 Lance-Naik Nan Bahadur.
 1020 Sepoy Kartar Singh.
 1770 Lance-Naik Kaila.
 344 Havildar Faujun.
 23 Havildar Gama.
 Subadar Ahmad Khan.
 076 Havildar Hussain Khan.
 0181½ Lance-Naik Zamir Khan.
 0146 Sepoy Ahmad Khan.
 0398 Sepoy Amir Ali.
 Subadar (Acting Subadar-Major) Alam Khan.
 5499 Naik Raghpat.
 Subadar Faujha Singh.
 Subadar Sukhbir Gurung.
 207 Naik Kulbahadur Gurung.

Meritorious Service Medal.

- 5132 Havildar Jaimal Singh.
 5558 Naik Kadsu.
 5664 Acting Havildar-Major Sowar Khan.
 158 Temp. Havildar Awal Nur.
 152 Temp. Havildar Abdullah Shah.
 5406 Sepoy (Ward Orderly) Zain Din.
 4207 Havildar Sundar Singh.
 4466 Havildar Dhan Singh.
 4886 Havildar Mangtu.
 4696 Lance-Naik (Bugle Major) Bishen Singh.
 1940 Havildar Surat Singh.
 4655 Havildar Gajjan Singh.
 680 Sepoy Bhan Singh.
 2809 Sepoy Kali Rana.
 060 Q.M. Havildar Atta Muhammad.
 0111-B Havildar Taza Gul.
 0153 Havildar Mir Abdullah.
 0250 Naik Muhammad Khan.
 4397 Havildar Pardham Singh.
 211 Havildar Omar.
 4815 Havildar Karna Singh.
 5013 Havildar Ambar Khan.
 384 Havildar Asar Khan.
 5663 Havildar Azam Khan.
 5730 Havildar Shah Wali.

- 5526 Havildar Shankar.
 4616 Havildar Nowsher Khan.
 164 Naik Nar Bahadur.
 5312 Naik Jagtu.
 93 Naik Bahadur Jang.
 5676 Naik Nawab.
 968 Naik Ghulam Muhammad.
 346 Naik Gulistan.
 572 Naik Gobinda.
 1243 Naik Atta Muhammad.
 134 Naik Baldeo Singh.
 913 Naik Nur Muhammad.
 58 Lance-Naik Mao Khan.
 5712 Lance-Naik Lachman Singh.
 118 Lance-Naik Hazara Singh.
 1035 Lance-Naik Musahib Khan.
 274 Lance-Naik Lal Bahadur.
 291 Lance-Naik Adal Shah.
 1691 Lance-Naik Nur Muhammad.
 054 Havildar Mankan Khan.
 167 Naik (Temp. Havildar) Hira Nand.
 0371 Naik (Temp. Havildar) Allah Dad.
 0403 Naik (Temp. Havildar) Bahadur Thapa.
 0333 Sepoy Ganda Singh.
 032 Havildar Hukam Chand.
 0280 Lance-Naik Sudagar.
 0197 Havildar Nazar Muhammad.
 0145-1 Havildar Niamat Khan.
 0829 Lance-Naik Manbahadur Gurung.
 0492 Sepoy Lal Singh.
 01 Temp. Naik Sete Thapa.
 0571 Naik Bahadur Gharti.
 0230 Naik Ziyarat Khan.
 0148 Havildar Ahmad Khan.
 0820 Sepoy Harak Singroka.
 021 Cy. Havildar-Major Shiama.
 039 Havildar Achchhar Singh.
 0580 Sepoy Partab Singh, Gurung.
 0523 Lance-Naik Fateh Muhammad.
 0127-1 Havildar Sultan Ahmad.
 0234 Havildar Dalbahadur.
 594 R.Q.M. Havildar Raja Ram.
 14 Havildar Hazara Singh.

St. George (3rd Class).

- 510 Sepoy Bhan Singh.

St. George (4th Class).

- 532 Sepoy Hazara Singh.

Croix-de-Guerre.

- Subadar-Major Alam Khan.
 4474 Havildar Kishan Singh.

Médaille Militaire.

- 5312 Sepoy Jagtu.

APPENDIX VIII (A)

ORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY

From January 1847 to April 1849 the Cavalry consisted of one troop only. Strength :—

1 Risaldar	2 Kote Dafadars
1 Resaidar	12 Dafadars
2 Jemadars	81 Sowars
	1 Trumpeter.

The strength was then raised to three troops—i.e.,

3 Risaldars	6 Kote Dafadars
3 Resaidars	36 Dafadars
6 Jemadars	243 Sowars
	3 Trumpeters.

In July 1850 six Camel Sowars were substituted for six Sowars, but the strength otherwise remained constant until April 1858, when a fourth troop was added. Strength :—

4 Risaldars	46 Dafadars
4 Resaidars	316 Sowars
8 Jemadars	4 Trumpeters
8 Kote Dafadars	8 Camel Sowars.

In January 1860 the Dafadars were increased to 48 and Sowars reduced to 280, and in the Army List of this date mention is made for the first time of the composition. This was to be 2 troops Pathans and 2 troops Sikhs, but, in fact, it is on record that the actual composition on 15 September 1867 was as follows :—

	Risaldars.	Resaidars.	Jemadars.	Kote Dafadars and Dafadars.	Trumpeters.	Sowars.
Dogra	—	—	—	2	—	10
Yusafzai and Khattak	1	1	2	10	—	42
Punjabi Mussulman ...	—	—	—	3	1	16
Afridi	—	—	—	3	—	16
Farsiwan	1	1	2	14	1	70
Sikhs	2	1	2	16	1	80
Hindus (Punjab) ...	—	1	1	6	—	35
Hindus (Hindustan) ...	—	—	—	—	—	9
Muhammadans (Hindustan) —	—	—	1	2	1	10
Total ...	4	4	8	56	4	288

From indirect evidence it appears that 1st and 2nd Troops were Mussulman, and 3rd and 4th Troops Sikh and Hindu.

In 1872 the commissioned and non-commissioned grades were reduced to 2 Risaldars, 2 Resaidars, 1 Woordie-Major, 4 Jemadars, 4 Kote Dafadars, 32 Dafadars and 4 Pay Sowars.

These were presumably organized in two squadrons, for by special Indian Army Circular of Fort William dated 23 March 1887 a third squadron was raised with a total strength of 469, the composition to be 1 squadron Sikhs, 1 squadron Pathans, half squadron Dogras and half squadron Punjabi Mussulmans.

APPENDIX VIII (A)—*continued*.

In 1908 the establishment was reduced by 11 Dafadars, viz. :—To 6 Kote Dafadars, 30 Dafadars, 1 Salutri, and a paid establishment of 24 Lance-Dafadars was substituted.

The composition remained in force until 1914, the actual allocation of classes to squadrons being as under :—

R.A.	Yusafzais and Afridis.
L.A.	Dogras, Punjabi Hindus, Khattris, and Muhiyals. ¹
R.B.	Farsiwans and Khattaks—Hazaras being added in 1913. ²
L.B.	Sikhs.
R.C.	Sikhs.
L.C.	Punjabi Mussulmans.

On 24 November 1914 orders were received to raise a fourth squadron. Afridis and Muhiyals were taken out of their original troops and formed the basis of the new squadron which became R.D. Muhiyals, L.D. Afridis (Adam Khel and Kuki Khel).

In 1921, when Indian cavalry regiments were formed into groups, the Regiment was reconstituted on a 3-squadron basis as follows :—

" A " Squadron ...	Dogras.
" B " Squadron ...	Sikhs.
" C " Squadron ...	Punjabi Mussulmans.
" H.Q." Squadron	A proportion of all the above classes.

Sanction was accorded to the inclusion of Khattaks and Yusafzais under the heading of Punjabi Mussulmans.

¹ Muhiyals, or more correctly Muhiyal Brahmins, are a class of Punjabi Hindu who live in the Jhelum district. They served in the Guides from the very early days until 1922, when they were demobilized owing to the reorganization of the army. Although a very small community, they have proved themselves fine soldiers and have provided the Guides with three Risaldar-Majors and one Subadar-Major.

² These men came from Afghanistan and are not to be confused with the Hazaras of Hazara District near Abbottabad.

APPENDIX VIII (B)

ORGANIZATION OF THE INFANTRY

1. From indirect evidence it appears that, at any rate from the Mutiny onwards, the composition of the companies did not alter. Companies were organized as follows :—

" A " Company ...	Dogras (Kangra and Jammu).
" B " Company ...	Yusafzais and Riverine Akora Khattaks.
" C " Company ...	Punjabi Mussulmans and Cis-Indus (Narreb) Khattaks.
" D " Company ...	Afridis (Malikdin and Kambar Khel).
" E " Company ...	Gurkhas (Magar and Gurung).
" F " Company ...	Jat Sikhs (mixed).
" G " Company ...	Mixed Classes.
" H " Company ...	Jat Sikhs (Mixed).

2. When the double-company system was introduced into the Indian Army in September 1900, the companies were linked as follows :—

1st Double Company ...	" B " Company (Yusafzais).
	" D " Company (Afridis).
2nd Double Company ...	" A " Company (Dogras).
	" E " Company (Gurkhas).
3rd Double Company ...	" C " Company (Punjabi Mussulmans).
	" G " Company (Mixed Classes).
4th Double Company ...	" F " Company (Jat Sikhs).
	" H " Company (Jat Sikhs).

Double companies were therefore Hindu or Mussulman except where " G " Company was concerned ; Gurkhas had a minimum height standard of 5 ft. 2 in., and so were the tallest in the Army.

3. On 16 March 1911 the double companies were rearranged on a basis of half Hindu and half Mussulman, as follows :—

1st Double Company ...	" A " Company (Dogras).
	" B " Company (Yusafzais).
2nd Double Company ...	" C " Company (Punjabi Mussulmans).
	" E " Company (Gurkhas).
3rd Double Company ...	" D " Company (Afridis).
	" F " Company (Jat Sikhs).
4th Double Company ...	" G " Company (Khattaks).
	" H " Company (Jat Sikhs).

At the same time Khattaks (Trans-Indus and Hill Akora) took the place of the mixed classes in " G " Company.

4. On 14 November 1916 the platoon system was introduced into the Guides Infantry, and double companies became companies as follows :—

" A " Company ...	1st Platoon (Dogras).
	2nd Platoon (Dogras).
	3rd Platoon (Yusafzais and Riverine Akora Khattaks).
	4th Platoon (Yusafzais and Riverine Akora Khattaks).

APPENDIX VIII (B)—*continued*.

" B " Company	...	5th Platoon (Punjabi Mussulmans and Cis-Indus Khattaks). 6th Platoon (Punjabi Mussulmans and Cis-Indus Khattaks). 7th Platoon (Gurkhas). 8th Platoon (Gurkhas).
" C " Company	...	9th Platoon (Punjabi Mussulmans to replace the Afridis who had deserted in 1914-15). 10th Platoon (Punjabi Mussulmans to replace the Afridis who had deserted in 1914-15). 11th Platoon (Dogras—as it was difficult to replace Sikh drafts to the Great War). 12th Platoon (Sikhs).
" D " Company	...	13th Platoon (Trans-Indus Khattaks). 14th Platoon (Trans-Indus Khattaks). 15th Platoon (Sikhs). 16th Platoon (Sikhs).

Although the old " B " Company had gone to France, there was no difficulty in instantly refilling it with fresh Yusafzai recruits.

5. At Samarra in the summer of 1917 the companies were reorganized to meet the shortage of Sikhs and large supply of Gurkhas (both new enlistments and drafts from the Assam and Burma Military Police) :—

" A " Company	...	1st and 2nd Platoons (Dogras). 3rd and 4th Platoons (Yusafzais and Riverine Akoras).
" B " Company	...	5th and 6th Platoons (Punjabi Mussulmans and Cis-Indus Khattaks). 7th and 8th Platoons (Gurkhas).
" C " Company	...	9th and 10th Platoons (Punjabi Mussulmans). 11th and 12th Platoons (Jat Sikhs).
" D " Company	...	13th and 14th Platoons (Trans-Indus Khattaks). 15th and 16th Platoons (Gurkhas).

6. On return to India in 1921 and the introduction of the Group System, the companies were reorganized as under :—

" A " Company	...	1st and 2nd Platoons (Dogras, Rajput, Jammu and Kangra). 3rd Platoon (Yusafzais). 4th Platoon (Khattaks—mainly Riverine Akoras).
" B " Company	...	5th Platoon (Punjabi Mussulmans). 6th Platoon (Punjabi Mussulmans and Cis-Indus Khattaks). 7th and 8th Platoons (Dogras).
" C " Company	...	9th and 10th Platoons (Punjabi Mussulmans). 11th and 12th Platoons (Sikhs).
" D " Company	...	13th Platoon (Trans-Indus Khattaks). 14th Platoon (Orakzais). 15th and 16th Platoons (Sikhs).

GLOSSARY

- Atta*, wholemeal flour.
Badmash, scoundrel.
Bargir, a Silladar cavalry man who does not provide his own horse.
Batta, compensation in the form of money.
Bhoosa, chaff, barley or wheat straw after threshing.
Bhisti, water-carrier.
Chiga, village pursuit party.
Fakir, Muhammadan holy man.
Ghazi, Muhammadan who fights against infidels.
Ghussa, angry, indignant.
Jirga, tribal meeting.
Jumerat, Thursday.
Jangi Inam, money reward for services in the field.
Jihad, holy war.
Kafir, infidel, unbeliever, one who does not believe in Muhammad.
Khajawa, camel saddle, pack saddle, frame for carrying tools, arms, etc., on pack.
Khilat, a robe of honour.
Kotal, summit of mountain pass.
Kukri, a Gurkha knife.
Kullah, a kind of cap worn under the *pagri* or turban by Mussulmans.
Lashkar, tribal army.
Malik, a notable, headman, large landowner.
Ma-ssak, a leather bag usually used for carrying water.
Mullah, Muhammadan priest.
Nezabasi, tent-pegging.
Nullah, ravine, watercourse.
Pagri, turban.
Panchayat, village council.
Poshteen, coat made of sheepskin without the wool being removed; usually heavily embroidered.
Sayed, holy man.
Serai, caravanserai.
Sangar, piquet, defensive wall.
Silladar, a man who enlisted in a Silladar cavalry regiment. Under the Silladar system Government only provided rifles, bandoliers and revolvers. The provision of all other requirements such as horse, saddlery, clothing, etc., was made under regimental arrangements. To provide the working capital for this each man, when he enlisted, paid a lump sum known as an "assami," which was refunded to him when he left the regiment.
Sarnai, Pathan pipe similar to highland chanter.
Tangi, a narrow pass or defile.
Thanadar, a subordinate police officer.
Tulwar, curved sword.
Tumtum, trap, buggy, small dog-cart.
Wadi, ravine, watercourse.
Ziafat, a feast, entertainment.
Ziarat, a shrine, grave of a holy man.

INDEX

INDEX

- Abadali, 208
 Abazai, 23, 74, 75, 122, 186, 188, 190, 195, 203
 Abbottabad, 282
 Abdullah, Bugler, 100
 Abdullah, Mullah, 62
 Ab-i-garm, 219
 Abueh, 165, 166
 Abu Jawari, 218
 Abu Sidrah, 208
 Abuxa, 251
 Acre, 238
 Adams, Major-General Sir R. B., 108-9, 112, 116, 117, 123, 131-3, 136-9, 143, 148-9, 155-6, 160-1, 164-6, 176, 178-85, 280, 291
 Aden, 283
 Adhaim River, 228
 Adinzai Valley, 138, 196
 Adozai, 201
 Adrag Badrag Pass, 107
 Adye, Colonel, 67
 Afghanistan, 1, 56, 64, 77-8, 80, 254
 Afghanistan, Amir of, 116, 152
 Afzal, Sher, 130
 Afzal, Subadar Sher, 220, 225, 241, 271
 Agababa, 220
 Agha, Sepoy Said, 100
 Agra, 9, 171, 176, 178-9
 Agror, 70, 127
 Ahmad, Sowar Gul, 99
 Ahmad, Sepoy Nur, 162
 Ahmadwam, 264
 Ahnai Tangi, 262
 Ain Sofar, 250
 Ajmere Bastion, 48
 Ajmere Gate, 48
 Aka Khel, 264
 Akab, 226, 228
 Akali, 14
 Akbar, Sowar, 99
 Akhora, 21, 211
 Alawi-ki-Serai, 34, 35
 Aleppo, 211-13, 240
 Alexander the Great, 290
 Alexandria, 229, 241, 249-50
 Ali, Jemadar Akbar, 47
 Ali, Sepoy Amir, 249
 Ali Gharbi, 208
 Ali, Dafadar Ghulam, 277
 Ali Khel, 90, 92-3, 105, 255
 Ali, Subadar Kurban, 65, 67
 Ali Mangal, 255, 257
 Ali Masjid, 78, 81-3, 88, 105, 188
 Ali, Sowar Nadir, 72
 Ali, Amir Sher, 77, 116
 Ali, Risaldar Sherbat, 284
 Ali, Sepoy Yakub, 30
 Ali Kandi Pass, 195
 Alipore, 42
 Alizai, 255-8
 Alladad, Sepoy, 57
 Alladad, Jemadar, 271
 Allahdand, 137-9, 154, 162-3
 Allenby, Field-Marshal Lord, 229, 232, 234, 237, 241, 244-5, 249
 Alus Bend, 212-13
 Alwein, 244
 Amandarra, 154, 160, 162-3
 Amani, 274
 Amanullah, Amir, 254
 Amara, 208, 228
 Amazai, 67, 128
 Amb, 62
 Amb, Nawab of, 27
 Ambala, 122
 Ambar, Havildar, 241
 Ambeyla, 66-7, 182
 Ambeyla Pass, 62-3, 65, 69, 180, 183, 197, 199, 290, 293
 Amerieh, 219
 Amin, Sowar Muhammad, 99
 Amir, Sepoy Said, 100
 Amir Thana, 256-7
 Amir-ul-Mulk, 130, 148
 Amirulla, Farrier, 100
 Amritsar, 12
 Ana, 213
 Andak Fort, 147
 Anderson, Lieut., 11
 Anderson, Capt. J. V. C., 192, 197, 200, 225, 227, 229, 230-2, 282
 Anderson, General, 187
 Anebta, 248, 276
 Anghapur, 182
 Anson, General, 36
 Anti-Lebanon, 250
 Appleyard, Brigadier-General, 85
 Arabi Pasha, 244
 Arnott, Lieut. R. L. I., 235, 237
 Arsuf, 245
 Asadabad, 219
 Asa Khan, 262
 Ashton, Lieut. B. S., 206, 214-15
 Asmai Heights, 111-13, 115
 Asmai Hill, 120-1
 Asmar, 129, 147
 Asmatulla, 85
 "Assyrian Wall," 216
 Athlit, 237
 Attock, 16, 27, 33, 52, 288
 Attrek, 77
 Aubers, 269
 Aubers Ridge, 273
 Aveh, 219

- Aveh Pass, 222
 Avitabile, 29
 Azim, Havildar, 241, 242
 Aziziya, 208, 226

 Baalbek, 240, 250
 Baba, Jemadar Haji, 40
 Baba Kushkar, 115
 Baba, Sowar Khan, 280
 Babuzai, 8
 Badakshan, 72
 Badalai, 171, 177
 Badama, 258
 Badankot, 171
 Baddar Toi, 266
 Badli-ki-Sarai, 36
 Badwan, 155
 Bagawi, 257
 Bagh, 18
 Bagh Springs, 254
 Baghdad, 207-10, 213, 215, 218-20, 226, 228, 270, 275-6
 Baghdada, 285-6
 Bahadur, Jemadar Khan, 190, 207
 Bahadur, Lance-Naik Lal, 241
 Bahadur, Naik Man, 233, 241
 Bahadur, Havildar Puran, 233
 Bahawalpur, Nawab of, 11
 Bahawalpur Imperial Service Troops, 206
 Bahjun, 123
 Baho Dheri, 192
 Baidulla, Sepoy, 100
 Baiho, 128
 Baiji, 218-19
 Bainbridge, Major D., 255, 258, 268
 Baja Bam Khel, 62-3
 Bajgiran, 277
 Bajkatta, 182
 Bajour, 129-30, 167-9, 175, 179, 186
 Bajour, Chief of, 129
 Baker, General, 92, 109-15
 Bakhsh, Jemadar Pir, 10, 24
 Bakrai, 128
 Bakrialla, 34
 Baksh, Hospital Asst. Rahman, 100
 Bala Hissar, 91-2, 94-5, 109-11, 113, 119
 Baldwin, Brigadier-General G. M., 131, 136-8, 148-9, 151, 155, 160, 167, 176, 180, 182, 206, 281
 Bampokha, 181-3
 Banda, 66-7
 "Bangiwallah Hill," 264
 Banks, Capt. P. d'A., 192, 194-5, 271-2, 282
 Bannatine-Allason, Major-General R., 192
 Bannu, 11, 56, 58-9, 254
 Baraddar, 27, 127
 Barangola, 155
 Barari Algad River, 263
 Barari Tangi, 59, 263-4
 Barchar Spur, 127
 Barclay, Lieut., 84-5
 Bari Doab, 12
 Barikao, 106
 Barikot, 166
 Baringanr, 123, 200-1
 Bar Kalai, 182
 Barmol, 70

 Barnard, General, 34, 36, 41-2
 Barnes, 2/Lieut. H. A., 258
 Barrett, Major-General A. A., 188-9, 254
 Barrett, Capt. M. L., 206, 214, 219
 Barton, Major F. J. H., 123, 127, 131, 133, 138-9
 Barwand, 58
 Basawal, 106
 Basra, 207-8, 222, 225-6, 228, 275
 Basti Khel, 21
 Bateman-Champain, Brigadier-General H. B., 219
 Bat Khela, 161
 Batrun, 238, 250
 Battine, Lieut., 148
 Battye, Lieut.-Colonel F. D., 73-5, 81, 85, 87-8, 109, 112, 114, 116-17, 121, 127, 131, 134-5, 139-45, 152, 288, 293-4
 Battye, Brigadier I. U., 159, 161, 162, 169, 180, 199, 202-3, 225-7, 242, 251, 283, 288
 Battye, Lieut. Q., 33, 37-9, 51-2, 152, 293-4
 Battye, Major W., 62, 65, 73, 75, 77-8, 81, 83, 85-7, 89, 152, 280, 284, 291, 293-4
 Battye, Fort, 107
 Bawi, 208
 Bazar Valley, 83, 186
 Bazdarra Valley, 9, 20
 Bazian Pass, 218
 Beach Post, 246
 Beas River, 1, 4, 13, 15
 Beatson, Major, 158, 160
 "Bedford Hill," 161
 Bedmanai Pass, 175
 Beecher, Lieut., 3
 Beg, Sowar Mirza Fazl, 53
 Beirut, 237-8, 240, 250-1
 Beisan, 251
 Beit Jahad, 208
 Beit Lid, 236
 Beit Nuba, 244, 245
 Bela, Naik, 143, 145
 Beled, 215, 275
 Bellew, Dr. H. W., 32, 55-6, 62, 68
 Bemaru, 99, 110, 114-15
 Bengal, 60
 Benha, 240
 Beni Hissar, 98, 109, 110, 116
 Beni Suef, 251
 Beshmezzin, 238, 250
 Bhai, 182
 Bhyrawal Ghat, Camp, 4
 Biaz, Havildar, 159
 Bibi Pakdaman Mosque, 12
 Biddulph, Major-General, 80
 Bigsby, Mr., 203
 Biland Khel, 56-7
 Bilot, 174
 Bir Asur, 276
 Bir, Jemadar Birna, 276
 Bir, Jemadar Chandra, 275
 Bir, Jemadar Kans, 242
 Bir, Subadar-Major Man, 225, 233, 241
 Bir, Jemadar Ran, 234
 Bir Salim, 252
 Bir, Jemadar Santa, 244
 "Bird Cage," 290
 Birket Ramadan, 235

- Bisitun, 219
 Black Mountain, 26, 27, 62, 127, 129, 184
 "Black Watch Wadi," 245, 247
 Blacker, Lieut.-Colonel L. V. S., 193, 225, 272-3, 276-7, 292
 Blake, Brigadier-General, 241
 Blandy, 2/Lieut. R. B., 202-3, 275
 Blois-Johnson, Lieut.-Colonel J. E., 131, 134, 140, 142-3, 148, 151, 162, 176-7, 180-1, 189, 192, 196, 205-6, 211-12, 281-2
 Blood, Major-General Sir B., 137, 159-60, 162, 165, 167-8, 170, 173, 175, 176, 178, 180, 182
 Blood, Lieut.-Colonel W. H., 199, 206, 214, 292
 Bogle, Lieut.-Colonel J. S., 131, 134, 137, 140, 141, 167, 169, 180, 189, 193, 204, 226, 240, 243, 246, 249-51, 279, 292
 Boileau, Colonel, 28-9
 Bois de Biez, 271
 Bolarum, 61
 Bombay, 243
 Bond, Lieut. E. E. B., 43, 47, 53, 55, 58
 Boobial Tope, 35
 Boran, 33
 Bori Pass, 28, 29, 42, 74
 Borrett, Colonel, 267
 Bostock, Major, 259
 Bourke, Lieut. A. J. H., 255, 257
 Bradshaw, Lieut.-Colonel, 19
 Bramley, Colonel, 251
 Brasier-Creagh, Capt., 163, 167
 Bretherton, Lieut., 123, 288
 Bright, Major-General, 105, 108
 Broad Wadi, 210
 Brooking, Major-General Sir H. T., 210
 Broome, Lieut.-Colonel A., 123
 "Brown Ridge," 230
 Browne, Capt., 11
 Browne, Capt. C. P., 192-3, 269, 292
 Browne, General Sir Sam, 69-70, 80-6, 88, 121, 152, 287, 290
 Browne, Lady, 287
 Brownlow, Lieut.-Colonel, 64-5, 113
 Bucknall, 2/Lieut. H. L., 207
 Buddha, 291
 Buist, Lieut.-Colonel A. H., 191, 193, 197, 199-203, 225, 231, 236-7, 241-2, 281, 284, 288
 Bukhsh, Pir, 38, 53
 Buland, Bugler Akhtar, 39, 53
 Bulfin, Lieut.-General Sir E. S., 229, 238
 Buner, 19, 62-3, 66-7, 122, 128, 153, 167, 180, 182, 184, 192, 197, 199, 203, 286, 289
 Burin Wells, 248
 Burkitt, Mr., 203
 Burma, 163
 Buta, Sowar, 67
 Butkhak, 109, 115
 Butto Killi, 258

 Caesarea, 234
 Cairo, 229, 252
 Calcutta, 71
 Calonne-sur-le-Lys, 271
 Cameron, Lieut. D. A., 192, 205
 Campbell, Brigadier-General Sir C., 21-6, 54
 Campbell, Lieut. C. H., 189
 Campbell, General Sir F., 131, 135-7, 139-41, 143-4, 149, 167, 170-5, 178, 180-1, 183, 201-2, 204, 206, 283, 288
 Campbell, Colonel Sir Guy, 121
 Campbell, Brigadier H., 192-3, 229, 242, 251-3, 281, 282-92
 Campbell, Major L., 109, 123
 Campbell, Major-General R. B. P. P., 69-70, 73-6, 81, 83, 85, 87-8, 108, 112-13, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122, 126, 152, 288, 294
 Campbell-Harris, Lieut. C., 214
 Canning, Lord, 48, 56
 Carey, Lieut.-Colonel C. W., 185, 195, 206, 211, 213, 222, 281-2, 292
 Carmel, 238
 Carter, Lieut., 67
 Caspian Sea, 219
 Cassels, Brigadier-General R. A., 208, 212, 214, 216
 Castle Rock, 154
 Cavagnari, Major Sir L., 74-5, 78-9, 84, 88, 90-3, 95-8, 100, 102-3
 Cave-Penny, Lieut. E. A., 225, 231-2
 Chagarzai, 128
 Chakdara, 130, 137-9, 148, 153-4, 158, 160-2, 168, 184, 186, 191, 196, 203, 205
 Chalmers, Lieut. O. I., 42-3, 53
 Chamberlain, General N., 43, 47, 56-9, 62-4, 66, 69, 77
 Chamchemal Post, 218
 Chamheri, 62
 Chamla, 63, 64, 67, 128
 Chamla Valley, 62-3, 182-3
 Chand, Wurd-Major Duni, 40, 67, 87
 Chand, Resaidar Ratan, 203, 207, 270
 Chapman, Lieut. R. V., 233-4
 Charai, 182
 Charasia, 106, 110, 116, 118, 121
 Charbagh, 166
 Chardeh Valley, 111
 Charsadda, 23, 187, 190, 280
 Chattha, 27
 Chehil Dukhteran, 116-17
 Chelmsford, Lord, 205
 Chemera, 274
 Chenab, 34
 Cherat, 73
 Chhapri, 256, 258
 Chilgazai, 85
 Chinese Turkestan, 276
 Chingai, 171
 Chingalai, 55
 Chitral, 7, 129-30, 147, 153, 191, 196, 281, 293
 Chora Kandao, 83
 Chorbanda, 181-2
 Chorkana, 11
 Chororai, 62
 Chuj Doab, 25
 Chunda, 259
 Churabai Ridge, 244
 Churcher, Lieut., 133
 Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., 170-1
 Clementi, Colonel J., 192-3, 207, 254-6, 260-1, 266, 281
 "Cliff End," 264
 Climo, Major-General S. H., 254, 260

- " Cloud End," 264
 Clyde, Lord, 41
 Coates, Capt. J. C., 204, 225, 231-3, 237
 Cobbe, General Sir A., 215
 Cockerill, Lieut., 132, 140
 Codrington, Brigadier-General H. W., 128, 131, 134, 140-2, 167, 173-4, 178, 180, 189, 283
 Cole, Capt., 170-1
 Congreve, Lieut.-General Sir W. N., 252.
 " Conical Hill," 66-7
 Connaught, H. R. H. Duke of, 229
 Connell, Major J. V. A., 219
 Constantinople, 193
 Cooke-Collis, Major M. C., 74-5, 81, 87, 108, 116-7, 127
 Cortlandt, General von, 12
 Cotton, Major-General Sir S., 51, 54
 Craigie, Lieut. A. W., 43, 50, 53
 Creagh, Capt. R. C. O., 163, 169
 Crocker, General S. F., 197-9
 Cruddas, Colonel H. M., 189, 209
 Currie, Sir F., 10
 Curzon, Lord, 185
 Cyprus, 241

 Dab, 22
 Dabaye, 238
 Dabeli Pass, 107
 Dag, 175
 Daggar, 182
 Dahri Rocks, 227
 Dakka, 83, 105-6, 254
 Dalhousie, Lord, 13-14, 21, 26, 31, 293
 Dallah, 15
 Daly, Lieut. G. K., 108-9, 116-17, 280
 Daly, General Sir H., 7, 31, 33-8, 40-2, 44-5, 49, 51-2, 54, 125, 152
 Daly Bastion, 287
 Damadola, 171, 174
 Damanhour, 240
 Damascus, 240
 Dand, 188
 Dane, 2/Lieut., 192
 Dangram, 166
 Darband, 62, 127-8
 Darb-el-Haj, 274
 Dar-es-Salaam, 274
 Dargai, 24, 132-5, 137, 155-6, 159, 196, 288
 Darhan Pass, 55
 Dart, Capt. L. V., 243, 246, 253
 Dar Wekkai Ridge, 257
 Darya Khan, 259
 Das, Jemadar Bishan, 87
 Dast, Naik Gul, 136
 Dast, Havildar Sher, 242
 Daudzai, 188
 Davies, Capt. F. A., 206, 214, 216, 219, 284, 288
 Davies, Brigadier-General F. G. H., 133, 136-9, 145, 148, 167, 176, 180, 185, 191-2, 195-6, 201, 280-2
 Davies, Sir Henry, 71
 Deane, Major, 153-4
 Debori, 91
 de Brett, Lieut. H., 43, 53
 de Freitas, Capt. D. A., 219-20
 Deh-i-Mazang, 109, 112

 Deir Ibzia, 244
 Delhi, 33, 35-7, 39, 43-5, 47-9, 51-2, 54, 122, 124-5, 183, 185, 221, 223, 285, 287, 293
 Denikin, General, 219
 Dera Fattah Khan, 11
 Dera Ghazi Khan, 11
 Dera Ismail Khan, 56-7, 259
 Derajat, 11, 254
 Devonshire, Lieut. N. G., 237, 268
 Dew, Lieut. A. B., 128
 Dhanu, 13
 Dhariala, 11
 Dhoj, Havildar Karma, 233, 241
 Dila, 208
 Dil, Naik Mehr, 96, 100
 Dillia, Lance-Naik, 114
 Diliarai Hill, 128
 Din, Mullah Fazal, 265
 Din, Naik Asal, 241
 Dir, 129-30, 148, 153, 154, 186, 191
 Dir, Nawab of, 167, 184
 Ditta, Havildar, 273
 Dodd, Major P. C. R., 256
 Doncaster, Capt. C., 225, 230-2, 245
 " Doncaster Wadi," 245
 Dost, Sepoy Muhammad, 94, 100
 Douglas, 2/Lieut. N. D., 256-7, 261-2, 268
 Drakki, 259
 Drosch, 129
 " Dud Post," 230-1
 Dujailah Redoubt, 275
 Duncan, Surgeon-Major A., 128
 Dunsford, Brigadier-General, 70
 Dunsterville, Brigadier-General L. C., 204, 219
 Durand Line, 254, 257
 Durand, Sir M., 152
 Dwatoti, 265-6
 Dyer, Brigadier-General R. E. H., 256

 " Eagle's Nest," 64
 Eales, Capt. C. H. H., 206, 218
 East Africa, 274
 Edward VII, 72, 293
 Edwardes, Colonel H., 11-12, 30-1, 35, 51, 55
 Edwards, W., 5
 Egerton, Field-Marshal Sir C. C., 149-50, 184
 Egerton, Lieut.-General Sir R. G., 126, 131, 148, 150-2, 190, 270, 292
 Egypt, 204, 226, 241, 243, 250, 252, 274, 282
 El Ajik, 215
 El Damur, 238
 El Humr, 215
 El Huweslat, 227
 El Jebil, 249
 El Mina, 239
 El Mugheir, 234
 El Shatt, 274
 El Tireh, 235-6
 El Wasta, 251
 Elburz Mountains, 220
 Elliott-Lockhart, Lieut.-Colonel P. C., 131, 134, 140-3, 155-6, 161, 163, 180, 183, 194, 288
 Elles, General W. K., 127, 168, 175
 Entwistle, Capt. F., 256, 258
 Enzeli, 219

- Erbil, 218
 Erinpura, 49
 Erskine, Brigadier C. E. T., 189, 195, 197, 202, 225, 231, 233, 237-8
 Esdraelon, Plain of, 234-5
 Esher, Lord, 223
 Eski Baghdad, 227
 Estaires, 273
 Euphrates, River, 209-10, 213, 292
 Eustace, Major-General A. H., 255
 Ezra's Tomb, 208

 Fagan, Brigadier-General E. A., 255
 Fagnani, Lieut. H. H., 225, 230, 276
 Fakira, Dafadar, 62
 Falcon, Capt., 145
 Falluja, 210
 Famagusta, 241
 Fane, Major-General Sir V. B., 226, 250
 Fanshawe, Major-General, 218
 Farquhar, Lieut.-Colonel, 47
 Fat-ha Gorge, 214, 219
 Fattehabad, 85, 87, 89, 106-7, 291
 Faujun, Havildar, 232, 237
 Fayoum, 251
 Feisal, King of the Hedjaz, 240
 Fejja, 249
 Fellowes, Capt., 272
 Ferguson, Capt. F. E., 255, 259, 260, 268
 Ferozepore, 10, 45, 191
 Festubert, 269, 273
 Fincastle, Lieut. Lord, 164-6, 291
 Finland, 193
 Fisher, Surgeon-Capt. J., 173
 Forsyth, Sir D., 71
 Fort-el-Kermeah, 215
 Foster, 2/Lieut. H. B., 207
 Fox-Strangways, Lieut. H. S., 126
 Fox-Strangways, Lieut. V., 243, 246, 249, 292
 France, 193-4, 205, 208, 230, 244, 269, 270, 273
 Fraser, Lieut. C. A. D., 255, 268
 Free, Capt. C. W., 255, 257, 268
 French, Field-Marshal Sir J., 273
 French, Lieut. W. S., 179
 Fuhaimah, 213
 Furlong, Lieut. W., 62, 65, 68

 Gadaizai Valley, 182
 Gadun, 128
 Gaina, Sepoy, 100
 Galai, 20
 Galilee, Sea of, 251
 Gallipoli, 205
 Gama, Havildar, 237
 Gamrowlah, 14
 Gandamak, 85, 87-8, 106-8, 114
 Gandamak, Treaty of, 90
 Gandra, 24
 Gandhara, 290
 Gandiob, 57
 Garden, Lieut.-Colonel A. R. H., 128, 163, 167, 171, 180, 186, 189
 Garstin Bastion, 48
 Garu Hill, 67
 Garvock, Major-General, 66-7, 69
 Gat, 176, 178-9

 Z *
 Gathorne-Hardy, Major-General Hon. J. F., 252
 Gatkala, 182
 Germany, 193, 239, 249
 Gerrard, Colonel, 49-50
 Ghalanai, 188
 Ghaligai, 166
 Gharah, 215
 Ghariba, 74
 Ghazi, Atalik, 71
 Ghazi, Sowar, 53
 Ghazni, 92, 105, 109
 Ghobani, 139, 147
 Ghulam Nabi, 130, 149
 "Gibraltar," 263
 Gilal, 171
 Gilbert, 2/Lieut. W. G. L., 203, 275
 Gilbert, General, 16
 Gilgit, 130, 277, 283
 Givenchy, 269
 Gobardhan, Sepoy, 100
 Gobinda, Lance-Naik, 241
 Godby, Major-General C. J., 30, 294
 Goldney, Lieut.-Colonel, 162, 170, 174
 Good, Capt. S. B., 251, 253
 "Goojerat," 17
 Gordon, Capt., 57
 Gosam, 147, 169
 Gough, General Sir C. J. S., 49, 53, 81, 85, 87, 106, 107, 114, 115, 120
 Gough, Lord, 14, 17
 Goulstone, Lieut. W. H., 243, 246
 Gouraud, General, 240, 251
 Govindgarh, 12
 Gradidge, Capt. J. H., 219-20
 Graham, Capt. R. B., 288
 Grand Trunk Road, 37, 80
 Grant, Brigadier-General Sir H., 40-1, 44, 46-7
 Grant, Lieut.-Colonel P., 192, 195, 197, 225, 230, 232, 237
 Grant, Surgeon, 123
 Greaves, Major-General G. R., 102, 120
 Greaves, Lieut. R. T., 164-6, 291
 Grenfell, 281
 Grose-Hodge, Capt. H., 225, 230, 232, 237, 239
 Gudar, 81
 Guides Hill, 138, 154
 Gujargarhi, 22, 285
 Gujerat, 14, 16-17, 34, 285
 Gul, Jemadar Ahmad, 71
 Gul, Jemadar Ali, 145, 172, 179, 186
 Gul, Sepoy Hussan, 100
 Gul, Subadar Khyal, 194, 203-4, 225-6
 Gul, Havildar Sher, 67
 Gulabu, Subadar, 112
 Gul-i-Bagh, 166
 Gul Imam, 259
 Gulistan, Naik, 241
 Gulmarg, 284
 Gumal Pass, 56
 Gumbat, 73
 Gungar, Naik, 242
 Gunning, Lieut., 172
 Gurung, Jemadar Lal, 258
 Gurung, Jemadar Nur Bai, 244
 Gurung, Subadar Parshed, 244

- Gurung, Subadar Sukhbir, 259
Gwalior, 1
- Habib, Sowar Ghulam, 99
Habibullah, Amir, 254
Hadda Mullah, 167-8, 175
Haditha, 211, 213
Hafiz Kor, 187-9, 195, 201-2, 204
Haibatgram, 163
Haidar, Sowar Amir, 99
Haidario Kach, 58
Haifa, 237-8
Haines, General Sir F. P., 84, 119
Hajil, 215
Hakdarra, 257
Hamadan, 219, 222
Hamelin, General, 250
Hamilton, Lieut. W. R. P., 74-5, 81, 84-7, 89, 90, 93-100, 102, 104, 152, 280, 291-4
Hammam Ali, 218
Hammond, Colonel Sir A. G., 73-5, 81, 87-8, 109, 112-13, 116-17, 121, 127-9, 131, 149, 152, 280, 288, 294
Hammond, Lieut.-Colonel A. V., 192, 205, 214, 218, 220, 222, 226
Hamzakot, 192
Hamzulla (1), Sepoy, 100
Hamzulla (2), Sepoy, 100
Hamzulla, 12
Handeni, 274
Hankin, Lieut. H. M., 193, 269
Hanna, 208
Hanna, Capt. G. B., 225, 231, 237
Hansi, 44
Hardinge, Lord, 3, 26
Hardinge, Lieut. G. N., 18, 22-3, 26
Harrison, Lieut., 255
Harunabad, 219
Harvey, Lieut. G. T. B., 206, 214
Hasan Abdal, 71, 81, 83
Hashtnagar, 24-5, 292
Hassan, Havildar, 100
Hassan, Sowar Muhammad, 99
Hassanabad, 219
Hathala, 259
Hawes, Lieut. C. W., 33, 37-8, 43-4, 48, 52, 55, 62-3, 66-7
Hawes, Lieut. H. J., 19, 22, 26
Hayley, Lieut. H., 42, 53
Hayward, Surgeon-Lieut., 135
Hazara, 27, 61-2
Hazarnao, 176
Health, H., 280
Heard, Surgeon-Lieut., 133, 136, 138-9, 148
Helmieh, 252
Hensley, Major F. K., 243, 247
Hensman, Mr., 98
Herat, 80, 91-2, 94, 119
Hills, Lieut., 40
Hills, Major-General, 119
Hinaidi, 209, 219, 222, 228
Hindishi, 219
Hindu Raj Pass, 176
Hindu Rao, 37, 39, 44, 46, 47
Hinnis Tangi, 260
His Majesty the King, 213
Hit, 210-11, 214
- Hobday, Colonel, 291
Hodgins, Capt. J. N. M., 237
Hodson, Brigadier-General G. B., 127, 151-2, 163, 173, 178, 180, 185, 281, 283-4
Hodson, Major W. S. R., 9-18, 26-31, 41-5, 53-4, 286-7, 289
Hodson, Mrs. W. S. R., 286
Hodson Bastion, 287
Homs, 239-40
Hoshtora, 250
Hoti, 180, 293
Hoti, Khan of, 285
Howe, 2/Lieut. G. E., 207
Howell, Brigadier-General P., 187, 190
Hudeira, 235, 237
Hughes, Capt. C. R., 243, 245-6, 251
Hughes, Lieut. H. W., 75, 81, 85, 87, 111, 116, 119, 280
Hunza, 277
Hussain, Havildar, 94
Hussain, Sowar Ali, 72
Hussain, Sepoy Mir, 189
Hussain, Jemadar Saadat, 206
Hussanabad, 222
Hutchinson, Lieut.-Colonel R. C., 75, 81, 89, 111, 116, 119, 122-4, 283, 293-4
Huwaish, 216-17
- Ilai, 182
Imam Mahdi, 208
Inayat Kila, 170, 174-6, 178-9
Indus River, 6, 7, 16, 33, 73, 285
Iranian Plateau, 220
Iro Manzil Pass, 107-8
Iron Bridge, 209, 215
Ironside, General Sir E., 221
Ismail Hakki, 217
Ismailia, 228
Istabulat, 215, 275
- Jabul, 208
Jackson, Lieut. W. F., 206, 208, 214, 217
Jackson, Major, 22
Jacobabad, 282
Jafar, Lance-Naik Mir, 159
Jafia, 229, 232
Jag Bahadur, Jemadar, 115
Jagdalak, 107-9, 120
Jagraon, 34
Jagtu, Naik, 241
Jalala, 30, 75, 132, 163, 179, 191, 205
Jalalabad, 84-5, 87, 105-6, 108, 257
Jamalgarhi, 283, 292
Jameson, Capt. J. H., 255-8
Jammu Pass, 28
Jamrud, 78-82, 105-6, 186, 188
Jan, Sepoy Dar, 162
Jan, Dafadar Muhammad, 222
Jan, Subadar Shahi, 162, 174
Janbatai Pass, 130
Jandol, 129-30, 143, 148
Jandol, Khan of, 129
Jandol River, 139, 140, 142, 147, 169
Jandol Valley, 139, 179
Jandola, 260, 261-2, 266-7
Jandola Camp, 261
Jangi, Lance-Naik, 100
Jani-ki-Sang, 34

- Janjai, 265
 Jarobi, 168
 Jar Qala, 176, 179
 Jebeil, 238, 250
 Jebel Hamrin, 207, 215, 226
 Jebel Khanuka, 214, 215
 Jebel Makhul, 214, 215
 Jeffreys, Brigadier-General P. D., 159, 167, 170-1, 173-5, 177-8, 180
 Jeffries, Capt. H. R. M., 255, 260, 261
 Jehangira, 7, 211
 Jelil, 229, 232-3
 Jenkins, Colonel Sir F. H., 62-3, 65-6, 68-70, 76-9, 81-3, 85, 86-7, 88-9, 103, 106-9, 110-19, 121-2, 152, 291, 293
 Jenkyns, Mr., 90-1, 96-8, 102
 Jhelum, 16, 33-4, 206
 Jholagram, 167
 Jibniyeh, 208
 Jilaat Hussain, 208
 Jiljilia, 244
 Jindan, Rani, 2
 Jisi Ayash, 239
 Jit, Havildar Dhan, 233
 Johnstone, Major, 67
 Jones, Capt. I. N., 215, 217
 Jones, Brigadier-General, 45
 Jordan, River, 244, 292
 Jordan Valley, 234
 Jowar, 181-2
 Jughtu, Sepoy, 202
 Juma Masjid, 48
 Jumna River, 4, 37, 48
 Jung, Havildar Bahadur, 241
 Junie, 238, 250

 Kabul, 2, 72, 77-8, 80, 84-5, 88, 90-2, 94, 96, 98-101, 106-9, 112-13, 115-17, 119-21, 129, 152, 186, 257, 292, 294
 Kabul, Amir of, 79, 122
 Kabul River, 7, 19, 22, 54, 73, 85, 107, 153, 211
 Kafr-el-Zayat, 240-1
 Kaikileh, 249
 Kak, 196
 Kaliran, 35
 Kalpani River, 286, 288, 289
 Kalu Khan, 8
 Kamali, 167
 Kamar, 171
 Kamarudin, Naik, 53, 65
 Kamokee, 34
 Kamrani Pass, 139
 Kana Kutch, 10
 Kanari, 11
 Kandahar, 31, 55-6, 80, 84, 92, 105, 116, 119, 279, 285
 Kandoa, 28
 Kane, Lieut., 145
 Kangavar, 219
 Kanhar, 127-8
 Kaniguram, 59, 260, 265-6
 Kanoude, 49
 Kantara, 229, 240, 249, 251-2
 Kantara East, 244
 Kantara West, 244, 251
 Karachi, 205-6, 223, 225, 241-2

 Karakar Pass, 166
 Kare Anjir, 218
 Karim, Sowar, 53
 Karnal, 35, 42
 Karppa Pass, 188
 Kasauli, 26
 Kashgar, 71, 193, 277
 Kashmir, 1, 5-6, 277, 283, 292
 Kashmir Bastion, 45
 Kashmir Gate, 45
 Kasim Dheri, 282
 Kasvin, 219-22
 Katakushta, 81-3, 88
 Katasang, 107
 Katgala Pass, 139, 196-7
 Katlang, 8, 19, 180, 183, 192
 Kats Laghman, 85
 Kats Muhammad Ali, 107
 Kaufmann, General, 77
 Kaur Bridge, 259
 Kay, Major H. C., 214
 Kaye, 47
 Kazian, 219
 Kefr-el-Lebad, 248
 Kelly, Dr. A. H., 74-5, 81, 87, 90, 93-4, 96-8, 102
 Kembball, Brigadier-General A. G., 228
 Kemm, Capt. A. H., 204, 243, 245-6, 248-9
 Kennedy, Lieut.-General Sir T. G., 33, 37-9, 49-52, 54-6, 58
 Ker, 2/Lieut. J. S., 207
 Kerind, 219
 Kermanshah, 219, 222
 Kerr, Lord Ralph, 86
 Keyes, General Sir C. P., 64-5, 70, 74
 Keyes, Lieut. C. V., 155, 159-61
 Khabbal, 55, 69
 Khairabad, 17
 Khairulla, Jemadar, 38
 Khairulla, Sowar, 99
 Khalel Pass, 166
 Khalik Dad, Jemadar, 28
 Khalozai, 171
 Khalsa, 17
 Khan, Jemadar Abdullah, 207
 Khan, Resaidar Abdullah, 217
 Khan, Amir Abdur Rahman, 119
 Khan, Sepoy Ahmad, 249
 Khan, Subadar Ahmad, 38, 53, 55, 66, 73, 244, 248
 Khan, Ajun, 24
 Khan, Sowar Akbar, 99
 Khan, Sowar Alaf, 164, 166
 Khan, Subadar Alam, 179, 202, 225, 283
 Khan, Naik Allah, 232-3
 Khan, Jemadar Arsala, 275
 Khan, Resaidar Ashraf, 50, 53
 Khan Baghdadi, 210-12, 214
 Khan, Jemadar Bahadur, 195, 244, 250, 271, 273, 276
 Khan Beg Kor, 189
 Khan, Dafadar Bura, 164, 166
 Khan, Sepoy Daria, 100
 Khan, Dilawur, 6, 7
 Khan, Faiz Muhammad, 78-9
 Khan, Risaldar Fatteh, 9-10, 12, 18, 21-2, 293
 Khan, Jemadar Firdos, 207

- Khan, Ghulam Haidar, 206
 Khan, Ghulam Nakshband, 84
 Khan, Subadar Gujar, 244
 Khan, Haidar, 87
 Khan, Hakim, 190
 Khan, Havildar Hussain, 249
 Khan, Jemadar Ibrahim, 32
 Khan, Subadar Ismail, 244
 Khan, General Karim, 94, 97
 Khan, Subadar Khaista, 260
 Khan, Risaldar Khanan, 11, 39, 53
 Khan, Khudu, 30
 Khan, Sirdar Khushdil, 90
 Khan, Jemadar Lal, 244
 Khan, Jemadar Latif, 30
 Khan, Risaldar Mahmud, 63, 85, 87
 Khan, Lance-Naik Mao, 241
 Khan, Sepoy Mir Haz, 100
 Khan, Kote-Dafadar Muhammad, 284
 Khan, Risaldar Muhammad, 19, 37-8, 42-3, 53
 Khan, Sowar Muhammad, 164, 166
 Khan, Subadar Muhammad, 234, 241
 Khan, Muhammad Hasan, 116
 Khan, Muhammad Hussain, 53
 Khan, Risaldar Muhammad Sarwar, 206-7
 Khan, Risaldar Muhammad Sherif, 96
 Khan, Mukaram, 22
 Khan, Jemadar Mustafa, 244
 Khan, Muzaffur, 126
 Khan, General Nadir, 255-6
 Khan, Subadar Nadir, 261-2, 268
 Khan, Risaldar-Major Nakshband, 91-2, 96
 Khan, Jemadar Natha, 193, 208, 269
 Khan, Nuqtah, 210, 214
 Khan, Risaldar Nur, 207
 Khan, Pasand, 8
 Khan, Kote-Dafadar Pir Muhammad, 40
 Khan, Resaidar Pulwan, 19
 Khan, Subadar Rasul, 12-13, 19
 Khan, Jemadar Saadat Hussain, 207
 Khan, Subadar Saida, 225, 233
 Khan, Subadar Samundar, 122, 276
 Khan, Subadar-Major Sarfaraz, 162, 293
 Khan, Jemadar Shadi, 244, 262
 Khan, Resaidar Sharbat Ali, 184
 Khan, Amir Sher Ali, 80, 84
 Khan, Jemadar Sher Muhammad, 270
 Khan, Subadar Shukr, 27
 Khan, Jemadar Siffat, 71
 Khan, Jemadar Sikandar, 171, 174, 179
 Khan, Subadar Sirdar, 272
 Khan, Sepoy Sohbat, 159, 179, 186
 Khan, Lieut. Taj Muhammad, 202, 225, 253, 268, 293
 Khan, Sirdar Wali Muhammad, 96
 Khan, Yahya, 93
 Khan, Amir Yakub, 84, 88, 90, 108
 Khan, Dr. Yakub, 32, 53, 55
 Khan, Sepoy Yakub, 100
 Khan, Lance-Naik Zamir, 249
 Khan, Resaidar Zardad, 207
 Khan, Jemadar Zarif, 207
 Khanikin, 222
 Khapak Pass, 189
 Khar, 137-9, 153, 163, 167, 169, 184
 Khar Plain, 158, 161
 Kharlachi, 256
 Khazana, 142
 Khazana Ghund, 203
 Khel, Jemadar Masam, 59
 Khiali River, 187
 Khirgi, 260, 267
 Khiva, 77
 Khoedad, Sepoy, 100
 Khoja Khel, 85-6
 Khokand, 77
 Khost, 255
 Khuai, 181
 Khubri East, 274
 Khudu Khel, 189, 195
 Khui, 21
 Khungai, 140
 Khungai Fort, 139
 Khushal, Jemadar, 202, 225
 Khushalgarh, 28, 73
 Khyber Pass, 6, 15, 17, 31, 80-4, 88, 105-6, 119, 126, 167, 188
 Kiamari, 206, 225
 Kifri, 207
 Kingargalai, 181-3
 Kinloch, Brigadier-General, 136
 Kirkpatrick, Capt., 192
 Kirkuk, 207, 218-19
 Kirtiman, Subadar, 230, 276
 Kishen, Kote-Dafadar Ram, 160
 Kisiwani, 274
 Kissengunge, 37, 46-7
 Kitchen, Capt., 255, 258
 Knight, Major L. R., 255, 259, 261, 263-4, 267-8
 Koga, 62-3, 183
 Koga Pass, 171
 Kohat, 21, 28, 33, 56, 62, 74, 79, 126, 255-6, 258, 284
 Kohat Pass, 20, 28, 73
 Koh-i-Daman, 115
 Kohistan, 109, 111-12, 166
 Kom Abu Rade, 251
 Korla, 34
 Korogwe, 274
 Kot Azam, 259-60
 Kotah, 165
 Kotaniyeh, 208-9
 Kotkai, 27, 127-8, 139-40, 169, 262, 267
 Kotke Pass, 166
 Kuchik Khan, 220
 Kuen-Lun, 277
 Kuhin, 220, 222
 Kuka China Pass, 73
 Kulachi, 11
 Kulalwalla, 13
 Kulla-Fi-Arangi, 95
 Kunar River, 130
 Kunar Valley, 129
 Kuria, 63, 68-9
 Kurram, 105
 Kurram River, 56, 256, 258
 Kurram Valley, 80, 91, 152, 255, 257
 Kut, 207-8, 275
 Kut-al-Amara, 208, 222, 228
 Kutcherry, 34
 Kuti Khel, 116
 Kuz Istia, 257

- La Bricque, 272
 "Ladder of Tyre," 238
 Ladha, 266
 Ladysmith, 292
 Laghman Valley, 108
 Lahore, 5, 9-13, 34, 40, 46, 48, 72
 Lahoru, Jemadar, 244
 Lajj, 208
 Lakarai, 175
 Lake, Lieut., 17
 Lalpur, Chief of, 22
 Lalu, 66-7
 Landakai, 153, 158, 163-5, 291
 Landakai Spur, 184, 196
 Landi Khana, 83
 Landi Kotal, 82-3, 105-6, 188
 Lansdowne, Marquis of, 126
 Laorai Pass, 130
 Laq Laq Island, 218
 Laram Hills, 130
 Laram Pass, 139
 Larsauli, 35-6
 Lashkari Banda, 73
 Lashora, 81-2
 Lataband, 109, 114
 Lataband Pass, 107
 Latif, Lance-Naik Abdul, 234
 Latrun, 244
 Lawrence, Colonel G., 8, 16, 26, 285
 Lawrence, Mrs. G., 16, 35
 Lawrence, Colonel Sir H. M., 1-5, 9-10, 18, 20, 26, 30, 124
 Lawrence, Sir John, 1, 7-8, 30, 38, 42, 49, 55
 Leach, Capt., 85
 Leaman, Lieut., 231
 Le Bas, Mr., 35
 Lebanon, 238, 240
 Lee, Lieut. R., 237
 Lehna, Lance-Naik, 114
 Leslie, Major-General, 226, 229, 267
 Lesser Zab River, 215
 Lewis, Lieut., 58
 Lewtas, Surgeon J., 81, 85, 87, 109, 112, 114, 116, 118-19
 Lockhart, Lieut.-General Sir W., 129, 151-2, 176
 Logar River, 111
 Longfield, Brigadier-General, 46
 Loos, 273
 Love, Major R. H. A. D., 219
 Low, Major-General Sir R. C., 131-3, 135, 137-8, 143-4, 146-7, 149
 Lower Egypt, 240, 250
 Lower Sitana, 55
 Lower Swat Canal, 155, 203, 278, 288, 291
 Lucknow, 54
 Ludd, 229, 244, 249
 Ludhiana, 34
 Lukhai, 108
 Lumsden, 51
 Lumsden, Lieut.-General Sir H. B., 4-12, 14-17, 19-26, 31-2, 33, 55-6, 58-9, 61, 125, 150, 152, 279, 290, 292-4
 Lumsden, Lieut. P., 32, 56
 Lumsden Bastion, 287
 Lundkhuar, 8, 285
 Luni, 259
 Lyell, Dr. R., 19, 22, 27-9, 55
 Lytton, Lord, 77-8
 Maadi, 251
 Macartney, Sir G., 276
 MacBarnett, 51
 McCaskill, Lieut.-Colonel J. C. H., 155-6, 180, 189
 McConaghey, Lieut. F., 179-80
 McFarlane, Lieut., 258
 MacGregor, Colonel Sir C., 93, 101-3, 120-1, 126
 Macgregor, Capt. L. E., 232
 Machai, 63
 MacHutchin, Lieut. G., 128
 Mackenzie, Lieut. A., 53
 Mackeson, Colonel, 16, 27, 30
 Mackeson, Fort, 28
 McLagan, Lieut., 3
 McLean, Lieut. C. S., 48, 53
 MacLean, Lieut. H. L. S., 128, 133, 138, 145, 151, 155, 163-6, 281, 291, 294
 McLeod, Major-General D. K., 187, 192-3, 219
 Macnab, Surgeon-Capt., 155, 160-1, 180
 Macnamara, Lieut., 197-8, 292
 McNeill, Capt., 192
 Macpherson, General, 85, 107, 109, 112-14, 117-19
 McQueen, Major-General Sir J., 127
 McRae, Colonel, 182
 "Mad Fakir," 168, 182, 184
 Mada Baba Ziarat, 75
 Madugure, 274
 Magazine Bastion, 287
 Mahaban, 62
 Mahaban Mountain, 61, 64, 68
 Maharaj, Guru, 11
 Mahidasht, 219
 Mahi-ud-Din, 11
 Mahmud, Jemadar Sultan, 262
 Maidan Algad Plateau, 266
 Maidan Valley, 148
 Maidanai, 57
 Maini, 69
 Maiwand, 119
 Maizullah, Naik, 65
 Makhmadin, Sepoy, 145
 Makhranai, 128
 Makin, 59, 260, 265
 Mal, Lunga, 11
 Malakand, 136, 148, 153, 155-63, 169, 179, 182-3, 205, 243, 293
 Malakand Fort, 154
 Malakand Pass, 24, 132-5, 137-9, 154
 Malandri Pass, 180, 192, 200
 Malandri Valley, 123, 192, 199
 Malandri, 197-8
 Malandri Pitao, 123, 192, 199, 200
 Malandri Surai, 123, 199
 Malka, 61, 66-8
 Mallins, Surgeon, 75
 Mamund Valley, 173, 176
 Mandanna Kach, 261
 Mandi, 69
 Manduri, 255
 Manga, Havildar, 189
 Mangal Thana, 54, 62
 Manglaur, 166
 Mangtu, Jemadar, 225, 233, 273

- Manian, 219
 Manipur, 280
 Manjha, 25
 Manjhi, 259-60
 Mankot, 171
 Mantaris, 208
 Manzai, 267
 Mardan, 2, 7-8, 19, 22, 30, 33-4, 35-6, 38, 52, 54, 56, 61-2, 69-76, 78-80, 88, 90, 103, 106, 108, 120, 122-4, 126-8, 131-2, 148, 150-1, 153, 155-7, 159, 161, 163, 167, 169, 179-80, 183-4, 186-7, 189, 191-3, 195, 199, 201-6, 208-9, 212, 223, 225-7, 238, 242-3, 252, 254, 256-8, 267-70, 275, 278-80, 282-6, 288-9, 291, 293-4
 Mardani, Sepoy, 234
 Margho Kandao, 257
 Margil, 207
 Mari Indus, 267
 Markhanai, 169
 Marobi, 260, 265
 Marshall, General Sir W. R., 209, 210, 214, 217-18
 Marshall, A. H., 253
 Masamdag, 208
 Massy, Brigadier-General, 92, 105, 109
 Matomondo, 274
 Matta, 22
 Matta Mughal Khel, 187
 Matta Shah, 179
 Matun, 255-6
 Maude, Major-General, 83
 Maude, General Sir S., 207, 209
 Mauri, 274
 Mawhood, Lieut. J. C., 219, 222
 Maxwell, Lieut. F. A., 131, 135, 140, 142-4, 148
 Mazinghem, 274
 Maznur, Sepoy, 100
 Meade, Lieut. I. de C., 108
 Mecca, 250
 Meerut, 33, 36-7, 52
 Mehtar, 130
 Meiklejohn, Brigadier-General W. H., 154-5, 158-63, 178, 182
 Mejdalaya, 240
 Melogan, 196
 Menjil, 220
 Merv, 277, 292
 Meshed, 185, 191
 Mesopotamia, 202-7, 209, 218, 223, 225, 229-30, 270, 274
 Messudie Junction, 237
 Mex, 241
 Mexaa Mahmud, 250
 Mian Kalai, 139, 146-7
 Mian Khan, 9, 70
 Mian Khel, 22
 Michni, 22, 84, 203
 Mihna, 34
 Miller, Lieut. H. N., 18, 19, 22, 26
 Minchin, Lieut., 154
 Mingaora, 166
 Minia, 251
 Mirariah, 13
 Mir Bacha, 115
 Mirkhanni, 191
 Miru, Sowar, 99
 Mitai, 175
 Mitchell, 2/Lieut. C. H., 243
 Mitla Pass, 274
 Moascar, 228-9
 Mohallat-el-Kuhrat, 240
 Mohibulla, Jemadar, 206
 Mokattam Hills, 252
 Molony, Capt. C. W., 243, 245-7, 249
 Mombasa, 274
 Money, Capt. H. D. K., 226, 268
 Montgomerie, Lieut. A. W. J., 53
 "Mooltan," 17
 Mora Pass, 132, 163
 Mori Bastion, 45, 47
 Morris, Major C. E., 189, 208
 Morris, Capt. N. B., 258
 Mosul, 207, 215-18
 Mount Carmel, 237
 Mugh Darah, 8
 Muhammad Agha, 116
 Muhammad, Naik Atta, 237, 241
 Muhammad, Amir Dost, 17, 31, 116
 Muhammad, Kote-Dafadar Fatteh, 94, 100
 Muhammad, Dafadar Fatteh, 72
 Muhammad, Naik Ghulam, 241
 Muhammad, Havildar Ghulam, 234
 Muhammad, Dafadar Hayat, 164, 166
 Muhammad, Jemadar Nur, 225
 Muhammad, Naik Nur, 71, 241
 Muhammad, Subadar Nur, 230, 276
 Muhammad, Sowar Pir, 161
 Muhammad, Dafadar Sher, 191
 Muhammad, Sowar Sher, 195
 Muhammad, Jemadar Sultan, 259, 268
 Muhazu, 274
 Mula, Jemadar, 225
 Mulraj, Diwan, 11-12
 Multan, 11-12, 14, 17, 25, 80
 Multani, Sepoy, 67
 Munda, 140, 147-8, 294
 Murray, Lieut. A. W., 42-3, 47, 51, 53
 Murray, Lieut., 193
 Musahib, Lance-Naik, 241
 Muscat, 228
 Musheirafah, 238
 Mushki, 126
 Muter, Capt., 46
 Muztagh Pass, 277
 Nabi, ex-Sepoy Ghulam, 96
 Nablus, 234-5, 237
 Nadrai, 128
 Nafata, 210
 Nahakki Pass, 188-9
 Nahavand, 219
 Nahr-el-Faliq, 248
 Nahr Umar, 207-8, 228
 Najafgarh Canal, 45
 Napier, Capt. the Hon. G., 72
 Napier, Field-Marshal Lord, 1, 9, 20, 27
 Nara Khulla, 74
 Narai, 192, 203
 Narnoul, 49, 50
 Nasar Camp, 11
 Nasim, Sepoy Muhammad, 186
 Naurangabad-ki-Serai, 16

- Nawab, Naik, 241
 Nawagai, 167-9, 175, 183
 Nawagai, Khan of, 167
 Nawe Dhand, 23-4
 Nawe Kalai, 62-3, 69, 165-6, 182
 Nazareth, 251
 Neave, Capt. A. L. W., 243, 245-6, 248
 Nepal, 291
 Neuve Chapelle, 269, 271, 273
 Newbolt, Sir H., 104
 Niag, 171
 Nicholson, General, 45-6, 51, 54
 Nicholson, Lieut., 68
 Nikanai Hill, 182
 Nile, River, 240, 251
 Nisibin, 218
 Nizam-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral, 129
 Nkessa, 274
 Norman, Brigadier-General C. L., 281-2
 Norman, Lieut. W. H., 159, 161, 164-5, 167
 "North Sister," 231, 233-4
 Norton, General, 217
 Nowshera, 19, 21, 33, 54-5, 70, 73, 103, 131-2, 151, 185, 187, 192, 201, 205-6, 225, 243, 267, 279, 282-4, 288
 Nowsheri, Havildar, 232, 241
 Nur, Abdullah, 78
 Nur, Havildar Awul, 277
 Nur, Jemadar Mian, 244, 248
 Nurabdin, Sepoy, 72
 Nurpore, 15
 Oghi, 127-9
 Ogilvie, Major J. F. W., 197-8, 206, 208-9, 211, 214
 Ommaney, Capt. A. H., 131, 134-5, 159, 163, 294
 Ommaney, Lieut. A. M., 62, 68-9
 Ouderdom, 271
 Oudh, 39
 Oxus River, 72
 Paharunpur, 37, 46
 Paiah, 73, 74
 Pailam, 127-8
 Paitak, 219, 222
 Pajja Mountain, 283, 289
 Palai, 9, 20
 Palestine, 228-30, 238, 242, 244, 251-2, 271, 276, 282, 292
 Palk, Capt. L. C., 219
 Palmer, Capt., 162, 164-5
 Palmer, Major-Gen. Sir A. P., 151
 Palmerston, Lord, 59
 Palosai Plain, 128
 Palosin Kach, 58
 Palosina, 262, 267
 Palosina Plain, 261
 Pandiali, Chief of, 22
 Panepal, 81-2
 Pangani, 274
 Panjaba, Sowar, 161
 Panji Gali, 27
 Panjkora, 130, 168-9, 176-7
 Panjkora River, 139, 140, 142-6, 196
 Panjkora Valley, 130
 Panjpao, 22
 Panjpao River, 22
 Panjtar, 55
 Panjtar Hills, 8, 18
 Parachinar, 255-8
 Parapure, 259
 Pari Dara, 107
 Parker, Lieut. E., 256
 Parmulai, 63
 Partab, Sepoy, 100
 Pasand, Jemadar Shah, 207
 Pashat, 179
 Pathankot, 15
 Patiala, 193, 281
 Pattullo, Lieut., 3
 Peebles, Capt., 145-6
 Peiwar, 92, 255, 257-8
 Perry, Surgeon-Lieut. E. L., 167, 174
 Persia, 72, 219, 222, 270
 Pesh Bulak, 83
 Peshawar, 2, 7-8, 17-21, 23-5, 27-8, 30-1, 33, 51-2, 54, 70, 74, 78-9, 83-4, 88, 107, 126, 153, 168, 187-8, 191, 195, 201, 270, 282, 285, 290
 Peshawar Valley, 22, 62, 80
 Pezu, 259, 267
 Pezwan, 107-8
 Piaza Raghza, 265, 267
 Pigeon Rocks, 250
 Pigot, Lieut. H., 219-20
 Pindigheb, 279
 Pipli, 35
 Pir Baba, 182
 Piran, 136
 Pirano-Kili, 160-1
 Pirghal Mountains, 59
 Pirsai, 197-8
 Pirsai Pass, 180-2
 Pirzanda Bela, 128
 Pitao Malandri, 123, 192, 199-200
 Plassey, 41
 "Point 2510," 261
 Pollock, Colonel R. C. G., 204, 244, 253
 "Pope's Nose," 273
 "Port Arthur," 273
 Port Said, 240, 251, 274
 Potah, 259
 Powinda, Mullah, 265
 Powindiah, 34
 Prang Ghar, 24
 Prendergast, Lieut., 3
 Prendergast, Lieut.-Colonel N. H., 189, 192, 292
 Primrose, General, 119
 Prince of Wales, H.R.H., 274
 Prioleau, Lieut. C. P. J., 206, 214, 217
 Pritchard, Capt., 255, 257
 Probyn, General Sir D., 63, 67, 72, 183
 "Pucka Serai," 16
 "Punjaub," 17
 Pustawanai Valley, 74
 Qaiyara, 218
 Qala Salih, 208
 Qantarar, 227
 Qubba, 210-11
 Quentin, 273
 Quetta, Staff College, 193
 Quraitu, 219, 222
 Qurnah, 208

- Ragpat, Naik, 241
 Rahman, Abdur, 53, 116
 Rai, Jemadar Dhanpat, 207
 Raj, Sepoy Kabi, 233
 Rajah, Subadar, 143, 145
 Rajpooora, 35
 Rakan-ud-din, Mian, 75
 Ram, Risaldar Abnashi, 190, 206
 Ram, Subadar Devi, 237
 Ram, Sowar Dowlut, 87
 Ram, Lance-Naik Hasta, 233
 Ram, Sowar Paras, 100
 Ram, Jemadar Rajah, 207
 Ram, Resaidar Tirath, 160-1
 Ramadi, 210
 Rambat Pass, 169-70
 Ramora, 137-8
 Rana, Sepoy Kali, 242
 Rangalnagar, 13
 Ranizai, 24, 26
 Rao, 291
 Ras-el-Ain, 238
 Ras-el-Lados, 238-9
 Rasul, Sepoy, 95-6, 100
 Ravi, River, 10, 14-15
 Rawalpindi, 16, 17, 33-4, 122, 224, 258, 281
 Rawlinson, General Lord, 242
 Rayak, 250-1
 Razani, 59
 Razmak, 59
 Rechnah Doab, 25
 Redding, Capt. J. E., 237
 Reed, Major-General, 33, 39, 42, 44
 Reekie, 2/Lieut. J., 207
 Rega, 182
 Reid, Colonel, 39, 41, 44, 46, 159, 162
 Resht, 221
 Rich, Lieut. C. L. M., 128
 Rich, Capt. E. P., 230, 237
 Richard Cœur de Lion, 245
 Richebourg St. Vaast, 271
 Riez Bailleul, 273
 Risalpur, 206, 279, 282-3
 Rivière des Layes, 273
 Roberts, Brigadier-General A., 25
 Roberts, Lieut., 257
 Roberts, Lord, 36, 48, 67-8, 80, 91-3, 98, 101-3, 105-9, 111, 113-16, 118-20, 126, 183
 Robertson, Field-Marshal Sir W., 139, 144
 Robins, Lieut. E., 255, 257
 Rohtak, 44
 Rohtas Mountain, 81-2
 Romala, Subadar, 202
 Romano, 265
 Rosa, Kahan Singh, 35, 37
 Rose, 2/Lieut. S. G. S., 243, 246
 Roseveare, Lieut. F. B., 228
 Roshpina, 251
 Ross, General, 116
 Ross-Smith, 2/Lieut. W., 203, 270
 Rothney, Major, 58
 Ruan, 219
 Rue du Bois, 271, 273
 Rufigi River, 274
 Rushakai, 103
 Russia, 77, 193, 276
 Russian Turkestan, 277
 Rustam, 123-4, 180-1, 183, 192, 197, 199-201, 203, 292
 Ruwe River, 274
 Ryder, Capt. 172-4
 Sabzi Mandi, 37, 39, 41-3
 Sadda, 255-6, 258
 Sado, 130, 139-40, 167-9
 Sadr-ud-Din, Kote-Dafadar, 161
 Sadullah, 153
 Sadusam, 11
 Safed Sang, 87, 107
 Sahiliya, 210-11
 Said Haif, 208
 Saida, 238
 Saif-ud-Din, 13
 St. Jean, 272
 St. Petersburg, 77
 Sakricha, 208
 Salarzai Valley, 148, 179
 Salim Khan, 55
 Sam Baizai, 19-20
 Sam Browne Bastion, 287
 Samakh, 251
 Samana, 153, 167
 Samar, 208
 Samaria, 237
 Samarra, 207, 226-8, 275
 Samasata, 206
 Samundar, Jemadar, 225
 Samundar, Subadar, 65, 142
 Sandaki, 196
 Sandeman, Colonel D., 187, 189, 192, 197, 203-4, 225, 227, 229-30, 237, 240
 Sanford, Capt. C. A., 45, 47, 50, 53
 Sang i Sarai, 84
 Sanghao, 19, 70, 123, 180, 182-3
 Sannayat, 208, 275-6
 Sanpu River, 186
 Sapri, 74-5
 Sapri Peak, 81-2
 Saracens, 245
 Sarai, 169
 Sarghasha Pass, 28
 Sar-i-pul, 219
 Sarkai Ridge, 262-3
 Saro Rogha, 262-5, 267
 Saroba, 59
 Saron, 229, 245
 Saronwalla, 13
 Sarpoorah, 121
 Saveh, 219
 Sawada, 208
 Scarth, 2/Lieut. A. E., 203, 275, 276
 Scott, Colonel, 138, 147
 Seaton, Colonel, 43
 Secunderabad, 61
 Seh Baba, 109, 114
 Selimgarh, 48
 Senu, Lance-Naik, 143, 145
 Serai, 129, 148
 Seri, 61
 Shabkadar, 22, 168, 187-8, 195, 201
 Shabkadar Fort, 153, 186
 Shadipur, 73
 Shafi, 208
 Shagai, 83

- Shah, Naik Adil, 241
 Shah, Sowar Akbar, 10, 94, 100
 Shah, Sepoy Alam, 100
 Shah, Havildar Barkat, 242
 Shah, General Daud, 93-4
 Shah Daula, 264
 Shah, Sepoy Ghani, 136
 Shah, Jemadar Haidar Ali, 244, 247
 Shah, Kasim Ali, 53
 Shah, Jemadar Khawas, 190, 203, 275
 Shah, Nadir, 285
 Shah, Lance-Dafadar Sikandar, 149
 Shah, Suban, 28
 Shahbaz Khan Kor, 187
 Shahkot, 24, 75, 134, 137
 Shahkot Pass, 132
 Shaikshi, 208
 Shakari, 21
 Shalufa, 274
 Shamatai of Toru, Colour-Havildar, 272
 Shamelai Pass, 166
 Shamshi-Khan, 139
 Shankar, Havildar, 241-2
 Shankarghar, 168
 Sharif Khana, 171
 Sharon, 238
 Sharon, Plain of, 249
 Shatt-el-Arab, 207
 Shaw, Mr. Robert, 71
 Shawi Khan, 275
 Shea, Major-General Sir J. M. S., 244, 246, 249
 Shebbeare, Capt. R. H., 41, 43-4, 47-8, 53
 Sheikh Muannis, 245
 Sheikh Saad, 208
 Sheikhapura, 10
 Sher Khana, 20
 Shergarah, 27
 Shergarb, 24, 84
 Sherif, Jemadar Muhammad, 85
 Shergpur, 91, 99, 108-9, 111, 113-16, 120-1
 Sherqat, 214-15, 217-18
 Shibba, Sepoy, 100
 Shibil Pass, 220
 Shigo Kach, 139
 Shin Kor, 264
 Shindand, 126
 Shindar Mountains, 59
 Shindh, 74
 Shingi Kot, 59
 Shinkot, 171
 Shippard, Lieut. S. S. A., 206, 214, 215
 Shoshni, 27
 Showers, Brigadier, 49
 Shuja, 228
 Shumran, 208
 Shungali, 27
 Shutur Gardan Pass, 91-2, 105
 Shuweikeh, 249
 Siah-Dehan, 219, 221
 Siah Koh, 85
 Siah Sung, 110-11, 115
 Sialkot, 47
 Sidi Bishr, 249
 Sidi Gaber, 249
 Sikandar, Lance-Naik, 30, 71
 Simla, 36, 51, 77, 90, 92, 118, 193
 Sind, 1
 Sing, Jemadar Kaman, 225
 Sing, Havildar Karna, 241
 Sing, Jemadar Kharak, 39
 Sing, Subadar Kour, 30, 39, 42
 Sing, Subadar Rup, 112, 114
 Singh, Sepoy Ajaib, 100
 Singh, Jemadar Amar, 100, 244
 Singh, Jemadar Arjan, 207
 Singh, Autar, 53
 Singh, Risaldar-Major Bahadur, 101, 190, 207, 283
 Singh, Subadar Bahadur, 129, 164, 166, 292
 Singh, Naik Baldeo, 241-2
 Singh, Jemadar Beant, 207
 Singh, Sepoy Bhagat, 100
 Singh, Resaidar Bhagwan, 207, 216
 Singh, Sepoy Bhan, 242, 272, 274
 Singh, Kote-Dafadar Bhup, 53, 111
 Singh, Sepoy Bishan, 162
 Singh, Naik Bishen, 241
 Singh, Sepoy Chanda, 100
 Singh, Subadar Chattar, 275-6
 Singh, Dafadar Dal, 30, 38
 Singh, Jemadar Dal, 53
 Singh, Sepoy Dasranda, 241
 Singh, Subadar Daya, 203, 275
 Singh, Risaldar Dayal, 207-8
 Singh, Sepoy Devi, 100
 Singh, Sowar Dewa, 100
 Singh, Maharajah Duleep, 1
 Singh, Sepoy Esa, 100
 Singh, Sepoy Fatteh, 100
 Singh, Subadar Fauja, 244, 249
 Singh, Sepoy Gaja, 100
 Singh, Jemadar Ganda, 14-15, 196, 205, 209, 270
 Singh, Lance-Naik Gopal, 234
 Singh, Lance-Naik Gujar, 30, 245
 Singh, Maharajah Gulab, 1, 5
 Singh, Subadar Gulab, 225
 Singh, Resaidar Gurdeo, 207
 Singh, Sowar Gurdit, 53, 100, 161
 Singh, Sepoy Hari, 100
 Singh, Jemadar Harnam, 100, 234
 Singh, Lance-Naik Hazara, 100, 179, 241
 Singh, Sepoy Hira, 100
 Singh, Risaldar Ishar, 177
 Singh, Isri, 53
 Singh, Jemadar Jagat, 75
 Singh, Capt. Jai, 52, 53, 100, 206
 Singh, Jemadar Jaimal, 244
 Singh, Jemadar Jhar, 28
 Singh, Sowar Jiwan, 38, 45, 100
 Singh, Jemadar Jiwand, 87, 96, 100-1, 129
 Singh, Resaidar Jiwand, 207, 209
 Singh, Sepoy Jowahir, 162
 Singh, Subadar Jowalla, 112, 114
 Singh, General Kahan, 10
 Singh, Resaidar Kala, 87
 Singh, Subadar Kala, 50, 53, 271, 284
 Singh, Sepoy Kartar, 234
 Singh, Subadar Kehr, 225
 Singh, Havildar Kharak, 96, 100
 Singh, Jemadar Khazan, 157
 Singh, Havildar Kishen, 199
 Singh, Lal, 2, 9
 Singh, Jemadar Mangal, 235, 237
 Singh, Sepoy Mehr, 271
 Singh, Mehrban, 39

- Singh, Jemadar Mehtab, 96, 100
 Singh, Sepoy Mith, 100
 Singh, Sowar Mul, 100
 Singh, Mutha, 30
 Singh, Jemadar Narain, 225
 Singh, Sepoy Narain, 100
 Singh, Sowar Narain, 94, 100
 Singh, Sepoy Nidhan, 100
 Singh, Dafadar Nihal, 53
 Singh, Jemadar Ousan, 24
 Singh, Havildar Pardhan, 241
 Singh, Risaldar-Major Prem, 53, 87, 120
 Singh, Sirdar Ram, 15
 Singh, Ranjit, 1, 7, 12
 Singh, Maharajah Ranjit, 285
 Singh, Sepoy Ranju, 100
 Singh, Sowar Ratan, 100
 Singh, Dafadar Sham, 161
 Singh, Jemadar Sher, 225
 Singh, Lieut. Sher, 243, 246-7
 Singh, Subadar Sher, 117-18, 120, 241
 Singh, Sepoy Subha, 67
 Singh, Lance-Dafadar Subha, 137
 Singh, Dafadar Suchet, 148
 Singh, Sepoy Tahil, 100
 Singh, Jemadar Tarlok, 244, 248
 Singh, Kote-Dafadar Tarlok, 38
 Singh, Sowar Thakur, 100
 Singh, Dafadar Tota, 137
 Singh, Sepoy Udin, 100
 Singh, Sirdar Uttur, 16
 Singh, Jemadar Wadhawa, 190, 195, 271
 Singh (1), Sepoy Wariam, 100
 Singh (2), Sepoy Wariam, 100
 Singh, Jemadar Wasawa, 207
 Singh, Sowar Wazir, 100
 Sinn-adh-Dhibban, 210, 214
 Sirandaz, Sowar, 161
 Sirmil, 219
 Sirsa, Sepoy, 100
 Sissobi Pass, 83
 Sitana, 54-5, 61-2, 69, 184
 Sitana, Maulvi of, 62
 Skeen, Major-General, 262, 267
 "Slug Hill," 264
 Smelt, Capt. M. V., 268
 Smith, Lieut. C. de H., 160-1, 176
 Sobraon, 1, 34
 Sohawah, 34
 Sohbat, Naik, 186
 Somaliland, 283
 Sonu, Sepoy, 100
 "South Sister," 231-2
 Spinkai Ghash, 261
 Spinkai Raghza, 260-2
 Spinwam, 255
 Spottiswoode, Colonel, 293
 Spurway, 2/Lieut. W. R. P., 225
 Stedman, Major-General, 149
 Stewart, Lieut.-Colonel A. C., 131-2, 134, 140, 141, 163, 180, 205-6, 208, 214, 219
 Stewart, Lieut.-General Sir D., 80, 92, 116, 119
 Stewart, Major-General G., 72-5, 77, 81, 83, 89, 111, 116, 118, 121-2, 185, 280
 Stewart, Surgeon J. L., 33, 52, 55
 Stockwell, Major, 113
 Straubenzee, Major van, 220
 "Strong Point," 266
 Subhan Kalai, 140
 Suez, 228-9, 241, 244, 274
 Suleiman, Sepoy, 100
 Suleimaniyah, 218
 Sultanabad, 222
 Sundar, Havildar, 143, 145
 Surafend, 244-5
 Surai Malandri, 123
 Surkhab, 107-8
 Surkhawai, 63, 183, 197-9
 Sursurang, 257
 Suruj Kund, 12
 Sutherland, Surgeon-Lieut. D. W., 131, 135, 141, 144
 Sutlej River, 1, 4, 34
 Swabi, 62-3, 198
 Swat, 20, 22, 129-30, 153, 182-3, 192, 196, 285-6, 291
 Swat Canal, 75, 203
 Swat Mountains, 7
 Swat River, 22, 74-5, 122, 129-30, 136-9, 146, 167, 187, 190, 195, 203
 Swat Valley, 130, 132-3, 136, 154-5, 157, 179
 Swinley, Major, 111
 Syria, 239-40, 250
 Taani, 171
 "Table Mountain," 264
 Tabriz, 220
 Tabsor, 235
 Taimus, Dafadar Shahzada, 97, 100, 184
 Taiyif, 208
 Tajidiyeh, 215
 Takht-i-Shah, 109-11, 120
 Takki Zam River, 260-4
 Takwara Pass, 179
 Talab, Risaldar Faiz, 185
 Talash Valley, 139
 Tangi, 75, 175, 190, 204
 Tangi Pass, 180-2
 Tangi, Thanadar of, 190
 Tank, 57-9, 258-60, 267
 Tantah, 240-1
 Tarbela, 26
 Tarkanri or Tarkalani, 130
 Taruni, 28
 Tashkend, 277
 Tauda China, 265, 266
 Taylor, Colonel A., 67
 Taylor, Colonel R. G., 31, 67-9.
 Teheran, 72, 221
 Tel Banat, 227
 Tel-el-Kebir, 244
 Telfit, 244
 Thackwell, Capt., 133
 Thakht Bai, 291
 Thakot, 128
 Thal, 56, 255-8
 Thana, 138, 153-5, 163, 166
 Thapa, Subadar Lal Bahadur, 260
 "The Crag," 64-5
 "The Dam," 266
 "The Sisters," 230-3, 235
 Thew, 2/Lieut. I. A., 243, 246, 253
 Thibet, 186
 Thomason, Mr., 18

- Tigris, River, 207, 209, 211, 214-17, 227-8
 Tikrit, 207, 215-16, 226, 228
 Tilli Plateau, 27, 127-8
 Tirah, 194
 Tochi Valley, 152-3, 255
 Toi Khan, 254
 Tolanj, 73
 Toll Gate, 221
 Tombs, Major, 39-40, 42, 47
 Topi, 26, 62-3
 Tota, Sepoy, 100
 Totali, 55
 Tower Hill, 202
 Towi, 15
 Trail, Lieut. R. G., 189, 193
 Transvaal, 185
 "Tree Town," 264
 Trevor, 51
 Tripoli, 235, 237-40, 250
 Tul Keram, 234, 237, 245, 248
 Tulo, 274
 Turangzai, Haji Sahib of, 197
 Turani Pass, 29
 Turkestan, 80
 Turkey, 239, 249
 Turnab, 190
 Turner, Lieut. F. McC., 26-9, 31
 Tursak, 181-2
 Tursam, Dafadar, 161
 Tuson, Surgeon, 58
 Tytler, Brigadier-General J. A., 81-2, 85, 88

 Umar, Havildar, 241
 Umballa, 34-7, 45
 Umra Khan, 130, 138-9, 147
 Unwin, Colonel, 187
 Upper Bala Hissar, 98
 Upper Kurram Valley, 90
 Upper Sitana, 55
 Upper Swat, 138, 165-7, 184, 290
 Upper Swat Canal, 278-9, 282
 Uqbah, 210
 Ushiri River, 143
 Utete, 274
 Uthmaniyeh, 215
 Utman Khel, 19, 23-4, 141
 Utsaar, 257


 Vans Agnew, Lieut., 11
 Vieille Chapelle, 271
 Villiers-Stuart, Lieut.-Colonel W., 254
 Vivian, Lieut.-Colonel, 170-1
 Vlamertinghe, 272
 Vousden, Colonel W. J., 150

 Wadi Falik, 245
 Wadi Hauran, 212, 214
 Wadi Hurab-el-Miskeh, 235
 Wainwright, Lieut. J. G., 230, 276
 Wali, Havildar Shah, 241
 Wallis, Lieut. C., 207, 214
 Wana, 152
 Wapshare, Lieut.-General R., 254
 Warburton, Capt., 75
 Ward, Lieut. H. C. E., 49, 53, 55-6
 Wardak, 116
 Wardlaw, Colonel, 50
 Wardlaw, Captain, 51
 Wardrop, Major-General A. E., 252
 Warm Bad, 185
 Watalai Valley, 170
 Water Bastion, 45
 Waterfield, Brigadier-General H. G., 131, 133-4, 138
 Waterfield, Lieut. A. C. M., 159
 Watson, Brigadier-General C. F., 244
 Watts, Capt. E. P., 232
 Wazir, Jemadar, 225
 Wazirabad, 15-16
 Waziristan, 56, 61, 153, 241-2, 260
 Wells, Lieut. L. S., 189
 Wheeler, Brigadier-General, 13, 15, 19
 Whish, General, 12
 White, Major, 117
 White, Sir George, 144, 178
 Wilde, Lieut.-General Sir A. T., 62-3, 65-7, 69-70, 294
 Wilkinson, Lieut. R. R., 268
 Willcocks, General Sir J., 187-9, 193, 271
 Williamson, Brigadier-General R. F., 127
 Willock, Lieut. F. G., 53
 Wilson, Brigadier-General, 44, 48
 Winton, Lieut. C. A., 233-4, 237
 Woodyatt, Brigadier-General N., 199-201
 Worlledge, Major, 174
 Wright, Major, 67
 Wuch, 138-9, 167, 196
 Wylie, Lieut. H., 70
 Wylly, Colonel G. G. E., 185, 190, 193, 290
 Wynter, Lieut. C. P., 163, 174

 Yangi Khan, 219
 Yar, Jemadar Ahmad, 244
 Yar Husain, 18
 Yarkand, 277
 Yazur, 249
 Younghusband, Major-General Sir G. J., 123, 139, 149, 185, 187-90, 291, 294
 Ypres, 271-2
 "Y Road," 246
 Yusafabad, 220
 Yusafzai, 8, 18, 25, 31, 54, 122, 190, 278, 289, 292
 Yusafzai Plain, 155, 285-6
 Yuz Bashi Chai, 220

 Zab Desert, 219
 Zadai Nullah, 260
 Zagai, 175, 178
 Zaidulla, Sepoy, 100
 Zaidulla, Sowar, 111
 Zakha Narai, 57
 Zakha Pass, 57
 Zaman, Sepoy Nur, 189
 Zaman, Havildar Sher, 242
 Zamin Shah Ziarat, 288
 Zarbacha, 85
 Zarghun Khel, 21
 Zeriwam, 59
 Zerkiyeh, 235
 Ziarat, Sepoy, 57
 Zimmerin, 237
 Zinjan, 220
 Zormandai, 20

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
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
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